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We could hardly imagine the global economy the way it functions today, had it 
not been for ships and the shipping industry. Sea transport forms by far the largest 
share in international trade0F0F1 and its importance and volume have been constantly 
growing in the last century. Only in the period 2000-2010, world seaborne trade 
increased from 23 trillion to about 33 trillion ton-miles,1F1F2 to reach about 50 trillion ton-
miles in 2014, while steady growth was observed throughout all that period except for 
the years of 2008 and 2009, the latter attributable to the economic and financial turmoil 
at that time.2F2F3 In a nutshell, there is no other means of transport capable of moving 
immense quantities of cargo over great distances so efficiently and at such a low cost. 3F3F4 
The focus of the current academic thesis will be the legal and contractual 
obligations of a sea carrier relating to the care for the cargo. This subject deserves 
research and critical analysis for several reasons. To begin with, the practical 
importance of the duties to load, handle, stow, carry, keep, care for and discharge the 
goods carried should not be underestimated. Within the claim’s portfolio of a given P&I 
Club, the cargo claims form the biggest share. 4F4F5 On average, every year more than 30% of 
all claims involve cargo.5F5F6 These claims may be for loss, damage, shortage or misdelivery 
of the goods, and the most frequent causes appear to be structural or operational flaws, 
theft or negligence of the stevedores upon loading or discharging as well as poorly 
prepared holds or tanks. 
Furthermore, today’s complex shipping arrangements make it increasingly 
difficult to outline the sphere of obligations and responsibilities of a common ocean 
                                               
1 Nowadays about 90% of world trade is transported by sea. Source: International Maritime Organization 
(IMO), http://www.imo.org/ 
2 A unit measuring freight transportation (sometimes referred to as “transportation work”) equivalent to a 
ton of goods transported over one mile. Source UNCTAD secretariat. See ‘Review of Maritime Transport 
2011’, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 
http://unctad.org/en/docs/rmt2011ch1_en.pdf and ‘Review of Maritime Transport 2014’, United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationChapters/rmt2014ch1_en.pdf. The 
numeric notion “trillion” is employed here within the meaning of the short scale that is commonly applied 
nowadays both in the US and, since 1974, in the UK to designate a thousand billions (1012), where the latter 
stands for a thousand millions (109). Therefore, 50 trillion cargo ton-miles are to be understood as 50 000 
billion cargo ton-miles.  
3 The increase can be generally attributed to the ceaseless expansion of world population, increasing 
industrialization, liberalization of national economies as well as due to the emerging economies of developing 
countries. Last but not least, shipping is the most fuel-efficient and carbon-friendly form of transport. 
4 Cargo means any commodity (e.g. raw materials, products, foodstuffs, timber), which enters the 
transportation chain. 
5 A P&I Club represents an association of shipowners that have grouped together in order to insure each 
other’s third-party liability on a mutual and non-profit basis. Thus, a P&I Club is an insurance association 
which provides international marine insurance, best known as protection and indemnity (P&I) insurance. 
This third-party liability insurance is done through risk pooling, providing information and representation 
for the members of the Club, the latter being shipowners, vessel operators and demise charterers. In other 
words, the Club is on the shipowners’ side against third parties who bring claims to the P&I members. The 
P&I Club is different from a conventional insurance company, because all P&I clubs are a mutual, meaning 
that they identify themselves closer to their members’ interests, and are not driven by the profit motive. 
Where others insurance companies report to shareholders, P&I clubs report to their members. 
6 ‘Steamship Mutual’ report for over 30% share every year, while ‘UK P&I Club’ speak of 40%. 




carrier over the goods he carries on board. This stems from the number of parties and 
legal relationships involved in the process of carriage of goods by sea (e.g. carriers, 
shippers, charterers, sub-charterers, shipowners, operators, NVOCCs, freight 
forwarders, consignees, agents, sellers and buyers of the cargo), the various documents 
in which the contract of carriage is contained (bills of lading, sea waybills, voyage or time 
charter parties), and the multiplicity of legal regimes – the Hague Rules, Hague-Visby 
Rules, Hamburg Rules as well as national regimes. With regard to the latter problem, 
the current work will focus on the leading Convention regulating carriage of goods by sea 
– the Hague-Visby Rules. The presumable successor of the Convention – the Rotterdam 
Rules, will also be scrutinized in an effort to establish how this particular aspect of the 
carriage of goods by sea will change should the new regime ever comes in force. Thus, the 
similarities and differences between the Hague-Visby Rules (HVR) and the Rotterdam 
Rules (RR) in the area of the carrier’s duties over the cargo will be explored, in particular 
Article III(2) HVR and the relevant articles of Chapter 4 RR. In the maritime world 
there is a saying that a good knot will hold for years without unravelling. To this effect, 
the current research will also aim to establish whether the dated Hague-Visby Rules are 
capable of bridging the gaps between shipping law and commercial practice, or whether 
modernization of shipping law in the form of the Rotterdam Rules is justified from the 
perspective of the carrier’s cargo-related obligations. 
Although the interplay between duties and liabilities cannot be avoided, the scope 
of the current thesis will not go beyond the content of the contract of carriage, and in 
particular the obligations of one of the parties, the carrier, while it will set aside other 
major aspects of the contract of carriage such as conclusion of the contract (i.e. the issue 
of transport documents) or execution of the contract, which is related to liability and 
limitation of liability.6F6F7 Moreover, the subject matter is further narrowed down by 
focusing expressly on the cargo-related duties and leaving aside the other fundamental 
obligation of the carrier, which relates to the vessel, though reference will occasionally be 
made to the seaworthiness obligation as well, where this is deemed necessary. 
The thesis will be organized in five chapters. Firstly, an opening chapter (Chapter 
I) will serve as a theoretical background. It will introduce basic concepts in maritime 
law, which is intended to help even an unfamiliar reader to grasp the intricacies of those 
aspects of the carriage of goods by sea that will be dealt with in the subsequent chapters. 
Chapter II presents the legal framework of the carrier’s cargo-related obligations and the 
structural foundation of the thesis. It is shaped as a comparable analysis of the relevant 
provisions of the Hague-Visby Rules and the Rotterdam Rules, and attempts to establish 
what sphere of obligations is bestowed upon carriers by the applicable legal regime; what 
the essence of these obligations is; which party to the contract of carriage is responsible 
in case of short, damaged or lost cargo as well as at what point this responsibility arises 
and ceases. Then the focus shifts to particular subtleties seen in actual practice such as 
                                               
7 However, see Chapter II, section 1. Also, as regards carriage of goods on deck (Chapter IV), the discussion 
will inevitably involve also the subject of the conclusion of the contract, in particular the issue of a clean B/L 
or a claused B/L. In general, as regards the carrier’s obligation over the cargo, it should be noted that in 
some instances, a clear dividing line could not be made between the contents of the contract of carriage, on 






the incorporation of a FIOS clause 7F7F8 in the contract of carriage (Chapter III), the carriage 
of cargo on deck (Chapter IV), and the carriage of containerized cargo and the advance of 
containerization (Chapter V). Most of these carriage arrangements represent deviations 
from the carrier’s obligations under the Hague-Visby Rules and as such their 
interpretation may be accompanied with legal uncertainty. 
The larger purpose of the work is to define these particular aspects of the carriage 
of goods by sea and to analyze through critical thinking the problems which occur in the 
process of loading, handling, stowing, carrying, and discharging, and which often give 
rise to costly disputes. The study will be carried out through an analysis of the leading 
international liability regime as specific attention will be dedicated to English law but 
other legal systems, both common law and civil law countries, will also be carefully 
considered. Furthermore, the position taken by the Rotterdam Rules with regard to the 
problems discussed will also be analyzed. Although it seems that, in present day, the 
chances of the Rotterdam Rules to be ratified and to come into force are diminishing, the 
new Convention is of immense value from academic point of view. Its provisions offer a 
modern solution to all the problems discussed in the thesis and as such, they cannot be 
omitted. 
  
                                               
8 FIOS stands for Free In and Out Stowed. This clause, when incorporated in a contract of carriage, indicates 
that loading, stowage of cargo as well as unloading of cargo is free of expense to the shipowner. It is the 
shipper who bears the associated costs and risks. 








General Introduction to Bill of 
Lading Law 
Before embarking on the main question and starting ascertaining the law on the 
specific problems laid down in the current work, it is essential that we employ consistent 
terminology. In order to avoid discrepancies and ambiguity, the following remarks and 
comments should be made concerning the contract of carriage and the parties thereto. 8F8F1 
1. Parties to a contract of carriage 
It is paramount to outline the main parties that are involved in the carriage of 
goods by sea. Different parties have different rights and obligations and may be subject 
to a different liability regime. For example, the Hague-Visby Rules, which will be in the 
center of attention, have no application to any other parties but to those who are a party 
to the respective bill of lading contract, either where it was originally generated or where 
the contract subsequently came into existence by means of the transfer of the bill. 9F9F2 
First of all, when referring to a sea carrier, a distinction should be made between: 
- a “common carrier”10F10F3 is a business or agency which is available to the general public 
for transportation of people, goods or messages at reasonable rates and without 
discrimination. That is, a common carrier can render transportation services to any 
person and company provided that the carrier has been licensed or authorized by the 
respective regulatory body.11F11F4 This is the first general category of sea carriage, which 
is known as liner shipping. Liner services operate within strict schedules and have a 
fixed rotation of ports, where they call at preliminarily published dates. This type of 
services may include carriage of containers, bulk and break bulk 12F12F5 as well as RORO 13F13F6 
service. Voyages in the liner trade usually provide transportation to many different 
parties, meaning that there are numerous shippers. 
                                               
1 An official definition of these terms is listed in the “Transportation Expression” dictionary provided by the 
Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) on http://www.bts.gov/dictionary/index.xml 
2 Paul M. Bugden and Simone Lamont-Black – ‘Goods in Transit and Freight Forwarding’ (2nd edition), 
Thomas Reuters (1999), ISBN 978-1-84703-772-5, p. 340. 
3 This is a common law term, and its functional equivalent in civil law is a ‘public carrier’. 
4 For instance, a US common carrier must secure a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the 
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) and the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) in order to operate 
and render services. 
5 Bulk cargo is homogeneous cargo – such as grains, ores, oil, and coal – which is loaded and stowed 
unpackaged in the vessel’s holds. Break bulk cargo, on the other hand, represents non-containerized cargo 
that is packaged and shipped as individual pieces in a unit (may that be boxes, barrels, drums, pallets). Such 
cargoes often include items that are too big to be carried on a container and they vary from construction 
equipment to yachts and windmills. 
6 RORO (Roll-on/roll-off) vessels carry wheeled cargo, such as trucks, buses, automobiles and tractors, which 
are driven on and off the vessel on their own. 




- a “contract carrier”14F14F7 is a transport line that carries people or goods under a contract 
of carriage with one shipper or limited number of shippers as the carrier may refuse 
to transport goods for anyone else. This type of transportation does not serve the 
general public and is called tramp shipping or tramper. This is the other general 
category of sea transportation and it is more flexible than liner shipping as it needs 
not to adhere to a particular schedule. As the tramp service does not offer a fixed 
itinerary, it can be available on short notice and it can load, generally, any cargo 
from any port to any other port subject to the agreement between the parties. Tramp 
services mainly includes transportation on bulk and break bulk carriers. Typical for 
tramp shipping arrangements is the issuance of a charter party, through which a 
shipowner and a charterer arrange for the hire of the vessel for a particular journey 
or a period of time, although a liner ship can also be chartered. 15F15F8 
- a “private carrier” is a company rendering transport services for its own goods, 
usually on an irregular or ad hoc route. Thus, while common carriers and contract 
carriers provide transportation service to others, private carriers own the goods 
which they are transporting. One important feature is that the primary business of 
private carriers is actually not transportation, and the private carriage is merely 
intended to support other legitimate businesses of the operator. Private carriage is 
more common for road transportation and it is less used for water carriage. 
- a “freight forwarder”16F16F9 is an individual or a company which operates as an 
intermediary between shippers and carriers in the transportation chain, providing a 
wide range of important services 17F17F10 in order to facilitate the movement of goods. 
Freight forwarders usually receive small shipments – referred to as less-than-
carload (LCL) or less-than-truckload (LTL) – from shippers, after which they 
consolidate them and contract with a sea carrier for the transportation of the goods. 
A freight forwarder can, depending on the specific case, act as an agent of the 
shipper18F18F11, as an agent of the carrier, as an agent of an NVOCC19F19F12, and he may well 
contract for a carriage of goods as a principal, i.e. the freight forwarder being the 
contractual carrier vis-à-vis the shipper.20F20F13 
                                               
7 This type of a carrier is also called a ‘private carrier’ in UK English. A stipulation should be made that this 
common law distinction between contract/private and common/public carriers does not apply in civil law, and 
it is not known in the Hague-Visby Rules either. That is why the distinction does not play an important role 
in nowadays international laws regulating modern carriage of goods by sea. The Hague-Visby Rules may 
apply not only to common carriage, but also to tramp carriage as well, when a bill of lading is issued under a 
charter party or when the charter party contains a Clause Paramount. See Chapter II section 4.4 infra. 
8 Thomas J. Schoenbaum – ‘Admiralty and Maritime Law’ (5th edition), Thomas Reuters (2011), Volume 1, 
Chapter 10, p. 777 at § 10-3. 
9 This party is also called a ‘forwarding agent’ or ‘forwarder’. 
10 Freight forwarders can, inter alia, give advice on exporting costs and charges (freight costs, port charges, 
insurance costs); prepare and file the relevant documents accompanying the contract of carriage or the 
contract of sale between a seller and a buyer; arrange the processes of packing, loading and discharging the 
cargo; book the necessary space on board a sea vessel; ensure that cargo and transport documentation 
comply with customs regulation. 
11 Brennan International Transport Ltd and Anr v Blue Q Corporation and Another – High Court of New 
Zealand (Asher J) – 18 December 2008 – Lloyd’s Maritime Law Newsletter [2009] 761, p. 3. 
12 Owners of cargo formerly laden on board the “Bunga Mas Tiga” v Confreight Cargo Management Centre 
(Pty) Ltd – High Court of South Africa (Durban and Coast Local Division) (Theron J) – 28 September 2001 – 
Lloyd’s Maritime Law Newsletter [2002] 582, p. 4. 
13 Vastfame Camera Ltd v Birkart Globistics Ltd (The "Hyundai Federal") – High Court of Hong Kong SAR 
(Stone J) – 5 October 2005 – Lloyd’s Maritime Law Newsletter [2005] 677, p. 4. 




- a “non-vessel operating common carrier” (NVOCC) performs, in essence, almost the 
same activities as a freight forwarder as he is also an intermediary, who acts as a 
freight consolidator for smaller shipments. The NVOCC can, too, issue its own 
documents of title (e.g. a house bill of lading or a sea waybill) and thus he works in 
the same way as a shipping line but, unlike a freight forwarder, the NVOCC can be 
liable for loss, damage or shortage of the goods during the sea carriage. The NVOCC 
appears as a “carrier to shippers” (in the house bill of lading) and as a “shipper to 
carriers” (in the master’s bill of lading). Depending on the facts of the case, an 
NVOCC may be deemed an agent of the shipper 21F21F14 or an agent of the carrier. 
As seen above, the terminology differs depending on the specific jurisdiction 22F22F15 and 
also on the facts of the case. For instance, a contractual carrier under a bill of lading 
contract of carriage may not always be the actual carrier who performs the voyage. 23F23F16 
That is why, when the term “carrier” is employed in the present work, reference will be 
made, unless explicitly stated otherwise, to the definitions laid down in the international 
instruments governing the international carriage of goods by sea. Accordingly, Article I(a) 
of the Hague-Visby Rules provides that: 
‘Carrier’ includes the owner or the charterer [of the vessel] who enters 
into a contract of carriage with a shipper. 
Evidently, the definition envisages not only the shipowner of the vessel but also 
other parties including a charterer. For comparison, the definition laid down in Article 
1.5 of the Rotterdam Rules is even more straightforward: 
’Carrier’ means a person that enters into a contract of carriage with a 
shipper. 
Next, the “shipper” is generally the party that enters into a contract of carriage 
with the carrier and is named as such in the bill of lading.24F24F17 The shipper may well be a 
voyage or time charterer of the ship, and in the same time he may be the seller or the 
buyer of the goods in accordance with the underlying contract of sale. The shipper is the 
party that prepares the bill of lading and he is obliged to provide accurate information in 
it. Next, he hands the bill of lading to the master of the ship for signature. 
The “consignee” is the party who is entitled to delivery that is, the person to 
whom the cargo is to be delivered under the contract of carriage. 25F25F18 The consignee is 
named as such in the bill of lading, electronic transport record or another transport 
document, but it is not always the case that a specific name is entered in the consignee 
box in the bill of lading. Depending on the nature of the underlying sales transaction, the 
                                               
14 Hartford Fire Insurance Co v Novocargo USA Inc and Others (The "Pacific Senator") – US District Court 
(Southern District of New York) (William H. Pauley DJ) – Lloyd’s Law Reports [2002] Vol. 1, p. 485; Lloyd’s 
Maritime Law Newsletter [2004] 632, p. 2(2). 
15 For example, carriers in the US are required to treat freight forwarders and NVOCCs as shippers (Ocean 
Shipping Reform Act 1998, amending Shipping Act of 1984). 
16 For example, German maritime law distinguishes between a contractual carrier and an actual carrier. 
Whereas the former will enter into a contract of carriage with a shipper, the actual carriage may be carried 
out through via charterers (disponent owners) or sub-carriers employed by the contractual carrier, who are 
generally referred to as actual carriers. Under German maritime law, contractual and actual carriers are 
jointly and severally liable. See: Klaus Ramming – ‘German Transport Law and its Effects on Maritime Law’, 
27 International Business Law (July/August 1999), p. 323 at p. 325. 
17 See Article I(8) of the Rotterdam Rules. 
18 See Article I(11) of the Rotterdam Rules. 




bill of lading may provide for various possibilities as regards the party that has the right 
to receive or to control the receipt of the cargo.  
First, as stated, the consignee can be explicitly named in the bills of lading and in 
this case the bill can be physically passed from the shipper to the consignee (i.e. the bill 
is consigned to the consignee). The consignee has no right to further consign or endorse 
the bill of lading to any other party.26F26F19  
Secondly, the consignee box may contain the words “to order”. This allows the 
shipper to endorse the bill of lading, thus giving orders to whom the cargo is to be 
delivered. There can be two types of endorsement – it is either an endorsement in blank, 
which is the signature of the shipper on the back of the bill, thus allowing any person 
who holds the bill of lading to claim the cargo, or a special endorsement (“endorsement in 
full”), where the shipper puts his signature on the bill together with the name of the 
intended recipient of the bill. It is important to note that “to order” bills of lading when 
in the hands of a party to whom they have not been endorsed, neither in blank nor in 
full, does not entitle that party to receive the cargo, even when that party is the notify 
party under the bill of lading. 27F27F20 Accordingly, should a carrier release the goods against 
such bills, he will be liable for misdelivery. The dictum of Reyes J in a case before the 
Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal clearly states that “the [bill of lading] contract is to 
deliver, on production of the bill of lading, to the person entitled under the bill of 
lading”.28F28F21 That is, a sole presentation of the bill of lading might be insufficient to justify 
a release of the goods if the party presenting the bill is not entitled to the goods in 
accordance with the terms and conditions therein. 
The third possibility for entitling a party to receive the goods in a bill of lading is 
a mixture of the first two – i.e. the consignee box contains the words “to order” and also 
the name of a specific consignee. In this scenario, the bill can be physically passed to the 
named consignee as described in the first example. However, here the words ‘to order’ 
allow the consignee to further endorse the bill of lading either by an endorsement in 
blank or by a special endorsement to a third party. That third party then cannot 
anymore endorse the bill of lading. 29F29F22  
Fourthly, the consignee box may contain the words “bearer” or “holder”, or it can 
be simply left blank. In this case, the holder of the bill of lading is the party entitled to 
delivery of the cargo. The bill of lading can simply be consigned (that is, physically 
passed) from one party to another. 
The “cargo owner” is the party whose interest in the cargo entitles him to sue 
under the contract of carriage for goods that have been lost or damaged. As the cargo 
may be sold and resold several times during the contractual voyage, the cargo owner 
prior to and in the beginning of the voyage may well not be the same party as at the end 
of the voyage. 
                                               
19 That is why such bills of lading are called a ‘straight’ bill of lading or a ‘non-negotiable’ bill of lading. 
20 Charmax Trading Ltd v WT Sea Air Asia Ltd and Another – High Court of Hong Kong SAR (Reyes J) – 1 
December 2009 – Lloyd’s Maritime Law Newsletter [2010] 787, p. 1. 
21 Charmax Trading Ltd v WT Sea Air Asia Ltd and Another – High Court of Hong Kong SAR (Reyes J) – 1 
December 2009 – Lloyd’s Maritime Law Newsletter [2010] 787, p. 1 
22 An exceptional case is when the consignee endorses the bill of lading to a third party by way of a special 
endorsement which consists of the words ‘to order’ coupled with the name of the third party. In this 
particular case the third party, having become the proper owner of the bill of lading, can further endorse it. 




Having ascertained the status of the main parties involved in the carriage of 
goods by sea, it is worth having a look at the essence of the underlying contract. The 
contract for the international carriage of goods by sea requires the presence of an 
international element – that is, the transportation should commence in one country and 
end in another.30F30F23 This process involves implications of a private international law as well 
as of a public international law character. 31F31F24 
2. Types of contracts of carriage 
A contract of carriage is a contract for the carriage of goods between two parties – 
a carrier and a shipper (a consignor or consignee). The definition of a contract of carriage 
varies depending on the international liability regime in which it is found. For example, 
the Hague-Visby Rules state that “[a] ’contract of carriage’ applies only to contracts of 
carriage covered by a bill of lading or any similar document of title, in so far as such 
document relates to the carriage of goods by water, including any bill of lading or any 
similar document as aforesaid issued under or pursuant to a charter-party from the 
moment at which such bill of lading or similar document of title regulates the relations 
between a carrier and a holder of the same”.32F32F25 This definition refers to the document that 
is issued under a contract of carriage and for this reason the Rules are said to have 
adopted a documentary approach to contracts of carriage. 33F33F26 On the other hand, the 
Rotterdam Rules provide a definition which describes the obligation of the carrier to 
carry goods from one place to another, which may include carriage by more than one 
mode: “[a] ’contract of carriage’ means a contract in which a carrier, against the payment 
of freight, undertakes to carry goods from one place to another. The contract shall provide 
for carriage by sea and may provide for carriage by other modes of transport in addition 
to the sea carriage.”34F34F27 
There are two main types of a contract of carriage, which regulate the rights and 
liabilities of the shipowner, charterer and shipper. Depending on how the ship is 
employed, the contract may be evidenced by and contained in the bill of lading 
(abbreviated as B/L), or it may be contained in a charter party. Because of the negotiable 
character of the bill of lading, third parties’ rights and liabilities may also be affected 
although these parties do not taken part in negotiating and drafting the maritime bill. 
                                               
23 For the definition of ‘international carriage’, see Article 1.9 of the Athens Convention Relating to the 
Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea, 2002: “any carriage in which, according to the contract of 
carriage, the place of departure and the place of destination are situated in two different States, or in a single 
State if, according to the contract of carriage or the scheduled itinerary, there is an intermediate port of call in 
another State” 
24 On the one hand, the legal relationship between carriers and their clients (cargo owners, shippers, 
charterers, freight forwarders) is contained in the contract of carriage and in related legal institutes such as 
marine insurance and general average; on the other hand, international conventions, treaties and customs 
on sea carriage of goods delineate the legal framework governing the relationship between the parties. 
25 The Hague-Visby Rules, Article I(b). 
26 Francesco Berlingieri – ‘A Comparative Analysis of the Hague-Visby Rules, the Hamburg Rules and the 
Rotterdam Rules’, a paper delivered at the General Assembly of the AMD in Marrakesh on November 5-6, 
2009, p. 2: 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/workinggroups/wg_3/Berlingieri_paper_comparing_RR_Hamb_HVR.pdf 
27 The Rotterdam Rules, Article 1.1. 




2.1 Bill of lading contract of carriage 
2.1.1 General 
The contract contained in and evidenced by the bill of lading (B/L; BOL) is a real 
contract. This means that, unlike consensual contracts, there should be something more 
than mere consent between the parties in order to trigger the contract. Thus, when the 
shipper delivers the cargo to the carrier and the latter accepts it, the contract starts 
operating. Yet, the contract of carriage is always concluded before the issue of the bill of 
lading.35F35F28 
It has become increasingly common for shippers to draft their own bills of lading 
and present them to the carrier for signature. The bills are usually signed by the master 
of the ship or the carrier’s agents. A bill of lading is issued and dated only after the 
entire cargo covered thereby has been loaded on board the vessel. 36F36F29 If a mate’s receipt or 
a tally clerk’s receipt has been issued beforehand to the shipper, then the carrier delivers 
the bill of lading to the shipper in exchange for that receipt. In general, once the bill of 
lading has been duly signed by the master and thus issued by the carrier to the shipper, 
the bill is then transferred to the receiver of the goods, either by endorsement or a 
simple consignment. When the vessel carrying the cargo reaches the port of discharge, 
the receiver of the goods, who is either a consignee or the shipper himself, must present 
the bill to the carrier, which will entitle the former to receive the goods stated therein. 
2.1.2 Three main functions of the bill of lading 
When discussing the bill of lading as an evidence of the contract of carriage, it 
should be underlined that this shipping document serves and combines three separate 
and essential functions. 
First, it serves as a receipt which evidences that the cargo has been received by 
the carrier and also provides information about the goods loaded on-board such as their 
nature, leading marks, number of packages or pieces, quantity, weight, and apparent 
order and condition.37F37F30 This function is codified in Article III rule 3 and rule 4, which are 
discussed below in section 4.1 of Chapter II. The evidentiary value of a bill of lading, 
being a receipt, is a very important issue to carriers when they try to escape liability for 
damaged or lost cargo. For the purpose of the current academic thesis, it is noteworthy to 
distinguish the evidentiary role of the bill of lading as a receipt as opposed to that of a 
bill of lading as a contract of carriage. The facts in the bill of lading, as a receipt, may be 
altered and corrected by extrinsic evidence if, for example, there is a clerical error. This 
is not the case, however, with the terms of the bill of lading in its role of a contract of 
                                               
28 Pyrene Company Ltd. v Scindia Steam Navigation Company Ltd. – Queen’s Bench Division (Devlin J) – 
Lloyd’s Law Reports [1954] Vol. 1, p. 321 at p. 329: “The use of the word “covered” [in Art. I (b) of the 
Hague(Visby) Rules] recognizes the fact that the contract of carriage is always concluded before the bill of 
lading, which evidences its terms, is actually issued. When parties enter into a contract of carriage in the 
expectation that a bill of lading will be issued to cover it, they enter into it upon those terms which they know 
or expect the bill of lading to contain.” 
29 Sir Thomas Edward Scrutton, Stewart C. Boyd, Andrew S. Burrows, David Foxton – ‘Scrutton on 
Charterparties and Bills of Lading’, 20th edition, Sweet & Maxwell (1996), ISBN-10: 0421525800. 
30 Historically, the bill of lading originates as a receipt and the earliest bills of lading did not have 
contractual functions. The other two functions developed throughout the years. 




carriage, because it is considered the final written agreement between the parties. This 
difference is exemplified infra in Chapter IV on the carriage of goods on deck. 38F38F31 
Secondly, the bill of lading represents a document of title to the cargo being 
shipped. Although there is no universal definition of a document of title, this phrase 
characterizes the bill of lading as a document being capable of transferring constructive 
possession over the goods while they are in the temporary physical possession of a bailee 
(in the case of maritime shipping, the carrier). The transfer of constructive possession 
takes place upon endorsing or consigning the bill to a third party, which stems from the 
document’s feature to be negotiable, i.e. transferable. 39F39F32 After the pivotal case The 
“Rafaela S” 40F40F33, even non-negotiable bills of lading, also known as straight bills of lading in 
the sense that they are not endorsed to third parties but are consigned to a specified 
person, are considered a document of title, too. 
Thirdly, the bill of lading evidences and contains the contract of carriage. The bill 
of lading is not the contract of carriage, as most often bills are issued after the contract 
has been made, but it is said to be the best evidence of the contract of carriage. 41F41F34 When 
the contract contained in the bill of lading or evidenced thereby is accomplished, the bill 
becomes a spent bill of lading. It is necessary, however, not solely the bill to be 
surrendered by the consignee to the carrier for the bill to become a spent bill of lading, 
but the contract should be fully discharged by both sides and no obligations should be 
left pending.42F42F35 A typical bill of lading contains a significant number of contractual terms 
and conditions of carriage, which are traditionally situated on the front of the bill of 
lading. This first page, containing the Terms and Conditions of the Carrier, is commonly 
referred to as the “back of the bill of lading”. The reverse page of the bill contains 
particulars such as the name of the shipper, the consignee, and the notify party; the 
                                               
31 Under a clean bill of lading it is not admissible to prove a preceding agreement between a carrier and the 
cargo interests that the goods may be carried on deck regardless of other evidence. However, a clean bill of 
lading does not preclude a party from evidencing that there is an accepted custom to carry on-deck in a 
particular trade. See Chapter IV, section 3. 
32 The term ‘transferrable’, as opposed to ‘negotiable’, may be considered the technically more correct term. 
Yet, ‘negotiable’ has been established as an international term when it comes to bills of lading. This was 
recognized also in the travaux préparatoires of the Rotterdam Rules. See UNCITRAL Document 
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.21 – Working Group III (Transport Law), 9th session (New York, 15-26 April 2002) 
Transport Law – Preliminary draft instrument on the carriage of gods by sea, Annex, para 13: “The use of 
the word “negotiable” has been much discussed, and it is undoubtedly true that in some countries the use of 
the word is not technically correct when applied to a bill of lading. One may consider to use the word 
“transferable” as being more neutral. The draft instrument uses the expression “negotiable” on the grounds 
that even if in some legal systems inaccurate, it is well understood internationally (as is evidenced by the use 
of the word “non-negotiable” in article VI of the Hague Rules), and that a change of nomenclature might 
encourage a belief that a change of substance was intended.” Under the Rotterdam Rules, however, the 
problem of negotiability (i.e. whether the transferee gets better title over the goods than the transferor) is 
not addressed and this issue is left to national law. Thus, whereas under English law the transferee of the 
bill cannot obtain better title over the goods than the title that the transferor had (therefore the term 
transferable is more appropriate than negotiable), under German law, for example, the term negotiable is 
not that misleading as the parties can indeed negotiate so that the transferee may receive a better title over 
the goods than the transferor had. See: Felix Sparka – ‘Jurisdiction and Arbitration Clauses in Maritime 
Transport Documents’, Hamburg Studies on Maritime Affairs, Vol. 19, p. 47-48. 
33J. I. MacWilliam Company Inc v. Mediterranean Shipping Company S.A. (The “Rafaela S”), Lloyd’s Law 
Reports [2002] Vol. 2, p. 403; Lloyd’s Law Reports [2003] Vol. 2, p. 113; Lloyd’s  Law Reports [2005] Vol. 1, p. 
347.   
34 See, for example, The “Kapitan Petko Voivoda” [2003] 2 Lloyd’s Law Reports 1, where the contract of 
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name of the vessel, the carrier, the master as well as the ports of loading and discharge; 
description of the cargo, and payable or paid freight. 43F43F36 Whereas between a carrier and a 
shipper the bill of lading itself provides a prima facie evidence of the terms of the 
contract of carriage along with other sources of evidence such as the booking notes and 
the correspondence between the parties, the bill becomes conclusive evidence of the 
contract as between the carrier and a bona fide endorsee of the bill.44F44F37 
In other words, a bill of lading represents (1) evidence that the goods have been 
shipped; (2) evidence that its holder has the right to claim possession of the goods and, in 
certain circumstances, have the property in them; and (3) evidence of the terms and 
conditions of the contract of carriage. 
2.1.3 Essence of the bill of lading 
Since the bargaining power between the parties to a bill of lading is unequal, bill 
of lading contracts are statutorily regulated. The natural result is that freedom of 
contract is restricted, and this is achieved on a worldwide level through international 
conventions. The Hague-Visby Rules45F45F38 is the most widespread legal regime as it is in 
force in most of the world shipping nations. These Rules apply in three instances: firstly, 
when the bill of lading is issued in a contracting state; secondly, when the carriage is 
from a port in a contracting state; and, thirdly, when the particular bill of lading 
contract contains a Clause Paramount, specifying that the contract will be governed by 
these Rules or by a national legislation implementing them.46F46F39 In the first two instances, 
the Rules apply mandatorily, namely by force of law whereas in the third instance the 
Rules apply voluntarily. The division between instances, where the rules apply ex 
proprio vigore, and instances where they are incorporated, is explained by the different 
effect that will be derived on the operation of the Rules, or on the legislation giving effect 
to them. Courts often apply the “contract approach” towards the Rules when the latter 
are incorporated and, thus, render them merely equal to contractual provisions. 47F47F40 In this 
case it will be the construction of the contract of carriage on the whole, which will be 
decisive of whether the incorporated Rules will prevail over the inconsistent contract 
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terms.48F48F41 In other words, when the Hague-Visby Rules are incorporated in a bill of lading 
or in a charter party, they will represent just an additional term of the bill (or the 
charter party, respectively) that is, the Rules will not operate as statutory provisions and 
will not have an overriding character in relation to the other terms and clauses in the 
contract of carriage, which will otherwise be the case if the Rules apply mandatorily by 
force of law.49F49F42 When it comes to incorporation of the Rules to a bill of lading, however, 
English law expressly gives them the force of law in all three instances. 50F50F43 
2.1.4 Other transport documents 
Further characteristics of the bill of lading as a shipping document may be 
derived by comparing it to other instruments. Depending on the type of trade, the parties 
to a contract of carriage may issue similar shipping documents, such as receipts, sea 
waybills, delivery orders, and booking notes, whose functions correspond better to the 
relevant commercial needs than the bill of lading. Some of the functions of these 
documents are duplicated, while others differ. In practice, trading parties normally 
select the document corresponding most to their kind of trade. 
The “mate’s receipt”, as the name suggests, is a mere receipt. As such, it neither 
evidences the contract, nor is it a document of title. Historically, mate’s receipts used to 
be issued by the chief mate, but nowadays they can be issued by other officers on board 
the vessel as well. The mate’s receipt evidences that the carrier has taken possession of 
the goods. That is why the information it contains about the cargo is based on a ship’s 
tally or measurement and not on the shipping note that accompanies the goods. The 
mate’s receipt is an interim document as it serves as a basis for the preparation of the 
bill of lading on behalf of the shipper. When the carrier dates and signs the bill of lading, 
he requires that the shipper returns the mate’s receipt in exchange if such has been 
issued. 
The “sea waybill” identifies the person to whom the carrier has to deliver the 
cargo, and as a result the consignee is not required to produce the waybill to the carrier 
in order to receive the goods covered thereby. All he has to do in order to obtain delivery 
of the goods is just present identification. That is why the sea waybill is normally issued 
for cargo that is not likely to be resold while afloat (i.e. the container trade), which 
suggests that the consignee remains invariable from the beginning until the end of the 
contractual voyage. The usage of a sea waybill also solves the problems associated with 
the cargo arriving at the port of discharge before the bills of lading. In this particular 
scenario the carrier cannot deliver the goods without production of a bill of lading on 
behalf of the receiving party, and this may cause considerable delays, extra costs and 
port congestion. Such a problem may occur on short-distance routes like, for example, in 
the North Sea or the Baltic Sea. The sea waybill solves this problem. It evidences the 
contract of carriage and operates as a receipt for the cargo loaded, but it is not a 
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document of title and cannot transfer constructive possession in the goods. 51F51F44 Therefore, 
the issue of a sea waybill will not trigger the application of the Hague-Visby Rules, 
which apply only to “a bill of lading or any similar document of title”.52F52F45 In essence, the 
sea waybill is broadly similar to a straight (non-negotiable) bill of lading, in the sense 
that it is not transferable, with the exception that the straight bill of lading must be 
presented by the consignee in exchange for the goods at the port of discharge. Another 
difference between the sea waybill and the straight bill of lading is that the latter, being 
a document of title, is a bill of lading within the meaning of the Hague-Visby Rules.53F53F46 
Lastly, an important characteristic of the sea waybill is that a shipper may vary the 
delivery instructions to the carrier at any given moment during the carriage. 
The issuing of another shipping instrument, the “delivery order”, is necessitated 
when bulk cargo under a bill of lading has to be sold by the seller, or re-sold by the buyer 
(who would be the consignee in that bill of lading), to several buyers in different 
quantities or weight. In this case, the bill of lading covers the bulk cargo as a single 
consignment, and in order for that consignment to be divided in portions among the new 
buyers, the underlying contract of sale may provide for the issuance of delivery orders. 
The delivery order does not assume any of the three characteristics of the bill of lading – 
it is not a receipt, it does not have contractual and evidential character, and it is not a 
document of title. Instead, it contains instructions as to the delivery of the cargo. 54F54F47 These 
instructions may generally be of two types: instructions by the seller or consignee to his 
agents at the discharge port and instructions by the seller/consignee to the carrier. The 
first type is called ‘merchant’s delivery order’ while the second type is called ‘ship’s 
delivery order’. Although they are both non-transferable,55F55F48 the latter has functions that 
are closer in nature to bills of lading, for ship’s delivery orders contain the carrier’s 
signature and, thus, his consent to undertake to deliver the respective portion of the 
cargo to the named holder of the delivery order. 56F56F49 By putting his signature on the 
delivery order, the carrier undertakes to fulfill the delivery order and acknowledges its 
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new holder as a consignee, which also makes the delivery order capable of transferring 
constructive possession to its holder over that part of the cargo that is covered thereby. 57F57F50 
2.1.5 Bills of lading under charter parties 
In addition, it may often be the case, in fact more often than not, that a bill of 
lading incorporates some or all of the contractual terms set in a charter party. This is 
done with the intention to prevent the bill of lading to vitiate or abrogate some or all of 
the shipowner’s right and liabilities that are set in the charter party. Another reason is 
that charter parties usually contain extended contract provisions, the so-called “rider 
clauses” and it would be impractical to include all these in the bill of lading. Instead they 
can be incorporated in the bill. The incorporation, however, must take place expressly 
through an incorporation clause laid down in the bill of lading so that the bill of lading 
holder, usually the consignee, is familiar with the terms to which he agrees when buying 
the negotiable instrument (i.e. the bill of lading). If this condition is met, the bill of 
lading functions as a receipt and a document of title, whereas the actual contract of 
carriage is contained in the charter party. 
In this regard, of considerable importance are the rights of a third party in the 
particular case when that party becomes a holder, and thus a party to a bill of lading 
which incorporates a charter party agreement whose clauses may entitle the shipowner, 
for example, to have a lien over the cargo as a security for the freight and other amounts 
due to him under the charter party. Unless the bill of lading clearly and unequivocally 
refers to the relevant lien provision in the charter party, the term is not considered 
negotiated to this third party and, therefore, the shipowner cannot assert his right to 
detain the cargo against the bill of lading holder. 58F58F51 For a provision to be validly 
incorporated in the contractual relationship between a carrier and a bill of lading holder, 
it is decisive whether these two parties intended and agreed to be bound by such a 
provision found in another document. 59F59F52 This discussion is also very relevant to the 
problems analyzed in Chapter III on the FIOS(T) clause. 
Besides the lien clause and the FIOS(T) clause, charter party provisions relating 
to the payment of freight and clauses regarding law and arbitration are also among the 
most likely candidates to be incorporated in a bill of lading. In the dictum of the court in 
The “Mariana” case,60F60F53 a charter party arbitration clause is deemed incorporated in the 
bill of lading in either one of the two categories of cases. The first category includes cases 
which meet the following three conditions: the bill of lading specifically refers to the 
charter party arbitration clause; the arbitration clause makes sense in the context of the 
bill of lading; the arbitration clause does not conflict with the terms of the bill of lading. 
The second category of cases are related to bills of lading which incorporate the terms of 
the charter party generally, while there is no specific reference to the arbitration clause. 
In these cases, the charter party arbitration clause itself or some other provision should 
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make it clear that the arbitration clause found in the charter party is to govern bill of 
lading disputes as well. 
An uncertain situation arises where the vessel is sub-chartered and it is not 
specified in the bill of lading which of the charter parties along the chain is the one 
incorporated. The rule of thumb is that the parties intended to incorporate the head 
charter party rather than a sub-charter party as there is a preference in the authorities 
to maintain the position that a general reference to a charter party should relate to the 
charter party contract, to which the shipowner, who issues the bills of lading, is a 
party.61F61F54 
However, courts do not apply this rule invariably. In the case The “Vinson”62F62F55, the 
vessel’s owners Quark entered into an “Eco Pool Vessel Contribution Agreement 1999” 
and, following the provisions of this agreement, time chartered their vessel to Eco 
Shipping Ltd. on an Ecotime 99 charter party, which contained a New York Arbitration 
clause. Eco Shipping Ltd. as owners further sub-chartered the vessel to Sunline 
Shipping Ltd. on a Baltime charter party, which included a London arbitration clause. 
Sunline Shipping Ltd. as time charterers contracted to perform a carriage of bananas 
and several bills of lading were issued by the master of the vessel on a Congenbill form. 
The front of the bills stated “Freight payable as per Charter-Party dated”, and Clause 1 
on the back read: “All terms and conditions, liberties and exceptions of the Charter 
Party, dated as overleaf, including the Law and Arbitration Clause, are herewith 
incorporated”. However, no date for the charter party was stated on any of the bills of 
lading, and when the bananas arrived in a damaged condition, the receivers brought 
arbitration proceedings against the shipowners in London, contending that clause 1 of 
the bills of lading referred to the Baltime charter party, namely the sub-charter. Quark 
contended that it was the head charter party that was incorporated into the bills of 
lading and, accordingly, that arbitration should have taken place in New York. Quark’s 
arguments were that the bills of lading were owners’ bills and that the shipowners were 
a party to the Ecotime charter and not to the Baltime charter. Eventually, the court 
ruled in favour of the receivers, that is, the unspecified charter party incorporated in the 
bills of lading was the Baltime charter which contained a London arbitration clause. 
Although the provisions of none of the charter parties were appropriate to be incorporate 
into the bills of lading, the Baltime charter was considered more closely related to the 
bills of lading. Decisive considerations for this ruling were a lien provision, which could 
be incorporated in the bills, and also a clause relating to the responsibility for delay. The 
court decided that these charter party provisions contributed to the bills of lading 
contract and, hence, that they made the Baltime charter party more appropriate to be 
incorporated. 
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This more recent approach is also found in The “Mariana”63F63F56 and it has adopted 
the view which was re-stated in ‘Scrutton on Charterparties and bills of lading’ (20th 
edition) that, on examining the facts, the intention of the parties can be to incorporate 
the sub-charter rather than the head charter. 64F64F57 
2.2 Charter party contract of carriage 
2.2.1 General 
The second type of a contract of carriage is the one contained in a charter party. 65F65F58 
The term “charter party” is derived from the Latin designation “carta partita” and 
reflects the old practice of drafting this shipping document. 66F66F59 The terms and conditions 
were written twice on two parts of a single sheet of paper, which was then torn into two 
duplicate sets – one for each party – and thus the existence of the contract could be 
evidenced by matching the two copies. Accordingly, the term “charter” signifies that the 
vessel was leased or granted, whereas the term “party” derived from the parting of the 
paper.67F67F60 
A charter party is noticeably different to the cargo-related transport documents 
mentioned above. To begin with, a charter party is, in essence, a contract for the hire of 
the vessel and it is focused not only on the carriage of the cargo but also on the vessel 
and the voyage that she takes on. This contract is usually arranged by a shipbroker, who 
operates on a commission basis and acts in a free market as a mediator between the 
charterer (who may be a shipper as well) and the shipowner (the actual carrier) of the 
vessel which will be hired to carry the shipper’s cargo. The two parties, the shipowner 
and the charterer, may be unfamiliar to each other. The process of chartering a vessel is 
called a “fixture” and once the vessel is chartered she is said to be “fixed”. In essence, a 
charter party will be concluded if the entire ship or a significant part of it is to be used 
for the transportation of the goods during a specified period of time, or for a specified 
voyage. 
The negotiations on a charter party usually circulate around the terms of a 
standard form of a charter party (e.g. Gencon, Graincon, Gentime, NYPE83) as the 
display of good faith is required from both sides. Although concluding a charter party is 
usually a swift process, there are three distinct stages during the negotiations. The first 
stage is referred to by authors as an indication stage, in which parties provide to each 
other indicative information which does not bind them. 68F68F61 The second stage is known as 
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the fixing stage where a “fixture” is achieved under the form of a pro forma contract. The 
“fixture” represents the meeting of the minds on the main terms of the charter party 
agreement between the party that is to use the service of the ship and the party that is 
to supply the ship. These may include, inter alia, the type of charter, the parties thereto, 
the duration of the agreement, the type and characteristics of the cargo that is to be 
carried, vessel characteristics, rates, etc. After the “fixture” has been made, the parties 
may continue their negotiations into the third stage – the detail stage – where terms 
that are considered to be of less importance are negotiated such as the speed of the 
vessel, the fuel use, arbitration and forum selection, and so on. 69F69F62 
2.2.2 Essence of the charter party agreement 
The charter party contract is a consensual contract, meaning that delivery and 
acceptance of the cargo are not necessary in order to trigger the contract. 70F70F63 The 
chartering agreement may be based on the charter party document but it may also stem 
from the general principles of contract law related to the formation of contract. Unlike 
bill of lading contracts, here it is the attained consent between the charterer and the 
shipowner on all essential terms which marks the beginning of a charter party contract 
unless the parties have agreed otherwise. 71F71F64 This consent may assume either a formal 
written form or an oral form as long as there is consideration and manifestation of offer 
and acceptance on behalf of the parties.72F72F65 Even if the final document is never signed, 
courts give effect to the intentions of the parties. 73F73F66 To sum up, charter parties are formed 
as soon as the traditional elements of a contract are attained: contracting parties, 
mutual assent manifested by an offer and acceptance, and consideration. This means 
that the charter party contract is concluded before any cargo is loaded on the vessel. 
A further fundamental distinction between charter party contracts and bills of 
lading contracts is that the former are not governed by statutory provisions (e.g. the 
Hague-Visby Rules) but are mostly subject to the general rules of contract law. 74F74F67 Thus, 
the charterer and the shipowner, not being limited by statutory provisions, have much 
more leeway to negotiate the terms and conditions in drafting the contract of carriage. 
The negotiations between these parties are in general influenced by the rules of supply 
and demand. There are practitioners, however, who are of the opinion that charter 
parties, too, should be subjected to mandatory legislation. 75F75F68 This is a standpoint, which 
is motivated by reasons such as the legislative protection of charterers, the need for 
uniformity between a charter party and a bill of lading, and the lack of logical distinction 
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between charters and bills of lading, considered both a contract of carriage. The first 
argument can easily be addressed with the fact that tramp shipping is not as tightly 
organized as liner shipping, and the charterer, who usually contracts to provide cargo for 
the entire ship or significant part of it, is in a much stronger bargaining position vis-à-
vis the shipowner compared to a single shipper vis-à-vis the carrier. The second goal, 
namely the pursue of uniform rules for both tramp shipping and liner shipping is 
nowadays unfeasible since even bill of lading contracts of carriage lack uniformity as 
there are three international sets of mandatory legislation that currently apply to them: 
the Hague Rules, the Hague-Visby Rules, and the Hamburg Rules. With regard to the 
third point raised, this introductory chapter of the thesis has brought forward fairly 
numerous features of the charterparty agreements which point to the conclusion that the 
latter are in many aspects distinct from bills of lading, and that it is not practicable to 
render parties to both types of contracts of carriage subject to the same level of 
legislative protection. Finally, it is not a coincidence that neither the international 
liability regimes that are currently in force, nor the Rotterdam Rules include charter 
parties in their scope of operation. Therefore, some of the problems addressed below in 
this study will generally not apply to charter parties unless similar issues arise in the 
context of a charterparty agreement (e.g. through a clause paramount). 
As stated above, charter parties are not subject to statutory provisions such as, 
for example, the Hague-Visby Rules or the Hamburg Rules. Article I(b) of the Hague-
Visby Rules expressly states that the Convention applies only to contracts of carriage 
covered by a bill of lading or any similar document of title. Similarly, the Rotterdam 
Rules in Article 6 exclude from its scope charter parties and other contracts for the use of 
a ship or of any space thereof. For this reason, international liability regimes are, 
generally, not applicable with regard to the relations between a shipowner and a 
charterer. Instead, charter parties are subject to the rules of contract law and, therefore, 
parties have better chance to negotiate the terms that would satisfy best their 
commercial needs. The rationale behind not exercising legislative control over charter 
parties lies in the far stronger bargaining position of the charterer vis-à-vis the 
shipowner as opposed to the position of the shipper vis-à-vis the shipowner. 
Theoretically, the two parties to a charter party contract may agree on any terms, and in 
that sense the carrier may contract out all of his duties pertaining to the carriage of 
goods. This freedom of contract, however, is not unlimited. Courts construe restrictively 
liability exclusion clauses, even where the literal reading of the terms suggests exclusion 
of carrier’s liability for any cause of loss or any damage (e.g. wording such as “however 
caused” and “or otherwise howsoever”). 76F76F69 
Charter parties never serve as receipts, nor do they represent documents of title 
as their commercial functions are different to those of bills of lading. In the case of a 
charter party contract, bills of lading will also be issued by the master to the charterer 
but here they will have no contractual power if the charter keeps the bill of lading and 
does not negotiate them – this will be the case when the charterers transports their own 
goods on the chartered vessel and do not procure transport service for third parties. 
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Therefore, the bills will serve only as a receipt and as a potential document of title over 
the goods carried. The reason is that the contractual relationship between the shipowner 
and the charterer is found in and regulated by the charter party. However, bills of lading 
that are issued under a charter party contract, if in the hands of a third party, will 
constitute a contract between the carrier (the shipowner or the charterer) and the 
relevant bona fide holder, who is normally either the shipper or the receiver of the goods. 
The reason is that it is the bill of lading, which regulates the relations between the 
carrier and the bill’s holder. 77F77F70 Thus, the underlying negotiable document will become a 
separate source of rights and obligations, which is independent from the charter party 
when in the hands of a third party holder. 
The underlying commercial purpose of a charterparty is clearly and neatly laid 
down by Saville, J. in The “Danah”: 
Under a contract of this kind the owners provide the services of their 
vessel to the charterers in order to enable the latter (either directly or 
through sub-charters) to engage in the business of carriage of goods 
by sea. Such a business is very likely indeed to involve making further 
contracts (usually contained in or evidenced by bills of lading) with 
third parties wishing to ship goods on the vessel; and such contracts 
are in turn likely to be made between the shippers and the owners 
through the agency of the charterers. 78F78F
71
 
2.2.3 Types of charter parties 
Depending on how the vessel will be employed by the charterer, there are two 
main types of charter parties. These are the voyage charter party and the time charter 
party.  
2.2.3.1 Voyage charter parties 
A voyage charter party will be used if the vessel is employed for one single 
journey. The start and end points of the journey do not necessarily have to be specific 
ports but they can be specified as regions as well. Thus, for example, in The “Rio Sun” 
the vessel was voyage chartered “from one safe port Egyptian Red Sea to a choice of 
discharging ports which included the European Mediterranean not east of, but including 
Greece, and the continent of Europe (Gibraltar-Hamburg range) [excluding the UK], and 
also Scandinavia and parts of the Far East”.79F79F72 
The most widespread voyage charter party is the Gencon, which is a BIMCO 
form80F80F73, whereas for particular trades there are specialized voyage charter forms such as 
the Polcovoy, Intertankvoy and the Abstankvoy. In principle, the voyage charterer is 
under the obligation to pay “freight” to the shipowner. This charge represents the price 
that has to be paid in order for certain amount of cargo to be carried on the vessel from 
one point to another. The freight rate generally depends on the size of the cargo, its 
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weight and form as well as on the distance between the port of shipment and the port of 
destination. The freight, however, may as well represent a lump sum, which is a fixed 
rate regardless of how much cargo is loaded on the vessel. The charterer will also have to 
load and unload the cargo within a specified limited period of time, which is called 
“laytime”.81F81F74 If this period of time is exceeded, the charterer will have to pay to the 
shipowner liquidated damages called “demurrage”. On the other hand, if the charterer 
manages to load the cargo before the provided laytime has expired, then he is awarded 
despatch (dispatch) money, which is a sum paid by the shipowner. In practice, the 
despatch money usually amounts to half of the demurrage rate. 82F82F75 
A problem may arise in determining the existence and amount of the demurrage, 
or of the despatch money, respectively, when the notice of readiness (NOR), which is 
usually required in a voyage charter party so as to trigger the start of the laytime, has 
turned out to be invalid when given at the port of discharge. The difficulty in this 
scenario lies in the uncertainty regarding when the relevant period – namely, the 
laytime giving rise to the owner’s rights to demurrage and to the charterer’s rights to 
dispatch money – should start counting. The authoritative decisions in the cases The 
“Mexico 1”83F83F76 and The “Agamemnon”84F84F77 support the view that when a NOR is required for 
the commencement of laytime, and when that notice was tendered in a manner which 
made it invalid, then it is not admissible that the notice be subsequently rendered 
effective or that there be a requirement for the notice to be waived once the vessel has 
started discharging. In The “Happy Day”85F85F78 Langley J explored the issue deeper and ruled 
that laytime shall commence on the first occasion on which it should have commenced 
had a valid notice of readiness has been tendered in accordance with the charter party. 
2.2.3.2 Time charter parties 
If a ship is chartered for a particular period of time, regardless of the number of 
voyages she embarks on, then a time charter party will be used. This is the second main 
type of a charter party, where a shipowner still operates his vessel but he receives 
instructions by the charterer. In literature, this is described as a situation where the 
shipowner retains the navigational control over the vessel, while the charterer acquires 
the commercial control over her. 
Chronologically, time charters were invented later than voyage charters and, 
although the majority of views uphold that they are contracts of carriage by sea, there 
are contentions that time charter parties rather represent a contract for the hire of the 
vessel, for once the ship is time chartered, the charterer is under no obligation 
whatsoever to perform a sea voyage but he may simply anchor her, however 
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commercially unsound this may be. 86F86F79 Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the charge that 
a time charterer will have to pay to the shipowner for using his ship is called “hire”, 
which may be a daily, weekly or monthly rental of the vessel. Instead of a demurrage 
clause, time charter parties usually contain an “off-hire” clause which does not provide 
for liquidated damages (demurrage) or despatch money but instead relieves the 
charterer from paying hire when the vessel is unable to serve her contractual purpose. 87F87F80 
Off-hire clauses, either printed or tailor-made, are not liquidated damages because the 
latter represent damages that are formulated in a clause upon formation of the contract 
and provide that the injured party will be duly afforded with a specified compensation 
should a specific breach occur, which in the case of voyage charter parties is late 
performance on behalf of the charterer. Conversely, when we talk about time charter 
parties, there is no need for a breach in order for an off-hire clause to be triggered. The 
sole purpose of this clause is to relieve the charterer from paying hire for a period of time 
during which the use of the vessel is compromised. 
Time charter parties are usually more extensive (for instance, more details will be 
provided on fuel consumption and speed) and contain more provisions than voyage 
charters as the former have to account for much more contingencies due to the longer 
period of the operation of the contract compared to a contract covering a single voyage. 
When bills of lading are issued under a time charter party a particular problem 
may arise with regard to determining the identity of the carrier. In other words, who is 
the carrier? Who is to be held responsible for damaged or lost cargo? These are questions 
which may often puzzle shippers or third-party bills of lading holders who want to file a 
claim. The problem is that in transportation under a time charter party, the carriage 
obligations are not allocated to either party but are rather shared between the 
shipowner and the time charterer because, as stated previously, while the owner 
possesses the navigational control over the vessel, he transfers the commercial control to 
the charterer. The default position, however, in common law and also in most 
international conventions and national legal systems is that only one party can be the 
carrier in a contract of carriage and this is either the shipowner or the charterer of the 
vessel.88F88F81 The situation is further exacerbated by two facts: first, very often the bill of 
lading is not clear enough as to the identity of the carrier, and, secondly, the Hague 
Rules and the Hague-Visby Rules provide for in Article I (a) that a carrier may well be 
either the shipowner or the charterer, leaving the cargo claimants with no indication 
which party is to be legally pursued. Resolving this puzzle is of utter importance for the 
claimants because suing the wrong party will not only result in inevitably increased 
legal costs but it may also eventually time-bar their claim.89F89F82 
In general, a time charterer may often operate as a carrier since the time 
charterer will be the party that is to make a contract with a shipper or several shippers. 
In this case, shippers will have the status of a consignor vis-à-vis the shipowner, 
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whereas they retain their status as shippers vis-à-vis the charterer.90F90F83 The commercial 
rationale behind this distinction is that under a time charter it is the charterer, and not 
the shipowner, the party who enters into an express contractual relationship with the 
shipper. Thus, the charterer may assume the status of a contracting carrier although the 
default position is actually that, unless there is evidence to the contrary, it is the 
shipowner who is the actual carrier and employer of the master, who signs the bills of 
lading, and of the crew. 91F91F84 In other words, the shipowner has been traditionally the party 
that is responsible for the cargo, as he owns the vessels that plays a central role in 
fulfilling the carrier’s obligations, but with the advent of vessel-chartering and the more 
complex shipping arrangements, the shipowner has been losing out to the charterer in 
terms of significance. 
However, none of the above should be perceived as a rule of thumb as practice has 
shown that a conflict may occur as to the identity of the contracting carrier under the bill 
of lading when goods are carried on a chartered vessel and the shipper or receiver is not 
a party to the charter. In the cases The “Flecha“ 92F92F85 and The “Starsin“93F93F86, the court reached 
two apparently contrasting decisions with regard to the same printed form of bills of 
lading, which were issued by the charterer and which contained an identity of carrier 
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84 It should be noted that if a “demise” clause or “identity of carrier” clause is included in the bill of lading, a 
time or voyage charterer will be considered an agent either of the shipowner or of the demise charterer as 
the case may be. This is, actually, the main difference between the two clauses – the identity of carrier 
clause will shift liability to the shipowner, whereas the demise clause will bound the demise charterer to be 
liable as a carrier. Thus, the time charterer will not be personally liable for short, damaged or lost cargo, and 
instead the shipowner (or the demise charterer) will be bound by this clause as a contractual carrier. One 
issue is that these two clauses are lurking on the back of the bill of lading, and they would normally not 
create much confusion if they merely confirmed what is mentioned on the face of the bill. The problem with 
the identity of carrier arises when the respective clauses contradict what it is stated in the signature box on 
the front side of the bill of lading. 
 The demise clause was drafted by Sir William McNair at the beginning of World War II in order to 
meet the necessities of the war when merchant fleet was controlled by the government, who chartered the 
vessels. However, nowadays the validity of the demise clause and the identity of carrier clause is highly 
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clause. In the first case, the bills of lading were held to be owner’s bills of lading, 
meaning that it was the shipowner who was considered a contractual carrier, whereas 
the second case reversed the decision reached in The “Flecha” and the bills were held to 
be charterer’s bills, meaning that the charterer was held liable as a contractual carrier. 94F94F87 
Thus, it is evident that case law is conflicting and does not offer a clear solution how to 
identify the defendant as the actual carrier. As Colman J points out in The “Starsin”, 
identifying the party that is to carry out the obligation of a carrier will be a matter of 
construction of the particular bill of lading as well as a question of assessment of the 
level of understanding of a reasonable person with regard to the clauses therein.95F95F88 To 
that regard, authors point to several factors to be taken into consideration when 
determining who the actual carrier is: the signature on the bill of lading, the heading on 
the face of the bill, the name of the vessel, and, finally, the presence or absence of an 
identity of carrier clause. 96F96F89 In The “Starsin” case, in particular, the front of the bill of 
lading was unequivocal that the contract of carriage was concluded with the time 
charterer, whereas the reverse contained a demise clause and an identity of carrier 
clause, which indicated that it was the owner who was the carrier. Because the 
indications on the face were so clear, the court preferred to ignore what was written on 
the back of the bill. It was decided that the signature on the bill should be given greater 
significance for the sake of commercial certainty and business common sense. 
2.2.3.3 Other types of charter parties 
For the sake of accuracy and comprehensiveness, it should be noted that besides 
the aforementioned two main forms of charter parties, there are others as well. The 
reason for having numerous types of charter parties is vested in the freedom which the 
parties have in negotiating and drafting their contract so that it fits their commercial 
needs.97F97F90 
 One hybrid form of a charter party is the “trip” charter, which is, in essence, a 
voyage charter that adapts some of the elements of the time charter. In particular, the 
trip charter covers a specific voyage, but instead of paying freight, the charterer pays 
hire for using the vessel for the time that it takes to transport the cargo from port of 
shipment to port of destination. This contractual form can be varied in cases when the 
port of discharge is a remote area and the carrier cannot ensure that he could contract 
for the carriage of other cargo on the way back. Therefore, the charterer may have to pay 
further hire until the vessel comes back to a certain trade area. 98F98F91 
The “slot” charter party is employed when cargo is to be carried on a container 
vessel. This type of a charter party represents an agreement between the vessel owner 
and a slot charterer. Slot chartering may be part of a vessel-sharing agreement – this is 
often referred to as an “alliance” or “consortium” between two or more carriers (either 
                                               
87 These cases also show that the analysis applied to identify the carrier is first and foremost involved with 
determining the party which issued the bill of lading to the cargo interests. 
88 Homburg Houtimport B.V. v. Agrosin Private Ltd. and Others (The “Starsin”) – Queen’s Bench Division 
(Commercial Court) (Colman J) – Lloyd’s Law Reports [2000] Vol. 1 at pp. 85-87 and p. 90: “The essential 
question is, however, in what sense could the shipper to whom the bill was originally issued be expected to 
have understood the words used.” 
89 Caslav Pejovic – ‘The Identity of Carrier Problem under Time Charters’, Journal of Maritime Law and 
Commerce, Vol 31, No. 3 (July 2000), p. 379 at p.394. 
90 John F. Wilson – ‘Carriage of Goods by Sea’, 7th edition, Longman (2010), ISBN-13:  9781408218938. 
91 John F. Wilson – ‘Carriage of Goods by Sea’, 7th edition, Longman (2010), ISBN-13:  9781408218938. 




shipowners, time charterers or bareboat charterers), who reserve a specific number of 
containers, or slots, on each other’s vessels, thus extending their regular service and 
reducing operating costs by pooling their capacity. Thereby, the slot charterer leases one 
or several slots on board of a container ship in accordance with the number of containers 
that he has to transport, as one slot accommodates a 20-foot container. However, some 
slot charter parties, such as the BIMCO’s SLOTHIRE Charter, 99F99F92 provide that it is the 
weight allocation but not the number of slots which determines the ultimate limits of the 
containers loaded aboard. Accordingly, if the stipulated total weight has been reached 
and there are still slots available, these latter slots will remain unused, although paid by 
the charterer. Nowadays, slot charters are very often used in the container trade and 
this is so because this chartering arrangement utilizes space on a container vessel more 
efficiently, which cuts operating costs. In the container trade, when container line 
operators enter into a reciprocal slot charter party, this contract is known as the “cross-
slot” charterparty. 
The charter parties mentioned so far represent the so called carriage charters, 
and this means that the shipowner and the charterer contract for the use of the carrying 
capacity of the vessel, and yet she is still manned and navigated by the crew of the 
shipowner. However, the two parties may also contract for a “demise” charter for a 
certain period of time or for a particular voyage. 100F100F93 This is technically not a contract of 
carriage but a lease of the ship per se, whereby the shipowner transfers to the charterer 
not only the carrying capacity of the vessel but also a possessory interest in her as well 
as a certain degree of control over her management and navigation. 101F101F94 With the 
shipowner having surrendered the possession and control of the vessel to the charterer, 
the latter becomes a pro hac vice owner of the vessel during the operation of the demise 
charter party, meaning that now he is vested with the responsibility to man and 
maintain the vessel. Thus, the pre-existing master and crew of the vessel are now 
considered employees of the demise charterer and as such they follow his orders. The 
vessel, however, may also be chartered without a master and crew and this type of 
demise charter is known as a “bareboat” or “net” charter.  
When a charterer, regardless of the type of a charter party employed, sub-
charters the vessel to a third party, the charterer is referred to as a disponent owner vis-
à-vis the sub-charterer. This is to be contrasted with the registered owner, known also as 
a beneficial owner of the vessel, who is the real owner of the ship. Once the vessel is 
chartered, the charterer obtains commercial control over the ship and can subsequently 
sub-charter her to other parties. This allows for a long chain of contractual relationships 
of chartering and then sub-chartering a vessel. These were the circumstances in The 




93 It may be noted that in legal literature the demise charter party is often classified as the third main type 
of a charter party along with the voyage and time charter. 
94 The temporary transfer of “possession, command, and navigation” of the ship from the shipowner to the 
charterer can indicate whether the charter party is a demise charter party or not. See: Robert Force, 
‘Admiralty and Maritime Law’, University of Michigan Library (2004), p. 43. Furthermore, when applying 
this test, the existing factual context has priority over what is written in the charter party, that is, a charter 
party may be held to be a demise charter notwithstanding the express “non-demise” clause incorporated 
therein. See: Samuel Williston, Richard A. Lord, ‘A treatise on the law of contracts’, Vol. 22 (4th edition), §58:6 
at p. 26. 




“Bremen Max”102F102F95 case, where the vessel was time chartered first to “Cosbulk” on an 
amended NYPE form103F103F96, after which she was sub-chartered under back-to-back charters104F 104F97 
to “Farenco”, who further sub-chartered her to “Daebo”, who in his turn sub-chartered 
her to “Norden”, who then sub-chartered her to “Deiulemar”, who had to ship dry cargo 
from Brazil to Bulgaria. In principle, this chain of chartering and sub-chartering can go 
even further as long as there is commercial interest in a party to sub-charter the vessel. 
Finally, a distinction should be made between a contract of affreightment (COA), 
on the one hand, and a charter party contract, on the other. Although contracts of 
affreightment in their essence resemble a voyage charter for a series of voyages, the COA 
is noticeably different than charter parties. Contracts of affreightment are aimed at the 
transportation of a fixed quantity of specified cargo by means of several regular voyages. 
Very often the contract is not limited to one particular vessel, but several ships may be 
employed to carry out the agreed number of shipments at pre-determined intervals as 
the freight is to be assessed on the basis of the total quantity of the cargo to be 
transported. These are, in general, long-term contracts and they are custom-made in 
order to satisfy the specific needs of the contracting parties. Hence, unlike charter 
parties, few standard contractual terms can be found in a COA. It is safe to conclude that 
a COA rather functions as a contractual “umbrella” of a series of individual voyage 
charter parties. 
COAs have to be viewed also in the context of the so called volume contracts, a 
term introduced by the new maritime plus convention the Rotterdam Rules, which have 
not entered into force yet. 105F105F98 Although volume contracts, being a revolutionary concept, 
have been subject to much debate and controversy, here only their comparison with 
COAs will be pointed out in line with the subject of this introductory chapter, which is 
limited to clarifying parties, terms, and notions. According to the definition in Article 
1.2, a volume contract is “a contract of carriage that provides for the carriage of a 
specified quantity of goods in a series of shipments during an agreed period of time 
[where] the specification of the quantity may include a minimum, a maximum or a 
certain range”.106F106F99 It appears that COAs under the Rotterdam Rules can be considered 
volume contracts and they can enjoy the same degree of freedom of contract. 
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cargoworthiness though); the shipper’s obligation to provide information, instructions and documents; the 
shipper’s obligations with regard to the carriage of dangerous goods; any liability arising from an intentional 
act or omission or recklessness. See Article 80 of the Rotterdam Rules. 








The Carrier’s Obligations over the 
Cargo under the Hague-Visby 
Rules and the Rotterdam Rules 
1. Introduction 
Each contract of carriage may be regarded as having three aspects: first, the 
conclusion of the contract, which is the issuance of transport documents and their effect 
on the legal relationship between the parties; secondly, the content of the contract, that 
is, the obligations of the parties to the contract; and thirdly, the execution of the 
contract, which is related to its performance, liability and limitation of liability.107F107F1 The 
current academic thesis will focus on the second element of a contract of carriage and, in 
particular, on the obligations of the carrier over the cargo. The provisions regulating 
these duties are of fundamental importance to any liability regime governing carriage of 
goods by sea, because these provisions are inextricably linked to the liability of the 
carrier. In both international liability regimes, which will be considered closely in this 
chapter, the obligations of the carrier are defined as positive duties, the breach of which 
leads to the liability of the carrier. 108F108F2 Although the carrier’s obligations and the carrier’s 
liability are matters that are closely interrelated, topics such as the liability or the 
limitation of liability stand outside the scope of the current thesis as the focus of the 
research will be on the legal framework of the carrier’s obligations over the cargo per se 
under a contract of carriage.  
Furthermore, although reference will occasionally be made also to the duties of 
the carrier vis-à-vis the vessel, the focal point will be aimed at the carrier’s duties with 
regard to exercising care for the cargo. Particular attention will be devoted on how these 
duties are formulated, whether codified or forged by means of the extensive case law; 
what is their content and nature; how they impact on the evidentiary burden and 
sequence, namely the burden of proof; and when and under what circumstances carriers 
can be entitled to exceptions from these cargo-related obligations.109F109F3 
                                               
1 Philippe Delebecque – ‘Obligations of the Carrier’, published in: ‘The Rotterdam Rules 2008: Commentary to 
the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea’ 
/ ed. Alexander von Ziegler, Johan Schelin, Stefano Zunarelli, Alphen aan den Rijn : Kluwer Law 
International (2010), ISBN9789041131485, at p. 71. 
2 The Hamburg Rules, on the other hand, adopted a different model, upon which the carrier’s obligations are 
implied under the general provision on liability. 
3 The terms “obligations” and “duties” are used interchangeably hereafter. 




However, it should be noted that, where the Rotterdam Rules actively promote 
the expression “obligations of the carrier” 110F110F4 and draw a clearer line between obligations 
and liability, the Hague-Visby Rules do not consider the dichotomy between the two 
concepts so vividly and, hence, the issue of liability cannot be excluded altogether from 
the current analysis. Equally important is that under both the Hague-Visby Rules and 
the Rotterdam Rules, the obligations (Article III (1) and (2) under the HVR and Chapter 
4 under RR, respectively) and the respective liability (Article IV under the HVR and 
Chapter 5 under RR, respectively) are interrelated and cannot operate separately. 111F111F5 
2. The evolving law of the carriage of goods by sea 
Today’s shipping law, and in particular the carrier’s obligations and liability, have 
been influenced by two major factors. The first one is the major alteration of the 
economic and technical state of seafaring, and it took place in mid-19th century. This, in 
its turn, triggered the other factor – the international development of laws regulating 
the shipment of goods by means of merchant vessels. 112F112F6 In the past ships were 
considerably smaller and with limited cargo space, which allowed less goods to be 
transported in a single voyage. On the other hand, there was much more proximity 
between cargo owners and shipowners, which facilitated the control over the cargo-
related operations. However, when the technical and engineering progress in the late 
19th and early 20th century made it possible for bigger vessels equipped with steam 
engines and steel hulls, then the amount of cargo carried in the holds increased while 
the close proximity between the two parties started to slightly fade away, also because of 
the increasing number of other parties involved in the process of sea carriage (e.g. 
agents, intermediaries, banks, insurers).113F113F7 
Furthermore, immediately after the end of World War I, there was a tremendous 
increase in international trade and most of it was carried by sea. The hostilities in 
international waters ceased in 1918, which was followed by a rapid growth in 
international commerce, in which the bill of lading started to play an ever more 
important role.114F114F8 
In the beginning of the 20th century, the international community became aware 
of the need for an international regime to regulate world sea trade and to strike a 
balance between the far stronger bargaining positions of carriers and those of shippers. 
Although the former were less numerous in numbers, they were much better organized 
than the latter. The legal relationship between carriers and shippers was, thus, far from 
being just a simple contract between equal contracting parties that were completely free 
                                               
4 See the Rotterdam Rules, Chapter 4. 
5 Alexander Von Ziegler – ‘The Liability of the Contracting Carrier’, Texas International Law Journal, Vol. 
44, Spring 2009, p. 329 at p.332. 
6 Божидар Христов – „Отговорност на морския превозвач при контейнерните превози“, Библиотека 
„Българска търговско-промишлена палата“ (БТТП), София (1977), сигнатура №105, стр. 4-5. [Bozhidar 
Hristov – ‘The Responsibility of the Sea Carrier in Containerized Shipments’, issued by the Library to the 
Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (BCCI), Sofia (1977), signature №105, pp. 4-5.] 
7 This was when the bill of lading as a shipping document gained more functions and turned from a mere 
receipt into a document of title and an evidence of the contract of carriage. See: Chapter I, section 2.1.2. 
8 W. E. Astle – ‘Shipping and the Law’, Fairplay Publications (1980), at pp. 1-2. 
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to negotiate but, to the contrary, there was uneven negotiating power. The statutory 
restriction of the freedom of contract in the relationship between these two parties was 
thus deemed necessary in order to prevent shipowners from abusing their superior 
bargaining power. However, it was not an easy task to achieve harmonization and 
uniformity with regard to both allocation of risks and protection of potentially weaker 
parties in the process of negotiating the conditions of carriage. This is mostly due to the 
fact that political consent is required between ship-operating countries and shipping 
countries.115F115F9 What renders the whole harmonization process even more complicated is that 
there are two sides to the coin when it comes to balancing the commercial interests of 
carriers and shippers. On the one hand, the notion of fairness would suggest that carrier 
interests and cargo interests should be equal but, on the other hand, every increase in 
the liability of carriers normally results in increased freight rate. At the end of the day, 
increased shipping freight rates will have an overall negative impact on international 
trade, because they will affect manufacturers, exporters, importers, consumers and, 
eventually, the entire society.116F116F10 In other words, equity and efficiency do not always meet.  
2.1 The Hague Rules (1924) and Hague-Visby Rules (1968) 
In 1924, the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law 
Relating to Bills of Lading, known as the Brussels Convention or, more commonly, as the 
Hague Rules, was signed. 117F117F11 One important feature of the Convention must be mentioned 
here as it will be revealed in each subsequent chapter of the current thesis, and it is that 
the Hague Rules do not provide a complete regulation of the carriage of goods by sea as 
they regulate only certain aspects of the contract of carriage, and only if a bill of lading is 
issued. This Convention was subsequently amended by the Visby Protocol in 1968 and 
the SDR unit Protocol in 1979. These two amendments, which were collectively referred 
to as the Hague-Visby Rules, introduced some slight changes 118F118F12 but the core provisions 
                                               
9 The former, normally operating a substantial fleet, uphold carrier interests. These are industrialized and 
developed nations such as the USA, the UK, the Netherlands, Germany, and Japan. The latter, on the other 
hand, are in favour of cargo interests due to the fact that their nationals are usually shippers or consignees. 
Most of these countries are developing countries with emerging economies. 
10 Ralph C. Walker – ‘Regulating Ocean Shipping: Powers and Problems of the Federal Maritime 
Commission’, 51 Cal. Law. Rev. 986 (1963). 
11 These geographically confusing designations stem from the pre-history of the Hague Rules. In the context 
of the abovementioned problems in international marine shipping, the International Law Association 
(founded in 1873 in Brussels and having Headquarters Secretariat in London) convened a conference in 
September 1921 to rectify the existing problems. The conference, which took place in the Hague and was 
highly influenced by the English maritime and transport concepts and ideas, eventually passed draft rules 
that were called "Hague Rules, 1921, defining the Risks to be assumed by Sea Carriers under a Bill of 
Lading". These were seen as an international solution to the unbalanced positions of carriers and shippers. 
General adoption of the Rules did not, however, materialize and that led to a Diplomatic Conference held in 
Brussels in 1922, aimed at passing a convention, based on these Rules, that is internationally adopted. The 
Conference appointed a Committee, which, in October 1923, carried out slight modifications to the Rules. 
Thus, with some alterations, the Hague Rules became the basis of the International Convention for the 
Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading adopted in Brussels on August 25, 1924. See: 
Charles Noble Gregory – ‘The Thirtieth Conference of the International Law Association’, The American 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Jul., 1922), pp. 451-456 and W.E. Astle – ‘Shipping and the 
Law’, Fairplay Publications (1980), at p. 2. 
12 For example, the limit of carrier’s liability was increased under the Visby protocol and the limitation  
assumed two formats – one per package or unit and the other per kilo of gross weight, whichever is the 
higher (see: Hague Rules, Art. IV(5) and Hague-Visby Rules, Art. IV(5)(a)). Then, the SDR Protocol brought the 
Rules up to date with the IMF’s current unit of account – the special drawing rights (SDR), which replaced 




remained the same, that is, imposing minimum liability on carriers, which they cannot 
evade.  
Most of the provisions in the Rules, if not all of them, are a result of international 
negotiations and compromises, and as such they may lead to inconsistent results when 
applied if they are not construed properly. In order to understand how specific provisions 
within the Rules operate and how to interpret them, we should take into consideration 
that “[they] must be read as a whole, they must be read in the light of the history behind 
them, and they must be read as a set of rules devised by international agreement for use 
in contracts that could be governed by any of several different, sometimes radically 
different, legal systems.”119F119F13 
Historically, the liability of shipowners used to swing into extremes from almost 
full responsibility of the carrier to almost full immunity from liability. In the 19th century 
a shipowner under English law was strictly liable for loss of or damage to the cargo 
during the voyage unless he could prove that his negligence did not contribute to the loss 
or damage and also that one of the excepted perils applied to the case. 120F120F14 This strict 
liability prompted carriers to seek escaping liability through negotiating wide 
exculpatory clauses as judges in England favoured the autonomy of the parties in 
drafting their contract.121F121F15 Thus, by employing their vastly superior bargaining position, 
carriers achieved to compel shippers to agree on all kinds of liability exceptions laid 
down in the bills of lading which the carriers drafted. The outcome was that such 
practice ultimately led to a situation where carriers were contracting out their liability 
altogether.122F122F16 While much of the trade was carried out on British vessels and bills of 
lading often designated English law as applicable, many countries faced the need to 
issue their own legislation, striving to reach a balance between cargo interests and 
carriers.123F123F17 However, the need for uniform legislation was obvious as the various regimes 
differed from one another. As a result, the growing international pressure towards 
drafting an international regime culminated in the adoption of the International 
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading known 
as the Hague Rules. The uniformity and simplification of the bills of lading was thought 
to bring efficiency benefits to the entire business: first, shippers would not have to 
closely scrutinize all bills of lading in order to ascertain their rights and obligations; 
secondly, underwriters were afforded the same benefit upon ascertaining the terms of 
the bills of lading with regard to the insurance of the cargo; thirdly, bankers were also 
                                                                                                                                                   
the abandoned gold standard and its unit, the Poincaré franc. The SDR are a unit of account which is based 
on the weighted average value of several major currencies, and which is less susceptible to inflation. 
13 Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne, JJ in Great China Metal Industries Co. Ltd. v. Malaysian International 
Shipping Cooperation Berhad (The “Bunga Seroja”), Lloyd’s Law Report  [1999] Vol. 1, p. 512 at  point 9 
14 See section 3.1 infra. 
15 Robert Force – ‘Admiralty and Maritime Law’, University of Michigan Library (2004), p. 53 
16 See, for instance, In Re: Missouri Steamship Company (1889) 42 Ch.D 321, 326. 
17 For instance, the Harter Act (1893) in the USA, which is said to have laid the foundations of all 
international maritime legislation that followed; the Sea-Carriage of Goods Act (1904) in Australia; the 
Water-Carriage of Goods Act (1910) in Canada, and  the Shipping and Seamen Act (1908) in New Zealand. 
The Harter Act, in particular, was the basis for the 1924 Hague Rules. This Act, essentially, prohibited the 
exoneration of the carrier’s liability for negligence and for errors to exercise due diligence to provide a 
seaworthy vessel, while on the other hand a limitation of liability was provided in certain instances (e.g. 
errors of navigation, sea perils, acts of God). 
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assisted in extending credit lines under bills of lading. Thus, uniformity in bills of lading 
facilitated many areas along the entire shipping chain. 
The Rules did not immediately become a leading international regime for carriage 
of goods by sea. Their success depended, of course, on the leading shipping countries that 
adhered to it. First, Great Britain and Spain ratified the Rules in 1930 and then, in 
1937, France and the USA ratified them as well, followed by Germany in 1939 which 
incorporated the Hague Rules in their Commercial Code – “Handelsgesetzbuch” (HGB). 
This means that it took more than 10 years for the Hague Rules’ provisions to be invoked 
worldwide. 
The Hague Rules and their amended version, the Hague-Visby Rules, were the 
first international liability regime and have well proved to be a successful one, judged by 
the long period of time in which it has been in use and by its widespread adoption which 
accounts for more than 80 countries 124F124F18 that represent more than 90% of global shipping 
tonnage. It is not a coincidence that the International Group of P&I Clubs 125F125F19 has been 
very supportive of the Hague-Visby Rules and use them as a benchmark for the Clubs’ 
insurance cover. The merits of this liability regime are the fairly equitable allocation of 
risk between a carrier and a shipper, its widespread adoption throughout the world, and 
the extensive case law accumulated during all these years of operation, which provides 
predictability and diminishes disputes and legal costs. 
However, there are several reasons why it is time that the Hague-Visby Rules 
were updated by a new carriage of goods convention. First, nowadays there are more 
sophisticated shipping arrangements and modernized practices, which were not 
addressed by the Rules since these practices (e.g. containerization) simply did not exist 
when the Convention was drafted. Secondly, the tackle-to-tackle scope of the Hague-
Visby Rules – though it can be extended by the parties – leaves out multimodal 
transport. This is an issue that is already addressed by the Hamburg Rules, having a 
port-to-port scope, and by the Rotterdam Rules, which cover carriage from door to door, 
but which have not come into force. Thirdly, a modern liability regime should regulate 
electronic bills of lading and electronic records, something that was unthinkable in the 
beginning of the 20th century. 
2.2 The Hamburg Rules (1978) 
The Hamburg Rules126F126F20 were devised as an evolutionary rather than a 
revolutionary instrument, whose aim was to replace the outdated Hague-Visby liability 
regime. The Hamburg Rules were drafted in 1978 after working groups were appointed 
by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) in order to 
explore the weaknesses of the Hague-Visby Rules. In 1992 the new liability regime 
entered into force. 
                                               
18 Along with the countries which adopted the Hague Rules, all put together, the total number of states that 
adhere to the Hague /Hague-Visby Regime exceeds 90. 
19 An association of the 13 principal P&I clubs (non-profit mutual clubs) which insure wide range of third-
party liability such as oil pollution, collision, cargo damage, personal injury to passengers and/or crew. These 
13 clubs cover 90-92% of the sea-going vessels tonnage. 
20 United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea [1978]. 




The Hamburg Rules, however, did not succeed in unifying various national 
regimes, and turned out to be an attempt to replace the Hague-Visby Rules, which 
eventually failed to accomplish its purpose. Therefore, the Hamburg Rules have little 
significance in international shipping as the USA, Germany, France, the UK, Japan, 
China, the Netherlands, the Nordic countries and, generally, most of the leading 
shipping nations have not ratified and adopted the Convention. Instead, the endorsing 
states are mostly developing countries and, what is more, a significant number of the 
members that adhere thereto are landlocked countries. There are only 34 countries that 
have implemented the Hamburg Rules and their total share in world maritime trade is 
estimated at about 5%.127F127F21 As a result, the contracting states control just a tiny share not 
only in the world’s commercial fleet but also in international trade, meaning that the 
regime did not achieve international acceptance. This is explained by the fact that the 
Hamburg Rules are perceived as a cargo-oriented liability regime128F128F22 whereas big trading 
countries, as pointed out supra, are ship-operating countries. Therefore, these countries 
are in favour of carriers’ interests and are not willing to embrace a liability regime which 
puts too much burden on the carrier. Likewise, being more cargo-oriented, the Hamburg 
Rules are opposed by insurance companies and carriers. 
To conclude, the Hamburg Rules did not fulfill their function, which is keeping 
harmonization of national regimes of sea carriage aligned with the evolved shipping and 
technological realities at the end of the 20th century. As a result, the Rules do not play a 
significant role in international shipping nowadays and their limited importance is 
unlikely to change in the future. This is why they will not form part of the analysis in 
the current thesis, though reference to them will be made occasionally where deemed 
necessary. 
2.3 The Rotterdam Rules (2008) 
The Rotterdam Rules129F129F23 are the next attempt of the international community to 
modernize and harmonize the existing liability regimes, and when they come into force 
they will become the third Convention regulating sea carriage. The work on the 
Rotterdam Rules began in 1998 when UNCITRAL invited the Comité Maritime 
International (CMI) to prepare a preliminary Draft instrument. CMI, which was the first 
group to work on this project,130F130F24 introduced the Draft on 10 December 2001. On that 
basis, UNCITRAL’s Working Group III on transport law took up the project in 2002. The 
Convention was finally drafted in 2008, and the General Assembly of the UN adopted it 
on 11 December 2008.131F131F25 The formal signing ceremony for the opening for signature took 
place on 23 September 2009 in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, and this is why the 
                                               
21 http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/transport_goods/Hamburg_status.html 
22 For example,  unlike the Hague-Visby Rules, the Hamburg Rules hold the carrier liable for negligence and 
errors of navigation or management of the ship on behalf of the master, mariner or carrier’s agents (see: the 
Hamburg Rules, Article 5). Also, the time bar is extended from one to two years (see: the Hamburg Rules, 
Article 20(1)), lessening significantly the possibility that shippers lose their right of suit because of a time 
lapse. 
23 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly By Sea. 
24 Chester D. Hooper, Book Review of “The Rotterdam Rules: A Practical Annotation” and “A New Convention 
for the Carriage of Goods by Sea – The Rotterdam Rules”, Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, Vol. 41, 
p.144, fn.2. 
25 The Convention was adopted through a Resolution 63/122 passed by the UN General Assembly. 
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Convention is referred to as the Rotterdam Rules. There were 16 signatory states to put 
their signatures under that document in Rotterdam, followed by several others 
thereafter at the Headquarters of the United Nations in New York. 132F132F26 So far, 25 countries 
have signed the Rotterdam Rules but only three of them have ratified it – Spain, Congo, 
and Togo.133F133F27 The required number of ratifications is 20, for according to the Convention’s 
provisions it will enter into force one year after the deposit of the twentieth instrument 
of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. 134F134F28 
In 2010, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the “strategic goals 
and recommendations for the EU's maritime transport policy until 2018” 
(2009/2095(INI)), which invites EU Member States to support and ratify the new 
Convention: 
The European Parliament […] calls on Member States speedily to sign, 
ratify and implement the UN Convention on Contracts for the 
International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea, known as the 
‘Rotterdam Rules’, establishing the new maritime liability system; 
(para 11) 135F135F
29 
Regardless of that note, there hasn’t been yet an official conclusion on that matter 
reached by the European Union. It is to be seen in the following years whether and to 
what extent this non-binding recommendation will be followed. 
Although not operational yet, the Rotterdam Rules purport to be capable of 
replacing the Hague-Visby Rules as a leading legal regime in international sea 
shipping.136F136F30 The ultimate attempt is to replace not only the Hague and the Hague-Visby 
Rules but also the Hamburg Rules and, thus, to become a single and uniform 
international code regulating carriage of goods by sea. Whether this will happen depends 
not only on any twenty nations ratifying the convention, but also on the accession of the 
big trading countries. Otherwise, the Rotterdam Rules will share the same unfortunate 
setbacks as the Hamburg Rules. 
Achieving harmonization is considerably more difficult in the 21st century than it 
was in the beginning of the 20th century, given the expanding volumes of international 
trade out carried by sea transport, and considering the increased number of independent 
states involved in shipping and international transport nowadays. Equally important, 
consensus is also difficult to achieve, which leads to a long and complicated drafting 
process. This can be partially evidenced by the 96 Articles divided into 18 Chapters that 
are laid down in the Rotterdam Rules and compared to only ten articles in the Hague-
Visby Rules. Since the new convention has extended much beyond the boundaries of the 
                                               
26 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea, 
Article 88. 
27 For the status of the ratification process, see: 
 http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/transport_goods/rotterdam_status.html 
28 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea, 
Article 94.1. 
29 ‘Strategic goals and recommendations for the EU's maritime transport policy until 2018’ (2009/2095(INI)), 
text adopted by the European Parliament on 5 May 2010 (Wednesday) in Brussels. It can be accessed on: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2010-
0128+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN. Document: A7-0114/2010. 
30 See: United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by 
Sea, Article 89. 




preceding conventions, some authors suggest that the regulation of the contractual 
relationship between carriers and shippers has grown into an instrument, which has the 
character of an international maritime and commercial code. 137F137F31 
The substantive scope of the Rotterdam Rules is significantly expanded as the 
Rules extend to door-to-door carriage. The very name of the Convention indicates that it 
will regulate multimodal transport, and that is why it is not only a maritime instrument 
but a so-called “maritime plus” instrument.138F138F32 This means that it will regulate 
multimodal transport provided that at least one of the legs in the international carriage 
of goods is by sea. 139F139F33 In other words, the Rules were not designed to be an exclusively 
multimodal instrument but a maritime instrument that extends to other modes of 
carriage complementing the sea leg. This was prompted by the needs of the shipping 
industry as it was noted that 50% of the 60 million containers carried worldwide in the 
year of 2000 were transported on a multimodal basis.140F140F34 
Historically, the Rotterdam Rules are not the first international instrument 
intended to regulate the carriage of goods by various modes of transport. In 1980, the 
United Nations Convention on International Multimodal Transport of Goods was signed 
in Geneva. However, this Convention has not entered into force and it is highly unlikely 
that it will ever do, given the time that has passed since its adoption. 
3. The obligations of the carrier over the cargo under 
common law 
Prior to addressing the matter of carriers’ responsibility for damaged or lost cargo 
under the Hague-Visby Rules and the Rotterdam Rules, it is necessary to devote 
attention to common law in order to understand the rationale behind the various cargo-
related provisions. Accordingly, common law will be first discussed in short, bearing in 
mind that various Hague and Hague-Visby principles (for instance, the burden of proof 
or the obligations of the carrier) flow from the common law position, and also that the 
common law approach can be used as a means to construe the contract of carriage. 141F141F35 
Actually, the Rules themselves were to a large extent contrived on the basis of the 
common law as well as on maritime customs and practices. 
                                               
31 D. Rhidian Thomas – ‘A New Convention for the Carriage of Goods by Sea – The Rotterdam Rules: An 
Analysis of the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea’ 
(2009), Lawtext Publishing limited, Preface, p. v. 
32 In common jargon the Convention is also referred to as a “wet multimodal transport” convention, a 
“maritime multimodal” convention, or a “maritime plus multimodal” convention. See: Meltem Deniz Güner-
Özbek – ‘The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or 
Partly by Sea: An Appraisal of the Rotterdam Rules’, Hamburg Studies on Maritime Affairs, Springer (2011), 
ISBN: 978-3-642-19649-2, p. 140. Also see: Yvonne Baatz, Charles DeBattista, Filippo Lorenzon, Andrew 
Serdy, Hilton Staniland, Michael Tsimplis – ‘The Rotterdam Rules: A Practical Annotation’, Informa Law 
(2009), pp. 15-16, para. [5-01]. 
33 The Rotterdam Rules, Article 1.1: “The contract [of carriage] shall provide for carriage by sea and may 
provide for carriage by other modes of transport in addition to the sea carriage.” 
34 Working Group III on Transport Law, 11th session (New York, March 24 – April 4, 2003). See: 
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.29, para. 25. 
35 Mitsubishi Corporation v Eastwind Transport Ltd and Others (The “Irbenskiy Proliv”) – Queen’s Bench 
Division (Commercial Court) (Ian Glick Q.C., sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court) – 15 December 
2004 – Lloyd’s Law Reports [2005] Vol. 1, p 383. 
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3.1 Cargo claims 
Firstly, at common law there was only one overriding obligation for the carrier 
and this was to deliver the cargo in the same condition in which he had received it. 142F142F36 
This duty later developed and split into the two separate carrier’s obligations that are 
well known nowadays and codified in the relevant maritime liability regimes – the 
obligation to provide a seaworthy vessel and the obligation to care for the goods (i.e. to 
properly and carefully treat them). Throughout the 19th century, carriers were under a 
strict liability with regard to those two obligations. It was the Harter Act (1893), which 
transformed that strict obligation into one of exercising due diligence to provide a 
seaworthy vessel and another one of taking care for the goods. 143F143F37 
Therefore, under common law the carrier has a fundamental duty to take 
reasonable care of the goods. A common carrier for reward144F144F38 has strict liability for loss or 
damage to the goods in transit. The Court interprets this liability as being so severe as to 
make the carrier virtually assume the nature of an insurer of the cargo. 145F145F39 Accordingly, 
the defendant will be held liable even when he may have used all his due care and 
diligence. Recovery for the damages could be sought merely by proving that the cargo 
was delivered to the carrier for shipment in good condition and then it reached its 
destination in bad condition. 
The only escape route for the carrier, thus, was to prove, first, that it was not his 
negligence to cause or contribute to the loss and, second, that the loss was due to one of 
the following exceptions: (a) an act of God, (b) Queen’s enemies, (c) an inherent vice of 
the goods, (d) a fault on part of the shipper, or (e) a sacrifice of the goods as general 
average. In other words, relying only on the excepted perils is not enough for the carrier 
to avoid liability but he must also show due diligence. This view is expressed by Willes J. 
in Notara v. Henderson: 
The exception in the bill of lading only exempts the shipowner from 
the absolute liability of a common carrier, and not from the 
consequences of the want of reasonable skill, diligence, and care. 146F146F
40 
                                               
36 N.J. Margetson – ‘Liability of the carrier under the Hague (Visby) Rules for cargo damage caused by 
unseaworthiness of its containers’, (2008) JIML 14, pp. 153-161, at p. 160. 
37 See Harter Act (1893), Sec.191. 
38 Shipowners who are not common carriers are liable only as bailees and their liability stretches to loss 
caused by negligence. That is, a carrier will not be found liable in case he proves that he exercised due care 
and diligence. See: Sir Thomas Edward Scrutton, Stewart C. Boyd, Andrew S. Burrows, David Foxton, 
‘Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of Lading’, 20th edition, Sweet & Maxwell (1996), ISBN-10: 
0421525800, Article 105, pp. 200-201. 
39 Forward v. Pittard (1785), K.B.1 Term Report 27. 
40 Notara v. Henderson (1872) L.R. 7 Q.B. 225 at pp. 235 and 236. In this case, the plaintiffs shipped beans 
on board the defendants’ vessel from Alexandria to Glasgow as the bills of lading allowed calling at 
intermediate ports. After the vessel left the port of Liverpool, she collided, without any fault on behalf of the 
carrier, which constituted an excepted peril under the bills of lading. The vessel had to go back to Liverpool 
for a repair, where it was discovered that the beans were damaged by sea water ingress. At that point, the 
plaintiffs requested the wetted cargo to be discharged but the defendant shipowners denied and continued 
with the carriage of the cargo to its final destination in Glasgow where, however, the beans were already 
significantly impaired and its value immensely decreased in comparison with the value of the cargo if it had 
been discharged and dried at Liverpool. Eventually, the court ruled in favour of the shippers. The 
shipowners had to pay damages as, regardless of the excepted peril, they breached their duty to take 
reasonable care (emphasis added) for the goods entrusted to them. 




Carriers’ strict liability under common law, however, is lessened by the rule of 
freedom of contract whereby carriers may contractually limit, and in fact exclude 
altogether, their liability by expressly allocating the risk in their contract of carriage 
with the shipper. Consequently, to counteract this hardline approach established by the 
common law rules, a shipowner or charterer may rely on a contract provision which may 
limit, or may very well exclude his liability under a charter party contract or a bill of 
lading contract, even in cases when the party in breach committed a fundamental breach 
of the contract.147F147F41 Contractual exceptions, inter alia, may be: pirates, robbers, thieves, 
pilferage, barratry, arrest or restraint of princes, strikes, jettison, leakage, ullage, fire, 
collision, force majeure, accidents, goods forwarded at ship’s expense but owner’s risk, at 
shipper’s or charterer’s risk, exclusion of some or all liability with regard to particular 
goods, exclusion of liability for goods covered by insurance, exceptions renouncing the 
shipowner’s warranty of seaworthiness and so on. 148F148F42 
3.2 Burden of proof 
As the late lamented Prof. William Tetley rightly remarks, the traditional 
distinction between burden of proof and order of proof extends to marine cargo claims as 
well.149F149F43 The first term defines the duty of a party to adduce evidence for proving or 
disproving a fact (the evidentiary burden), whereas the second one denotes the sequence 
of the facts and allegations to be proved or disproved by either party (the evidentiary 
sequence). For the sake of simplicity, the term “burden of proof”150F150F44 will be used in the 
current thesis so as to embrace both concepts – the burden of proof as well as its 
allocation. 
The contract of carriage is a contract of bailment for reward. In general, the law 
governing carriage of goods by sea has its roots in the law of bailment. Accordingly, once 
the cargo owner establishes loss or damage to the cargo during the contractual period of 
bailment, the burden of proof shifts to the latter, who has to prove that the damage to or 
loss of the cargo did not occur as a result of his fault or the fault of his agents, and that 
one of the excepted perils applies to the case. 151F151F45 Where the exception covers the alleged 
loss or damage, the burden shifts on the cargo owner to show that it was the negligence 
of the carrier or his agents that contributed to the damage and thus to deprive the bailee 
(the carrier) of the safe haven provided by the relevant exception. 152F152F46 
                                               
41 A fundamental breach is one that goes to the roots of the contract, and it usually occurs when either party 
breaches a condition. To the contrary, a breach of a warranty or an innominate term, which does not go to 
the roots of the contract, is not considered a fundamental breach. 
42 It is difficult to outline a comprehensive list of all the various contractual exceptions. For the most 
frequent ones that appeared before the court, see Sir Thomas Edward Scrutton, Stewart C. Boyd, Andrew S. 
Burrows, David Foxton – ‘Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of Lading’, 20th edition, Sweet & Maxwell 
(1996), ISBN-10: 0421525800, Articles 106 to 119. 
43 William Tetley – ‘The Burden and Order of Proof in Marine Cargo Claims’ (2004). Retrieved from: 
http://www.mcgill.ca/maritimelaw/sites/mcgill.ca.maritimelaw/files/burden.pdf 
44 Note that due to the term’s Latin name (onus probandi), sometimes it is referred to as onus of proof. 
45 See 3.1 supra. 
46 See “The Xantho” (1887) 12 App. Cas. 503. 
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4. The obligations of the carrier over the cargo under the 
Hague-Visby Rules 
4.1 Carriers’ responsibilities: general overview 
An ocean carrier has two main bundles of obligations – to provide a seaworthy 
vessel and to care for the goods from the beginning until the end of the voyage. The 
current thesis will be dedicated to the second of these fundamental obligations, and to 
the tasks and operations associated with it such as receiving, loading, handling, stowing, 
carrying, keeping, caring for, discharging and delivering the cargo. Although this bundle 
of obligations may be codified differently in the different liability regimes, a carrier wil 
usually have the following duties with regard to the goods carried: 
1. First, the carrier has to accept the cargo from the consignor who may be the 
shipper, charterer or the freight forwarder. 
2. Secondly, he has to ship the cargo, which requires him to: 
a) carry out transportation;  
b) proceed with the necessary dispatch following the contracted schedule;  
c) keep the cargo safe, and 
d) execute the orders of the shipper as contracted.  
3. Thirdly, the carrier has to deliver the cargo to the entitled receiver – 
consignee or endorsee under the bill of lading, meaning that:  
a) the cargo should arrive at the contracted destination, which is the port of 
discharge designated in the bill of lading; 
b) the carrier should give notice of readiness to the notify party, certifying 
that the cargo has arrived, and 
c) finally, the carrier should discharge the cargo or make it available to be 
discharged. 
As it will be seen below, the Hague-Visby Rules do not follow that three-
dimensional structure. This is so because the Rules were not drafted academically to 
cover exhaustively every aspect of the process of shipping (which the Rotterdam Rules 
seem to have attempted as observed infra), but they intend to provide unified rules that 
work well in practice. Thus, some of the cargo-related obligations are worded differently, 
others are implied, while some are omitted. In particular, some of the duties – such as 
the duty to carry the goods to the contracted destination and the duty to deliver them to 
the consignee – are fundamental but are not manifested in the Hague-Visby Rules, 
where they are solely implied. By contrast, the duty to carry the cargo is expressly 
recognized in the Rotterdam Rules under the definition of a “contract of carriage” in 
Article 1.1 and also in Article 11; likewise, the duty to deliver the goods to the consignee 
is laid down in Articles 11 and 13.1 of the Rotterdam Rules. The result is that 
misdelivery under the Hague-Visby Rules, which do not elaborate on the liability in case 




the carrier breaches these fundamental duties, will be regulated by the relevant 
applicable law, whereas the Rotterdam Rules will apply also to claims for misdelivery. 153F153F47 
Having noted these general differences, the focus of the analysis will first shift to 
the framework of the carrier’s responsibilities set forth in Article III of the Hague-Visby 
Rules, and then it will focus on the obligations over the cargo in particular. The provision 
consists of eight rules and particular attention will be devoted to Article III rule 2, which 
is dedicated precisely to the care for the cargo, whereas the rest of the rules will be 
briefly outlined as their detailed analysis goes beyond the subject matter of the present 
thesis. 
4.1.1 Article III rule 1 
The carrier shall be bound before and at the beginning of the voyage 
to exercise due diligence to:  
(a) Make the ship seaworthy; 
(b) Properly man, equip and supply the ship; 
(c) Make the holds, refrigerating and cool chambers, and all other 
parts of the ship in which goods are carried, fit and safe for their 
reception and preservation. 
Article III rule 1 of the Hague-Visby Rules prescribes the first paramount duty of 
the carrier, which is to provide a seaworthy vessel. The elements of this duty are 
illustrated by case law as being twofold: 
(1) The vessel must be in a suitable condition and suitably manned 
and equipped to meet the ordinary perils likely to be encountered 
while performing the services required of it. This aspect of the duty 
relates to the following matters. 
  (a) The physical condition of the vessel and its equipment; 
  (b) The competence / efficiency of the master and crew. 
  (c) The adequacy of stores and documentation. 
(2) The vessel must be cargoworthy in the sense that it is in a fit state 
to receive the specified cargo. 154F154F
48
 
This statement of Cresswell J as well as the three sub-sections of Article III rule 1 
suggest that the term “seaworthiness” has a broad and comprehensive meaning as it 
embraces not only a ship’s physical characteristics and condition but also her proper 
manning, crewing and equipment as well as her “cargoworthiness”. Consequently, she 
must be able to perform the contractual voyage, fit for the conditions expected along the 
journey, and adequately equipped to receive, carry and deliver the respective contractual 
cargo at the specified destination. 
Unlike under common law, where the obligation to provide a seaworthy ship 
amounts to an absolute warranty155F155F49 in the sense that presence or want of due diligence is 
                                               
47 D. Rhidian Thomas – ‘A New Convention for the Carriage of Goods by Sea – The Rotterdam Rules: An 
Analysis of The UN Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by 
Sea’, Lawtext Publishing Limited (2009), ISSN 1478-8586, Chapter 3, pp. 58-59. 
48 Papera Traders co. Ltd. and Others v Hyundai Merchant Marine Co. Ltd. and Another (The "Eurasian 
Dream") – Queen’s Bench Division (Commercial Court) (Cresswell J) – Lloyd’s Law Reports [2002] Vol. 1, p. 
719 at p. 736, para. 128. 
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irrelevant for establishing fault on part of the carrier, the position taken by the drafters 
of the Hague-Visby Rules reduced this duty to exercising due diligence to provide a 
seaworthy ship before and at the beginning of the voyage. This means that the duty of 
seaworthiness is modified and restricted in two ways – first, the standard is one of 
exercising due diligence and, secondly, it shall be applied before and at the beginning of 
the voyage but not en route. 
The reason why the obligation of seaworthiness in the Hague-Visby Rules is 
restricted to the time of embarking on the voyage is clearly explained by the renowned 
legal authority in the shipping world Sir Norman Hill during the proceedings of the 
Hague Conference of ILA in 1921: 
To begin with, before you start loading your cargo you must have a 
seaworthy ship, a ship worthy to take that cargo, and when she 
leaves on the voyage she must still be seaworthy. If you go further 
than that, and you say that there is an absolute obligation on the part 
of the shipowner to keep the ship seaworthy throughout the voyage, 
then, of course, you render quite valueless most of your exceptions [in 
Article IV]. For instance, if, through the negligent navigation of the 
pilot, the ship is run on the rocks and holed, she ceases to be 
seaworthy. 156F156 F
50 
The main argument upholding the temporal limitation of the duty to provide a 
seaworthy vessel, as laid down by Sir Norman Hill, is that a carrier can no longer 
influence the condition of the ship once she has set sail. 
Thus, in The “Aconcagua”157F157F51 a container of dangerous cargo exploded as a result of 
being stowed close to a bunker tank which was heated up during the voyage so that 
bunkers could be transferred for fuel oil. The shipper’s allegation that the charterer 
failed to provide a seaworthy vessel was struck down by the court on the grounds that at 
the commencement of the voyage the vessel was not unseaworthy as the usage of this 
particular bunker tank, which caused the heating and the subsequent explosion, had 
been neither necessary, nor pre-programmed to occur, but it was rather a result of 
operational decision made during the journey. The court accepted that it was the 
operative fault of the Chief Officer and the Chief Engineer upon taking a decision on 
which bunkers should be used and disregarding the instruction that the dangerous cargo 
in the container should be stowed away from sources of heat. Therefore, heating the 
specific bunker tank was considered negligence but not unseaworthiness. 
It is also noteworthy that a carrier is not under a duty to provide a seaworthy 
vessel when the ship is actually not in his “orbit”; like, for example, when she is being 
constructed in the shipyard. In The “Happy Ranger” it was ruled that the obligation 
under Article III rule 1 does not attach, unless the vessel is in the ownership, possession 
or control of the carrier, and this stance is not affected by the standard practice in 
                                                                                                                                                   
49 Kopitoff v. Wilson (1876) 1 Queen’s Bench Division 377, at 380; Steel v. State Line Steamship Co. (1877) 3 
App. Case at 86 (Blackburn LJ). 
50 Comité Maritime International – ‘The Travaux Préparatoires of the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules’, p.145 
at [82]. 
51 Compania Sud Americana De Vapores SA v Sinochem Tianjin Import and Export Corporation (The 
"Aconcagua") – Queen's Bench Division (Commercial Court) (Christopher Clarke J) – 24 July 2009 – Lloyd’s 
Law Reports [2010] Vol 1, p. 1. 




shipbuilding contracts to allow the master and/or the chief officer to come on board the 
vessel before completion of construction in order for them to be familiarized with the 
vessel.158F158F52 Gloster J asserted that “a shipowner will not, in principle, be liable for any 
defects in the construction of the vessel because this would involve “an almost unlimited 
retrogression” in relation to a shipowner’s non-delegable duties”.159F159F53 
 As pointed out above, the nature of the duty of seaworthiness is limited, too. The 
obligation is reduced to one of exercising due diligence. Thus the shipowner is relieved 
from the absolute obligation under common law to provide a seaworthy vessel: 
Seaworthiness is not an absolute concept; it is relative to the nature 
of the ship, to the particular voyage and even to the particular stage 
of the voyage on which the ship is engaged. Seaworthiness must be 
judged by the standards and practices of the industry at the relevant 




The lower standard of seaworthiness can be explained with the fact that, under 
the Hague-Visby Rules, carriers cannot escape liability by relying on the freedom of 
contract to negotiate terms reducing or excluding this duty altogether. Accordingly, 
requiring carriers to conform to an absolute warranty of seaworthiness would place too 
much burden on them.  
Furthermore, the exact standard of seaworthiness cannot be fixed but it varies 
according to the specific marine adventure and to numerous factors such as the type, age 
and characteristics of the vessel, the type of cargo that is to be carried on that vessel, the 
geographic area of the voyage, the season of the year and the expected atmospheric 
conditions, the knowledge of shipbuilding and navigation that is available in the 
shipping industry at the time of the voyage, etc. The required degree of fitness that a 
ship must have in order to be considered seaworthy is determined in an earlier case as 
being the following: 
The ship must have that degree of fitness which an ordinary careful 
owner would require his vessel to have at the commencement of her 
voyage having regard to all the probable circumstances of it. Would a 
prudent owner have required that it [the defect] should be made 
good before sending his ship to sea, had he known of it?  
It would not be enough for him to say, "at the time this ship was built 
she was seaworthy in the state of knowledge then existing, and I am 
not going to alter her in view of later discoveries."  
                                               
52 Parsons Corporation and Others v CV Scheepvaartonderneming Happy Ranger (The “Happy Ranger”) – 
Queen’s Bench Division (Commercial Court) (Gloster J) – Lloyd’s Law Reports [2006] Vol. 1, p. 649. 
53 Parsons Corporation and Others v CV Scheepvaartonderneming Happy Ranger (The “Happy Ranger”) – 
Queen’s Bench Division (Commercial Court) (Gloster J) – Lloyd’s Law Reports [2006] Vol. 1, p. 649, at p. 653, 
para. 19. 
54 Papera Traders co. Ltd. and Others v Hyundai Merchant Marine Co. Ltd. and Another (The "Eurasian 
Dream") – Queen’s Bench Division (Commercial Court) (Cresswell J) – Lloyd’s Law Reports [2002] Vol. 1, p. 
719 at p. 736, para. 126-127. 
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The standard of seaworthiness must rise with the improved 
knowledge of shipbuilding and navigation. 161F161F
55
 
In the case The “Eurasian Dream”, Cresswell J provided four benchmarks to 
distinguish between negligence of the master and crew, which is excused under Article 
IV rule 2(a), and incompetence, which is tantamount to unseaworthiness. Incompetence, 
in his dictum, is derived from: “(a) an inherent lack of ability; (b) a lack of adequate 
training or instruction: e.g. lack of adequate fire-fighting training; (c) a lack of knowledge 
about a particular vessel and/or its systems (operation of the CO2 fire-fighting system); 
(d) a disinclination to perform the job properly; […] (e) physical or mental disability or 
incapacity (e.g. drunkenness, illness)”.162F162F56 
Furthermore, Article III rule 1 on seaworthiness is paired with Article IV rule 1, 
which confirms that the duty is confined to exercising due diligence only, but here this 
standard is upheld from the perspective of the carriers’ defences – i.e. the latter shall not 
be liable unless seaworthiness is caused by want of due diligence. 163F163F57 The rule goes on to 
specify that the burden of proof shall be on the carrier who invokes the defence under 
that particular rule. In other words, whenever goods have been lost or damaged, the 
carrier must prove that he exercised due diligence to make the ship seaworthy. What is 
more, it is common ground that a carrier must establish that due diligence was exercised 
not only by him, but also by his independent contractors. 164F164F58 
It is important also to point out two other aspects of the duty to provide a 
seaworthy vessel. First, it is an “overriding” obligation and, thus, a carrier who breached 
it by providing an unseaworthy ship cannot then avail himself of the defences laid down 
in Article IV or of contractual exceptions that can meet the requirements of Article III 
rule 8.165F165F59 The term “overriding” originates from common law and it implies that even 
when the failure to provide a seaworthy vessel forms only a part of the cause for the 
damage, the other part being an excepted peril, the breach of that overriding obligation 
                                               
55 A statement of Lord Justice Scrutton in F. C. Bradley & Sons Ltd. v Federal Steam Navigation Co. – Court 
of Appeal (Bankes LJ, Scrutton LJ and Atkin LJ) – 26 March 1926 – Lloyd’s Law Reports [1926] Vol. 24, p. 
446 at p. 454. This statement was maintained also in: Eridania S.p.A. and Others v Rudolf A. Oetker and 
Others (The "Fjord Wind") – Court of Appeal (Waller LJ, Clarke LJ and Sir Murray Stuart-Smith) – Lloyd’s 
Law Reports [2000] Vol. 2, p. 191 at p. 197. 
56 Papera Traders co. Ltd. and Others v Hyundai Merchant Marine Co. Ltd. and Another (The "Eurasian 
Dream") – Queen’s Bench Division (Commercial Court) (Cresswell J) – Lloyd’s Law Reports [2002] Vol. 1, p. 
719 at p. 737, para. 129. 
57 Article IV rule 1 prescribes: Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be liable for loss or damage arising or 
resulting from unseaworthiness unless caused by want of due diligence on the part of the carrier to make the 
ship seaworthy, and to secure that the ship is properly manned, equipped and supplied, and to make the 
holds, refrigerating and cool chambers and all other parts of the ship in which goods are carried fit and safe 
for their reception, carriage and preservation in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article III. 
Whenever loss or damage has resulted from unseaworthiness the burden of proving the exercise of due 
diligence shall be on the carrier or other person claiming exemption under this article. 
58 Riverstone Meat Co Pty. Ltd. v Lancashire Shipping Co Ltd. (The “Muncaster Castle”), Lloyd’s Law Reports 
[1961] Vol. 1, p.57. 
59 Maxine Footwear Co Ltd v. Canadian Government Merchant Marine Ltd (The ‘Maurienne’) – (Viscount 
Kilmuir (Lord High Chancellor), Lord Reid, Lord Tucker, Lord Somervell of Harrow and Lord Denning.) – 
Lloyd’s Law Reports [1959] Vol. 2, p. 105. 




will nevertheless be regarded as the only cause, which makes the carrier responsible for 
the entire damage.166F166F60 In Lord Wright’s dictum: 
“I doubt whether there could be any event which could supersede or 




With regard to causation, it is interesting pointing out an observation made by 
Lord Wright, namely that the concept of unseaworthiness manifests differently when 
applied to two different kinds of maritime agreements – a marine insurance contract and 
a contract of sea carriage of goods. Under a marine insurance contract, seaworthiness 
represents a condition precedent, meaning that, if unseaworthiness is present, the 
insurance cover is void regardless whether unseaworthiness was a cause for the loss or 
not. Conversely, under a contract of carriage, as observed hereinabove, failure to fulfill 
the seaworthiness obligation does not affect the carrier’s liability as long as 
unseaworthiness is not a cause for the loss or damage. 168F168F62 
Secondly, the obligation to exercise due diligence to provide a seaworthy ship is a 
non-delegable duty and, hence, the carrier cannot contract it out; accordingly, he will be 
held liable also for the fault of his agents as well. This was established in the famous 
case The “Muncaster Castle”.169F169F63 This Hague-Rules case that dates back to 1961 gave rise 
to the so-called “Muncaster Castle Amendment”, which was proposed during the 
negotiations for the Visby protocol. Ultimately it was rejected at the 1968 Diplomatic 
Conference since it proposed an amendment of Article 3 rule 1 of the Hague-Rules that 
would allow carriers to subcontract their obligation to exercise due diligence to make the 
vessel seaworthy to an independent contractor, which was considered to be a 
retrogressive step.170F170F64 
4.1.2 Article III rule 2 
Article III rule 2 contains the second bundle of duties placed on the carrier, which 
are related to the proper and careful care for the cargo throughout the contractual 
journey. As such, this article will be particularly addressed in detail below in section 4.3, 
and special attention will be devoted to the nature of these duties, the moment when 
they arise and cease, and the possibility of delegating them to third parties. 
4.1.3 Article III rule 3 
After receiving the goods into his charge the carrier or the master or 
agent of the carrier shall, on demand of the shipper, issue to the 
shipper a bill of lading showing among other things: 
                                               
60 Smith, Hogg & Co., Ltd. v. Black Sea & Baltic General Insurance Company, Ltd. (The “Librum”) – House 
of Lords (Viscount Maugham, Lord Atkin, Lord Wright, Lord Romer and Lord Porter) – Lloyd’s Law Reports 
[1940] Vol. 67, p. 253. 
61 Smith, Hogg & Co., Ltd. v. Black Sea & Baltic General Insurance Company, Ltd. (The “Librum”) – House 
of Lords (Viscount Maugham, Lord Atkin, Lord Wright, Lord Romer and Lord Porter) – Lloyd’s Law Reports 
[1940] Vol. 67, p. 253, citation at p. 260. 
62 Smith, Hogg & Co., Ltd. v. Black Sea & Baltic General Insurance Company, Ltd. (The “Librum”) – House 
of Lords (Viscount Maugham, Lord Atkin, Lord Wright, Lord Romer and Lord Porter) – Lloyd’s Law Reports 
[1940] Vol. 67, p. 253, at p. 258. 
63 Riverstone Meat Co Pty. Ltd. v Lancashire Shipping Co Ltd. (The “Muncaster Castle”), Lloyd’s Law Reports 
[1961] Vol. 1, p.57. 
64 William Tetley – ‘Marine Cargo Claims’ (4th edition), Les Editions Yvon Blais Inc. (2008), Vol.1, ISBN: 
978-2-89635-126-8, p. 11. 
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(a) The leading marks necessary for identification of the goods as the 
same are furnished in writing by the shipper before the loading of 
such goods starts, provided such marks are stamped or otherwise 
shown clearly upon the goods if uncovered, or on the cases or 
coverings in which such goods are contained, in such a manner as 
should ordinarily remain legible until the end of the voyage. 
(b) Either the number of packages or pieces, or the quantity, or 
weight, as the case may be, as furnished in writing by the shipper. 
(c) The apparent order and condition of the goods. 
Provided that no carrier, master or agent of the carrier shall be bound 
to state or show in the bill of lading any marks, number, quantity or 
weight which he has reasonable ground for suspecting not accurately 
to represent the goods actually received, or which he has had no 
reasonable means of checking. 
Article III rule 3 contains one of the most important duties of the carrier under 
the Hague-Visby Rules. It obliges the master or the carrier’s agent to issue, “on demand 
of the shipper”, a bill of lading that certifies the cargo’s leading marks, the quantity or 
weight of the goods, and their apparent order and condition. While representations 
regarding the first two of these cargo characteristics can hardly be ambiguous, 171F171F65 the 
third one – the apparent order and condition of the cargo – is not always sufficiently 
clear as the master or his agent usually states in the bill of lading only what is directly 
observable. Thus, when, for instance, a packed cargo is flawed but its packages seem to 
be unimpaired, then a reasonable master is likely to state in the bill of lading “received 
in apparent good order and condition”, being able to see only the cargo’s external 
appearance, unaware of the true state of the goods inside the package. In such a case 
and especially with regard to containerized cargo, the statements of the carrier will refer 
only to the condition of the container and not to the goods inside. 172F172F66 
4.1.4 Article III rule 4 
Such a bill of lading shall be prima facie evidence of the receipt by the 
carrier of the goods as therein described in accordance with 
paragraph 3 (a), (b) and (c). However, proof to the contrary shall not 
be admissible when the bill of lading has been transferred to a third 
party acting in good faith. 
A bill of lading, which shows the representations made by the carrier in 
accordance with rule 3, is rendered by force of Article III rule 4 a prima facie evidence of 
receipt of the cargo by the carrier as it is described therein. It follows that a carrier is 
prima facie liable for all loss or damage to goods that were delivered to him in good 
order, as evidenced by the bill of lading, and that out-turned lost, short or in bad order 
when they were received by the consignee at the end of the voyage. That is why in 
                                               
65 Whereas sub-sections (a) and (b) require information as furnished by the shipper, in the third instance the 
carrier shall take steps to ascertain the apparent order and condition of the goods. Equally important, the 
proviso at the end of the rule suggests that, with regard to sub-sections (a) and (b), the carrier is not bound 
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unable to check them. 
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practice carriers endeavour to put as few details as possible in the bill of lading so that 
they keep themselves less exposed to risks of future litigation.173F173F67 One should also keep in 
mind that rule 4 is only operable in relation to Article III rule 3 and will, therefore, not 
be triggered if the description of the cargo is said to be made by the shipper or if the 
carrier clauses the bill.174F174F68 What is more, where the apparent condition of the goods cannot 
be ascertained by the carrier by performing a reasonable and practical examination upon 
loading, a clean bill of lading may be insufficient to establish a prima facie case.175F175F69 
Also, it should be noted that the presumption created by rule 4 of Article III is a 
rebuttable one, namely, a clean bill of lading constitutes only a refutable proof of absence 
of physical damage to the cargo. In The “Eagle Strength” and “Hyundai Pioneer”176F176F70 a 
clean bill of lading was issued at the port of loading regarding the carriage of a container 
stuffed with rolls of mattress fabric. After several sea journeys and a subsequent rail 
carriage, the cargo was found damaged by seawater. The court pointed out that the clean 
bill of lading meant only that the cargo was accepted in apparent good condition and that 
the bill was only a proof of visible and actual damage, noting also that it was impossible 
for the shipowners to establish the true condition of the goods carried. In the court’s 
opinion, the claimant cargo owners failed to provide evidence proving that the goods 
were damaged while in the custody of the carrier and, thus, they failed to discharge the 
burden of proof. That is, no matter that the cargo was undoubtedly wetted at some point 
by an unknown source, the cargo owners did not succeed to hold the shipowners liable 
for the damage. On the facts of the case, a sole clean bill of lading was not considered 
sufficient evidence given that: the rolls were received at the port of discharge without 
any exceptions, showing that the actual condition of the rolls was impossible to be 
ascertained; the exterior packaging of the rolls was proven by the shipowners to be 
intact; there were no other claims or notations by shippers regarding damage of goods 
carried alongside the cargo of rolls that was allegedly damaged during the sea voyage. 
On the other hand, vis-à-vis third party bill of lading holders, the information as stated 
on the bill becomes a conclusive evidence as to the quantity and condition of the cargo. 
4.1.5 Article III rule 5 
The shipper shall be deemed to have guaranteed to the carrier the 
accuracy at the time of shipment of the marks, number, quantity and 
weight, as furnished by him, and the shipper shall indemnify the 
carrier against all loss, damages and expenses arising or resulting 
from inaccuracies in such particulars. The right of the carrier to such 
indemnity shall in no way limit his responsibility and liability under 
the contract of carriage to any person other than the shipper. 
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Article III rule 5 provides for obligations that are owed by the shipper to the 
carrier, namely to guarantee the accuracy of the information (marks, number, quantity 
and weight), which is furnished to the latter at the time of shipment in order for the bill 
of lading to be issued, and to indemnify him against all losses that stem from unfulfilling 
this obligation. Two points must be highlighted with regard to these duties. First, it is 
presumed that the duties mentioned herein cannot be transferred from the shipper to a 
third party along with the transfer of the bill of lading. 177F177F71 Secondly, the rule explicitly 
denies any limitation of carrier’s responsibilities and liability under the contract of 
carriage towards other persons, apart from the shipper. 
4.1.6 Article III rule 6 
Unless notice of loss or damage and the general nature of such loss or 
damage be given in writing to the carrier or his agent at the port of 
discharge before or at the time of the removal of the goods into the 
custody of the person entitled to delivery thereof under the contract 
of carriage, or, if the loss or damage be not apparent, within three 
days, such removal shall be prima facie evidence of the delivery by the 
carrier of the goods as described in the bill of lading. 
The notice in writing need not be given if the state of the goods has, 
at the time of their receipt, been the subject of joint survey or 
inspection. 
Subject to paragraph 6bis the carrier and the ship shall in any event 
be discharged from all liability whatsoever in respect of the goods, 
unless suit is brought within one year of their delivery or of the date 
when they should have been delivered. This period, may however, be 
extended if the parties so agree after the cause of action has arisen. 
In the case of any actual or apprehended loss or damage the carrier 
and the receiver shall give all reasonable facilities to each other for 
inspecting and tallying the goods. 
Article III rule 6 provides the carrier with a statutory time bar for claims against 
him. The provision relieves the carrier of any liability if no litigation or arbitration 
proceedings are brought within one year after the goods were delivered or should have 
been delivered unless the parties agree otherwise once the cause of action has arisen. 
Furthermore, rule 6 also creates a refutable presumption that the goods have been 
delivered by the carrier as described in the bill of lading unless notice of loss or damage 
has been given in writing to the carrier upon delivery of the goods at the discharge port 
or, in case the loss or damage is not that apparent, within 3 days after delivery. Lastly, 
the provision in its final paragraph vests the carrier and the receiver with the duty to 
facilitate each other in inspecting and tallying the goods in the case of actual or 
apprehended loss. It is supposed that this duty is owed by the carrier while the cargo is 
still on board the vessel, whereas it is owed by the receiver once the goods are 
discharged.178F178F72 
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The parties to the contract are not conferred a choice as to which limb of the time-
bar provision in rule 6 will come into play upon determining the commencement of the 1-
year time limit. In other words, the parties cannot decide arbitrarily whether the 
reference point should be the date of delivery of the goods, or the day when “they should 
have been delivered”. Conversely, the words “should have been delivered” are held to be 
applicable only when there had been no delivery of the cargo. 179F179F73 Thus, when determining 
whether there has been a valid delivery, time should start counting when the goods 
arrive at a legitimate place and, in case they do not do so as a result of, for example, 
losing the goods overboard or never loading them, time starts counting when they ought 
to have been delivered assuming the contract has been duly performed. Even in cases 
where the contract has been varied, it will be accepted that there has been a valid 
delivery but if, on the other hand, delivery takes place under a separate agreement, then 
there is no such delivery within the meaning of Article III rule 6. 180F180F74 
Besides issues related to the calculation of the 1-year time limit set by rule 6, 
controversies may also arise with regard to whether the commencement of arbitration or 
suit falls within this particular time-bar period. This can happen where the 
communication between the parties is not that unambiguous and that makes it difficult 
to assess whether the parties’ intent was indeed to begin arbitration or court proceedings 
or not. In The “Voc Gallant” 181F181F75 two preliminary issues arose: whether a message from the 
shipowners’ solicitors to the charterers constituted a notice to commence arbitration; and 
whether the 1-year time bar will apply also to a counterclaim raised in defence of the 
shipowner’s claim in the arbitration proceedings. The shipowners in that case claimed 
outstanding hire from the charterers, and in return the charterers brought a cross claim 
alleging that the owners breached Article III rule 2 of the Hague Rules. The one year 
time bar for the charterers cargo claimed expired on 11 November 2006. On 2 November 
2006 the shipowners’ solicitors sent a message to the charterers reading: 
In the circumstances, therefore, we are instructed to notify you that 
failing payment of the US$162.22.60 [sic] within 7 days of today’s 
date we are instructed to commence arbitration against you pursuant 
to clause 45 of the charterparty. 
[…] 
Failing payment, or in the alternative agreement to the appointment 
of one of the above arbitrators as sole arbitrator, we will appoint our 
own arbitrator… 
As to the first issue, the High Court ruled that the arbitration panel erred in its 
finding that this message did not constitute a notice that is sufficient to commence 
arbitration and that it was rather a mere demand. Judge Mackie QC also rejected the 
owners’ submission that the message constituted no more than a threat. The Court’s 
view was that the message of 2 November 2006 was a notice, through which one party 
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required another to appoint an arbitrator. In that sense, it invoked the arbitration 
agreement in the charter party and constituted a notice to commence arbitration. As to 
the second issue, the cross claim by the charterers against the shipowners was held not 
to be barred by Article III rule 6. The Court regarded all the claims and counterclaims 
together under the umbrella of the arbitration proceedings and did not apply the time 
bar separately to each claim and cross claim within the proceedings. 
4.1.7 Article III rule 6bis 
An action for indemnity against a third person may be brought even 
after the expiration of the year provided for in the preceding 
paragraph if brought within the time allowed by the law of the Court 
seized of the case. However, the time allowed shall be not less than 
three months, commencing from the day when the person bringing 
such action for indemnity has settled the claim or has been served 
with process in the action against himself. 
Article III rule 6bis was introduced as a proviso to rule 6, and it provides a party 
with an extended period, which stretches beyond the 1-year time bar, allowing him to file 
a claim for indemnity against a third party. This additional period, allowing a liable 
party to file a claim for indemnity, will depend on the law of the Court seized but shall 
be no less than 3 months after the person seeking indemnity has settled the claim filed 
against him. In other words, the time prescribed by rule 6 bis applies where, for 
example, a shipowner A, being liable to cargo owner B, claims an indemnity from 
shipowner C. It is important to note that while the claim by shipowner A to shipowner C 
should be under a contract of carriage governed by the Hague-Visby Rules in order for 
Article III rule 6 bis to apply, there is no such requirement that the claim by cargo owner 
B against shipowner A should also arise under a contract of carriage to which the 
Hague-Visby Rules are applicable. 182F182F76 
4.1.8 Article III rule 7 
After the goods are loaded the bill of lading to be issued by the 
carrier, master, or agent of the carrier, to the shipper shall, if the 
shipper so demands be a ‘shipped’ bill of lading, provided that if the 
shipper shall have previously taken up any document of title to such 
goods, he shall surrender the same as against the issue of the 
‘shipped’ bill of lading, but at the option of the carrier such document 
of title may be noted at the port of shipment by the carrier, master, or 
agent with the name or names of the ship or ships upon which the 
goods have been shipped and the date or dates of shipment, and 
when so noted, if it shows the particulars mentioned in paragraph 3 
of Article III, shall for the purpose of this article be deemed to 
constitute a ‘shipped’ bill of lading. 
Article III rule 7 grants the shipper the right to demand a “shipped” bill of lading, 
provided that he surrenders to the carrier any document of title 183F183F77 previously issued to 
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him by the carrier in accordance with Article III rule 3. The article goes further to 
specify that in case that the previously issued bill of lading is a “received for shipment” 
bill of lading, then no new bill is issued but instead the initial bill is usually stamped so 
that it shows that the goods have been loaded on board, which in essence converts the 
“received for shipment” bill of lading into a shipped bill of lading. The shipped bill is a 
classic form of a bill of lading which “indicates that the goods have been loaded on board, 
or shipped on a named vessel”.184F184F78 By showing that the goods are already on board, the 
shipped bill vests the shipper with the advantage of having evidence as to the date of 
shipment. 
4.1.9 Article III rule 8 
Any clause, covenant, or agreement in a contract of carriage relieving 
the carrier or the ship from liability for loss or damage to, or in 
connection with, goods arising from negligence, fault, or failure in the 
duties and obligations provided in this article or lessening such 
liability otherwise than as provided in these Rules, shall be null and 
void and of no effect. A benefit of insurance in favour of the carrier or 
similar clause shall be deemed to be a clause relieving the carrier 
from liability. 
Article III rule 8 disables the carrier to go below the limits of liability that are 
statutorily determined by the Hague-Visby Rules. Although, inter alia, Article III rules 1 
and 2 suggest that the obligations laid down thereby cannot be circumvented by the 
carrier, rule 8 expressly renders any such attempt to lessen liability null and void. In 
that sense, Art. III rule 8 can be perceived as the self-protective provision of the 
Convention. It does not prevent the parties to a bill of lading contract of carriage from 
agreeing on terms that stay outside the Convention, but it forbids limiting or eliminating 
the carrier’s liability as set in the Rules. In other words, the article allows freedom of 
contract when the shipowner’s liability, duties and obligations are increased, but this 
freedom to contract out is prohibited when it is done in the direction of diminishing 
those. 
4.2 Article II 
Subject to the provisions of Article VI, under every contract of carriage 
of goods by sea the carrier, in relation to loading, handling, stowage, 
carriage, custody, care and discharge of such goods, shall be subject 
to the responsibilities and liabilities and entitled to the rights and 
immunities hereinafter set forth. 
 This short article is crucial to the cargo-related duties of the carrier as it activates 
them and renders them applicable. It is this article which entitles the carrier with all his 
rights and immunities on the one hand, and obliges him to carry out all obligations and 
responsibilities with regard to a series of cargo operations. 
 The provision expressly states that the substantive rights and obligations “in 
relation to loading, handling, stowage, carriage, custody, care and discharge” are brought 
into play only under a contract of carriage. To understand the concept of the contract of 
carriage under the Hague-Visby Rules, one should look at Article I(b) which embodies a 
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documentary approach in defining the term. 185F185F79 Contracts of carriage are only those that 
are covered by a bill of lading or any similar document of title. This means that a 
contract of carriage should be differentiated from the contract to arrange carriage; from 
a contract for carriage, when a party contracts to procure carriage without undertaking 
the obligations of a carrier; and from a contract for the hire or use of a vessel. 186F186F80 However, 
the definition in Article I(b) goes on to include in its ambit also time or voyage 
charterer’s bills of lading from the moment they start regulating the contractual 
relations between a carrier and a holder of such a bill of lading or document of title. The 
stipulation is derived from one of the policy goals of the Hague-Visby Rules, which is to 
protect third parties. In this way consignees or endorsees who were not part of the 
negotiation process between the charterer and the shipowner will be safeguarded from 
any burdensome terms laid down in the charter party contract of carriage, to which they 
are not a party. 
 By making Article II subject to Article VI, the proviso in the beginning of the 
sentence provides room for freedom of contract in specific circumstances, allowing the 
carrier and shipper to come to any terms as to the responsibility and liability of the 
carrier on the condition that their agreement is not contrary to public policy, or to the 
care or diligence of the servants or agents of the contracting parties with regard to 
loading, handling, stowage, custody, care and discharge of the goods. Moreover, the 
parties are allowed to circumvent the Rules only in the exceptional case when no bill of 
lading is issued but instead a non-negotiable receipt is issued to cover goods in an 
extraordinary non-commercial carriage. 187F187F81 
4.3 Article III rule 2 
Subject to the provisions of Article IV, the carrier shall properly and 
carefully load, handle, stow, carry, keep, care for, and discharge the 
goods carried. 
The second paramount bundle of obligations embodied in the Hague-Visby Rules 
relates to the proper care for the cargo, including but no tlimited to its loading, stowing, 
lashing, dunnaging, handling, and discharging. 
The provision in rule 2 is short and lacks precision. That is why it raises various 
important questions that have to be dealt with separately, namely: (a) what is the 
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meaning of the phrase ”properly and carefully” – is the obligation overriding in character 
like the duty set forth in rule 1, or is it an obligation of a lower standard; (b) what is the 
relationship between Article III rule 2 and the exceptions in Art. IV; (c) can the duty to 
load, handle, stow, carry, keep, care for, and discharge the goods carried be delegated to 
other parties; (d) when is the the carried under this duty; (e) what is the burden and 
order of proof. 
(a) nature of the obligation and meaning of ”properly and carefully” 
Unlike the duty to provide a seaworthy ship, which was already discussed above, 
Article III rule 2 does not embody an overriding obligation. 188F188F82 Instead, this second 
important bundle of duties, to which a carrier is bound, has different nature and 
operation in cargo claims. 
In the opinion of Sir Norman Hill, rule 2 of Article III “is not a question of the 
carrier exercising due diligence” as it is in rule 1, but “[t]hat is an absolute obligation on 
the carrier during the voyage, and it is only qualified by the exceptions in Article 4.” 189F189F83 
These remarks distinguish the duty in Article III rule 2 as one of absolute nature that is, 
it is not reduced to exercising due diligence only as is the case with Article III rule 1. 
Regardless of this cardinal difference in the nature of the two main bundles of 
obligations, it should be borne in mind that the same circumstances, for instance the 
presence of rats in the ship’s holds before and during the journey, may be considered a 
cause for the breach of both rule 1 and rule 2 of Article III. 190F190F84  
Similarly, in The “Aliakmon”, where a consignment of steel coils was damaged 
during the voyage, the Counsel raised a seaworthiness argument about the lack of a 
system of mechanical ventilation on board the ship.191F191F85 However, Staughton J found this 
to be a matter of stowage than a matter of unseaworthiness. The explanation for that 
reasoning lies in the facts of the case – the steel was found to be damaged by, first, the 
way the goods were stowed in the holds and, second, by the fact that the steel coils were 
carried in the same hold where there had already been timber. It was assessed that the 
coils would not have been damaged had it not been for the timber consignment, which, 
without mechanical ventilation, creates condensation and moisture. 192F192F86 To sum up, 
depending on the facts of the case, the very same circumstances can lead to filing an 
action for damaged or lost cargo based on either Article III rule 1, or Article III rule 2, or 
both. As Langley J pointed out in The “Imvros”, “it is often not an easy question to 
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determine the moment when the line between bad stowage and unseaworthiness is 
crossed”.193F193F87 
With regard to the meaning of the words “properly and carefully”, it was clarified 
in the “Pyrene v Scindia” case.194F194F88 In Devlin J’s dictum, an interpretation of the phrase so 
as to mean that the carrier “shall do whatever loading he does properly and carefully” is 
more consistent with the object of the Hague Rules, rather than the more literal 
construction of the words, which is “[that] the carrier shall load and that he shall do it 
properly and carefully”. This first interpretation is preferred over the second one as the 
object of the Hague Rules are “to define not the scope of the contract service but the terms 
on which that service is to be performed”.195F195F89 In other words, the Rules specify the way in 
which these duties have to be performed, namely properly and carefully, and do not 
embody an obligation to perform per se. 
The standard indicated by the phrase ‘properly and carefully’ varies in accordance 
with the type of the voyage and the particular conditions that may occur throughout the 
journey. In The “Bunga Seroja” case, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne stressed on the 
contrastingly different conditions that may occur, by stating that “the proper stowage of 
cargo on a lighter ferrying cargo ashore in a sheltered port will, no doubt, be different 
from the proper stowage of cargo on a vessel traversing the Great Australian Bight in 
winter”.196F196F90 Hence, the required degree of care is dependent on the voyage, the cargo on 
board, the carrying vessel, and the knowledge that the parties have or ought to have had 
about all these elements. 
The word “carefully” means merely taking care and is considered by authors to be 
equivalent to the standard of reasonable care. 197F197F91 The latter is a subjective test to 
determine negligence, whereby the exercise of reasonable care is assessed and gauged by 
way of a comparison with what an ordinarily prudent and rational person would do in 
the same circumstances. 
The construction of the word “properly”, however, seems to be more problematic 
with regard to the element of skill that has to be exercised, and raises the issue whether 
this word conveys a higher standard of care. The counsel in another pivotal case, 
Albacora S.R.L. v. Westcott & Laurance Line, Ltd. (The “Maltasian”), tried to argue that 
the word “properly” meant “in the appropriate manner looking to the actual nature of the 
consignment…irrelevant that the shipowner and ship’s officers neither knew nor could 
have discovered that special treatment [is] necessary”.198F198F92 The panel in that case, however, 
rejected such a wide construction, pointing out to the unreasonable result that it would 
lead to if such a burden was placed on carriers. Instead, the court upheld the 
interpretation given in the 1957 case Renton v Palmyra (The “Caspiana”) where the 
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word “properly” is construed so as to mean “in accordance with a sound system”, which 
adds something more to carrying the goods “carefully”. 199F199F93 In The “Maltasian”, Lord 
Pearce and Lord Reid elaborate that this sound system does not follow to take into 
account all weaknesses and idiosyncrasies pertaining to a particular cargo but it shall 
rather reflect the general practice concerning the carriage of goods under the particular 
circumstances of the journey “in light of all the knowledge which the carrier has or ought 
to have about the nature of the goods”.200F200F94 Thus, “[the word ‘properly’] is tantamount, I 
think, to efficiency”, Lord Pearce summarized. 
On the facts of the case, The “Maltasian” concerned the carriage of wet salted fish 
from Glasgow to Genoa, which deteriorated during the voyage because it was carried in 
non-refrigerated compartments. The Court held that the carrier did not breach his duty 
to carry “properly and carefully” the cargo since the consignment was marked “Keep 
away from engines and boilers” – with which requirement the carrier complied – with no 
further instructions given by the consignors. Accordingly, the carrier was held to have 
applied a sound system in handling the cargo, and the damage was attributed to 
inherent vice of the cargo. The decision of the court in The “Maltasian” has become a 
reference point in later court decisions, and the case is cited by authors as a milestone in 
the interpretation of the words “properly and carefully”. 201F201F95 
Interpreting the Hague Rules in a way that renders the content of the phrase 
“sound system” equal to an “efficient system”, Lord Pearce refers to the common law 
position that he used as a guideline from which the Rules should not be radically 
different.202F202F96 His reasoning further elucidates that the duty laid down in rule 2 is not an 
obligation of result but an obligation of means, that is, it is not aimed at achieving the 
desired safe arrival of the goods but at carrying out the operations in question carefully 
and properly.203F203F97 
The reasoning in The “Maltasian” was adopted in the case The “Rio Sun” 204F204F98, where 
a consignment of crude oil deteriorated because it was not heated during the voyage, 
which led to some part of the oil, around 3,7%, becoming a hard waxy residue that could 
not be pumped. The judge ruled that there was no breach of Article III rule 2 on behalf of 
the shipowner since: the master did not deviate from standard practices and did not act 
carelessly; the great majority of crude oil worldwide, about 80%, does not require 
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heating, and there was not clear evidence whether the oil that was carried necessitated 
heating; the master had never carried such crude oil before and had known nothing 
about it; conversely, he had always carried crude oil without heating it and had 
considered this to be the usual practice; he also did not receive any instructions to heat 
the oil. Based on these facts, the shipowners were entitled to the provision in Article IV 
rule 2(m), thus relying on the inherent vice exception. 
Under certain circumstances, the duty to properly and carefully perform loading 
or unloading may well require the carrier to consult specialists and experts who can 
ensure that these operations could be successfully carried out. In The “Happy Ranger” 
the carrier was held liable for damage caused to heavy-lift cargo, which was dropped 
when the crane hook broke upon loading. The carrier was found, among other things, to 
have breached Article III rule 2 not only because of preparing a poor loading plan, but 
also because he failed to consult the classification society Lloyd’s with regard to whether 
the cranes of the carrier’s newly-built ship could handle the excessively heavy piece of 
machinery that was to be transported. 205F205F99 
Bottom line, both case law and legal literature 206F206F100 have shown that the level of 
care that a carrier is required to maintain cannot be gauged, and it depends on the facts 
of the case. In each case, the standard introduced by the term “properly and carefully” 
will depend on the particular cargo and the practices applied to that cargo, the voyage 
performed, the vessel employed as well as on the degree of knowledge that the carrier 
has on these factors. 
(b) relationship with the provisions of Article IV 
Unlike the obligation in rule 1, the one in rule 2 is expressly made subject to the 
exceptions laid down in Article IV. However, the level of care and the content of the 
obligation are not qualified by the exceptions listed in Article IV. 207F207F101 The result is that a 
party cannot lessen the duty laid down in rule 2 of Article III by invoking some of the 
exceptions in Article IV. Instead, the effect which the opening phrase of the rule has on 
the entire provision is that even if the carrier has breached the duty therein, he is 
entitled to a defence against his breach, provided he can prove that his case falls within 
the terms of the particular exception. 
In this regard, the relationship between Article III rule 2 and Article IV follows 
the common law approach.208F208F102 A carrier is bound to carry the cargo with reasonable care 
unless prevented by the excepted peril. For instance, in the case The “Aconcagua”209F209F103, 
mentioned hereinabove, the charterers failed to perform their duty to ‘properly and 
carefully load, handle, stow, keep, care for’ a container with a dangerous cargo, which 
they stowed next to a bunker tank that was heated during the voyage, causing the 
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container to explode. However, the charterers were not held liable as the heating of the 
cargo was considered by the court an ‘act, neglect, or default of the master, mariner, pilot, 
or the servants of the carrier…in the management of the ship’ and as such constituted an 
excepted peril under Article IV rule 2(a). 
On the other hand, if the excepted peril occurs as a result of the carrier’s failure 
to perform this duty, then he is held liable. 210F210F104 In the case The “Golden Lucy 1” 211F211F105, the 
carrier failed to discharge the cargo properly and carefully, and the recipient could see 
that the discharge operations were carried out badly and negligently but nevertheless he 
did not stop the discharge. The carrier submitted that this constituted act or omission of 
the owner of the goods within Article IV rule 2(i), thus seeking exoneration from liability. 
The court rejected the carrier’s submission and stated that a carrier who does not comply 
with Article III rule 2 acts on his peril and cannot engage the defences in Article IV rule 
2 by asserting that the cargo owners should direct the carrier in performing its 
responsibilities under Article III rule 2. In the court’s dictum, to assume the opposite 
would be tantamount to contracting out of responsibility, which is something expressly 
prohibited by Article III rule 8. 
(c) is the duty delegable or not 
The question whether the carrier may contract out his cargo-related obligations 
gives rise to a lot of confusion. A literal construction of rule 2 clearly points to the carrier 
as the party who has to carry out this duty. There is no doubt that absent an agreement, 
which modifies the allocation of duties, it is the ship and her owner who are responsible 
for loading, stowing and discharging cargo, and the consequences of a failure to perform 
these tasks fall on them. Moreover, any such agreement relating to the obligation 
contained in Article III rule 2 is likely to be eventually rendered invalid by the Hague-
Visby Rules. This is so, because objective and literal interpretation of the law will 
suggest that delegating this obligation to third parties will lessen a carrier’s liability 
otherwise than as provided in the Rules and will be null and void by force of Article III 
rule 8. 
However, the existing commercial practices point otherwise. The contractual 
delegation of the obligation to load, stow, trim and discharge the cargo has turned, 
therefore, into one of the three exceptions to the Hague-Visby Rules; the other two being 
the on-deck carriage and the carriage of live animals. In many cases the responsibility 
for loading/stowing/trimming/unloading was transferred from the carrier to the 
charterer. This practice has been recognized by the court in several English decisions 
such as the early “Pyrene”212F212F106 and “Renton”213F213F107 as well as the pivotal case The “Jordan 
II”. 214F214F108 In the latter case, Lord Steyn provided a solid and comprehensive argument in his 
interpretation of Article III rule 2. He commented that the Hague Rules partly 
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harmonized the diverse national laws by means of regulating freedom of contract in 
certain areas only. That is why, in his opinion, the seaworthiness obligation in Article III 
rule 1 was undoubtedly a fundamental obligation which cannot be transferred, whereas 
the cargo-related obligation in Article III rule 2 consisted of tasks, some of which (in 
particular loading, stowing and discharge) were of less fundamental character and, 
therefore, the owner could delegate them to another party. 215F215F109 
Thus, the non-mainstream practice of incorporation in the bill of a clause which 
expressly allocates the legal responsibilities and the functions of the parties regarding 
loading, stowage and discharging of cargo has turned in some jurisdictions into a 
permissible deviation from the Rules. 216F216F110 Such a clause is generally called FIOS(T), which 
can be found in the Gencon charter party or in clause 8 of the NYPE charter party. In 
essence, the clause provides that the charterer instead of the shipowner will bear the 
costs and risk associated with loading, stowing, trimming and unloading the cargo. 
With regard to the validity of FIOS(T) clause, it has been already established that 
under English law parties are at liberty to allocate in their contract of carriage the 
various operations involved regarding the loading, stowing, and discharging the cargo. 
This precedent, which has been in existence since the 1950s judgments in the “Pyrene v 
Scindia” and the “Renton v Palmyra” cases, will be carefully analyzed in Chapter III of 
the thesis that is dedicated to the carriage of goods on FIOS(T) terms. Other crucial 
court judgments that are relevant to the problem such as The “Jordan II”, The “Eems 
Solar”217F217F111, ‘The Coral’218F218F112, ‘Ismail v. Polish Lines’ 219F219F113 as well as the Dutch Supreme Court 
case The ‘Favoriet’220F220F114 will also be reviewed under scrutiny. 
(d) when does this duty arise and when does it cease 
Unlike the duty regarding seaworthiness, which applies before and at the 
beginning of the voyage, the obligation to “properly and carefully load, handle, stow, 
carry, keep, care for, and discharge the goods carried” is a continuing one and carriers 
should perform it throughout the contractual journey.  
The relevant period throughout which a carrier is under the duty set in Article III 
rule 2, and in particular the moment when it begins and when it ceases, represents a 
central problem for allocating the liability for cargo which is damaged upon loading or 
discharge. Solutions to these issues are found in the provisions which define the 
operation and applicability of the Rules. In order to outline the limits of this particular 
period, Devlin J construed Articles I(b), (e), and II in the pivotal case “Pyrene v Scindia”, 
where goods were damaged after they were delivered to the carrier but before they 
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passed the ship’s rail. 221F221F115 Although the central issue in this case is related to the 
immunities and protection from liability under the Hague Rules, the dictum given by 
Devlin J regarding the temporal operation of the Rules has to be discussed as it is 
considered undoubtedly correct by authors and judiciary. 222F222F116 
Article I(b) states that: 
[a] "contract of carriage" applies only to contracts of carriage covered 
by a bill of lading or any similar document of title, in so far as such 
document relates to the carriage of goods by water, including any bill 
of lading or any similar document as aforesaid issued under or 
pursuant to a charter-party from the moment at which such bill of 
lading or similar document of title regulates the relations between a 
carrier and a holder of the same; 
Then paragraph (e) of Article I lays down the definition of “carriage of goods”, 
which 
…covers the period from the time when the goods are loaded on to 
the time they are discharged from the ship. 
In “Pyrene v Scindia”, Article I(e) is construed as a tool for identification of the 
first and the last of a series of operations, which constitute the carriage, and not as a 
time marker as the rights and liabilities under the Hague Rules are not attached to a 
period of time but to a specific contract of carriage, and therefore paragraph (e) serves 
merely “to assist in the definition of contract of carriage”.223F223F117 An argument for this view is 
found in the word “covers”, which is far from being specific and does not intend to specify 
a precise moment of time. 
Furthermore, Devlin J rejected the submission by the claimants that loading 
should be divided into two parts (the first being lifting the cargo to the ship’s rail and the 
second one being taking the cargo on board and stowing it), and that the first stage, 
namely the operations on the shore side of the ship’s rail, fell outside the operation of the 
Rules. Instead, he ruled that the ship’s rail has no longer such significance in 
transferring risk and liabilities.224F224F118 He pointed out that Article I(e) of the Hague Rules 
should apply to the entire process of loading, even when the goods haven’t crossed the 
ship’s rail yet. Accordingly, the operation of the Rules is determined by the contract of 
carriage, and not by a time limit, and the duty set in Article III rule 2 is thus activated 
upon the first cargo-related operation listed in Article II in accordance with what the 
parties have agreed in their contract. 
An important observation is that the period of responsibility of the carrier is not 
affected by the so called FIOS(T) clause, which is discussed in details in Chapter III, and 
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which generally transfers some or all of the cargo-related obligations of the carrier to the 
shipper. As it will be further observed in the next Chapter, this clause is a mere 
delegation of certain duties but the carrier remains otherwise responsible for the cargo 
(e.g. he is obliged to care for the cargo): “[…] the whole contract of carriage is subject to 
the Rules, but the extent to which loading and discharging are brought within the 
carrier’s obligations is left to the parties themselves to decide”.225F225F119 Having noted that, it is 
important that no stages of the cargo-related operations are excluded from the contract 
of carriage even when they are delegated to another party. 226F226F120 
Furthermore, the carrier’s responsibility over the cargo may end upon discharging 
the goods into lighters.227F227F121 
Terminating the period of responsibility of the carrier is also a problem that 
deserves a more thorough comment. It is common knowledge that delivery of the cargo 
may take place after the discharge operations are completed – delivery may, for instance, 
take place at the warehouse. In such a situation, a major determinant whether the 
period of responsibility ends upon completing discharge or upon delivery is the fact 
whether the bill of lading has been duly surrendered (in which case it becomes a spent 
bill of lading). This is so because the contract is fully discharged only when the bill is 
surrendered and there are no obligations pending on either side.228F228F122 Therefore, should the 
B/L be not surrendered, the carrier period of responsibility will also cover the period 
between discharge of the cargo from the vessel until delivery. If, on the other hand, the 
bill of lading is surrendered, the period of responsibility of the carrier under the Rules 
will end upon completion of discharge and he may limit his liability, otherwise than 
under the HVR, for misdelivery or for loss or damage that the goods, for example, 
sustained in the warehouse. 229F229F123 
These difficulties reflect the scope of the 1924 Convention (tackle-to-tackle) as 
opposed to the scope of modern-day contracts of carriage. Both the Hague Rules and the 
Hague-Visby Rules do not concentrate much on the process of delivery of the goods. That 
subject is addressed in the Convention only with respect to the starting of the notice 
period and the time bar period. 230F230F124 That is why it is arguable whether delivery is a 
statutory obligation under the Rules and, what is more, there is no uniformity on that 
matter.231F231F125 The rationale in the Rules in that regard is based on a practice that was 
common decades ago – namely that, when the ship arrives at the port, the consignee and 
holder of the bill of lading was present on-site to claim his goods, which means that the 
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contract of carriage becomes discharged with the completion of unloading of the cargo. 
Nowadays, this is not necessarily the case as contractual arrangements have become 
much more complicated. The discussion about the carrier’s period of responsibility is yet 
another example that the Hague-Visby Rules are outdated in more than one aspect. 
(e) burden and order of proof 
The burden of proof in a cargo claim under the Hague-Visby Rules is far from 
difficult to be established, and yet in many cases it is a critical issue for asserting 
liability. In order to invoke Article III rule 2, particularly, a shipper must first prove loss 
or damage to the goods, while they were in the position of the carrier, which shifts the 
burden to the latter. The claimant shippers or cargo owners need neither to establish 
how the damage or loss occurred nor to adduce evidence of fault on behalf of the carrier. 
Instead it suffices for them only to establish that the cargo was damaged or lost while it 
was in the custody of the carrier. 232F232F126 If they succeed in showing this, they prove a 
contentious fact which is a sufficient component in their claim. Put differently, a 
refutable presumption of liability is created by proving that the carrier has received the 
goods under a clean bill of lading and then has delivered them in a bad order and 
condition. This presumption is implied by Article III rule 4 of the Hague-Visby Rules and 
the phrase “prima facie” found therein suggests that it can be rebutted. 233F233F127 
On that point the carrier has two options – he can either rebut the allegation of 
the shipper, and thus overturn his claim, by proving absence of causation, meaning that 
the carrier must prove that, on the facts, the cause for the loss was not his fault or 
negligence and that he fulfilled his obligations under Article III rule 2 to exercise proper 
and careful care in the handling of the cargo; or he can resort to the defences provided in 
Article IV and thus legally excuse himself from liability. In the former scenario, the 
burden reverts back to the claimant who should disprove the defence of the carrier, while 
in the latter scenario, where the defendant carrier proves that his case qualifies for an 
exception, the burden falls again on the claimant who must show negligence on behalf of 
the carrier, which will disentitle the defendant to rely on the exception invoked. 
To sum up, the burden of proof has a fault-based liability framework with 
reversed order. Professor Schoenbaum is correct in noting that the burden of proof “shifts 
more frequently than the winds on a stormy sea”.234F234F128 While this system is not so clearly 
codified in the Hague-Visby Rules, it has been developed and shaped by the courts. 235F235F129 
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The question of the burden of proof is of utter significance in cases which contain 
completely unexplained events.236F236F130 For example, in The “Devon”237F237F131 the defendant buyers 
Petronas alleged that at the point of discharge the cargo of high-viscosity oil did not meet 
the contractual specification of up to 1% water content, and hence Petronas refused to 
pay for the price and rejected the cargo. On the facts, the oil was loaded in Yanbu, Saudi 
Arabia on the transferring vessel Centaur and then through a ship-to-ship transfer at 
Port Sudan on the receiving vessel Devon, which carried the cargo to Singapore. Various 
measurements and samples were taken at all stages of the voyage. They revealed that 
the water content in the shore tanks before loading was 0.2%; no free water was found in 
the tanks of the Centaur vessel prior loading and no water was found in the cargo after it 
was loaded and before the ship-to-ship transfer took place; traces of water were found 
only in the tanks of the Devon vessel after the cargo was discharged but these traces 
were well within the contractual specifications of 1%. The unusually high content of 
water in the oil was found in shore line samples at the oil terminal in Singapore only 
after the receiving vessel Devon started discharging. The Court of Appeal did not fall in 
the fallacy of The “Popi M”238F238F132 and, affirming the first instance ruling, came to the 
conclusion that the appellant Petronas were unable to prove on the balance of 
probabilities that the cargo was contaminated with water on the Devon vessel and, 
accordingly, the claimant sellers of the cargo were entitled to the full price of the cargo. 
The contamination was indeed a mystery but Petronas was not able to discharge the 
burden of proof and hence their appeal on that issue was dismissed. 
4.4 Carriers’ cargo-related duties under charter parties 
Charter parties are not statutorily governed by the Hague Rules, Hague-Visby 
Rules or any other international maritime regime. Instead they are regulated by the 
general provisions of contract law and by arbitral and judicial decisions that interpret 
the usually standardized clauses found in a charter party.239F239F133 Of course, bills of lading 
issued to a third party pursuant to a charter party will be rendered subject to the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. 240F240F134 For example, a shipowner transporting bulk or break bulk 
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cargo, which has been sold on FOB terms, will usually conclude a charter party with the 
buyer (since, according to Incoterms 2010, it is the buyer’s obligation to provide a 
transporting vessel), meaning that their contractual relationship will not be governed by 
a liability regime unless agreed otherwise. 241F241F135 Whereas when such cargo is carried in the 
case of a preceding CIF or CFR sale, the charterer will be the CIF/CFR seller of the 
goods (according to Incoterms 2010, the seller must contract for the carriage of the 
goods), and the bills of lading issued by the shipowner to the seller (charterer) pursuant 
to the charter party, will be subsequently negotiated/transferred to the CIF/CFR buyer 
of the goods who, vis-à-vis the carrier, is a third party B/L holder, meaning that their 
contractual relationship will be governed by the bills and, hence, will be subject to the 
statutory provisions of the respective liability regime applied. 
Additionally, a charter party may become affected by a liability regime also in 
case that the parties choose to expressly incorporate a convention such as the Hague-
Visby Rules, or parts of the Rules, to their charter party contract of carriage. The 
incorporation clause is referred to as Clause Paramount and it should be a proper and 
logical statement of the intention of the parties. In fact, nowadays many standard forms 
of time charters (NYPE, Shelltime) and voyage charters (Gencon, Asbatankvoy) are 
Hague or Hague-Visby Rules based and have a Clause Paramount either printed or 
added as a rider clause. The clause will guarantee that even when the Rules do not apply 
compulsory, they will apply by contract. 242F242F136 Depending on the incorporation, this may 
create a situation where the shipowner and the charterer shall in their disputes refer to 
the clauses in the charter party, except for matters envisaged in the Hague-Visby Rules. 
In other words, if the Rules are incorporated in their entirety, all charter party terms 
and conditions which are contrary to the Rules will be rendered null and void. In that 
sense the Rules can be applicable to charter parties as well. 
4.4.1 Legal issues relating to the loading and stowing of cargo 
As mentioned above, charter party contracts of carriage lie outside the ambit of 
the Hague-Visby Rules. Hence, the transfer of the responsibility for loading and stowage 
of the cargo from the shipowner to the charterer does not cause such a conundrum. Yet, 
the delegation of this duty has been a subject of debate in the industry and in law. In a 
charter party contract of carriage, the charterer is obliged to make the cargo available to 
load, but the duty to properly and carefully load, stow and unload the cargo normally 
stays with the shipowner. However, many charter forms, such as the NYPE form, 243F243F137 
provide to the contrary and allow for the transfer of these duties to the charterer. The 
result is that it is the charterer who is responsible for performing these operations, and 
in case that the shipowner must compensate a cargo owner under a bill of lading for lost 
or damaged cargo, the charterer must subsequently indemnify the shipowner. 244F244F138 
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When it comes to loading operations, nowadays shipping practices and modern 
technical developments have made needless the outdated “over the ship’s rail” rule, 
whereby the loading operations were traditionally divided between shipowners and 
charterers in accordance with whether the goods have crossed the ship’s rail. 245F245F139 This is 
mainly due to the fact that the ship’s tackle is no longer the major means of loading 
and/or discharging the cargo as nowadays these operations are usually performed either 
by mechanical equipment, such as cranes and elevators, or by professional stevedores 
who may be hired either by the shipowners or by the charterers. 246F246F140 The appointment of 
stevedores by the charterers (thus, the stevedores will be acting as the charterers’ 
agents) leads to another modern shipping practice, which is the transfer of certain cargo-
related obligations from the shipowners to the charterers via a FIOS(T) clause that is 
included in the charter party. 
Usually, three main questions underlie the transfer of the obligations to load, 
stow, trim, and discharge the cargo: first, this is the question of who is the party that 
will actually perform these obligations; secondly, this is the question of cost, or who is 
the party that will pay for them; and the third question is the one of responsibility, or 
who is the party that will be held liable for cargo damage that may take place thereby. 
The applicability and enforceability of such a clause (FIOS) under a charter party will be 
addressed in detail in Chapter III, section 4.4 below. This free-in/free-out contractual 
arrangement has given rise to various legal problems, which have been addressed on 
numerous occasions by English courts, and these will be thoroughly analyzed in the 
abovementioned section of Chapter III. 
4.4.2 Legal issues relating to the discharge and delivery of cargo 
It is common ground that a carrier is under the implied obligation to deliver the 
cargo to the party entitled to receive the goods, i.e. the consignee as stated in the bill of 
lading. Prior to doing that, the master of the vessel is required to tender a notice of 
readiness (NOR), which is in essence a paper or a telex document. This is to inform the 
notify party awaiting shipment that their cargo has arrived and is ready to be 
discharged. 
As discussed in the introductory Chapter I, a bill of lading is a document of title 
and therefore a carrier should deliver the cargo only to a lawful holder of a bill of lading. 
Otherwise, he may be held liable for misdelivery and breach of contract or for the tort of 
conversion. Commercial realities, however, sometimes necessitate shipowners to face 
certain risks when they are asked by the charterers to deliver the cargo, against a letter 
of indemnity (LOI), to a party who does not hold a document of title or whose document 
of title is invalid (e.g. a “to order” bill of lading, which has not been endorsed). Releasing 
cargo against a letter of indemnity is neither wrong nor unusual, but this commercial 
decision hides its risks.  
First of all, although the letter of indemnity represents a comfort against any 
claim, by accepting to release the cargo without production of the bill of lading, the 
shipowner loses his P&I cover.  
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Secondly, a master should be aware that the undertakings in the letter of 
indemnity are conditional upon delivery of the goods to the party named therein. 247F247F141 
The third risk concerns the peculiar situation where the letter of indemnity is 
issued by the receiver to the charterer, and then the shipowner is sued for wrongful 
delivery. Can a shipowner rely on the letter of indemnity issued to the charterer? Two 
English cases answer this question in the affirmative. In both The “Laemthong Glory”248F248F142 
and The “Jag Ravi”249F249F143, the court ruled in favour of the shipowners who succeeded in 
arguing that they were agents of the charterers in delivering the goods to the receivers 
and as such benefited from The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, which 
allows a non-contracting party to enforce part or all of the contract. Accordingly, the 
receivers had to indemnify the shipowners following the letter of indemnity issued by 
them to the charterers. 
Another important consideration as regards discharge and delivery of the cargo 
under charter parties is that these two may take place at a different moment. This 
situation will arise when the bill of lading contains FIO arrangements,250F250F144 and more 
precisely free-out terms. In this case delivery will place before discharge because the 
shipowner has contracted out the duty to unload the cargo and, hence, as soon as the 
holds are opened and the goods are ready to be discharged, delivery is deemed to be 
completed. 
On the other hand, delivery may take place after discharge if this is set in the 
contract of carriage. In this case, the shipowner is bound by the Hague-Visby Rules, 
provided the Rules have been incorporated in the charter party, only until the 
completion of the discharge operations due to the period of operation of the respective 
liability regime.251F251F145 From the moment the goods are discharged from the ship up until 
their delivery, the shipowner may limit his liability in case of, for example, misdelivery 
or when cargo has been damaged or lost in a warehouse. 
5. The obligations of the carrier over the cargo under the 
Rotterdam Rules 
5.1 The launch of a new liability regime: foreword 
The very name of the Convention, 252F252F146 as opposed to the Hague-Visby Rules 
(International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law relating to Bills of 
Lading), indicates that the Rotterdam Rules are contractually oriented. This notion can 
be derived also by the format and way of drafting of the particular international 
instrument – while the style of the Hague-Visby Rules follows the architecture of a bill of 
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lading, the Rotterdam Rules assume a style of a legal instrument that is something more 
than a liability regime. The Rotterdam Rules go further and have been developed as a 
convention on the contract of carriage. The result is a complex structure consisting of 96 
articles divided in 18 chapters, which reflects the purpose behind the new Convention – 
to provide uniform regulation of contracts for the international carriage of goods wholly 
or partly by sea. 
Although the phrase “new Convention” has been widely used throughout this 
section, it should be emphasized that authors perceive the Rotterdam Rules as an 
evolutionary instrument rather than a revolutionary one. 253F253F147 The rationale behind the 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly 
or Partly by Sea (the Rotterdam Rules), in a narrow sense, is to substitute the leading 
international liability regime, the Hague-Visby Rules, which, although being accepted 
and favoured for over 80 years by the international shipping community, have not been 
implemented uniformly and is, moreover, nowadays significantly dated. Even the Visby 
protocol was signed only in the beginning of the container era and by that time door-to-
door contracts of carriage were not a benchmark in international shipping. Not to 
mention that the protocol did not change significantly the 1924 Hague Rules, which, 
being already 90 years old, are the kernel of the Hague-Visby Rules. Thus, the 
Rotterdam Rules strive to modernize the law by closing the gaps between the Hague-
Visby Rules and the modern-time shipping practices such as containerization, the use of 
electronic transport documents, and multimodal carriage of goods which provides door-
to-door service. In this context, the analysis will focus on how and to what extent the 
provisions of the new Convention will alter the carrier’s obligations and liabilities over 
the cargo. Furthermore, the book will try to find an answer to the question whether the 
new liability regime is capable of achieving commercial predictability in international 
shipping transactions should it come into force. 
In a wider sense, the philosophy behind the UN Convention is the replacement of 
the status quo, which comprises of a rather chaotic system of outdated maritime liability 
regimes (the Hague Rules, the Hague-Visby Rules, the Hamburg Rules) as well as 
national and regional alternatives, and also hybrid regimes that incorporate some 
elements from both the Hague (Visby) Rules and the Hamburg Rules. 254F254F148 This is the 
reason why some authors are of the opinion that international sea transport law is a 
victim of fragmentation.255F255F149 Achieving harmonization in the legal framework of 
international carriage of goods by sea was a key goal already in 1920s when the Hague-
Rules were drafted. This is evidenced by the very name of the convention: International 
Convention for the Unification of certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading 
[emphasis added]. However, the legal context of nowadays international carriage of 
goods by sea is undoubtedly characterized by disparity and a lack of harmony and a 
universal system for carriage of goods, which results in legal uncertainty and the 
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ensuing increased legal expenses that the shipping industry is facing. 256F256F150 That is why this 
section of the current thesis will deal also with the question whether the new 
international regime can indeed achieve the intended worldwide uniformity257F257F151 as well 
as with the impact it would be likely to have should the Rules be ratified and adopted. 
Promoting uniformity is statutorily set in Article 2 of the new Convention, 258F258F152 which 
suggests that the ambition of the drafters is the creation of a global regime. The 
introduction of uniform shipping laws worldwide will promote maritime commerce 
because shipping is an international industry. Uniformity will also promote clear judicial 
rules, which will facilitate courts when they have to apply foreign law and to adjudicate 
on a case between parties with diverse nationality.  
It should be reminded that the drafting and ratification of an international 
Convention alone is only the first step towards uniformity of law. Once a Convention is 
ratified, the new provisions must be properly and uniformly enacted by the relevant 
legislative body in all contracting states, and, equally important, these provisions must 
be then interpreted in an identical manner by the Court so that they provide uniform 
and predictable results everywhere. 259F259F153 Ideally, if this goal is achieved, all parties 
involved in sea shipping will be afforded legal certainty as the law will be applied 
uniformly wherever a dispute is adjudicated. The more predictable the results, the less 
necessary it will be for the parties to resort to litigation when settling their disputes and 
the easier it is for them to efficiently allocate the risks. 260F260F154 
5.2 Defining the principal parties to a contract of carriage 
Since the new Convention stretches beyond the sea leg of a carriage of goods, and 
thus regulates more complex commercial and legal relationships, it includes definitions 
and terminology which designate parties that were unknown to previous liability 
regimes. The “performing party” and the “maritime performing party” are a novelty and 
unique concepts introduced by the Rules. 
The “carrier” under the Rotterdam Rule is the contractual carrier, namely the 
“person that enters into a contract of carriage with a shipper”.261F261F155 This definition follows 
the approach taken by the Hague-Visby Rules, which means that it is expressly open-
ended and not at all exhaustive. Yet, the contractual nexus under the Rotterdam Rules 
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may be on a unimodal sea basis as well as on a multimodal basis as long as there is a sea 
leg in the transportation process. 262F262F156 Moreover, the new convention adds up these two 
additional definitions mentioned above – the performing party and the maritime 
performing party. The Rotterdam Rules define the contractual carrier but make no 
mention of an actual carrier, as it is under the Hamburg Rules for example 263F263F157, and yet 
these two new principal actors may be the actual carrier. 
A “performing party”, as the name suggests, is a person 264F264F158 other than the carrier 
who performs the carrier’s obligations under the contract of carriage with respect to the 
receipt, loading, handling, stowage, carriage, care, unloading or delivery of the goods, 
and who is under the carrier’s direct or indirect supervision or control.265F265F159 The inference 
derived from this definition is that any or all of these operations listed above can be sub-
contracted by the carrier to a performing party, which means that a performing party 
may be an ocean carrier, an inland carrier, a stevedoring company, a terminal or 
warehouse operator, but he may well be an agent of the carrier, an independent 
contractor, or a sub-contractor.266F266F160 The performing party is thus defined in a very broad 
way and it includes essentially everyone who acts on the side of the carrier. There are, 
however, several requirements laid down in the definition that should be met by a party 
in order to qualify for a performing party. First, a performing party should be a natural 
or legal person other than the carrier himself. Secondly, the performing party should, 
besides having a connection with the carrier, perform or undertake to perform at least 
one of his specific contractual obligations listed in Article 1.6(a): receipt, loading, 
handling, stowage, carriage, care, unloading or delivery of the goods. Thirdly, a 
performing party should act, directly or indirectly, at the carrier’s request or under his 
supervision or control. The rationale behind this wording is seen as to make the 
definition able to embrace any contractual chain no matter how long it is. 267F267F161 
A “maritime performing party” is a sub-category of the performing party that 
performs or undertakes to perform any of the obligations of the carrier but only within 
the period between the arrival of the goods at the port of loading and their departure 
from the port of discharge. 268F268F162 Thus, a maritime performing party may include a sea 
subcarrier269F269F163, tug boats (as long as they are actually towing the vessel and not merely 
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assisting in navigation), stevedores, terminal operators, warehouse keepers, lightering or 
barge operators, independent lashing and stowing companies as well as inland carriers 
provided that they perform their services exclusively within the area of the port. 270F270F164  
The performing party and the maritime performing party are the product of the 
“maritime plus” concept of the new Convention and its extended material scope of 
application, whereby the carrier’s period of responsibility can stretch from door to door in 
cases of multimodal transport. The inclusion of stages of the carriage that are 
complementary to the maritime leg introduced these two new parties. The performing 
party is perceived to be involved on the carrier’s side in a door-to-door carriage, whereas 
the maritime performing party’s involvement is confined within the port-to-port stage. 271F271F165 
Equally important is that the new Convention treats differently these two new actors. 
Maritime performing parties are rendered subject to the same obligations and liabilities 
that are imposed on the carrier and are entitled to same defences and limits of liability, 
given that some conditions are fulfilled. 272F272F166 On the other hand, performing parties 
(referred to by some authors as non-maritime performing parties for the sake of easier 
differentiation) are recognized by the Rotterdam Rules, but not incorporated in the 
liability regime of the Rules and, hence, no duties are imposed on them. Therefore, the 
obligations and liabilities owed by a non-maritime performing party under a multimodal 
contract of carriage with a sea leg are to be assessed by the relevant applicable law and 
not by the Rules. 
5.3 Identity of the carrier 
As observed in the introductory chapter above, identifying the defendant carrier 
can be an obscure matter. Often claimants, when confronted with this problem, cannot 
penetrate through the façade of the various transportation documents and thus their 
contractual counterpart may remain unknown. The bill of lading holder has to identify 
on whose behalf the master is acting when issuing the bill of lading. This could be either 
the vessel owner or the charterer as in cases where the vessel is sub-chartered there may 
be the issue of identifying which charterer precisely is the contractual carrier. 
The approach taken in the Rotterdam Rules provides a straightforward solution 
to that problem. Article 37 assists the shipper in identifying its contractual counterpart 
in the following way: 
Article 37 
Identity of the carrier 
1. If a carrier is identified by name in the contract particulars, any 
other information in the transport document or electronic transport 
record relating to the identity of the carrier shall have no effect to the 
extent that it is inconsistent with that identification.  
2. If no person is identified in the contract particulars as the carrier as 
required pursuant to article 36, subparagraph 2 (b), but the contract 
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particulars indicate that the goods have been loaded on board a 
named ship, the registered owner of that ship is presumed to be the 
carrier, unless it proves that the ship was under a bareboat charter at 
the time of the carriage and it identifies this bareboat charterer and 
indicates its address, in which case this bareboat charterer is 
presumed to be the carrier. Alternatively, the registered owner may 
rebut the presumption of being the carrier by identifying the carrier 
and indicating its address. The bareboat charterer may rebut any 
presumption of being the carrier in the same manner.  
3. Nothing in this article prevents the claimant from proving that any 
person other than a person identified in the contract particulars or 
pursuant to paragraph 2 of this article is the carrier. 
The provision is an elaborate attempt to deal with any issue that may occur in 
identifying the contractual carrier. The three paragraphs envisage three circumstances. 
First, when the carrier’s name is found on the contract particulars, this information shall 
be paramount as any information found in the transport document or electronic 
transport record that is inconsistent with it shall have no effect, which means that any 
demise or identity of carrier clauses found in a bill of lading will be invalidated. 273F273F167 The 
second paragraph gives a solution when no carrier is named in the contract particulars. 
In this case, a rebuttable presumption is created that the contractual carrier is the 
registered owner, on whose vessel the goods have been loaded. The shipowner may rebut 
this presumption in two ways: he can either prove that the vessel has been under a 
bareboat charter at the time of the carriage and indicate the charter’s address, which the 
bareboat charterer may likewise rebut in his turn, or indicate the true contractual 
carrier and provide his address. The third paragraph keeps the option open for a 
claimant to prove that a party is the contractual carrier regardless of which party is 
indicated as a carrier pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article. These three rules 
are all-embracing and they significantly facilitate a claimant when choosing which party 
to sue in case of short, damaged or lost cargo. What is more, the cargo interests under 
the Rotterdam Rules can claim against two parties at the same time, because the carrier 
and one or more maritime performing parties are jointly and severally liable.274F274F168  
5.4 The obligations of the carrier over the cargo 
5.4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 of the Rotterdam Rules is dedicated to the obligations of the carrier. An 
important remark is that the heading of the chapter is not entirely indicative of its 
content. Of all the six articles in the chapter, three provisions (Article 11, 13, and 14) lay 
down obligations per se for the carrier, one provision (Article 12) stipulates the period of 
responsibility of the carrier, and two provisions (Article 15 and 16) actually provide 
certain rights for the carrier. The reason why these two latter articles were included in 
that chapter is that they were contemplated by the draftsmen as exceptions to the 
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obligations of the carrier and as such, and to that extent, they belong to Chapter 4. 275F275F169 
Last but not least, the Rotterdam Rules were designed as an instrument that is, above 
all, pragmatic and capable of solving practical issues, which can partly explain the 
peculiar order of the provisions on the obligations of the carrier. 276F276F170 
To begin with, in its part on defining the duties of the carrier, the new Convention 
mostly assumes the philosophy of the Hague-Visby Rules by laying down positive duties 
for the carrier.277F277F171 In particular, the contents of Article III rules 1 and 2 HVR is 
preserved, albeit with certain amendments and modifications which go beyond the 
relevant Hague/Hague-Visby provisions. Together with the traditional duties already 
introduced by the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, the Rotterdam Rules impose additional 
duties for the carrier, such as the duty to receive the goods (Article 13 RR) and the duty 
to deliver them to the consignee (Article 11 and 13 RR). Secondly, the new Convention 
explicitly embodies issues that have been implicit in prior international liability regimes. 
For instance, the Rotterdam Rules expressly cover in Article 1.1 and Article 11 the core 
duty of the carrier to carry the cargo from one place to another, whereas under the 
Hague-Visby Rules this is only implicitly assumed. 278F278F172 Thus, the new Convention 
represents a modified and updated version of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules so far as the 
carrier’s obligations are concerned. 
With regard to the two traditional and fundamental obligations – the ones related 
to the cargo (Article 13) and to the ship (Article 14) – they have underwent certain 
modifications under the new Convention to the extent that they exceed in scope the 
corresponding provisions of the Hague-Visby Rules – Article III rule 1 and 2, 
respectively. It should be noted, however, that Articles 13 and 14 of the Rotterdam Rules 
modify the content of the respective Hague-Visby provisions only insofar as to adapt the 
obligations of the carrier to the extended multimodal scope of the new Convention, which 
applies to door-to-door carriage, and to the new technology and modern shipping 
practices.279F279F173 The general observation is that, having expressly defined in detail all core 
functions of the carrier, the new Convention seems to be well calibrated and with better 
architecture as regards the obligations of the carrier over the cargo. 
The cargo-related obligation, which is laid down in Article 13.1 of the Rotterdam 
Rules, requires the carrier to “properly and carefully receive, load, handle, stow, carry, 
keep, care for, unload and deliver the goods”. There are three novelties in this provision 
as opposed to the corresponding Article III rule 2 of the Hague-Visby Rules. First, 
reception and delivery of the goods are now included among the functions that a carrier 
has to perform. Secondly, and most importantly, Article 13.2 allows some of these tasks 
                                               
169 These insights of the author of this thesis were confirmed during personal discussions with prof. Gertjan 
van der Ziel – Professor Emeritus of Transport Law, Erasmus University Rotterdam and Head of the 
Netherlands Delegation to UNCITRAL WG Transport Law. 
170 Philippe Delebecque – ‘Obligations of the Carrier’, published in: ‘The Rotterdam Rules 2008: Commentary 
to the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by 
Sea’ / ed. Alexander von Ziegler, Johan Schelin, Stefano Zunarelli, Alphen aan den Rijn : Kluwer Law 
International (2010), ISBN9789041131485, p. 71, at p. 74. 
171 Dr. Theodora Nikaki – ‘The Fundamental Duties of the Carrier under the Rotterdam Rules’, (2008) 14 
JIML, p. 512 at p. 513. 
172 See section 4.1 supra for a summary of the duties owed by the carrier under the Hague-Visby Rules. 
173 Dr. Theodora Nikaki – ‘The Carrier’s Duties under the Rotterdam Rules: Better the Devil You Know?’, 
Tulane Maritime Law Journal, Vol. 35, No 1 (Winter 2010), p. 1. 
CHAPTER II: THE CARRIER’S OBLIGATIONS OVER THE CARGO UNDER THE HVR AND THE RR 
 
71 
to be contracted out and performed by the shipper, the documentary shipper or the 
consignee. Thirdly, the provision is titled “Specific obligations”, as opposed to the 
following article regarding seaworthiness named “Specific obligations applicable to the 
voyage by sea”. This wording, combined with the “maritime plus” nature of the 
convention, suggests that the scope of this second obligation is not restricted to sea 
carriage only but is applicable also for the non-sea legs of the journey. Hence, the carrier 
is obliged to care for the cargo throughout the period of his responsibility, irrespective of 
the mode of transport employed in the performance of the contract of carriage. Again, the 
provisions regulating the bundle of cargo-related duties, namely Article 13.1 as well as 
Article 11 of the Rotterdam Rules, are in the centre of attention of the current thesis 
and, as such, particular attention will be devoted to them in the following sub-sections 
below. 
A few words will be dedicated to the other fundamental obligation as well – the 
one related to the vessel. Article 14 of the Rotterdam Rules follows the three aspects of 
seaworthiness as laid down in Article III rule 1 of the Hague-Visby Rules. 280F280F174 The 
provision comprises (i) the ship’s physical condition, which is her actual seaworthiness; 
(ii) her proper manning and crewing; (iii) and the fitness of the ship’s holds and other 
parts, which is commonly referred to as a ship’s cargoworthiness. Following the Hague-
Visby Rules approach, the obligation to provide a seaworthy vessel under the Rotterdam 
Rules is not a duty of an absolute nature, as it is under common law, but it is reduced to 
a duty to exercise due diligence to ensure that the vessel is seaworthy. 281F281F175 Likewise, the 
duty is non-delegable since Article 18 renders the carrier liable for failure in carrying out 
his duties, even when the carrier entrusts the particular tasks to his employees, agents, 
independent contractors (i.e. performing parties), or any person who acts directly or 
indirectly at the carrier’s request or under his supervision or control. 
However, Article 14 of the Rotterdam Rules amends the seaworthiness obligation 
in several ways. First of all, the duty is extended to cover the whole sea journey, which 
means that carriers should exercise due diligence during the voyage and not only before 
and at the beginning of it as it is under the Hague-Visby Rules. This is also highlighted 
by the wording of the particular provision – the Hague-Visby Rules’ Article III rule 1 (a), 
which reads “Make the ship seaworthy”, has been modified in the Rotterdam Rules’ 
Article 13.1 into “Make and keep the ship seaworthy”. The change of the relevant time at 
which a carrier is under the said obligation is justified by the UINCITRAL on the 
grounds that it would be in line with the International Safety Management (ISM) Code 
and the latest safe shipping requirements. 282F282F176 Another argument in support of imposing 
this obligation upon the carrier also during the journey is that communication has 
improved nowadays and advanced tracking systems allow easy and constant contact 
between carriers and their vessels while they are at sea. 283F283F177 Yet, extending the obligation 
so as to include the voyage does not compel carriers to exercise the same diligence and to 
have the same behaviour before and at the beginning of the journey on the one hand, and 
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during the journey on the other, so as to meet the requirement set in Article 14. In that 
sense, authors remind that a different degree of diligence is due when, for example, a 
ship is at a safe port and when it is in a winter ocean storm since, apparently, a 
reasonable carrier is expected to exercise more care in the former situation given the 
particular circumstances. 284F284F178 
Secondly, the Rotterdam Rules modify the duty to exercise due diligence so as to 
include container-worthiness as well (besides seaworthiness and cargoworthiness), and 
thus to take into account the importance of containerization in nowadays international 
shipping.285F285F179 It should be noted, however, that the provision applies only to containers 
that are supplied by the carrier and not to those supplied by the shipper. The latter 
qualify as goods by force of Article 1.24. 
5.4.2 The obligation to carry and deliver the goods (Article 11) 
Article 11 
Carriage and delivery of the goods 
The carrier shall, subject to this Convention and in accordance with 
the terms of the contract of carriage, carry the goods to the place of 
destination and deliver them to the consignee. 
Article 11 of the Rotterdam Rules is a novelty in comparison with the Hague-
Visby Rules as it expressly imposes on the carrier the obligation to carry and deliver the 
goods subject to the provisions of the new Convention and of the respective contract of 
carriage.286F286F180 The article should not be viewed in isolation as the obligation enshrined 
therein is also supplemented by the provisions in Article 1.1 287F287F181 and Article 13.288F 288F182 
Accordingly, the carrier is required, against payment of freight, to properly and carefully 
carry the goods from one place to another and deliver them to the consignee at the place 
of destination, which may not necessarily be the port of discharge, as specified under the 
contract of carriage.289F289F183 The consignee is stated, under Article 1.11, to be the “person 
entitled to delivery of the goods under a contract of carriage or a transport document or 
electronic transport record”. 
In addition, the words “in accordance with the terms of the contract of carriage”, 
found in Article 11, produce the effect that the obligation to carry the goods does not go 
beyond what would be recognized under contract law, which is why some authors 
                                               
178 Michael F. Sturley, Tomotaka Fujita, Gertjan van der Ziel – ‘The Rotterdam Rules: The UN Convention 
on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea’, Sweet & Maxwell (2010), ISBN 
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179 The Rotterdam Rules, Chapter 4, Article 14 (c). 
180 In comparison, Article III rule 1 of the Hague-Visby Rules lays down how the contract of carriage should 
be carried out but there is no provision that explicitly states that the carrier must perform the core 
obligation under the contract of carriage, which is to carry the goods. 
181 Article 1.1 states:  “Contract of carriage” means a contract in which a carrier, against the payment of 
freight, undertakes to carry goods from one place to another. The contract shall provide for carriage by sea 
and may provide for carriage by other modes of transport in addition to the sea carriage. 
182 See Chapter II, section 5.4.3 infra. 
183 The reason why Article 11 speaks of “place of destination” instead of “port of discharge” is that the 
Convention must be in line with its maritime plus character, and, accordingly, the carrier’s cargo-related 
obligation to carry and deliver the goods may extend even to a non-sea leg of the carriage if the last mode of 
carriage is not a sea-going vessel. 
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question the practical use of the provision. 290F290F184 What this article actually requires from the 
carrier is, in essence, to perform the contract. Thus, the wording of Article 11 limits the 
scope of the obligation to what has been agreed in the contract of carriage, meaning that 
the carrier is not obliged to carry the goods per se but only to perform the carriage to the 
extent of what he contracted. For example, the carrier is not under the obligation to 
perform a door-to-door carriage if he preferred and contracted to provide only port-to-
port services. 
Another implication which stems from the words “in accordance with the terms of 
the contract of carriage” is that parties are actually free to insert into their contracts of 
carriage other terms that are outside the ambit of the convention. 291F291F185 However, a 
contract, which is missing the carrier’s obligation to carry the goods from one place to 
another, does not constitute a contract of carriage within the Rotterdam Rules, simply by 
inference of the definition laid down in Article 1.1. 
Article 11 may seem redundant especially in the light that any of the prior 
maritime legal regimes do not have a corresponding provision, and yet they proved to 
have functioned properly. However, one practical importance of Article 11 is that, as 
already pointed out in section 3.1 above, it provides rules on misdelivery, which is 
delivery of the goods in undamaged condition but to the wrong person. In contrast, since 
the Hague-Visby Rules do not have a corresponding provision, misdelivery of the goods 
under some jurisdictions is not considered breach of the Rules but a breach of the 
contract of carriage.292F292F186 The Rotterdam Rules put an end to the dispute whether 
misdelivery constitutes breach of the Hague or Hague-Visby Rules or not (and, hence, 
whether the limitations of liability apply) by redefining carrier’s core functions to carry 
and deliver the cargo as obligations in Article 11. Thus, misdelivery under the 
Rotterdam Rules simply qualifies as a breach of one of carrier’s cargo-related obligations, 
which is to deliver the goods to the consignee. 
5.4.3 The obligation to exercise care for the cargo (Article 13) 
Article 13 
Specific obligations 
1. The carrier shall during the period of its responsibility as defined in 
article 12, and subject to article 26, properly and carefully receive, 
load, handle, stow, carry, keep, care for, unload and deliver the 
goods. 
2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this article, and without prejudice 
to the other provisions in chapter 4 and to chapters 5 to 7, the carrier 
and the shipper may agree that the loading, handling, stowing or 
unloading of the goods is to be performed by the shipper, the 
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documentary shipper or the consignee. Such an agreement shall be 
referred to in the contract particulars. 
Article 13 is the main provision enshrining the carrier’s cargo-related obligations. 
Although the duties enlisted therein are referred to by the drafters as core 
responsibilities or core obligations, 293F293F187 the heading of the provision may suggest that 
there is something particular and specific about these obligations. However, one should 
not put too much emphasis on the heading “specific obligations” as the article simply 
enumerates general obligations of the carrier that are related to the cargo. This 
discrepancy can be explained with the logic and consistency of the system employed in 
the Rotterdam Rules, which codifies the duty of the carrier to carry and deliver the goods 
(Article 11) and thus the remaining cargo-related duties are systematized as specific 
tasks that are distinguishable from the general obligation. Nonetheless, such a 
conundrum is of little practical significance. 
As already established, Article 13 RR originates from Article III rule 2 of the 
Hague-Visby Rules.294F294F188 In both provisions – Article III rule 2 of the HVR and Article 13 of 
the RR – the cargo-related obligation is a continuous one but while in the Hague-Visby 
Rules this is implied, the Rotterdam Rules expressly state that the duty of care of the 
cargo applies during the whole period of responsibility of the carrier that is, during the 
time the carrier has custody of the goods.295F295F189 Thus, under a door-to-door contract of 
carriage, the carrier will be under the obligation to perform these particular tasks with 
respect to all legs and stages of the carriage. 
 In essence, the respective provisions of both regimes represent a bundle of cargo-
related duties that the carrier is bound to perform. Article 13 of the Rotterdam Rules, 
however, modifies these duties in several ways, and this modification will be observed 
from three perspectives: (a) the content of the obligation; (b) its scope of operation, and 
(c) the possibility to be delegated to other parties. 
(a) content of the obligation 
Firstly, Article 13.1 enumerates a wide range of tasks that a carrier has to 
perform properly and carefully: to receive, load, handle, stow, carry, keep, care for, 
unload, and deliver the cargo. During the discussions of UNCITRAL’s Working Group III 
on Transport Law, these duties were referred to as “core responsibilities”, “core 
obligations”, and “core functions”. 296F296F190 The default position is that the carrier is 
responsible for performing these duties, and in case the goods are damaged or lost as a 
result of a failure to perform any of them properly and carefully, he will be liable for a 
breach of contract. The standard used to clarify the term “properly and carefully” is 
derived from the construction of the corresponding Article III rule 2 of the Hague-Visby 
Rules. The extensive jurisprudence on the interpretation of the said term has been 
intentionally preserved by the drafters of the Rotterdam Rules. 297F297F191 In this way the well-
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forged jurisprudence under the Hague-Visby Rules conveys the same meaning to the 
term “properly and carefully” under the Rotterdam Rules. Therefore, the appropriate 
degree of care is the same under both regimes, namely the carrier must carry out his 
duty of care in accordance with a sound system in the light of all knowledge which he 
has or ought to have had about the nature of the goods. 298F298F192 
The duty of care of the cargo applies only to those operations which the carrier 
agrees to perform. 299F299F193 Therefore, there is no absolute obligation on the carrier to properly 
and carefully load, handle, stow or unload the goods but the provision rather imposes on 
the carrier the obligation to properly and carefully carry out only the tasks for which he 
assumed responsibility in the contract of carriage. 300F300F194 Such a position reflects the 
interpretation of the term ‘properly and carefully’ given by the English court that the 
carrier “shall do whatever loading he does properly and carefully”.301F301F195 In addition, 
pursuant to an agreement between the carrier and the shipper under Article 13.2 of the 
Rotterdam Rules, the shipper will also be bound to properly and carefully perform 
loading, handling, stowing and/or unloading of the cargo.302F302F196 
At first glance, the obligations enumerated in Article 13 follow neatly the 
obligations listed in Article III rule 2 303F303 F197 of the Hague-Visby Rules but for two additional 
duties that are included in the new convention. The novelty in the updated list of 
obligations is that the carrier is required also to receive the goods and to deliver them to 
the consignee. These two additional duties are necessitated by the door-to-door scope of 
the Rotterdam Rules and the ensuing extended period of responsibility of the carrier. 304F 304F198 
Although enumerated among the others, the two obligations have a distinct nature as 
they – unlike loading, handling, stowing, and unloading – cannot be contracted out in 
accordance with Article 13.2. This means that the duties to receive and deliver the goods 
cannot be performed by other parties but only by the carrier. Hence, as observed by some 
authors, a situation may arise where, with regard to the same cargo, a carrier will be 
responsible for the ultimate delivery of the goods to the consignee even when the 
unloading operations are carried out by the shipper. 305F305F199 Another result of including, in 
particular, the duty to deliver the cargo among the other cargo-related obligations is that 
claims for misdelivery will be based on the Rotterdam Rules, whereas, by contrast, the 
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Hague-Visby Rules do not provide for rules on misdelivery. 306F306F200 Thus, under the 
Rotterdam Rules, the carrier may rely on the liability exclusion provisions (Article 17) or 
on the liability limitation provisions (Article 59) in case of alleged misdelivery. 307F307F201 
With regard to the duty of the carrier to receive the goods, Article 13 should be 
interpreted in the light of Article 12.1, reading that “[t]he period of responsibility of the 
carrier […] begins when the carrier […] receives the goods for carriage”, and of Article 
27.1, stating that “[…]the shipper shall deliver the goods ready for carriage.” Read 
together, these two articles induce authors to make the inference that this specific 
obligation to receive the goods is placed on the carrier only with respect to goods that are 
intended for carriage.308F308F202 Alternatively, if a carrier receives goods for other purposes, such 
as storage until further instructions on behalf of the cargo interests, the Rotterdam 
Rules will not be triggered and it will be the relevant provisions of national law that will 
apply.309F309F203 
(b) scope of operation 
Secondly, the temporal scope of operation of Article 13 is inextricably linked to 
the period of responsibility of the carrier as set in Article 12. 310F310F204 Accordingly, the period of 
the obligation to exercise care over the cargo has been extended, as compared to the 
Hague-Visby Rules, and now it comprises possible non-sea legs of the journey as well. 
Thus, Article 13 applies not only during the period between loading the goods on the ship 
and discharging them from it, but it may also apply during the time while the goods are 
under the control or possession of the carrier before loading and after discharge. The 
result is that Article 13 will apply to any mode of transport that is employed under the 
contract of carriage, and this is a result of the door-to-door scope of the Convention. 
However, Article 13.1 provides for a reservation over the extended scope of the 
obligation, making it subject to Article 26 on the carriage preceding or subsequent to sea 
carriage: 
Article 26 
Carriage preceding or subsequent to sea carriage 
When loss of or damage to goods, or an event or circumstance 
causing a delay in their delivery, occurs during the carrier’s period of 
responsibility but solely before their loading onto the ship or solely 
after their discharge from the ship, the provisions of this Convention 
do not prevail over those provisions of another international 
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instrument that, at the time of such loss, damage or event or 
circumstance causing delay: 
(a) Pursuant to the provisions of such international instrument would 
have applied to all or any of the carrier’s activities if the shipper had 
made a separate and direct contract with the carrier in respect of the 
particular stage of carriage where the loss of, or damage to goods, or 
an event or circumstance causing delay in their delivery occurred; 
(b) Specifically provide for the carrier’s liability, limitation of liability, 
or time for suit; and 
(c) Cannot be departed from by contract either at all or to the 
detriment of the shipper under that instrument. 
In case of conflicting provisions between the Rules and a unimodal international 
convention, Article 26 ensures the priority of the unimodal instrument regarding the 
period before loading and after discharge of the goods if the unimodal convention would 
have applied under a separate and direct contract between the shipper and the carrier in 
respect of that particular stage of the carriage; if it specifically makes a provision on the 
carrier’s liability, limitation of liability, or time for suit; and if it cannot be contractually 
departed from to the detriment of the shipper. Hence, if the international unimodal 
instrument – regulating, for example, the carriage by road, rail or air – meets these 
preconditions, the carrier can be exempted from liability under the Rotterdam Rules 
during the period before loading and after discharge, and in this case it will be that other 
international instrument that will govern his liability. It should be reminded that Article 
26 does not extend to national laws. Equally important, the Rotterdam Rules give way to 
a relevant unimodal convention, under the circumstances described above, only with 
regard to localized damages that took place before loading or after discharge. 
Alternatively, in case that the loss, damage or delay in delivery took place during more 
than one transport leg or if the moment of that damage or loss cannot be identified, 
which is usually the case with containerized cargo, 311F311F205 then it will be the Rotterdam Rules 
that apply. 
After having explored the effect of Article 26, as it is, on Article 13.1, mention 
may here be made that the reference to Article 26 (“The carrier shall during the period of 
its responsibility as defined in article 12, and subject to article 26, properly and 
carefully…” [emphasis added]) is actually wrong because it is the result of a drafting 
mistake. During the negotiations, the Working Group subjected Article 13.1 to Article 26 
indeed, but that Article 26 had a different content and was, in fact, a different provision. 
The initial Article 26 was related to what is known as mixed contracts of carriage 
whereby, in case of a successive carriage under one contract of carriage, a carrier could 
be responsible only for one part of the voyage, whereas he could act as an agent (or quasi 
freight forwarder) for the shipper for another part of the carriage under a through bill of 
lading.312F312F206 Such a provision was highly criticized by part of the shipping industry for 
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limiting too much the carrier’s contractual obligations to carry and deliver the goods and 
was, therefore, abandoned whereas the draft Article 26 was deleted. Thus, Article 26 
became the one that we can find nowadays in the Rotterdam Rules but the drafters 
omitted to make a corresponding correction in Article 13.1 by deleting the reference 
phrase “and subject to article 26”. A modification of Article 13.1, however, cannot be now 
made because this matter concerns a point of substance and it will not be merely a 
correction of a technical drafting error. Such technical amendments have already been 
made with regard to, for example, Article 1(6)(a) and Article 19(1)(b) 313F313F207 following the 
procedure for the correction of errors in texts or in certified copies of treaties laid down 
in Article 79(2) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 314F314F208 In the case of Article 
13.1, however, such an amendment is not possible.315F315F209 
(c) transferability of the obligation 
Thirdly, Article 13.2 renders part of the cargo-related duties delegable to other 
parties. Thus, the second paragraph of the provision virtually upholds the contentious 
FIOS(T) clause,316F316F210 which will be further analyzed in detail in Chapter III, section 5. 
5.5 The period of responsibility of the carrier (Article 12) 
Establishing the temporal scope of a carrier’s responsibility is essential for 
determining at what point the cargo-related obligations arise and when they cease. The 
nature of the Rotterdam Rules (being a maritime plus instrument with a “door to door” 
scope of application) predetermines the extended operation of the Convention, as 
compared to the Hague-Visby Rules, and thus the longer period of responsibility of the 
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carrier. Article 12 prescribes that this period stretches from the moment when a carrier 
or a performing party receives the goods up until they are delivered to the consignee. 
Article 12 
Period of responsibility of the carrier 
1. The period of responsibility of the carrier for the goods under this 
Convention begins when the carrier or a performing party receives the 
goods for carriage and ends when the goods are delivered. 
2. (a) If the law or regulations of the place of receipt require the 
goods to be handed over to an authority or other third party from 
which the carrier may collect them, the period of responsibility of the 
carrier begins when the carrier collects the goods from the authority 
or other third party. 
(b) If the law or regulations of the place of delivery require the carrier 
to hand over the goods to an authority or other third party from 
which the consignee may collect them, the period of responsibility of 
the carrier ends when the carrier hands the goods over to the 
authority or other third party. 
3. For the purpose of determining the carrier’s period of responsibility, 
the parties may agree on the time and location of receipt and delivery 
of the goods, but a provision in a contract of carriage is void to the 
extent that it provides that: 
(a) The time of receipt of the goods is subsequent to the beginning of 
their initial loading under the contract of carriage; or 
(b) The time of delivery of the goods is prior to the completion of their 
final unloading under the contract of carriage. 
Formulated this way, the provision sets a period of responsibility which covers 
the time during which the carrier has possession or control of the goods either personally 
or through a performing party. That is, the period of responsibility of the carrier under 
the Rotterdam Rules coincides with the period during which he is in charge of the goods, 
and it is important to note that this period will not start if the shipper fails to deliver the 
goods to the carrier.  
The third paragraph of Article 12 of the Rotterdam Rules, however, allows 
contractual deviation from the period outlined in the first two paragraphs, but only if the 
deviation does not go beyond the tackle-to-tackle concept that can be found in, and that 
originates from, Article I (e) of the Hague-Visby Rules.317F317F211 In other words, following the 
door-to-door principle, the new Convention keeps the carrier responsible from the 
moment he receives the goods, may that be at the manufacturer’s premises, until their 
delivery, which may well be the buyer’s warehouse inland. Strictly speaking, the period 
of responsibility is thus significantly broadened under the Rotterdam Rules as compared 
to the Hague-Visby Rules. However, the parties to the contract of carriage are afforded, 
by means of Article 13.3, a possibility to agree on the time and location of receipt and 
delivery, and thus to opt for a more limited period of responsibility following, for 
example, the port-to-port rule, a concept introduced by the Hamburg Rules, or to reduce 
                                               
211 Article I (e) of the Hague-Visby Rules prescribes: “‘Carriage of goods’ covers the period from the time when 
the goods are loaded on to the time they are discharged from the ship.” 




it to the tackle-to-tackle rule. Yet, the parties are virtually prohibited to agree on terms 
which render the period of responsibility shorter than the tackle-to-tackle concept found 
in the Hague-Visby Rules. In other words, the proviso in Article 12.3 of the Rotterdam 
Rules upholds freedom of contract, but this freedom is limited to the extent that the 
carrier is not allowed to contractually receive the goods after the beginning of their 
initial loading, and he is not allowed to contractually deliver them before the completion 
of their final unloading, either. In case the carriage of the goods is multimodal, the terms 
“initial loading” and “final unloading” refer to the relevant multimodal contract of 
carriage. However, in cases where the carriage is multimodal but the contract is not, 
these two terms refer to the loading and unloading of the seagoing vessel under the 
particular contract of carriage covering the sea leg. 318F318F212 
Also, the second paragraph of Article 12 addresses the issue where, after the 
shipper surrenders the cargo and before the carrier receives it, the goods are, pursuant 
to the relevant laws or regulations, in the possession of an authority or other third party, 
who is not an agent of either the shipper or the carrier; as well as where the carrier 
hands over the goods to an authority or other third party before they are collected by the 
consignee. This exceptional problem is considered to be typical for port-to-port 
contracts319F319F213 and Article 12.2 gives a clear-cut solution to that issue by prescribing that, 
in such a situation, the period of responsibility of the carrier will begin when he collects 
the goods from that authority or other third party. Likewise, the carrier’s period of 
responsibility will come to an end when he hands the cargo over to that authority or 
other third party. 
In conclusion, the purpose of such a modifiable door-to-door regime, as regards 
the period of responsibility, was not promoting a fully-fledged multimodal convention but 
rather creating a maritime regime which reflects the current commercial reality that sea 
carriage is usually preceded or followed by another mode of transportation. 320F320F214 What is 
more, limiting the scope only to the sea leg was deemed to impede the harmonization 
and uniformity of transport law. 321F321F215 
5.6 Burden of proof 
The burden of proof in cargo claims under the Rotterdam Rules is very similar to 
that under the Hague-Visby Rules. 322F322F216 And yet, while the fault-based system of the 
Hague-Visby Rules was shaped by jurisprudence, the new Convention expressly provides 
in Article 17 the architecture of the burden of proof, starting with the provision that the 
initial burden of proof lays on the claimant. Article 17.1 of the Rotterdam Rules states 
that the “carrier is liable for loss of or damage to the goods, as well as for delay in 
                                               
212 Michael F. Sturley, Tomotaka Fujita, Gertjan van der Ziel – ‘The Rotterdam Rules: The UN Convention 
on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea’, Sweet & Maxwell (2010), ISBN 
978-1-84703-734-3, p. 62, para. 4.008. 
213 Francesco Berlingieri – ‘A Comparative Analysis of the Hague-Visby Rules, the Hamburg Rules and the 
Rotterdam Rules’, a paper delivered at the General Assembly of the AMD in Marrakesh on November 5-6, 
2009, p. 6: 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/workinggroups/wg_3/Berlingieri_paper_comparing_RR_Hamb_HVR.pdf 
214 Working Group III (Transport Law), 9th session (New York, 15-26 April 2002) – UNCITRAL Report of the 
Working Group on Transport Law. See: A A/CN.9/510, para. 28. 
215 (ibid) Working Group III (Transport Law), 9th session (New York, 15-26 April 2002) – UNCITRAL Report 
of the Working Group on Transport Law. See: A A/CN.9/510, para. 28. 
216 See Chapter II, section 4.3(e) supra. 
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delivery, if the claimant proves that the loss, damage, or delay […] took place during the 
period of the carrier’s responsibility”. This means that at this initial stage the claimant 
needs not to establish any breach of the obligations of the carrier. Again, following the 
Hague-Visby Rules system, the burden of proof shifts on the defendant carrier, who has 
two alternatives: either to show under Article 17.2 that there is no causal connection 
between the fault of the carrier or any person for whom he is liable, on the one hand, and 
the loss, damage or delay, on the other hand (i.e. proving absence of fault); or to prove 
that the loss, damage or delay is attributable to a cause that qualifies for one or more of 
the excepted perils listed in Article 17.3, which create a presumption that the carrier is 
not at fault. From that point on, the Rotterdam Rules codify the burden of proof in a 
more sophisticated manner. The claimant is afforded three alternatives by means of 
Article 17 paragraphs 4 and 5. He can prove either that the excepted peril was caused by 
the carrier or by any person for whom the carrier is liable (Article 17.4(a)), or that an 
event or circumstance not listed as an excepted peril contributed to the loss, damage or 
delay (Article 17.4(b)),323F323F217 or that the loss, damage or delay was caused by or contributed 
to by the unseaworthiness of the vessel (Article 17.5(a)). 324F324F218 In essence, the Rotterdam 
Rules follow the Hague-Visby framework and codify the principles that were created and 
shaped by jurisprudence. 
5.7 What lies ahead: prospects of the new Convention to modernize and 
harmonize the law 
The author of this work is far from advocating for the Rotterdam Rules but 
merely points to the obvious need of modernization of the regulatory framework of 
shipping. It is difficult to disagree that the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules are brilliantly 
devised. Their long lifespan are good evidence for their success and an indication that 
the Rules achieved to a considerable extent their aims – to reach a fair balance of the 
carrier’s and shipper’s interests, and to attain a standard set of provisions that are 
uniformly applied. However, one should not forget the legislative history of the Rules, 
which was deliberately presented in the beginning of this chapter. The Hague-Visby 
Rules were released in 1968 but, as discussed, they add very little to the then existing 
1924 Hague Rules. The same is true for the 1979 SDR unit Protocol, which is also an 
amendment bringing little substantial changes. The Hague Rules, on the other hand, 
were based and heavily relied on the US Harter Act, which was enacted in 1893. 325F325F219 This 
is already as long ago as the end of the 19th century; a time when steamships were still 
the major vessels in use in the world of shipping. 
                                               
217 In that second scenario, the burden of proof shifts back on the defendant carrier who may try to prove 
that this event or circumstance is not attributable to his fault or to the fault of any person for whom he is 
liable. 
218 In the latter scenario, the carrier may, under Article 17.5(b), either prove that there is no causal 
connection between the unseaworthiness of the vessel and the loss, damage or delay, or prove that he 
exercised due diligence to make and keep the ship seaworthy. 
219 See Robert C. Herd & Co. v Krawill Machinery Corp., [1959] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 305, at p. 308 and p. 308, fn. 3: 
“The legislative history of the [COGSA] Act shows that it was lifted almost bodily from the Hague Rules of 
1921, as amended by the Brussels Convention of 1924, 51 Stat. 233.” […] “The Hague Rules as amended by 
the Brussels Convention were, in turn, based in part upon the pioneering Harter Act of 1893, 27 Stat. 445, 46 
U.S.C. Sects 190-196. See H. R. Re. No. 2218, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7.” 




The above sections showed that the Rotterdam Rules offer a more elaborate and 
comprehensive architecture of the obligations of the carrier. The new Convention is 
intentionally based on the corresponding provisions of the Hague-Visby Rules, and yet it 
makes explicit what the Rules leave implicit. This well-calibrated structure of the 
carriers’ cargo-related obligations is devised to reflect modernized shipping practices 
such as multi-modal carriage in addition to the sea leg, the carriage on free in and out 
terms, as well as the transportation of containerized cargo and deck cargo. Furthermore, 
the comprehensive rules set down in the new Convention purport to be capable of 
ensuring the so needed harmonization and uniformity in the legal framework of 
international shipping. 
Whether these goals will be attained, of course, depends on the international 
acceptance of the Rotterdam Rules, which are currently far from being ratified by the 
necessary number of countries that is required in order to trigger their entry into force. 
The shipping community, however, is not unanimous about the Rotterdam Rules and its 
impact should they come into force. Numerous shipping countries which operate 
substantial fleets are concerned that the new Convention puts too much burden on 
carriers and thus fails to strike a fair balance between the responsibilities of the carrier 
and the shipper. 
One interesting opinion in this regard is that what matters most for any 
international liability regime is uniformity and not the division of responsibilities in 
particular: 
“[I]n the view of the [ICC], uniformity is the one important thing. It 
does not matter so much precisely where you draw the line dividing 
the responsibilities of the shipper and his underwriter from the 
responsibilities of the carrier and his underwriter. The all-important 
question is that you draw the line somewhere and that that line be 
drawn in the same place for all countries and for all importers." 326 F326F
220
 
The aim of the Rotterdam Rules is, in essence, to establish a liability regime that 
is pragmatic enough to facilitate maritime commerce and keep cases away from 
litigation, and not one that is elegant or simple. The benefit that is brought by greater 
uniformity was particularly acknowledged by Knud Pontoppidan, the Executive Vice-
President of the Danish business conglomerate A.P. Moller-Maersk AS.327F327F221 During a 
discussion on the final text of the Rules at a CMI conference in October 2008, he noted 
the greater responsibility imposed on carriers by the Rotterdam Rules as opposed to the 
Hague-Visby Rules but underlined in the same time that this would be outweighed by 
the benefits that the carriers will attain by the resulting greater uniformity if the new 
                                               
220 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules in Regard to Bills of Lading for the Carriage 
of Goods by Sea: Hearing on Executive E Before a Subcommittee of the Senate on Foreign Relations, US 
Senate, 70th Congress, 1st Session. 3 (1927) (statement of Charles S. Haight, chairman of the ICC, advocating 
for the US ratification and adoption of the Hague-Rules), reprinted in 3 ‘The Legislative History of the 
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act and the Travaux Préparatoires of the Hague Rules’ (compiled and edited by 
Michael F. Sturley; 1990) (n 14) at p. 327. 
221 The Group A.P. Moller-Maersk AS has a variety of businesses primarily in the field of transportation, 
logistics and energy, and is the largest container ship and supply vessel operator in the world as well as an 
undisputed leader in the international shipping industry. 
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regime is promptly ratified so that it enters into force. 328F328F222 The need of internationally 
applicable rules is also upheld by the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) – a 
globalized industry such as the shipping industry, which is perhaps also the most 
international one, should be regulated by international rules that are uniformly accepted 
and implemented so that conflict of laws, litigation and legal costs are reduced. 329F329F223 
No one can tell for sure whether one day the Rotterdam Rules will come into force 
but what lies ahead can be summed up into three alternatives. The first possibility is 
that the Rotterdam Rules be ratified by the major shipping countries, which will lead not 
only to their entry into force but also to their acknowledgment as a leading maritime 
liability regime. This will put an end to the fragmentation of international regimes (i.e. 
the Hague Rules, the Hague-Visby Rules, the Hamburg Rules) and will foster 
uniformity. The prospects for this possibility seem to be reasonable given the 25 
signatory countries, among which there are leading maritime and trading nations, 
carrier-oriented countries and shipper-oriented countries as well as both developed and 
developing countries.330F330F224 
Secondly, the new Convention may be ratified by the minimum required number 
of states, and thus come into force, but without receiving international acknowledgment 
and support. In this scenario the new Convention will turn into just another liability 
regime contributing to the further fragmentation of the legal framework regulating the 
carriage of goods by sea, which will inevitably impair international trade.  
The third possibility is that the Rules do not receive the necessary support and 
ratifications and as a natural result the effort of UNCITRAL and CMI will be wasted, so 
will be the opportunity to achieve uniformity and modernization in the international 
transport law governing the carriage of goods by sea. Eminent scholars are of the opinion 
that should this happen, the “patchwork system of competing and outdated multilateral 
conventions” will continue to exist, partially supplemented by national and regional 
regimes.331F331F225 
However, in case the Rotterdam Rules are to be rejected by the international 
community, it is more likely that the status quo will not be preserved, for the current 
leading liability regimes can no longer meet today’s needs of the shipping industry. As a 
result, big shipping nations will be more likely to issue their own domestic legislation 
which will create a system of regionalism and in the end of the day all parties involved in 
the process of international carriage of goods by sea will suffer from legal uncertainty, 
non-uniformity, conflict of rules, and increased legal and administrative costs. 
  
                                               
222 Knud Pontoppidan – ‘Shipowners’ View on the UNCITRAL Convention on Contracts for the International 
Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly By Sea’, CMI YEARBOOK ANNUAIRE 2009, Athens II, Documents of 
the Conference, p. 282. Retrieved from: http://www.comitemaritime.org/Uploads/Yearbooks/YBK_2009.pdf 
223 ‘The Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea (The 
“Rotterdam Rules”)’, a position paper by the ICS. Retrieved from: 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/transport/rotterdam_rules/ICS_PositionPaper.pdf 
224 A chronological list of the signatory states and the status of the ratification process of the Convention is 
available at: http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/transport_goods/rotterdam_status.html 
225 D. Rhidian Thomas – ‘A New Convention for the Carriage of Goods by Sea – The Rotterdam Rules: An 
Analysis of the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea’ 
(2009), Lawtext Publishing limited, Chapter I, p. 2. 









The FIOS(T) clause 
1. Introduction 
Handling cargo claims usually involves accidents that occur at three different 
locations: at the port of loading, on board the ship, and/or at the port of discharge. While 
Chapter II dealt primarily with obligations related to all three stages, the discussion in 
Chapter III will come down to the particular moment of loading, stowing, and 
discharging the cargo. More specifically, it will deal with the problems occurring as a 
result of the tension between the Hague-Visby Rules, on the one hand, and the transfer 
of the duty to load, stow, trim and discharge the cargo, on the other hand. Such a 
contractual arrangement is normally carried out through the so-called FIOS clause, 
which has been turned by the English jurisprudence into one of the permissible 
exceptions to the Rules. Not all jurisdictions, however, share the same view towards the 
contractual delegation of the obligations set forth in Art. III rule 2 HVR. That is why a 
concise review will be made of the position under Dutch, French and US law with regard 
to the nature and applicability of the FIOS(T) clause. 
An extensive study will be carried out of pivotal English cases in order to explore 
and define the limits of the carrier’s responsibility over the cargo when his obligations to 
load, stow and discharge have been contracted out. However, it is relevant to point out 
that while a FIOS clause, or any of its variants, 332F332F1 transfers the responsibility for loading, 
stowing and discharging to the charterer, shipper and/or consignee, the carrier is still 
under certain cargo-related obligations such as to avoid damage to other cargo on board 
the ship during the loading or discharging processes as well as to care for the cargo 
during the voyage.333F333F2 
Lastly, the current Chapter will also explore the new approach towards free-in-
and-out arrangements adopted in the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea (the Rotterdam Rules). A 
recourse will be made to the travaux préparatoires, where necessary, in order to 
establish the considerations of the drafters during the negotiations within the Working 
Group with regard to reaching the goals of achieving uniformity and modernization, 
taking into account current shipping practices. 
                                               
1 FILO, FILTD, FIO, FIOST, FIOT, FIS, FISLO, LIFO, etc. See section 2 infra. 
2 William Tetley – ‘Marine Cargo Claims’ (4th edition), Les Editions Yvon Blais Inc. (2008), ISBN: 978-2-
89635-126-8, Vol. 1, p. 661. 




2. Shipping Terms 
The expression FIOS, which means Free In and Out Stowed, as well as its 
variations (e.g. FIO, FILO, FIOT and FIOST), signifies who will be responsible for 
paying for and for performing the processes of loading, stowing, trimming, and 
discharging the cargo. FIOS clauses are inserted in charter parties or in bills of lading 
contracts of carriage to specify that the charterer in a charter party agreement, or the 
cargo owner in a bills of lading contract of carriage, is to carry out some or all of the 
cargo-related obligations: loading, stowing, trimming and discharging of the goods. In 
other words, the carrier is rendered contractually free from these obligations and is not 
bound to carry them out. 
The phrasing of the clause is always read from the perspective of the carrier and, 
therefore, the word “free” means free of charge for the carrier. Accordingly, FIO terms 
(Free In and Out) means that the carrier’s ordinary responsibility to load and discharge 
the cargo will be transferred to the charterer, the shipper and/or the consignee, 
depending on the specific case. Put another way, a shipowner under FIO terms will not 
pay for the expenses at the loading port (“in”) and at the discharge port (“out”). 
Conversely, where the shipowner pays for loading and discharge, this is known as liner 
terms, or gross terms, and these two shipping terms signify that the freight, which is 
paid to the shipowner, is inclusive of carriage and of the cost of cargo handling at both 
the loading and discharge ports. A similar term is FIS (Free In and Stowed) where, 
however, only loading and stowing are free of charge for the carrier and are to be 
performed by the charterer and/or shipper while the duty to unload stays with the 
carrier. 
 FILO (Free In Liner Out), also known as FILTD (Free In Liner Terms 
Discharge), absolves the carrier only from the responsibility to load the cargo, whereas 
he will still be under the obligation to take the cargo “out” of the vessel, namely to 
discharge it. Hence, the freight is inclusive of carriage and the cost for the discharge of 
cargo but, unlike liner terms, it does not include the cost of loading (“free in”). The LIFO 
(Liner In Free Out) term works in a reverse way – the carrier will be free from the 
responsibility to discharge the cargo but he will still have to load it. In this case the 
freight is inclusive of carriage and the cost for the loading of the cargo but does not 
include the cost of discharge, which have to be borne by the charterer, shipper or 
consignee. 
Yet another variation is the FISLO (Free In Stowed Liner Out), where the 
shipper or charterer is required to load and stow the cargo at their own expense while 
the cost for the discharge will be paid for by the carrier. That is, the ocean freight will 
include the cost of cargo discharge but not of loading and stowing.  
Furthermore, the FIOT (Free In and Out Trimmed) term will transfer the 
responsibility with regard to loading, trimming and discharge; whereas FIOST terms 
(Free In and Out Stowed and Trimmed) requires the charterer, shipper or consignee to 
pay for loading, stowing, trimming and discharging the cargo. Consequently, all these 
operations will be carried free of expense to the shipowner and are not included in the 
ocean freight. Another variant is FIOL (Free In  and Out Lashed). 
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Whereas FIOS(T) will usually apply to bulk cargo, the term FIOSLSD (Free In 
and Out Stowed, Lashed, Secured and Dunnaged) is used with respect to general cargo. 
Similarly, this term transfers the costs for loading, stowing and discharge as per FIOS 
but it also transfers the cost of lashing, securing and dunnaging cargo to the cargo 
interests or charterers. 
These commercial shipping terms derive from charter party agreements but 
nowadays they may well be found in bills of lading contracts, too. If this clause is found 
in a charter party agreement, the specified cargo-related obligations, as stipulated by the 
particular shipping term, will be transferred from the shipowner to the charterer. In 
general, it is in the interest of the shipowners to fix their ships on FIO(S)(T) terms so 
that they will not bear stevedoring costs for loading or discharging and/or other relevant 
cargo-related duties. Fixtures on these terms favour shipowners also in a sense that the 
latter will not have to worry about a possible rise in the charge of the stevedoring 
company given the fact that loading and discharging costs may vary from port to port. 
On the other hand, when one of these terms (FIO, FILO, FIOST) is laid down in 
the bills of lading, the cost and responsibility for these operations will be transferred 
from the carrier to the cargo interests (the shipper and/or consignee). 
3. The tension between the Hague-Visby Rules and the 
FIOS(T) clause 
Before diving headfirst into the debate over the validity of FIOS(T) clauses in 
bills of lading334F334F3, it is important to note that the transfer of the carrier’s duties to load, 
stow and/or discharge the cargo consists of three separate limbs. The first one is the 
transfer of the responsibility to actually carry out the tasks envisaged in the FIOS(T) 
clause; the second one is the transfer of the responsibility to pay for these tasks at the 
port of loading and/or discharge; and the third one is the transfer of responsibility over 
the goods should they be damaged during loading or discharge, namely the transfer of 
liability. Thus, for example, as von Ziegler points out, a FIOS clause which provides 
strictly for financial matters, namely what is inclusive of the freight, will not impact on 
the carrier’s basic and fundamental obligation to load, stow and discharge the goods; let 
alone will such a FIOS arrangement have any effect resulting in the transfer of the 
carrier’s liability (the third limb). 335F335F4 The same observation was expressed by the Court of 
Appeal in The “Jordan II” where it was reminded that the word “free” means free of 
expense and, although some FIOS(T) clauses transfer to charterers also the 
responsibility and liability, the inclusion of the acronym by itself does not always 
amount to a transfer of these cargo-related operations.336F336F5 Therefore, clear words should be 
used that refer to both cost and risk so that the clause can effectively transfer 
responsibility for the respective cargo operations. 
                                               
3 For the transfer of these duties under a charter party, see Chapter II, section 4.4.1 supra and Chapter III, 
section 4.7 infra. 
4 Alexander von Ziegler – ‘The Liability of the Contracting Carrier’, The Texas International Law Journal, 
Vol. 44, No 3 (Spring 2009), p. 329. 
5 Jindal Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. and Others v Islamic Solidarity Shipping Co Jordan Ltd. (The “Jordan II”) – 
Court of Appeal (Waller LJ, Tuckey LJ, Black J) – Lloyd’s Law Reports [2003], Vol. 2, p. 87 at p. 103. 




Contractual arrangements on FIOS terms are typically found in tramp and bulk 
carriage that are arranged through charter parties, under which bills of lading are 
issued. In this case, if the FIOS(T) clause is duly incorporated in the bill of lading, it is 
the shipper who performs loading of the vessel and it is the consignee who carries out 
the discharge, whereas the carrier is not involved in these operations. By transferring 
the duties to load and discharge the cargo, the free in/free out terms give rise to a 
difficult problem with regard to who is the responsible party for damaged goods upon 
loading or discharge. On the one hand, arguing that the FIOS(T) clause is not valid and 
that the carrier is still responsible for the goods during these stages, would be contrary 
to what parties have agreed; equally important is that the carrier would be thus 
responsible for the actions or omissions of other parties. Another argument promoting 
the validity of FIOS clauses is that the strict prohibition of the carrier contracting out 
his obligation to load, stow and/or discharge will render the defence in the Hague Rules 
Article IV(2)(q) meaningless.337F337F6 
On the other hand, ruling out that a carrier under FIOS terms is not responsible 
for damage that occurred during loading or discharge may conflict Article III rule 8 of 
the Hague-Visby Rules. Under that provision, the FIOS clause will be null and void if it 
is interpreted as a clause that lessens carrier’s liability otherwise than as provided in the 
Rules, by relieving the carrier from the (allegedly non-delegable) duty to properly and 
carefully load, stow and discharge the cargo as required by Article III rule 2. 
Therefore, the solution to the problem with the validity of a free in/free out 
arrangement comes down to the question whether the duty in Article III(2) is delegable 
or not. In case it is not, then a FIOS clause would be considered as a clause that relieves 
the carrier of liability for performing a duty set forth in the Rules and, therefore, the 
clause shall be invalidated by Article III rule 8. Alternatively, if the carrier’s obligation 
to load, stow and discharge the cargo is interpreted as one that can be lawfully 
transferred to another party, then the free in/free out terms represent a lawful 
contractual arrangement and are not rendered null and void by the relevant provision of 
the Hague-Visby Rules. 
Although acceptable in charter party contracts, the FIOS clause inserted in a bill 
of lading contract is a subject of significant disagreement among scholars, in particular 
whether a carrier can avoid liability for cargo damaged during loading, stowing and/or 
discharging where a party other than the carrier or his agents or employees has 
undertaken the responsibility to perform these tasks. Eminent commentators such as 
Professor William Tetley assert that such clauses, when inserted in a bill of lading, 
“upset the balance in the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules between the interests of shippers 
and carriers”.338F338F7 Conversely, other authors uphold that a shipper cannot sue for cargo 
                                               
6 This argument was raised in the US case Sumitomo Corp. of America v. M/V Sie Kim. The District Court 
went further and adduced the extreme argument that since the bill of lading specifies that loading and 
stowage are not performed by the carrier, then the bill will not regulate the relations between the carrier 
and the shipper during this stage. Hence, following COGSA’s provision which embodies the definition in 
Article I (b) of the Hague Rules, loading and stowage will not be part of the “contract of carriage” and, 
therefore, COGSA should not be applicable between the carrier and the shipper, allowing the former to 
contract out its liability for loading and stowage. 
7 William Tetley – ‘Marine Cargo Claims’ (4th edition), Les Editions Yvon Blais Inc. (2008), ISBN: 978-2-
89635-126-8, Vol. 1, Chapter 24, p. 1260. 
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damage caused by his own negligence upon loading and/or stowing when he assumes the 
responsibility to load and/or stow and actually does that.339F339F8 
English jurisprudence has answered in the affirmative the question whether a 
carrier can validly transfer the obligation to properly and carefully load and stow the 
cargo pursuant to Article III rule 2 of the Hague-Visby Rules. This view was first 
expressed by Devlin J in “Pyrene v Scindia”, and was later reaffirmed in the House of 
Lord cases “Renton v Palmyra” and The “Jordan II” as well as in other English cases 
that will be thoroughly studied below. The English approach has been adopted in other 
Commonwealth countries such as Australia, New Zealand, India and Pakistan. 340F340F9 
Yet, there are numerous other legal systems which reject the transferrable 
character of the obligation to properly and carefully load, stow and discharge the cargo 
such as France and South Africa. 341F341F10 For example, under French law a FIOS clause is 
interpreted as a financial clause, which does not modify other responsibility clauses in 
the contract or the imperative rules of Article 3 rule 2 of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules.342F342F11 
This means that the clause merely allocates the expenses for loading, stowing and/or 
unloading. It is still the carrier or its sub-contractors who shall load, stow and/or unload 
but the ocean freight, payable by the shipper to the carrier, will not be inclusive of the 
cost for performing these operations. Instead, the shipper will pay separately for these 
specific services. In this case, if damage occurs upon loading, stowing, and /or stowing, or 
in case these obligations are not performed properly and carefully so that cargo is 
damaged en route as a result thereof, it will be the carrier who will be held responsible 
and eventually liable for the damage to the cargo. 
Somewhere in between is the view taken by the United States, where there is a 
debate whether this obligation is delegable. For example, in the cases Sumitomo343F343F12, 
Atlas344F344F13, and Sigri345F345F14, the Court held that the carrier is allowed to contract out his liability 
for improper loading and stowage under a FIO agreement on condition that: the damage 
is caused by the shipper’s stevedores; and the carrier does not supervise, nor play any 
role in these processes, where the absence of the carrier’s active role or supervision is a 
critical factor for shifting the risk and liability for damaged cargo to the shipper. In other 
cases, however, the US Court of Appeal has ruled that the carrier’s duty to properly and 
carefully load and stow is non-delegable regardless of which party actually performed 
these tasks.346F346F15 Perhaps the most explicit example of the disagreement in the US 
                                               
8 Benedict on Admiralty, Michael Sturley et al, 7th ed., Matthew Bender, 1993, §94. 
9 William Tetley – ‘Marine Cargo Claims’ (4th edition), Les Editions Yvon Blais Inc. (2008), ISBN: 978-2-
89635-126-8, Vol. 1, Chapter 24, p. 1256. 
10 William Tetley – ‘Marine Cargo Claims’ (4th edition), Les Editions Yvon Blais Inc. (2008), ISBN: 978-2-
89635-126-8, Vol. 1, Chapter 25, pp. 1297-1300. 
11 Anne-Laurence Michel – ‘La Portée de la Clause F.I.O./F.I.O.S/ F.I.O.S.T dans l’affrètement au Voyage’, 
597 Droit Maritime Français, Octobre 1999, p. 799. 
12 Sumitomo Corp. of America v. M/V Sie Kim, 632 F.Supp. 824 (1985), United States District Court, S.D. 
New York, August 27, 1985. 
13 Atlas Assurance Co. v. Harper, Robinson Shipping Co., 508 F.2d 1381 (1975), United States Court of 
Appeals, Ninth Circuit. January 7, 1975. 
14 Sigri Carbon Corp. v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., 655 F.Supp. 1435 (1987), United States District Court, 
W.D. of Kentucky, Paducah Division, March 24, 1987. 
15 See: Demsey & Associates, Inc. v. S/S Sea Star, 461 F.2d 1009 (1972), United States Court of Appeals, 
Second Circuit. Argued January 11, 1972. Decided May 16, 1972.; and Nichimen Co. v. M/V Farland, 462 
F.2d 319 (1972), United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. Argued April 12, 1972. Decided May 12, 
1972. 




regarding whether the carrier may escape liability by means of a FIOS clause is the case 
Associated Metals & Minerals Corp. v. M/V Arktis Sky.347F347F16 The US District Court first 
granted a summary judgment that the carrier is entitled to the effect of the FIOS clause, 
but then the US Court of Appeal reversed the decision and held that a FIOS agreement 
is null and void under the relevant COGSA provision which embodies Article III(8) of the 
Hague Rules.348F348F17 
Dutch legal literature is divided in its stance on the tension between a FIOS(T) 
clause and the mandatory application of Article III rule 2. Some authors are proponents 
of the conception that carriers are always subject to the explicit requirement to properly 
and carefully load, stow and unload the cargo related to the even more explicit provision 
in Article III rule 8, which provides that any contractual relief or lessening of a carrier’s 
liability or duties or obligations as stated in the Rules shall be null and void. 349F349F18 In the 
opinion of S. Royer, while shippers admittedly may benefit from performing loading, 
stowing and discharge themselves, in the sense that the shipper’s expert handling may 
minimize the chance of damaging the cargo, the carrier will nevertheless remain liable 
for any damage that took place during these operations. 350F350F19 Similarly, H. Schadee 
                                               
16 Associated Metals & Minerals Corp. v. M/V Arktis Sky, 978 F.2d 47 (1992), United States Court of 
Appeals, Second Circuit. Argued June 4, 1992. Decided October 1, 1992. 
17 Mark Hegarty – ‘A COGSA Carrier’s Duty to Load and Stow Cargo is Non-delegable, or Is It?: Associated 
Metals & Minerals Corp. v. M/V Arktis Sky’, Tulane Maritime Law Journal, Vol. 18, No 1 (Winter 1993), p. 
125. 
18 Sjoerd Royer – ‘Hoofdzaken der vervoerdersaansprakelijkheid in het zeerecht’, Zwolle : Tjeenk Willink, 
1959, p. 431: “Het is dan ook allerminst in strijd met de billijkheid, dat de afzender zich met het inladen 
belast; wel zou het daarentegen onbillijk zijn om de vervoerder aansprakelijkheid te houden op grond van 
onbehoorlijk en onzorgvuldig laden, stuwen en lossen, terwijl in feite de afzender het laden heeft verricht en 
daarbij niet behoorlijk en zorgvuldig te werk is gegaan. Niettemin brengt de strenge leer deze consequentie 
met zich mede. Immers, indien de afzender de goederen inlaadt en daarbij schade veroorzaakt, is de 
vervoerder krachtens deze leer in ieder geval aansprakelijk, aangezien hij zich niet aan het voorschrift van 
art.III lid 2 heeft gehouden.” [Sjoerd Royer – ‘Main points of the carrier’s liability in maritime law’, Zwolle : 
Tjeenk Willink, 1959, p. 431: “It is, therefore, not at all contrary to fairness if the shipper is responsible for 
loading; on the other hand, it would be unfair if the carrier is held liable based on improper and careless 
loading, stowage and discharge, while in fact it is the shipper who has performed the loading and has not, 
thereby, properly and carefully proceeded with the tasks. Nevertheless, the strict doctrine involves these 
consequences. After all, if the shipper loads the goods and causes damage thereby, under this doctrine it is the 
carrier who is in any case liable since he has not complied with the provision of Art.III rule 2.”] 
19 Sjoerd Royer – ‘Hoofdzaken der vervoerdersaansprakelijkheid in het zeerecht’, Zwolle : Tjeenk Willink, 
1959, p. 430: “In sommige gevallen worden clausules, waarbij de afzender op zich neemt om te laden en te 
stuwen en de ontvanger om te lossen, juist door deze personen noodzakelijk geacht; indien het namelijk 
goederen betreft, die door hun bijzondere aard deskundige behandeling vereisen, zal de ladingbelanghebbende 
zich veel liever zelf met het uitvoeren der betrokken verrichtingen belasten dan dit overlaten aan de terzake 
niet, althans minder deskundige vervoerder, waarbij immers een veel groter kans op het ontstaan van schade 
aanwezig is. Weliswaar zal de vervoerder voor deze schade aansprakelijk zijn, doch een 
ladingbelanghebbende, die de keus heeft tussenschadevergoeding en onbeschadigde aflevering der goederen, 
zal over het algemeen uiteraard de voorkeur hechten aan dit laatste, ook al brengt zulks met zich mede, dat 
hij zelf voor het laden, stuwen en lossen zorg zal hebben te dragen.” [Sjoerd Royer – ‘Main points of the 
carrier’s liability in maritime law’, Zwolle : Tjeenk Willink, 1959, p. 430: “In some instances, clauses under 
which the shipper undertakes to load and stow and the receiver to discharge, are considered necessary 
particularly by these parties; in case this actually concerns goods that require expert handling because of their 
particular nature, then the cargo interests would prefer to take care of the handling operations themselves 
than to leave those to the, at this point, not or at least less experienced carrier, which will result in a much 
greater chance of damage to the cargo. Indeed the carrier will be liable for this damage, but the cargo interests 
who have the choice between compensation or undamaged delivery of the goods, will generally speaking prefer 
the last option of course, even if they themselves must take care of loading, stowage and discharge.”] 
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expresses his concerns that a desirable and justifiable clause such as FIOS(T) goes 
against the explicit provisions of the Hague-Visby Rules. 351F351F20 
Yet, other Dutch authors point out that a FIOS(T) clause is not limited to a fee 
clause but relates also to the responsibility to properly and carefully load, stow and 
unload the cargo.352F352F21 In the opinion of H. Boonk, Article III rule 2 HVR requires the 
carrier to properly and carefully perform these operations only when he undertook to do 
so. Accordingly, when it is the carrier who actually performed these cargo-related tasks, 
a FIOS(T) clause cannot absolve him from responsibility.353F353F22 
Although one could hardly find a consensus between the opinions of Dutch legal 
scholars, it is submitted that the Supreme Court of the Netherlands (SCN) has taken a 
rather reasonable view towards upholding this existing commercial practice, on the one 
hand, and protecting the interests of prudent cargo owners. 354F354F23 
In the case De Favoriet,355F355F24 the Dutch Supreme Court had to decide on the validity 
of a FIO clause in relation to the consignment of cargo of onion shipped from Alexandria, 
Egypt to London on the Dutch vessel De Favoriet. The cargo was loaded and stowed by 
the shipper who was also the charterer of the vessel, whereas the damage was found by 
the receiver (the B/L holder) who sued the carrier under the bill of lading. The Hague 
Rules were applicable to the case. The issue that came before the Supreme Court was 
whether the carrier could rely on the FIO clause against the bill of lading holder. The 
judges ruled that the carrier could transfer the responsibility to load, stow and unload to 
the shipper and rely on Article IV rule 2(i) and (q) but, in order to use the clause as a 
defence against a third party B/L holder, it was necessary for the carrier to prove that 
the B/L holder was aware that loading, stowing and unloading were performed by the 
sender, may that be the charterer or shipper, or other persons not employed by the 
carrier.356F356F25 This ruling has been positively welcomed by Dutch authors because of, first, 
                                               
20 H. Schadee – ‘Het Nieuwste Zeerecht’, Voordracht voor de leden der Nederlandsche Vereeniging voor 
Zeerecht te Amsterdam gehouden op 7.I.1956, Koninklijke Nederlandsche Reedersvereeniging, p.18: “Ik 
vrees, dat onder vigueur van ons nieuwste zeerecht dergelijke op zichzelf zeer wenselijke en gerechtvaardigde 
ontheffingsclausules [als FIOS] nietig zullen blijken te zijn. Art. 468-2 [Art.III(2) HVR] bepaalt uitdrukkelijk, 
dat de vervoerder verplicht is zorg te dragen voor goede stuwage en art. 468-9 [Art.III(8) HVR] even 
uitdrukkelijk, dat hij zich niet kan ontheffen van aansprakelijkheid voor schade voortvloeiende uit 
nalatigheid in het voldoen van deze verplichting.” [H. Schadee – ‘The Newest Maritime Law’, Speech for the 
members of the Dutch Association for Maritime Law held in Amsterdam on 7.I.1956, Koninklijke 
Nederlandsche Reedersvereeniging, p.18: “I am afraid that under our newest maritime law, such exemption 
clauses that are in and out themselves very desirable and justified [as FIOS] will turn out to be null and void. 
Art. 468-2 [Art.III(2) HVR] expressly provides that the carrier is required to ensure proper stowage and art. 
468-9 [Art.III(8) HVR) also expressly states that he cannot be exempted from liability for damages resulting 
from failure to comply with this obligation.] 
21 H. Boonk – ‘Zeevervoer onder cognossement’, Gouda Quint BV, Arnhem (1993), p. 190. 
22 H. Boonk – ‘Zeevervoer onder cognossement’, Gouda Quint BV, Arnhem (1993), p. 191: “Voor zover 
ondanks een FIOS-beding de inlading, lossing en/of stuwage daadwerkelijk geschieden door de vervoerder of 
diens hulppersonen, kan de vervoerder zich in verband met art. 381 lid 2 niet vrijtekenen voor de uitvoering 
van die werkzaamheden gemaakte fouten.” [H. Boonk – ‘Sea transport under bills of lading’, Gouda Quint 
BV, Arnhem (1993), p. 191: “To the extent that, despite a FIOS clause, a carrier or his agents actually carries 
out loading, discharge and/or stowage, in view of art. 381 rule 2 the carrier cannot be exonerated for the 
faults that were made during performing these activities.”] 
23 N.J. Margetson – ‘Liability of the Carrier Under the Hague (Visby) Rules for Cargo Damage Caused by 
Unseaworthiness of Its Containers’, (2008) 14 JIML 153, at p. 158. 
24 De Favoriet, SCN 19 January 1968, NJ 1968, 20; Schip en Schade [1968], p.51 No.19-20. 
25 De Favoriet, SCN 19 January 1968, NJ 1968, 20; Schip en Schade [1968], No. 20, pp. 51-53, at p. 52: 
“...voor het slagen van dat beroep niet, althans niet zonder meer en in alle omstandigheden, vereist is, dat de 
vervoerder stelt en/of te bewijzen aanbiedt, resp. bewijst, dat het aan de cognossementshouder bekend was, 




acknowledging an existing practice facilitating international trade and, second, affording 
sufficient protection to third party B/L holders. 357F357F26 
The more recent case De Atlantic Coast,358F358F27 held before the Court in Rotterdam, 
summarizes and confirms the Dutch law position towards FIOS(T) clauses. The case 
concerned a carriage of rice under a bill of lading from Nieuw Nickerie (Suriname) and 
Georgetown (Guyana) to Rotterdam. The plaintiff cargo interests claimed that the 
FIOST clause related only to the transfer of costs related to loading, stowing and 
unloading. Defendants, on the other hand claimed that the clause transferred to the 
cargo interests not only the cost but also the risk for those operations. The Court ruled, 
inter alia, that a FIOST clause relates to both costs and risks with regard to loading, 
stowing and discharging of cargo. 359F359F28 
Although it is observable that the Dutch and the English stance on the validity of 
a FIOS(T) clause are very similar, 360F360F29 other jurisdictions interpret differently the 
application of such a clause within the context of the Hague-Visby Rules. To sum up, it is 
perhaps fair to outline Lord Steyn’s observation that there is no dominant view on an 
international level with regard to whether the carrier’s duty to load, stow and discharge 
is delegable or non-delegable since the opinion in foreign jurisdictions is evenly divided. 361F361F30 
4. English jurisprudence on the FIOS clause: defining the 
limits of the carrier’s responsibilities over the cargo  
There are several English decisions that give a conclusive answer to the question 
whether a carrier can transfer under a bill of lading the obligation to load, stow and 
discharge as well as the responsibility for the performance of these operations. What is 
more, through the common law principle of stare decisis362F362F31 (to stand on decided cases) the 
                                                                                                                                                   
dat de belading en/of de stuwage is geschied door de afzender, casu quo bevrachter, resp. dat de goederen zijn 
geladen en gestuwd door personen niet in dienst van, ondergeschikt aan of werkende voor rekening van de 
vervoerder;”. [De Favoriet, SCN 19 January 1968, NJ 1968, 20; Schip en Schade [1968], No. 20, pp. 51-53, at 
p. 52: “…for the  success of this action it is not, at least not without question and in all circumstances, 
required that the carrier states and/or offers to prove, respectively proves, that the bill of lading holder was 
aware of the fact that the loading and/or stowage was performed by the shipper, casu quo the charterer, 
respectively that the goods were loaded and stowed by parties who are not agents, subsidiaries or employees of 
the carrier.”] 
26 M.L. Hendrikse, N.H. Margetson, N.J. Margetson – ‘Aspects of Maritime Law: Claims under Bills of 
Lading’, Kluwer Law International (2008), ISBN 13: 9789041126238, p. 80. 
27 De Atlantic Coast, Rb. Rotterdam 16 februari 1990, Schip en Schade [1991], Nr. 15, p. 34. 
28 De Atlantic Coast, Rb. Rotterdam 16 februari 1990, Schip en Schade [1991], Nr. 15, pp. 34-36 at p. 35: “De 
Rechtbank is van oordeel dat de FIOST-clausule behalve een kostenbeding tevens een risico-beding is. Dit is 
vaste rechtspraak hier te lande. Blijkens de bewoordingen van het beding (“free in and out stowed”) beoogt de 
clausule vrijtekening van de vervoerdersaansprakelijkheid volgens de Hague Rules zowel bij belading en 
stuwage als bij lossing.” [De Atlantic Coast, Rb. Rotterdam 16 februari 1990, Schip en Schade [1991], Nr. 15, 
pp. 34-36 at p. 35: “The Court finds that the FIOST clause, besides being a cost-related clause, also is a risk-
related clause. This is settled case law in this country. It is apparent from the wording of the clause (“free in 
and out stowed”) that the clause is deemed as an exemption for the carrier from liability under the Hague 
Rules with regard to both loading and stowage, and discharge.”] 
29 H.S. van Overklift – ‘De FIOS-clausule in rechtsvergelijkend perspectief’, Tijdschrift Vervoer & Recht 
(TVR), maart 2005 – afl. 2, p. 35. 
30 Jindal Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. and Others v Islamic Solidarity Shipping Co Jordan Ltd. (The “Jordan II”) 
– Lloyd’s Law Reports [2005], Vol. 1, p. 57, at p. 65. 
31 Under this common law principle, which distinguishes common law systems from civil law systems, new 
cases are decided with reference to former decisions or precedents in cases with similar facts. Although it is 
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Court gradually defined the limits of the cargo-related responsibilities of the carrier. It 
was first Devlin J who provided in “Pyrene v Scindia” a purposive interpretation of 
Article III rule 2 of the Hague Rules which requires the carrier to “properly and carefully 
load, handle, stow, carry, keep, care for, and discharge the goods carried”. His view, 
albeit obiter dicta, was reaffirmed and relied on in numerous subsequent cases. Only 
three years later, it laid the foundations of the reasoning in “Renton v Palmyra” where 
the House of Lords upheld contractual freedom regarding the scope of the carrier’s 
responsibilities over the cargo, and held that Article III rule 2 of the Hague Rules does 
not impose an obligation upon the carrier but instead specifies the terms on which the 
service should be performed. These decisions are closely related to the validity of the 
FIOS(T) clause which, under a bill of lading, purports to transfer the responsibility of 
loading, stowing and trimming to the shipper, and of discharging to the receiver of the 
cargo. Such a clause was the central issue in the more recent case The “Jordan II”, 
where the House of Lords definitively approved contractual arrangements on FIOS 
terms. Furthermore, the decision in the more recent case The “Eems Solar” elaborated 
and extended the scope of application of a FIOS clause laid down in a charter party 
agreement and incorporated in a bill of lading. 
Legal disputes that involve FIOS(T) arrangements in tramp shipping will also be 
considered because contracting out some of the carrier’s cargo-related obligations 
through a free-in-free-out clause is typical for bulk cargo carriage under a charter party. 
Conversely, in liner trade it is usually the carrier who is responsible for loading, 
handling, stowing and discharging the cargo. This is especially the case for containerized 
cargo. Nevertheless, there are sometimes situations where FIOS(T) arrangements are 
agreed between parties in liner trade as well, usually with respect to project cargo or 
special or particular goods, regardless whether the bill of lading refers to the provisions 
of a charter party or not. 
4.1 Opening the door to FIOS(T) clauses 
The pivotal case “Pyrene Company Ltd. v. Scindia Steam Navigation Company 
Ltd.” was already discussed in Chapter II in the light of the meaning of the phrase 
“properly and carefully”363F363F32 and also with regard to the interpretation of the Hague-Visby 
Rules’ Article I (e) on the period of responsibility of the carrier.364F364F33 Having made the 
stipulation that the “Pyrene v Scindia” case has several aspects (privity of contract, 
limitation of liability, period of application of the Hague Rules, varieties of FOB 
contracts), we will now focus particularly on Devlin J’s dictum with respect to the 
transfer of responsibility for loading. 
On the facts, the plaintiffs Pyrene contracted on “FOB terms London” for the sale 
of six fire tenders to the Indian Government, the buyers and shippers of the cargo. 
Accordingly, the buyers made all the arrangements for the carriage of the fire tenders by 
entering into a contract of carriage with the shipowners Scindia and nominating 
Scindia’s steamship Jal-Azad as the carrying vessel. Pyrene, following the instructions of 
                                                                                                                                                   
not always strictly applied, it provides for a predictable resolution of cases and for maintaining stability and 
uniformity in the application of the law. 
32 See Chapter II, section 4.3(a). 
33 See Chapter II, section 4.3(d). 




the buyers, delivered the cargo at the London docks, and then it was put onto lighters for 
shipment on Jal-Azad. While one of the tenders was being lifted by the ship’s tackle, and 
before it crossed the ship’s rail, it was dropped and damaged due to the negligence of the 
shipowners – Scindia. The fire tender never crossed the ship’s rail but, instead, was 
removed for repairs carried out by the seller Pyrene, and then it was shipped to India at 
a later stage. The repairing costs amounted to £966 and were claimed against Scindia. 
The defendant shipowners admitted the negligence of their stevedores, and also argued 
that the property and risk remained with the sellers when the damage occurred. 
However, the main issue that arose was on the amount of damages. The defendants 
claimed that they were entitled to the defences provided by Article IV rule 5 of the 
Schedule to COGSA 1924, which limited their liability to £200. Conversely, the plaintiffs 
claimed the full amount and argued that the COGSA did not apply since the damage 
took place before the fire tender passed the ship’s rail, and also that the fire tender was 
deleted from the bill of lading before the bill was signed. Moreover, the sellers sued in 
tort in order to avoid the Hague Rules package limitation, and argued that they were not 
a party to the contract of carriage. Thus, the core of the case comes down to the 
applicability of the Hague Rules to an FOB seller. 
Devlin J interpreted Articles I (b), I (e), II, III (2), and IV (5) of the Hague Rules 
to conclude that the plaintiffs were bound by the Hague Rules package limitation and 
also that they were in an implied contract of carriage with the carrier. Of particular 
interest for the legality of FIOS clauses is Devlin J’s construction of Article III rule 2. He 
justified the contractual delegation of the duty to load with the following arguments 
already pointed out in Chapter II: 
The phrase “shall properly and carefully load” may mean that the 
carrier shall load and that he shall do it properly and carefully: or that 
he shall do whatever loading he does properly and carefully. The 
former interpretation perhaps fits the language more closely, but the 
latter may be more consistent with the object of the Rules. Their 
object […] is to define not the scope of the contract service but the 
terms on which that service is to be performed.[…] It is difficult to 
believe that the Rules were intended to impose a universal rigidity in 
this respect, or to deny freedom of contract to the carrier. […] But I 
see no reason why the Rules should not leave the parties free to 
determine by their own contract the part which each has to play. On 
this view the whole contract of carriage is subject to the Rules, but 
the extent to which loading and discharging are brought within the 
carrier’s obligations is left to the parties themselves to decide. 365F365F
34 
Although Devlin J allowed the possibility of a literal interpretation of this 
particular provision of the Rules, he stressed on the fact that this would lead to absurd 
results.366F366F35 Instead, he adhered to a purposive reading of Article III rule 2 and upheld 
freedom of contract with regard to loading, stowing and discharging. This statement was 
in obiter dictum but nevertheless it was relied on in many subsequent cases and its 
importance can be evidenced by the words of Lord Steyn in The “Jordan II”, who 
                                               
34 Pyrene Company Ltd. v Scindia Steam Navigation Company Ltd. – Queen’s Bench Division (Devlin J) – 
Lloyd’s List Law Reports [1954] Vol. 1, p. 321 at pp. 328-329. 
35 Ibid., p.329. 
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qualifies it as “a carefully considered statement by one of the most distinguished 
commercial judges of the 20th century”.367F367F36 The effect of this interpretation is that Article 
III rule 2 of the Hague Rules does not impose upon the carrier an obligation to load, stow 
and discharge the goods properly and carefully, but it obliges the latter to perform these 
cargo operations so only when he has agreed and contracted to carry them out. This 
pivotal decision functions, thus, as an early herald that opened the door to the 
acceptability of FIOS(T) clauses. 
The  approach established in “Pyrene v Scindia” with regard to transferring the 
obligation of the carrier to properly and carefully load, stow and discharge the cargo was 
confirmed two years later in the House of Lords case “G. H. Renton & Co. Ltd. v Palmyra 
Trading Corporation.” (The “Caspiana”).368F368F37 Although that case did not refer to a FIOS(T) 
clause per se but to a clause which permitted cargo to be discharged at a port alternative 
to the contractual one in an event of a strike, its decision has a direct relevance to the 
admissibility of FIOS(T) clauses. 
The plaintiffs Renton, timber importers, contracted with the defendants Palmyra 
Trading Corporation, of Panama, for the carriage of lumber on Palmyra’s steamship The 
Caspiana from the Canadian ports of Vancouver and Nanaimo in British Columbia to 
London and Hull. The bill of lading contained a clause with two contentious provisions, 
one of which allowed the carrier to discharge the cargo at the port of loading or any other 
safe and convenient port in case of difficulties which could prevent loading or 
discharging such as, inter alia, strikes; whereas the other provision stipulated that all 
extra expenses incurred thereto would be borne by the merchant: 
14. Government Directions, War, Epidemics, Ice, Strikes, etc.  
. . . 
(c) Should it appear that epidemics, quarantine, ice, – labour troubles, 
labour obstructions, strikes, lockouts, any of which on board or on 
shore – difficulties in loading or discharging would prevent the vessel 
from leaving the port of loading or reaching or entering the port of 
discharge or there discharging in the usual manner and leaving again, 
all of which safely and without delay, the master may discharge the 
cargo at port of loading or any other safe and convenient port. 
. . . 
(f) The discharge of any cargo under the provisions of this clause shall 
be deemed due fulfillment of the contract. If in connection with the 
exercise of any liberty under this clause any extra expenses are 
incurred, they shall be paid by the merchant in addition to the freight, 
together with return freight if any and a reasonable compensation for 
any extra services rendered to the goods. 
The vessel loaded timber under four bills of lading, three of which were governed 
by the Hague Rules, while the fourth covered on-deck cargo and, hence, stayed outside 
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the ambit of the Rules.369F369F38 During the contractual voyage, after the vessel passed through 
the Panama Canal, a strike broke out in London, which later spread to neighbouring 
British ports including Hull, whereas stevedores in many other UK ports, as well as 
continental ports, were reluctant to discharge cargo which had been originally destined 
to the port of destination of The Caspiana. In accordance with Clause 14 (c) and (f), the 
carrier discharged the cargo in Hamburg which was admitted to be a safe and 
convenient port for the shipowners. Alleging that they have duly performed the contract 
of carriage, the carriers did not take any steps to forward the cargo from Hamburg to 
London and Hull, respectively, nor did they pay the cost for storage the timber in 
Hamburg or for the trans-shipment to London and Hull. 
The plaintiff cargo owners claimed damages and contended that the carrier failed 
to deliver the goods to the port of destination. In particular, Renton raised three 
arguments, one of which was that under Article III rule 2 of the Hague Rules – which 
requires the carrier to “properly and carefully […] carry […] and discharge the goods” – 
the defendants were obliged to discharge at the proper port, and any clause permitting 
deviation from this obligation was rendered null and void under Article III rule 8 of the 
Rules.  
On first instance McNair J. held, among other things, that the words “discharge 
the goods carried” within the meaning of Article III rule 2 meant discharge at the proper 
port, which in this case would mean the ports of London or Hull. Therefore, in his 
opinion, Clause 14, which allowed the master to discharge at Hamburg, relieved the 
carrier from their obligation under Article III rule 2. As a result, the clause was rendered 
null and void and, accordingly, the defendants were liable to the plaintiffs. 
However, the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment of McNair J., and later on 
the House of Lords confirmed the judgment of the appellate instance. With regard to the 
plaintiff’s contention that sub-clauses (c) and (f) of Clause 14 in the bill of lading were 
null and void because of the combined effect of Article III rule 2 and rule 8, Viscount 
Kilmuir pointed out that the natural and ordinary meaning of rule 2 was to perform the 
tasks outlined therein in accordance with a sound system, and that the provision did not 
have a geographical significance.370F370F39 Furthermore, Lord Morton of Henryton, cited and, 
thus, reaffirmed the decision in “Pyrene v Scindia”, holding that the words “shall 
properly and carefully […] carry […] and discharge the goods carried” meant that the 
carrier shall perform in a proper and careful manner only those duties that are imposed 
on him by the contract of carriage. 371F371F40 Lord Morton agreed with the interpretation given 
by Devlin J in “Pyrene v Scindia”, adding that it is not only more consistent with the 
object of the Rules, “but it is also the more natural construction of the language used”.372F372F41 
Likewise, Lord Somervell of Harrow also agreed with that interpretation of Article III 
                                               
38 For the carriage of goods on deck, see Chapter IV. 
39 G.H. Renton & Co. Ltd. v Palmyra Trading Corporation of Panama (The “Caspiana”) – House of Lords 
(Viscount Kilmuir, Lord Morton of Henryton, Lord Tucker, Lord Cohen and Lord Somervell of Harrow) – 
Lloyd’s Law Reports [1956] Vol 2, p. 379 at p. 388. 
40 G.H. Renton & Co. Ltd. v Palmyra Trading Corporation of Panama (The “Caspiana”) – House of Lords 
(Viscount Kilmuir, Lord Morton of Henryton, Lord Tucker, Lord Cohen and Lord Somervell of Harrow) – 
Lloyd’s Law Reports [1956] Vol 2, p. 379 at pp. 389-390. 
41 G.H. Renton & Co. Ltd. v Palmyra Trading Corporation of Panama (The “Caspiana”) – House of Lords 
(Viscount Kilmuir, Lord Morton of Henryton, Lord Tucker, Lord Cohen and Lord Somervell of Harrow) – 
Lloyd’s Law Reports [1956] Vol 2, p. 379 at p. 390. 
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rule 2, which leaves the door open for contractual arrangements that provide for the 
transfer of the cargo-related obligations listed in this respective provision of the Hague 
and Hague-Visby Rules.373F373F42 That way, the House of Lords endorsed the observations made 
by Devlin J in “Pyrene v Scindia” that, pursuant to Article III rule 2, the carrier is not 
obliged to load, stow and discharge the goods carried, unless he has undertaken to do so, 
which is of great relevance to the validity of a FIOS clause, which allocates these duties 
and the responsibility for performing them. 
The case “Leigh and Sillivan Ltd. v Aliakmon Shipping Co. Ltd.” (The 
“Aliakmon”)374F374F43 confirms in obiter the decision in “Pyrene v Scindia” as well, and it is 
interesting, among other things, 375F375F44 for two implications that are involved. The first one 
relates to the question who is considered to be the party designated as the “owner” under 
the free-out clause in the bill of lading – the shipowner or the cargo owner – when the 
bill provides an ambiguous and uncertain answer to that question. The second issue 
concerns the impact of a FIO clause on the moment when a clean bill of lading (in 
particular, the representation Shipped in apparent good order and condition) starts 
acting as an estoppel, which prevents the shipowner from denying the apparent good 
order and condition of the goods upon shipment. 
On the facts, the plaintiffs Leigh and Sillivan bought a cargo of steel coils which 
was loaded on the defendant’s vessel the Aliakmon for the carriage from Inchon, South 
Korea on C&F terms376F376F45 free out to Immingham, the UK. It is noteworthy that although 
most of the cargo was damaged during the voyage, upon discharge, and in the warehouse 
after discharge, part of the steel coils had been in a condition that did not comply with 
the contract of sale already before loading and that was marked in the mate’s receipt. 
Nevertheless, a clean bill of lading was issued, which contained the following free out 
(FO) clause: 
F.O. CARGO LOADED, STOWED AND TRIMMED BY OWNER AND TO BE 
DISCHARGED BY CONSIGNEE AT THEIR RISK AND EXPENSE PER 
BOOKING NOTE DATED AUG. 31, 1976 AT SEOUL. 
                                               
42 G.H. Renton & Co. Ltd. v Palmyra Trading Corporation of Panama (The “Caspiana”) – House of Lords 
(Viscount Kilmuir, Lord Morton of Henryton, Lord Tucker, Lord Cohen and Lord Somervell of Harrow) – 
Lloyd’s Law Reports [1956] Vol 2, p. 379 at p. 393: “[Article III rule 2] is, in my opinion, directed and only 
directed to the manner in which the obligations undertaken are to be carried out. Subject to the latter 
provisions, it prohibits the shipowner from contracting out of liability for doing what he undertakes to do 
properly and with care.” 
43 Leigh and Sillivan Ltd. v. Aliakmon Shipping Co. Ltd. (The “Aliakmon”) – Queen’s Bench Division 
(Commercial Court) (Staughton J) – Lloyd’s Law Reports [1983] Vol. 1, p. 203.; Lloyd’s Law Reports [1986] 
Vol. 2, p. 1 (House of Lords). 
44 The main issue at stake was whether the plaintiff buyers had title to sue since, at the time the damage 
took place, the legal property in the cargo did not pass to the buyers but only the risk of damage did. In fact, 
there was no contractual link between the c&f buyers and the defendant shipowners, because the sellers and 
buyers modified the terms of their c&f contract of sale, whereby the risk passed from sellers to buyers upon 
shipment whereas the sellers reserved the right of disposal of the goods even upon endorsement of the bill of 
lading up until the moment the buyers paid the price of the goods after they have been discharged. 
Eventually, the Court of Appeal and then the House of Lords ruled against the claim of the buyers, who had 
neither the legal ownership nor a possessory title to the goods concerned. 
45 The C&F (Cost and Freight) term has been nowadays modified by the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) into CFR (Cost and Freight) term ever since the Incoterms 2000 rules were issued. No 
other update of that term was made in the latest version of the rules known as Incoterms 2010 rules. 
Although C&F has been removed as an acronym since the Incoterms rules update in 2000, it still continues 
to be used by trading parties. See http://www.iccwbo.org/products-and-services/trade-facilitation/incoterms-
2010/ 




It was established and undisputed that most of the damage took place because of: 
(i) the over-stowage of the coils in the holds of the Aliakmon, which caused crushing of 
some of them, and (ii) carrying timber in the same holds where the coils were shipped, 
which resulted in condensation that caused rusting of the steel coils. Whereas both 
causes are, in general, attributable to poor stowage, Staughton J noted that the first one 
relates to the manner of stowing and securing the cargo and the second one relates to the 
stowage plan of the vessel. 377F377F46 Accordingly, the buyers of the cargo sued the shipowners, 
Aliakmon Shipping Line, for breach of the contract of carriage. 
One of the issues that the first-instance judge came across was related to the 
responsibility for stowage under the FO clause where it is not clear whether “owner” 
means shipowner or cargo owner. This is crucial for the outcome of the case, for if owner 
had meant the cargo owners, then loading, stowing and trimming would have been the 
responsibility of the shipper and, hence, the shipowners would not have been liable for 
poor stowage following the “Pyrene v Scindia” approach to Article III rule 2 of the Hague-
Visby Rules. Conversely, if “owners” had meant shipowner, then the shipowners would 
have been liable for the damage to the goods caused by bad stowage. 
 On the one hand, the expression FO, as opposed to FIO (free in and out), would 
suggest that loading is to be carried out by the shipowners since only discharge is free as 
it is under “free out”. On the other hand, everywhere else on both sides of the bill of 
lading where the term “owner” appeared, it was explicitly specified whether reference 
was made to either the cargo owner, or the shipowner. To resolve this ambiguous 
situation, Staughton J. looked at the booking note, which contained the words: "Berth 
terms loading/free out discharge", meaning that it was the shipowners who were 
designated by the word “owner” and who were responsible for loading, stowing and 
trimming the cargo; moreover, an addendum to the booking note expressly provided for 
that: “Cargo to be loaded, stowed and/or lashed and/or shored and/or secured free of 
risk and expenses to the shipper”.378F378F47 Thus, it was the shipowners who, by the terms of the 
bill of lading, were to load and stow the cargo and were, therefore, held liable by the 
first-instance judge for breach of the contract. 
Resorting to the booking note in order to interpret the contract of carriage and to 
clarify the intention of the parties is prompted by the fact that the terms of the contract 
are contained in and evidenced by the bill of lading, but the bill itself is not the contract. 
Although the bill of lading is a prima facie evidence of the contract, there are other 
sources like the booking note and the correspondence between the parties that also 
contain contract terms.379F379F48 
The second issue in this case concerned the clean bill of lading as an estoppel, 
preventing the shipowners from denying the apparent good order and condition of the 
cargo, and, in particular, the FIO clause and its effect upon that estoppel. Staughton J. 
made an interesting observation that where the duty to load and stow has been 
transferred from the shipowners to the shippers (i.e. under free-in terms), the 
                                               
46 Leigh and Sillivan Ltd. v. Aliakmon Shipping Co. Ltd. (The “Aliakmon”) – Queen’s Bench Division 
(Commercial Court) (Staughton J) – Lloyd’s Law Reports [1983] Vol. 1, p. 203, at p. 208. 
47 Leigh and Sillivan Ltd. v. Aliakmon Shipping Co. Ltd. (The “Aliakmon”) – Queen’s Bench Division 
(Commercial Court) (Staughton J) – Lloyd’s Law Reports [1983] Vol. 1, p. 203, at pp 208-209. 
48 See Chapter I, section 2.1 on a bill of lading contract of carriage. 
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representation made in the bill of lading relates to the period after the duty has been 
completed by the shippers. Conversely, as it was the case in The “Aliakmon”, when no 
FI(O) clause is inserted, meaning that the loading and stowing of the goods are the 
responsibility of the shipowners, then the representation “Shipped in apparent good 
order and condition” relates to any time that is no later than the moment of loading. 380F380F49 
Staughton J’s reasoning on this issue is in line with the English position on the 
FIOS(T) clause. As displayed so far, loading, stowing and discharging under English case 
law are considered part of the contract of carriage and thus these operations indeed lay 
within the ambit of the Hague-Visby Rules, but the parties are allowed freedom of 
contract on who will undertake these operations, which allows the carrier to be divested 
of responsibility for them. Therefore, the representation made in a clean bill of lading 
under a free-in clause relates after the moment the duty to load has been performed by 
the other party. 
4.2 Incorporating a charter party FIO clause into a bill of lading 
When charterparty clauses are incorporated in a bill of lading contract of 
carriage, that charter party must already have been concluded and in writing before the 
bill is issued. 381F381F50 Moreover, charterparty clauses must be expressly incorporated by 
reference in the bill of lading in order to form part of the B/L contract of carriage, 
whereas a general incorporation clause (e.g. “incorporating all terms and conditions of 
the charter dated…”) is said to incorporate only the primary clauses related to the 
carriage of goods that are directly germane. 382F382F51 The most frequent problems that arise in 
such incorporation are whether the clause as worded in the charter party will be 
applicable to the context of the bill of lading and whether it will be contrary to, for 
example, the Hague-Visby Rules. Courts can arbitrarily manipulate the wording of the 
charterparty clause only to the extent that it fits and makes sense in the context of the 
bill of lading.383F383F52 Also, courts may have to interpret the identity of a party in a 
charterparty clause (e.g. the charterer or owner) when incorporated into the bill of 
lading. 
The case “Balli Trading Ltd. v Afalona Shipping Ltd.” (The “Coral”) 384F384F53 is 
illustrative of the problems that appear when the bill of lading contains a general 
incorporation clause of a charter party, which contains a FIOS(T) clause. Although the 
court in that case does not provide a final ruling on whether the FIOS(T) clause is 
validly incorporated and does not violate Hague-Visby Rules’ Article III rule 8, the case 
is symptomatic of the problems that arise when a free-in/free-out arrangement is not 
clearly communicated to the other bill of lading party – the cargo interests. 
On the facts, the defendant shipowners Afalona Shipping time chartered their 
vessel The Coral to Gulf International Development and Investment Ltd. The ship was a 
self-trimming bulk carrier and her holds were designed in a way that made it very 
                                               
49 Leigh and Sillivan Ltd. v. Aliakmon Shipping Co. Ltd. (The “Aliakmon”) – Queen’s Bench Division 
(Commercial Court) (Staughton J) – Lloyd’s Law Reports [1983] Vol. 1, p. 203, at p. 209. 
50 Simon Baughen – ‘Shipping Law’, 6th edition (2015), p. 78. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Simon Baughen – ‘Shipping Law’, 6th edition (2015), p. 78. 
53 Balli Trading Ltd. v Afalona Shipping Co. Ltd. (The “Coral”) – Court of Appeal (Nourse LJ, Stocker LJ, 
Beldam LJ) – [ 1993] 1 Lloyd’s Law Reports 1. 




difficult to stow packaged cargo. The plaintiff cargo owners, Balli Trading Ltd., sued for 
damaged cargo under bills of lading, which covered the consignment of steel sheets from 
Durban, South Africa, to Trabzon, Turkey, and incorporated the provisions of the charter 
party and the Hague-Visby Rules. 
On her way to Trabzon, the vessel called at Diliskelesi, where she discharged the 
cargo consigned for that port, but no actions were taken to re-stow the remaining cargo. 
During the further voyage to the port of destination, the vessel encountered stormy 
weather, as a result of which the cargo fell down and sustained damage. The claimants 
sued for damages for the breach of the contract of carriage, and they were seeking for a 
summary judgment on the ground that the defendant shipowners had no defence for that 
claim. The shipowners relied, among others, on clause 8 of the charter party stating: 
…charterers are to load, stow and trim and discharge the cargo at 
their expense under the supervision of the Captain… 
Whereas at first instance the Admiralty Court ruled in favour of the plaintiffs, 
the Court of Appeal reversed the decision and held that the case was not suitable for 
summary proceedings since the defendants had a defence to the claim. The main points 
raised by Beldam L.J. were, first, that it was already established in “Pyrene v Scindia”, 
and approved in “Renton v Palmyra”, that Article III rule 2 of the Rules does not impose 
an obligation on the carrier to load, handle, stow, keep, care for, and discharge the goods 
carried; secondly, that the incorporation clause in the bill of lading was wide enough to 
incorporate a charter party provision which regulates the responsibility for loading and 
stowing. Thirdly, Beldam LJ admitted that there were two possible constructions of the 
charter party clause 8 as incorporated in the bill of lading: 
The question is what construction is to be put upon conditions agreed 
between the owner and the charterer when they appear in the 
context of a bill of lading between the owner and the shipper. […] In 
their context of the bill of lading it seems to me that the Court has to 
choose between two possible constructions of cll. 2 and 8 of the 
charter-party. The first that the clause not only restricts the scope of 
the obligation undertaken by the shipowner but also relieves him 
from responsibility for damage caused to the goods in the course of 
loading or by reason of bad stowage (the defendant’s construction); 
the second that it is inserted to make it clear that the shipowner is not 
personally going to carry out the obligation to see that these 
functions are properly carried out and will be liable if the charterer 
fails to do so (the plaintiff’s construction which is compatible with the 
conclusion of the learned Judge). 385F385F
54
 
While the Honourable Law Lord did not express his opinion on which is the 
correct interpretation, he ruled that the plaintiff failed to show that the defendant’s 
interpretation of the bill of lading was unarguable so as to justify a summary judgment 
on this case. Therefore, the defendant’s appeal was allowed. 
The shipowner’s reasoning in The “Coral” extended the transfer of the obligations 
to load, stow and discharge beyond the mere allocation of these duties between the 
                                               
54 Balli Trading Ltd. v Afalona Shipping Co. Ltd. (The “Coral”) – Court of Appeal (Nourse LJ, Stocker LJ, 
Beldam LJ) – Lloyd’s Law Reports [1993] Vol 1, p. 1, at pp 6-7. 
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parties to the bill of lading (the shipowner and the B/L holder), and suggested that these 
duties could be transferred to a third party – the charterer. However, although the 
shipowner’s interpretation was accepted as arguably correct, it cannot be said that it was 
the correct one, mostly because the Court did not rule on that specific issue but it merely 
took a stance so far as the case concerned a claim for summary judgment. It is not a 
surprise that authors have serious doubts whether a Court could possibly regard such a 
provision as a clause defining the allocation of responsibility; it is rather perceived as a 
clause, which exempts the carrier from liability. 386F386F55 Accordingly, a transfer of these cargo-
related obligations to a non-contracting party, such as the charterer, is deemed to fall 
foul of Article III rule 8 of the Hague-Visby Rules. 
4.3 Enforceability of FIOS(T) provisions 
4.3.1 The “Jordan II” 
The approach adopted in the 1950s cases “Pyrene v Scindia” and “Renton v 
Palmyra” has been enshrined and applied in subsequent cases for almost half a century. 
Yet, it was challenged in 2004 in the pivotal case The “Jordan II”,387F387F56 where the House of 
Lords was invited to depart from its earlier decision. 
The vessel Jordan II was chartered by her owners, Islamic Solidarity Shipping 
Company, to TCI Trans Commodities A.G. for a voyage from Mumbai, India, to the 
Spanish ports of Barcelona and Motril. The ship, which was chartered on a Stemmor 
(1983) form, carried 435 steel coils from Mumbai to Motril under two bills of lading 
issued to the shipper in Mumbai. Jindal Iron and Steel Company Limited were the 
sellers and a shipper of the cargo, while Hiansa S.A. were the buyers and a consignee. 
When the coils were discharged in Motril, they were found to be damaged allegedly due 
to defective loading, stowing, lashing, dunnaging, stacking and/or discharge. The 
charterers (TCI) sued under the charter party, while the shippers (Jindal) and the 
receivers of the cargo (Hiansa S.A.) sued under the bills of lading. All the three instances 
– the High Court, the Court of Appeal, and the House of Lords – ruled in favour of the 
defendant shipowners.388F388F57 
Both the voyage charterparty and the two bills of lading on the Congenbill form 
were governed by English law. The bills provided, among other things, that freight was 
to be payable as per charterparty and that all terms and conditions of the charterparty 
were incorporated in the bills of lading. The charterparty was originally designed for ore 
but for that particular voyage it was used for the carriage of steel coils. It incorporated 
the Hague-Visby Rules and contained, among others, clauses 3, 7, and 17 which 
provided: 
Clause 3 
                                               
55 Simon Baughen – ‘Shipping Law’ (4th edition), Routledge-Cavendish (2009), ISBN-13: 978-0-415-48719-1, 
p. 118. 
56 Jindal Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. and Others v Islamic Solidarity Shipping Co Jordan Ltd. (The “Jordan II”) 
– Lloyd’s Law Reports [2003], Vol. 2, p. 87 (Court of Appeal) ; Lloyd’s Law Reports [2005], Vol. 1, p. 57 
(House of Lords). 
57 The claimant charterers did not appeal the decision of the Court of Appeal and, hence, the dispute before 
the House of Lords was between the appellant cargo owners (the shipper and the consignee) and the 
respondent shipowners. 




Freight to be paid at the rate of U.S.$ . . . per metric tonne F.I.O.S.T. 
— lashed/secured/dunnaged . . . 
Clause 7 
Charterers to have full use of all vessel’s gear to assist in loading and 
discharging cargo . . . 
Clause 17 
Shippers/charterers/receivers to put cargo on board, trim and 
discharge cargo free of expense to the vessel. Trimming is understood 
to mean levelling off the top of the pile and any additional trimming 
required by the master is to be for owners account . . . 
At first instance, the claimant charterers submitted that clause 3 transferred 
from the shipowners to the charterers only the obligation to pay for the operations listed 
therein, but not the responsibility to properly and carefully perform them. The 
shipowners, on the other hand, contended the opposite – that clauses 3 and 17 
transferred the obligation to pay and also the responsibility to perform these tasks. The 
High Court held that the two clauses effectively transferred to the charterers the 
responsibility to properly perform the cargo operations, and that the defendants were not 
liable whatsoever as long as the damage was not caused by the acts or omissions of the 
shipowners, their servants or agents. The Court took into consideration the fact that 
Clause 17, unlike Clause 3, clearly intended the transfer of these activities to the 
shipper/charterers/receivers, and also that it was part of the printed form of the 
Stemmor charterparty.  
The claimant charterers appealed, arguing that clause 17 was discordant with the 
rest of the contract because it referred to “trimming” (being a result of the Stemmor 
charterparty designed for ore cargoes) whereas steel could not be trimmed. The Court of 
Appeal rejected that argument, pointing to the dash in Clause 3 after the letter “T”, 
which clearly stated what was required from the parties. The Court further stated that 
even if the second sentence of Clause 17 was erroneous, it was not fatal for the proper 
construction of the contract, because clauses 3 and 17 should be read together. 
Accordingly, the Court of Appeal rejected the appeal and reserved the decision reached 
by the first instance Court. The claimant charterers did not join the claimant cargo 
interests in further appeal before the House of Lords. 
As to the cargo interests, at first instance they claimed damages under the bills of 
lading, to which the Hague-Visby Rules applied. Since the Court had held that the 
obligations for loading, stowing and discharging were validly transferred to the 
charterers by means of charterparty clauses 3 and 17, the main issue was what effect 
there would be on the bills of lading, which incorporated the charter party. The judge 
found out that the defendants were under no liability for damage caused by improper 
loading, stowage, dunnaging, securing or discharging not only under the charterparty 
but also under the contract of carriage contained in and evidenced by the two bills of 
lading. Nigel Teare Q.C. held that clause 17 clearly indicated that the responsibility for 
the proper performance of putting the cargo on board, lashing, securing, dunnaging and 
discharging was transferred to the cargo interests. The cargo-related activities at the 
port of loading were transferred to the shipper and those at the port of discharge – to the 
receivers, respectively.  
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However, an important stipulation was made by the High Court. In case the 
receivers filed a claim regarding damage that had taken place during cargo operations at 
the port of loading, the defendants could not contend that the responsibility for those 
operations stayed with the receivers. The defendant shipowners could rather raise the 
defence in Article IV rule 2(i)389F389F58, namely that they had not undertaken to perform cargo 
operations at the port of loading and that they were not responsible for any loss or 
damage to the cargo resulting from act or omission of the shipper. Similarly, where a 
claim was filed by the shippers for damage that occurred at the port of discharge, the 
defendant shipowners could resort to the defence in Article IV rule 2(q) 390F390F59 if they could 
prove that the damage took place without the actual fault or privity of the carrier, or 
without the fault or neglect of the agents or servants of the carrier. 
The claimants appealed that judgment before the Court of Appeal, and the 
shipowners cross-appealed the holding of the first-instance judge that they had to resort 
to the Hague-Visby Rules defences in Article IV in order to deny liability. The 
shipowners raised the argument that they need not to rely on the defences in Article IV 
because there was no breach of Article III rule 2 in the first place. The cargo interests, on 
the other hand, submitted that if charterparty clauses 3 and 17 were validly 
incorporated in the bills of lading and had the effect of rendering the shipowners not 
responsible for loading, stowage and discharge, and, accordingly, not liable for cargo 
damage arising out of these operations, then these two clauses relieved the shipowner 
from the obligations listed in Article III rule 2, which would make them null and void 
pursuant to Article III rule 8. The Court of Appeal addressed that argument by referring 
to the dicta of Devlin J in “Pyrene v Scindia”, which was approved in “Renton v 
Palmyra”, and said that it was bound by the decision in the latter case where this issue 
was already settled – the obligation in Article III rule 2 of the Hague Rules does not refer 
to the scope of the contract service, and thus does not require the carrier to perform 
these cargo operations, but it refers to the terms on which this service will be performed, 
meaning that the carrier will be obliged to carry out these tasks only if he has 
undertaken to do so. Accordingly, the appeal of the claimants was dismissed. 
On the other hand, the cross-appeal of the shipowners was allowed by the Court 
of Appeal. The Court accepted the argument of the defendants that they did not 
undertake to perform, or to be responsible for, any cargo work at the port of loading and 
the port of discharge; and since Clauses 3 and 17 relieved the shipowners of any liability 
for damage arising out of cargo operations, the defendants did not need to resort to the 
defences provided in Article IV in order to escape liability. 
However, eminent authors like Simon Baughen point to a particular difficulty 
that arises from that ruling. 391F391F60 The result from the Court of Appeal’s decision, in 
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conjunction with the fact that there is no contractual nexus between the shipper and the 
receivers under the contract of carriage, is that the receivers of the goods have no 
contractual recourse to sue neither the shipowners, nor the shipper with respect to 
damage that occurred during loading or stowing. Similarly, the shipper will have no 
valid claim against either the shipowners, or the receivers of the goods with regard to 
damage that took place during discharge of the cargo. In such a hypothetical situation, 
the receiver of the goods will have as an only option to hold the shippers responsible for 
cargo damage during loading under the contract of sale and vice versa. 
The first and the third claimants, the shipper and the receivers (the cargo 
interests), respectively, appealed the decision of the Court of Appeal, whereas the second 
claimant, the voyage charterers, did not take part in the appeal before the last instance – 
the House of Lords.  
The Court of Appeal’s interpretation of clauses 3 and 17, in the sense that these 
two clauses indeed intended to relieve the shipowners from responsibility over cargo-
related operations, was not appealed and referred to the House of Lords. Instead, the 
issue that was brought before the Honourable Law Lords was whether the shipowners 
were entitled to contract out their responsibility by means of clauses 3 and 17 of the 
charter party without falling foul of Article III rule 2 and rule 8 of the Hague-Visby 
Rules. In other words, the cargo interests asked the House of Lords to depart from its 
1956 decision in “Renton v Palmyra”. In particular, the claimants submitted that, 
pursuant to Article III rule 2 of the Hague-Visby Rules, the shipowners were obliged as 
carriers to perform the cargo operations listed therein and to perform them properly and 
carefully. 
The House of Lords rejected that submission as it pointed out several arguments. 
First, the Honourable Law Lords held that under common law the obligation to load, 
stow and discharge prima facie lies on the shipowners but it can be contractually 
transferred to the cargo interests. Secondly, they emphasized on the importance of the 
certainty in international trade law and allowed that they may depart from a previous 
decision under the Practice Statement [1966], 392F392F61 as invited by the claimants, only “where 
that decision has been demonstrated to work unsatisfactorily in the market place and to 
produce manifestly unjust results”,393F393F62 which was not the situation in the present case. 
Another argument was that the decision in “Renton v Palmyra” had stood for more than 
50 years and there were no objections to it neither at the adoption of the 1968 Brussels 
Protocol to the Hague Rules, nor when the enactment of UK COGSA 1971 was discussed 
in the English Parliament, nor in the UK trade journals and publications. With regard to 
the decisions in foreign jurisdictions, in which it was held that the duties to load, stow 
and discharge under US COGSA were non-delegable and on which the Counsel in the 
present case heavily relied, the House of Lords noted that those decisions did not make 
any reference to the earlier English cases “Pyrene v Scindia” and “Renton v Palmyra”. 
Those US decisions, among which there was the US case Associated Metals & Minerals 
                                               
61 The Practice Statement is a statement made in the House of Lords in 1966 by Lord Gardiner. It allowed 
the House of Lords (the then Highest Court) to depart from its own previous decisions “when too rigid 
adherence to precedent may lead to injustice in a particular case and also unduly restrict the proper 
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62 Jindal Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. and Others v Islamic Solidarity Shipping Co Jordan Ltd. (The “Jordan II”) 
– Lloyd’s Law Reports [2005], Vol. 1, p. 57, at p. 63. 
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Corp. v. M/V Arktis Sky that was discussed above in the current thesis394F394F63, did not 
address any of the arguments raised in the two previous English cases and that is why 
they could not be used to challenge the English approach to the issue at stake. 
Eventually, the House of Lords did not venture to assess the correctness of the 
interpretation of Article III rule 2 in “Renton v Palmyra”, but it refused to depart from 
that decision and, accordingly, the appeal was dismissed. 
Although the case did not change the law, nor did it provide an innovative 
interpretation of the law, the reasoning of the House of Lords was interesting with its 
purposive reading of the Rules. By supporting the “Renton” decision, the Honourable 
Law Lords provided certainty in the day-to-day shipping business. The House of Lords 
admitted that a FIOS(T) provision alone would indicate only the transfer of cost and not 
the transfer of responsibility, 395F395F64 but read together with additional clauses in the charter 
party to that effect, and provided that express and clear words are used, the cargo-
related obligations can be validly transferred. This leads to the conclusion that, when the 
parties under a contract of carriage decide to alter their responsibilities with regard to 
the loading, stowing, and unloading the cargo, precise drafting should be applied. 
Carriers who do not want to be exposed to risks pertaining to the actions of stevedores, 
whom the carrier neither contracted with, nor paid for, must be aware that reliance on a 
sole FIOS clause may not be sufficient for contracting out the responsibility and risk 
with regard to cargo handling. 
4.3.2 The “Eems Solar” 
The “Eems Solar”396F396F65 is the most recent case in which the Court had to rule on the 
validity of a charterparty FIOS clause incorporated in the bills of lading. This was a 
cargo claim, which involved the transfer of the obligation and responsibility to stow from 
the contractual carrier to the cargo owner. 
 On 28 July 2010 the defendant Eems Beheerder BV, shipowners of MV Eems 
Solar (the vessel) and MV Eems Spirit, entered into a voyage charterparty agreement 
with Southern Transport Agency Co Ltd, of Sochi, Russia, for the carriage of two 
consignments of steel coils from Tianjin Xingang in China to Novorossiysk in Russia. 
The charterparty was on the Gencon 1994 form (BIMCO’s general voyage charter party), 
whose Clause 5(a) provided for: 
5. Loading/Discharging 
(a) Costs/Risks 
The cargo shall be brought into the holds, loaded, stowed and/or 
trimmed, tallied, lashed and/or secured by the Charterers, free of any 
risk, liability and expense whatsoever to the Owners. The Charterer 
shall provide and lay all dunnaged material as required for the 
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stowage and protection of the cargo onboard, the Owners allowing 
the use of all dunnaged available on board. 
The contract of carriage between the defendant shipowner and the claimant cargo 
owner and B/L holder, Yuzhny Zavod Metall Profil LLC, was evidenced in a Congenbill 
1984 bill of lading dated 10 August 2010 and signed by the master of the vessel Eems 
Solar. Clause 1 of the Conditions of Carriage of the bill of lading provided that: 
All terms and conditions, liberties and exceptions of the Charter Party, 
dated as overleaf, including the Law and Arbitration Clause are 
herewith incorporated. 
The bill of lading also contained a General Paramount Clause, which incorporated 
the Hague Rules in the contract of carriage. 
The cargo, 411 coils of steel sheets, was loaded by local stevedores on the vessel 
Eems Solar. During the voyage the vessel experienced adverse weather conditions in the 
Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea, where she was exposed to strong winds and heavy 
swells because of the monsoon season. When the vessel arrived at the place of 
destination in late September 2010, and upon discharge, it was discovered that 34 of the 
coils were damaged to a different degree and an independent pre-discharge survey report 
indicated that the coils had been shifting during the voyage. The cause of the damage 
was poor stowage due to lack of locking coils and systematic lashing. The stowage plan 
was prepared and provided by the master but carried out by local stevedores hired by the 
shipper. 
The total amount of the cargo claim came up to US$ 156,908 and was for breach 
of contract and/or the duty to load, stow, handle, carry and care for the cargo. The 
claimant also submitted that the defended failed to exercise due diligence to ensure a 
seaworthy vessel and to properly equip and supply her in that she left the port of loading 
without spare lashing materials. With regard to clause 5(a) of the Gencon charterparty, 
the claimant contended that the clause was not properly incorporated in the bill of lading 
since it was not consistent with the express terms of the bill. The claimant further 
submitted that, even if incorporated, the clause would be rendered null and void under 
Article III rule 8 of the Hague Rules. 
The defendant contended that the sole reason for the damage was poor stowage, 
for which the defendant was contractually absolved from responsibility. Neither was the 
master and crew responsible to rectify stowing deficiencies during the voyage. 
The Court dismissed the claim against the shipowners. Jervis Kay Q.C. held that 
the lack of spare lashing materials did not amount to unseaworthiness of the vessel. The 
damage occurred as a result of movement of the cargo due to the lack of locking coils to 
secure the cargo, which was a result of poor stowage that was unable to meet the 
foreseeable weather conditions. It was established that the cargo was stowed by local 
stevedores who were employed on behalf of the shipper/cargo owner, notwithstanding 
that it took place in accordance with the ship’s stowage plan and with the full knowledge 
of the master. The Court held that since there was no evidence that the stowage plan 
had contributed to the improper stowage or that the stevedores paid any attention to the 
plan, it was not considered an intervention in the process on behalf of the master so as to 
shift the responsibility for cargo stowage on the shipowners. 
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With regard to the legal responsibility for stowage, clause 1 of the bill of lading 
was found to be wide enough to incorporate clause 5(a) of the charterparty, which 
transferred the responsibility for stowing the cargo from the shipowners to the 
charterers. While accepting that the wording of the clause did not expressly transfer the 
responsibility for stowing to the cargo owners who were not also charterers, the Court 
construed the clause as one by which the parties to the bill of lading contract intended to 
exclude shipowner’s responsibility for stowing and to transfer it to the cargo owners: 
Although it is correct to say that there is nothing in the wording which 
transfers the responsibility for loading the cargo to cargo owners who 
are not also charterers, nonetheless the wording is sufficiently clear to 
make it apparent that the shipowner intended to exclude his own 
responsibility for the manner in which the loading was performed. […] 
It seems to me to follow that, as between themselves, the parties to 
the bill of lading must have thereby intended the responsibility of the 
stowage to have been transferred to the shippers/cargo owners. 397F397F
66 
Having found the FIOS clause validly incorporated in the contract of carriage, the 
Court cited “Renton v Palmyra” in holding that Article III rule 2 does not impose on the 
carrier to perform loading and stowing; it further relied on The “Jordan II” decision in 
that Article III rule 8 does not invalidate a FIOS clause incorporated in a bill of lading. 
There are three significant implications, which stem from this decision that are 
worth considering. First of all, The “Eems Solar” case provides valuable insights for the 
day-to-day shipping industry as it involves carriage on FIOS terms that includes the 
Gencon 1994 charterparty and the corresponding and widely-used Congenbill 1994. 
Although clause 5(a) of the charterparty in this particular case was modified so as to 
exclude the phrase “and taken from the holds and discharged” (found in the original 
Gencon 1994) in order to give effect to a transfer of responsibility only for loading, 
stowing and/or trimming, tallying, lashing and/or securing the cargo, there is no reason 
why the principle taken by the Court in this case should not apply mutatis mutandis to 
discharge operations as well. 
Secondly, Jervis Kay Q.C. provided a practical restatement of the law on the 
validity of FIOS clauses: 
…where the responsibility for the stowage has been contractually 
passed from the shipowner to the charterer (or the cargo owner) the 
shipowner will not be liable for damage arising from improper 
stowage even if it renders the vessel unseaworthy unless it is 
established that the bad stowage leading to the damage arose from 
a significant intervention by the shipowners or their master. In this 
respect it seems that the “intervention” must be significant in the 
sense that it operate so as to tie the stevedores’ hands and was 
caused only by the captain’s orders or was the result of matters of 
                                               
66 Yuzhny Zavod Metall Profil LLC v Eems Beheerder B.V. (The "Eems Solar") – Queen’s Bench Division 
(Admiralty Court) (Jervis Kay Q.C., Admiralty Registrar) – 5 June 2013 – Lloyd’s Law Reports [2013] Vol. 2, 
p. 489, at p. 518, para. 95. 




which the captain was, but the charterers were not, aware. 398F398F67 
[emphasis added] 
This paragraph summarizes the new development, introduced by this case, in 
defining the limits of the carrier’s responsibilities over the cargo, and there is little doubt 
that such a view will be more than welcomed by shipowners and P&I clubs. 
Thirdly, The “Eems Solar” decision affirmed the effective transfer of the 
obligation and responsibility to stow the cargo from the carrier to the bill of lading 
holder, even where the responsibility clause in the incorporated charterparty does not 
refer to the “shipper” or “receiver” but only mentions the “charterer”. This is a significant 
increase in the protection of contractual carriers who seek to contract out their 
responsibility for cargo-related operations; and it certainly goes beyond the protection 
afforded by the House of Lord case “Jordan II”, where the respective charterparty clause 
included the words “shippers/charterers/receivers”.399F399F68 
4.4 FIOS(T) clauses in charterparty agreements 
4.4.1 Transferring cargo-related operations to the charterer – general 
position 
The shipowners and the charterers have freedom of contract to agree on precisely 
what operations will be transferred and this is done through modifying or using a 
variation of the FIOS(T) clause. For example, a FIO (free in and out) clause will delegate 
to the charterer the obligations to load and to discharge, whereas through the FIS 
arrangement (free in and stowed) the shipowners will contract out only the duties to load 
and to stow the cargo.400F400 F69 Furthermore, the two parties to a charterparty contract of 
carriage may also agree whether these clauses will have an effect only on the costs for 
performing these operations, or whether they will actually transfer the responsibility for 
performing them. 
In principle, a standard charter party clause that transfers the respective 
obligations from the shipowner to the charterer will usually read: 
The cargo shall be brought into the holds, loaded, stowed and/or 
trimmed, tallied, lashed and/or secured and taken from the holds and 
discharged by the Charterers, free of any risk, liability and expense 
whatsoever to the Owners. […]401F401F
70 
A clause worded in that way is less prone to disputes between the parties as 
regards the transfer of the obligations in question. However, a FIOS clause may have 
less clear and ambiguous wording, which makes it difficult to outline the intention of the 
contracting parties. Such a problem appeared in The “Visurgis”,402F402F71 where the various 
cargo-related duties were distributed between the shipowners and the charterers in a 
seemingly contradictory way. The court, however, held that the charterparty contract 
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68 See section 4.3.1 supra. 
69 For the precise meaning of the FIOS(T) terminology, see section 2 above. 
70 This is a printed Clause 5(a) of Gencon 94 voyage charter party. 
71 The “Visurgis”, [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Law Reports 218. 
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should be read as a whole, and did not find a conflict in the various clauses of the 
amended Gencon voyage charterparty form splitting the duties as follows: charterers 
responsible for loading and stowing, while shipowners responsible for lashing, securing 
and dunnaging.403F403F72 
Furthermore, a FIOS(T) clause may also be qualified by a specific wording that 
attempts to revert the responsibility for loading, stowing, etc. back to the shipowners 
such as: 
…Charterers are to load, stow, lash, secure, unlash, trim and 
discharge and tally the cargo at their expense under the supervision 
of the Captain… 404F404F
73
 
 The effect of this clause is to transfer the obligations listed above to the charterer, 
regardless of the phrase “under the supervision of the Captain”. English courts make 
clear distinction between a right to supervise and a duty to supervise, and such wording 
does not bestow upon the shipowners an obligation; it is merely “an entitlement to 
supervise”.405F405F74 This transfer of cargo-related duties is, however, subject to two exceptions: 
the first exception is where the master supervised the loading of the cargo and it was his 
supervision and/or intervention that led to the damage or loss of the cargo; the second 
exception is where the damage or loss are attributed to the want of due care in matters 
related to the vessel, for which the master had, or should have had knowledge, but the 
charterers did not.406F406F75 The second exception, for example, was invoked by the charterers in 
The “Socol 3”, where the loss of deck cargo was held to be due to poor on-deck loading, 
which caused the vessel’s instability, the latter being within the knowledge of the chief 
officer. Thus, the owners were in breach and could not escape liability, although the time 
charterparty put the obligation to stow on the charterers. 407F407F76 
As to the scope of the phrase “under the supervision of the captain”, as it will be 
seen below, it is not tantamount to holding the shipowners responsible for stowage or for 
exercising due supervision over stowage. 408F408F77 In fact, such wording allows the captain to 
intervene in the aforementioned cargo-related operations but this is rather a right than 
an obligation owed by the master, and therefore absence of intervention on behalf of him 
does not convey liability. 409F409F78 Thus, in the absence of the words “and responsibility” in such 
a charterparty clause, it is the charterers, and not the shipowners, who will be liable for 
damages that arise from the actions or negligence of the stevedores. 
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Conversely, if these crucial words “and responsibility” are included in the clause, 
then the shipowner will be held liable for the actions or negligence of the stevedores, 
despite the fact that it is the charterer who will pay for the charges of the stevedores. 
Yet, there is still an escape way for the shipowner even where the words “and 
responsibility” are incorporated in the clause, and this was stated obiter by Neil LJ in 
The "Shinjitsu Maru No. 5":  
In the end I have come to the conclusion that […] the words "and 
responsibility" [are] a prima facie transfer of liability for bad stowage 
to the owners but that if it can be shown in any particular case that 
the charterers by, for example, giving some instructions in the course 
of the stowage, have caused the relevant loss or damage the owners 
will be able to escape liability to that extent. 410F410F
79
 
This assertion is accurate and it has been applied in other cases, which is clearly 
exemplified below in sub-section 4.7.3.1. Although the wording “and responsibility” shifts 
back to the shipowner the responsibility for faulty loading or stowage, as the case may 
be, this phrase is not definitive in apportioning the liability under a FIOS(T) clause for 
the damaged or lost cargo. This view was confirmed also in The “Alexandros P” where 
Steyn J. underlined that the words “and responsibility” effect a prima facie shift of the 
responsibility to the shipowners, subject to an eventual charterer’s intervention which 
could render the charterers liable. 411F411F80 The claim in that case concerned damage to the 
vessel caused by the stevedore’s negligence in discharging the goods under a FIOST 
clause laid down in cl. 8 of the widely-used NYPE time charterparty. Steyn J. equated 
the transfer of responsibility with a risk that the shipowners contractually assumed, and 
therefore the charterers were not held liable for the damages sustained to the vessel 
although the damage was caused by the stevedores who were hired by the charterers. 412F412F81 
In such a situation, a shipowner could not resort to Article IV rule 2(i), even if the 
charterer is a shipper or owner of the goods, because no goods were damaged. 
To sum up, the absence of the words “and responsibility” shields the shipowners 
from liability. What is more, the words “to the Master’s satisfaction” or “to the entire 
satisfaction of the Master” do not have the function of substituting the words “and 
responsibility”.413F413F82 Neither does the addition of the words “and directions”. 414F414F83 Therefore, in 
order for the shipowner to be held responsible for carrying out this duty, a stronger and 
express wording is needed. As stated by Langley, J., in The “Imvros”, when the 
obligations to load, stow and lash are expressly placed upon the charterers, “the 
references to loading and lashing ‘under the supervision of the captain’ and ‘to the 
master’s satisfaction’ and ‘to the entire satisfaction of the master’ are not expressed as 
qualification upon the obligations of the charterers; [...] a right to intervene does not 
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normally carry with it a liability for failure to do so let alone relieve the actor from his 
liability”.415F415F84 
4.4.2 The intervention proviso: “under the supervision of the master” 
The House of Lords case “Court Line Ltd. v Canadian Transport Company Ltd” 416F416F85 
from the 1940 is an important one because it is this case that elucidates the so called 
“intervention proviso”, which relates to the intervention of the captain upon loading, 
stowing and/or discharge performed under a FIOS agreement between the shipowners 
and the charterers. 
In this case, the vessel Ovington Court was time chartered by her owners (Court 
Line Ltd.), to the charterers (Canadian Transport Company). During the duration of the 
charter party, the cargo carried on board, wheat in bulk was damaged as a result of 
improper stowage, and the shipowners were liable to pay the sum of £101 to the 
receivers under several bills of lading. The shipowners’ P&I Club paid the entire sum to 
the receivers as Court Line were required to refund £10 franchise to the Club. 
Clause 8 of the charter party stated: 
The captain (although appointed by the owners) shall be under the 
orders and direction of the charterers as regards employment or 
agency; and charterers are to load, stow, and trim the cargo at their 
expense under the supervision of the captain, who is to sign bills of 
lading for cargo as presented, in conformity with mates’ or tally 
clerks’ receipts. Owners to give time-charterers the benefit of their 
protection and indemnity club insurances as far as club rules allow, 
and in case of shortage or damage to cargo, charterers to bear the 
franchise according to club rules, which owners would have otherwise 
borne. [emphasis added] 417 F417F
86
 
In essence, the claimant shipowners contended that they were to be repaid by the 
defendant charterers the sum of £101, which the shipowners had been required to pay to 
the bills of lading holder in respect to the damaged cargo. The shipowners claimed that 
the charterers were liable under clause 8 of the charter party for improper stowage. At 
first instance, Lewis J affirmed the award given by the arbitrator, namely that the 
shipowners were to recover from the charterers only the £10 franchise which the 
shipowners had had to bear in order to receive any indemnity from their Club. This 
decision was reversed by the Court of Appeal, which ruled, among others, that upon a 
true construction of the charter party the responsibility for stowage fell on the charterers 
and, accordingly, the shipowners were entitled to claim the full amount of the damage, 
which is £101. The time charterers appealed to the House of Lords. 
In establishing whether the claimant shipowners were entitled to £101, £10 or 
nothing, the House of Lords found, inter alia, that the expression “under the supervision 
of the captain” did not limit the obligation of the charterers to load, stow and trim the 
cargo. What is more, the master has in any event the right to supervise as a matter of 
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course.418F418F87 Lord Atkin rejected the defendants submission that the damage was a result of 
the captain’s omission to exercise due supervision as being an ill-founded defence, and 
pointed out that the supervision for stowage was in any event intended to prevent the 
ship from becoming unseaworthy. 419F419F88 Therefore, the charterers were able to escape 
liability only if they proved that the damage took place as a result of the captain’s orders 
or intervention, but not as a result of the captain’s reservation of his right to intervene. 420F420F89 
The “intervention proviso” was affirmed also by Lord Porter: 
It might be also that if it were proved that the master had exercised 
his rights of supervision and intervened in the stowage, again the 
responsibility would be his and not the charterers’. 421F421F
90
 
The effect of these words is that the charterers are the responsible party for the 
primary duty of loading, stowing and trimming, which they will perform at their expense 
and under the supervision of the master, whereas they will be relieved from liability only 
to the extent that the master, in exercising his right to supervise, limits the control of 
the charterers over the performance of these duties. The decision of the Court of Appeal 
was reserved. 
4.4.3 Qualifying the FIOS(T) clause:  
4.4.3.1 The addition of the words “under the responsibility of the master” 
The words “under the responsibility of the master” have a far greater significance 
that “under the supervision of the master” when the transfer of liability for damaged or 
lost cargo is concerned. In the former case, the responsibility for loading and stowing, 
which has been intended to be transferred to the charterer via a FIOS(T) clause, is 
reverted back to the shipowner. Furthermore, the words “and responsibility” relate to 
the relevant operations in their entirety and cover not only the mechanical aspect of 
loading, stowing, trimming and discharging, but also processes such as the strategic 
planning of these processes. 422F422F91 However, as pointed out in section 4.7.1 above, even in 
this case there is an escape way for the carrier. The following two English cases – 
“Ismail v Polish Ocean Lines” (The “Ciechocinek”) 423F423F92 and “MSC Mediterranean Shipping 
Company S.A. v Alianca Bay Shipping Company Ltd.” (The “Argonaut”) 424F424F93 – are 
illustrative of the point that, even though the prime responsibility for loading, stowing 
and discharging is conferred upon the shipowners, this responsibility is not absolute and 
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may be altered by other provisions of the charterparty or by the conduct of the 
charterers. 
The “Ciechocinek” concerned a voyage charter party concluded for the carriage of 
1400 tons of potatoes from Alexandria, Egypt to Boston, Lincolnshire in the UK. The 
claimant, Dr. Ismail, chartered the vessel Ciechocinek from her respondent owners 
Polish Ocean Lines. The Nuvoy charter party incorporated the Hague Rules, and the 
relevant printed clauses stated: 
18(c). Free in and stowed. The Charterers shall load and stow the 
cargo free of any expense whatsoever to the Owners. 
19. […]The Charterers shall provide and pay for all dunnage material 
as required by the Master for the proper stowage and protection of 
the cargo, the Owners allowing the use of all dunnage available on 
board. The dunnage shall be laid under Master’s supervision. 
Further, two typewritten clauses were added, which stated: 
49. Dunnaging and stowage instructions given by the charterers to be 
carefully followed but to be executed under the supervision of the 
Master and he is to remain responsible for proper stowage and 
dunnaging. [emphasis added] 
53. The vessel to be responsible for number of packages as signed for 
in Bills of Lading, but not for rot, decay or deterioration. 
Part of the consignment was packed in boxes, while another part was packed in 
polythene bags. Having admitted that potatoes are cargo that requires good ventilation, 
the vessel’s chief officer calculated that she could carry no more than 1000 tons of 
potatoes if they were to be properly ventilated, although the capacity of the vessel was 
1400 tons of weight. At the port of loading, the shipper, Dr. Ismail was absent but he 
authorized his brother – Mr. Ismail – to give instructions regarding loading of the cargo. 
Mr. Ismail rejected the proposal of the master and chief officer, and insisted that all the 
1400 tons of potatoes be loaded on the vessel. Moreover, he assured that the potatoes 
were packed in a new type of bags which made dunnage unnecessary. Nevertheless, the 
master was hesitant and raised an objection against Mr. Ismail’s instructions. As a 
response, the latter promised to provide a surveyor’s certificate saying that dunnage was 
unnecessary, as well as a guarantee in writing in order to protect the shipowners from 
any consequences arising from the stowing of the cargo in the way Mr. Ismail instructed. 
Given the far better expert knowledge of Mr. Ismail about potato shipments, the master 
agreed to the loading of all the 1400 tons of potatoes. 
Despite the master’s requests, the promised certificate and guarantee were never 
provided. Upon arrival, half of that part of the potatoes, which were stowed in bags 
without the necessary dunnage, was found to be rotten. It was assessed by the 
arbitrators that one-third of the damage was caused by inherent vice, while the other 
two-third by improper stowage. The shipowners were sued by the charterers for 
improperly stowed cargo. The shipowners denied and in their defence they contended, 
inter alia, that: (1) the improper stowage was the result of the charterer’s instructions 
and that the owners were exempt under clause 49 of the charter party; (2) the 
instructions given by Mr. Ismail were tantamount to an estoppel which exempted the 




owners from improper stowage; (3) the owners could rely on clauses 19 and 53, as well as 
on Article IV rule 2 (m)425F425F94 and (q)426F426F95 of the Hague Rules. 
The arbitrators made an award in favour of the claimant shipper to the amount of 
two-thirds of the damage. However, they stated a special case and referred questions to 
the Commercial Court. The court upheld the arbitration award, after which the 
shipowners appealed. 
The Court of Appeal held, among others, that by force of clauses 18 and 19, the 
obligation to load and stow was delegated to the charterers, and that the Hague Rules 
obligation set in Article III rule 2 did not apply since, following the reasoning in “Pyrene 
v Scindia”, the obligation to properly and carefully load and stow applies only in respect 
of any loading or stowing which the owner has undertaken under the contract of 
carriage, whereas in the present case the owners did not contract to perform any loading 
or stowing. 
As to the controversial clause 49 of the charter party, 427F427F96 which attempts to qualify 
clause 18(c), Lord Denning referred to “Canadian Transport v Court Lines”, pointing that 
the master had a right to supervise stowage as a matter of course but his responsibility 
did not stretch beyond ensuring the safety of the vessel and of the cargo so that it can 
withstand the ordinary incidents of the sea journey. The concluding words of the clause – 
“[the master] is to remain responsible for proper stowage and dunnaging” – were held not 
to apply. Lord Denning based his reasoning, first, on the fact that the charterer, Mr. 
Ismail, voluntarily stowed the goods in a way which rendered them incapable of 
withstanding the ordinary incidents of the voyage, and, secondly, on the fact that the 
shipper assured that no dunnaging was needed for the cargo, through which the 
shipper/cargo owner assumed responsibility for poor stowage. Alternatively, the 
shipowners were entitled to the defences in Article IV rule 2 (i) of the Hague Rules. 428F428F97 
What is more, even assuming the contrary, the master and the shipowners would be held 
to be able to rely on an estoppel by conduct, which would disentitle Dr. Ismail from 
asserting his legal rights. The appeal was allowed and the award was remitted to the 
arbitrators to further consideration taking into account the findings of the Court. 
                                               
94 Article IV rule 2 (m) states: “Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss or damage arising 
or resulting from: (m) wastage in bulk or weight or any other loss or damage arising from inherent defect, 
quality or vice of the goods;” 
95 Article IV rule 2 (q) states: “Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss or damage arising 
or resulting from: (q) any other cause arising without the actual fault and privity of the carrier, or without the 
fault or neglect of the agents or servants of the carrier, but the burden of proof shall be on the person claiming 
the benefit of this exception to show that neither the actual fault or privity of the carrier nor the fault or 
neglect of the agents or servants of the carrier contributed to the loss or damage.” 
96 As Lord Justice Ormrod pointed out, “it would be hard to find a form of words better adapted to promoting 
disputes between owners and charterers than this”, because the first part of the clause requires the master to 
carefully follow the instructions of the charterer with regard to stowage and dunnaging, while the second 
part leaves him responsible for the proper performance of these operations. See: Ismail v Polish Ocean Lines 
(The “Ciechocinek”) – Court of Appeal (Lord Denning, M.R., Lord Justice Ormrod and Lord Justice Shaw) – 
Lloyd’s Law Reports [1976] Vol. 1, p. 489, at pp 497-498. 
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The other case referring to the words “under the responsibility of the master” was 
The “Argonaut”,429F429F98 which concerned goods that were damaged by the stevedores upon 
discharge. The case is similar to “Court Line v Canadian Transport” in that it involves a 
charter party clause providing that the charterers are to load, stow and discharge under 
the supervision of the master, but the clause is modified so as to shift the responsibility 
for those operations to the latter. The varied wording, particularly the addition of the 
words “and responsibility”, prompted the parties to rely on their interpretation of the 
classic case “Court Line v Canadian Transport” whereas the court, in reaching its 
decision, eventually found the reasoning in the latter case not fully applicable to the 
construction of the particular charter party. 
On the facts, the plaintiff shipowners (Alianca Bay Shipping) time chartered their 
vessel Argonaut to the defendant charterers (MSC Mediterranean Shipping Company), 
for one time charter trip from South Africa to Europe. The time charter was in a NYPE 
form and it contained, inter alia, the following clauses: 
8. . . . Charterers are to load, stow and . . . discharge at their own 
expense under the supervision and responsibility of the Captain. 
[emphasis added] 
31. The Master shall supervise the stowage of the cargo thoroughly 
and let one of his officers control all loading stowage and discharge of 
the cargo . . . 
38. Charterers are not to be liable for any damage . . . unless same is 
reported by the Master in writing to the Charterer’s Agents at the 
port when and where such damage occurs or as soon as it is 
discovered. 
Part of the cargo, which the vessel loaded at Durban, was granite blocks that 
were heavy cargo of 4 to about 20 tons in a square or oblong shape. The ship was then 
ordered to proceed to the Mediterranean and discharge the blocks first at Sete, France 
and after that in Marina di Carrara, Italy. During unloading at the first discharge port 
in Sate, a falling granite block pierced one of the ship’s tanks and dented another one. 
The master procured a written notice to the stevedores and the respective surveys were 
carried out. Then, the vessel called at Marina di Carrara, where, upon discharging, a 
falling granite block again pierced the tank top of one of the holds. Shortly after that the 
charterer’s initiated repairing works on the ship but the owners required full repairs 
before she was redelivered. The matter was referred to arbitration, where the main 
dispute was whether the shipowners were responsible for damage to the ship done by the 
stevedores who were employed by the charterers. 
The arbitrators found that the master of the ship was not to be blamed for the 
damage that took place at the first discharge port (Sete). They pointed to the fact that 
the master and the chief officer were not indifferent about the unsafe method that the 
stevedores were employing to discharge the cargo. The lack of intervention did not attach 
blame on the part of the master, for “stevedores are notoriously unresponsive to 
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suggestions from ship’s officers as to how they should go about their work”.430F430F99 With respect 
to the damage that occurred at the second discharge port (Marina di Carrara), the 
arbitrators established that the stevedores’ careless handling could not have been 
prevented by closer supervision or control on behalf of the master. However, there was 
an omission on behalf of the master to provide steel plates to secure the unloading 
method. Given the fact that at Sete the master already experienced failure upon 
discharging the same type of cargo, he should have provided for some precautions at the 
second discharge port. The arbitrators found that should there had been a fail-safe 
system such as steel plates, damage would have been eliminated or significantly 
reduced. 
As to the interpretation of the charter party clause 8, and in particular the added 
words “and responsibility”, the arbitrators’ reasoning commenced from the decision in 
“Canadian Transport v Court Line” case.431F431F100 The added words were found to alter the 
result reached in the latter case to the effect that they pass to the master a bigger 
amount of responsibility for bad loading, stowage and discharge. However, in defining 
the limit of the master’s responsibility, the arbitrators rejected the proposition that the 
words should be construed so as they pass all responsibility to the master for whatever 
damage caused. Instead, the approach taken during arbitration was that the words “and 
responsibility” in clause 8 of the charter party did not impose a mechanical all-embracing 
responsibility upon the shipowners. Those words instead were interpreted as to transfer 
responsibility to the extent that the damage caused is related to a matter that is within 
the master’s province, even when, as it was in the present case, the damage is caused by 
stevedores hired by the charterers. On the other hand, the master could not be held 
responsible when the damage is caused by the stevedore’s negligence that is not 
connected whatsoever to the master’s supervision and control. 
Both parties, the charterers and the shipowners, appealed the arbitration award 
on the grounds that the arbitrators erred in law. After referring the issue with the 
Argonaut to the Court, the judge also used the “Court Line v Canadian Transport” case 
as a starting point but he refrained from the reasoning applied there as one that is not 
being apt for the present case. Leggatt J did not embrace the concept of “intervention” 
contemplated in “Court Line v Canadian Transport”, which was additionally defined as a 
concept in another case with the following: “the party primarily responsible might be 
relieved from liability caused by the other party’s intervention”.432F432F101 The reason why 
Leggatt J departed from that reasoning is that in The “Argonaut” the primary 
responsibility for stowage rests with the shipowners, whereas the charterers only have 
an obligation to load, stow, trim and discharge with due care. That is, in the present case 
the charterers are not vested with, and thus cannot exercise a right to supervise, which 
can take the form of an intervention. The hiring of the stevedores by the charterers was 
not considered by Leggatt J an intervention, either, and that is why the “intervention 
proviso” was rendered inapplicable to the present case. In other words, the primary 
                                               
99 MSC Mediterranean Shipping Company S.A. v Alianca Bay Shipping Company Ltd. (The “Argonaut”) – 
Queen’s Bench Division (Commercial Court) (Leggatt J) – 25, 26 February 1985 – Lloyd’s Law Reports 
[1985] Vol. 2, p. 216 at p. 218. 
100 See section 4.7.2 above. 
101 Neill LJ in A. B. Marintrans v Comet Shipping Co. Ltd. (The “Shinjitsu Maru No. 5”) – Queen’s Bench 
Division (Commercial Court) – 12, 13 November 1984 – Lloyd’s Law Reports [1985] Vol. 1, p. 568 at p. 575. 
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responsibility for stowage was conferred by clause 8 of the charter party to the owners 
and the fact that the stevedores were hired by the charterers could not avail the master 
in avoiding liability: 
[I]n a case such as the present, I see no need to ascertain what is “the 
dominant cause of particular damage”. Either a party is responsible 
for a particular operation (or damage caused by it) or he is not. The 
exercise of a right of supervision may impinge upon, override or 
detract from a duty to stow properly; but it is difficult to see why the 
fact that responsibility is conferred on the owners should have a 




Accordingly, Leggatt J upheld the arbitrators’ award given in favour of the 
charterers with regard to the damage that occurred at the second discharge port (Marina 
di Carrara) but did not uphold the arbitrators’ award, which exonerated the master with 
respect to the damage that took place at the first port of discharge (Sete). The judge 
acknowledged that the shipowners’ responsibility may be implicitly limited to “matters 
within the power of the master”, but these matters exceeded in scope what the 
arbitrators had contemplated as “the master’s province”. Therefore, the master could not 
be absolved from responsibility simply because of the reason that at the first discharge 
port he had not realized that steel plates had been needed as a precautionary measure. 
To sum up, the effect of the FIOS(T) clause in “Court Line v Canadian Transport” 
was that the charterers were relieved from responsibility regarding loading, stowing and 
discharge only to the extent that the master, by exercising his right to supervision, limits 
the charterers’ control over these operations (i.e. he intervenes), in which case the 
master limits pro tanto their liability as well. On the other hand, the modified FIOS 
clause in The “Argonaut”, containing the words “and responsibility”, conferred the prime 
responsibility for loading, stowing and discharging upon the shipowners, from which 
they could be exonerated only for damage that the master cannot avoid by exercising his 
powers of supervision and control. 
4.4.3.2 A transfer of costs or a transfer of risk? 
“C.H.Z. Rolimpex v Eftavrysses Compania Naviera S.A.” (The “Panaghia 
Tinnou”)434F434F103 is another case involving, among others, the responsibility for stowing and 
the master’s right to supervise loading and stowing under FIS arrangements. What this 
case is interesting with is that it further specifies the limit of the master’s cargo-related 
responsibilities under a charter party contract which includes a free-in-and-stowed 
arrangement. Two points have been raised by the claimant charterers in their attempt to 
place the responsibility on the master for damage of the cargo because of a wrongful 
stowage – the first one is that the FIS clause was under the heading “costs”; and the 
second one, being the contention that the master had both a right and a duty to 
intervene. 
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The vessel Panaghia Tinnou was voyage chartered by her disponent owners 
Eftavrysses Compania Naviera S.A. to the charterers C.H.Z. Rolimpex for the carriage of 
7000 tons of bagged oil cakes from India to Poland. The Nuvoy 1964 form contained, 
inter alia, the following clauses: 
4. Vessel to be cargo battens fitted, otherwise owners to supply 
dunnage wood and kraft paper to Shippers’/Charterers’ satisfaction 
before commencement of loading. Bags to be protected against 
getting in direct contact with steel parts of the vessel. 
8. Loading . . . (d) cost free in and stowed – see clause 18 (c); (e) 
dunnage for owners’ account; . . . (g) stevedores appointed by 
charterers. 
18. Cost . . . (c) Free in and stowed – The charterers shall load and 
stow the cargo free of any expense whatsoever to the owners. . . 
19. Dunnage. (a) For Owners account – the Owners shall provide and 
pay for all dunnage material required for the proper stowage and 
protection of the cargo. 
Although the oil cakes had to be carefully stowed because they were prone to self-
heating, the stevedores, who were appointed by the charterers, loaded and stowed the 
cargo in an entirely improper manner – no ventilation, insulation or protection from 
condensation and from heating surfaces was provided. The master was aware of the way 
the goods had been stowed but did not protest. During the voyage the cargo 
spontaneously caught fire and suffered damage. The charterers wanted to recover their 
losses and took the dispute to arbitration where they were given only nominal damages 
by the arbitrators, who referred the case to the Court. 
With regard to the issue who is the responsible party for bad stowage under the 
charter party, Steyn J reiterated that under common law the responsibility to stow the 
goods rests with the shipowners but he also relied on the “Pyrene v Scindia”435F435F104 and 
“Renton v Palmyra”436F436F105 decisions in that under the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules the 
owners and charterers were at liberty to choose which party will perform and be 
responsible for the loading and stowing of the goods. To that effect, the parties in the 
present case availed themselves of that freedom of contract by means of clause 18 of the 
charter party, which provided for free in and stowed terms.  
Two important points were raised by the charterers to the effect that the FIS 
clause was qualified and negated. The first one was that the FIS clause was under the 
heading “Costs”, which could suggest that the provision transferred from the owners to 
the charterers only the responsibility to pay for these operations but not the 
responsibility for properly and carefully performing loading and stowing. However, 
Steyn J ruled that the obligation set in clause 18(c) could not be qualified simply by the 
heading of the FIS clause itself and, thus, the charterers remained under the 
responsibility to load and stow the oil cakes. 
The second point was that clause 4 required the shipowners to provide dunnage to 
the shippers’/charterers’ satisfaction, which was suggested to qualify the FIS terms in 
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clause 18(c). This provision was found by the Judge to be irrelevant since no facts were 
provided for inadequate dunnage, whereas the phrase “Bags to be protected against 
getting in direct contact with steel parts of the vessel” constituted merely an indication to 
the owners of the amount of dunnage that would be needed, and it did not constitute any 
stowage obligations for the owners.  
It can be inferred that a master does not play a role in the stowage of the goods 
under FIS terms even when he is under the duty to supply dunnage as far as he does not 
fail carrying out this obligation. Thus, the primary obligation to load and stow the cargo 
stayed with the charterers and the provision in clause 18(c) could not be qualified by the 
“Costs” heading or by the dunnaging obligation set in clause 4.  
Steyn J further stated in obiter that in principle under a Nuvoy charter party, 
clause 18(c) can be qualified by other provisions and an example of such an attempt is 
found in the case examined above “Ismail v Polish Ocean Lines” 437F437F106. In that case clause 
18(c) was qualified by the controversial typewritten clause “Dunnaging and stowage 
instructions given by the charterers to be carefully followed but to be executed under the 
supervision of the Master and he is to remain responsible for proper stowage and 
dunnaging.” [emphasis added] 
But even that attempt to qualify the FIS clause in “Ismail v Polish Ocean Lines” 
did not achieve to do so, because the clause was found to be confusing and 
controversial438F438F107 and was held not to apply; let alone the lack of any relevant clauses that 
could be able to qualify or negative clause 18(c) in the present case The “Panaghia 
Tinnou”, or the absence of any intervention on behalf of the master within the meaning 
of the “Court Line v Canadian Transport” case.439F439F108 The charterers’ contention that the 
master had both a right and a duty to interfere was struck down and Steyn J reminded 
that only a possible unseaworthiness of the vessel as a result of poor stowage 440F440F109 may 
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have given rise to a duty on behalf of the master to intervene, whereas no such findings 
of unseaworthiness were present; nor did the master or the chief officer know of any 
characteristics of the cargo and nor did they know that the stowage was not proper. 
Accordingly, the charterer’s obligation to stow the cargo was not qualified and the latter 
was liable for the damage caused as a result of poor stowage. 
4.4.4 Exemption under Article IV rule 2(i) of the Hague-Visby Rules 
As seen above, when the cargo owners (either shippers or consignees) perform the 
operations of loading or discharge but the risk and responsibility stays with the carrier, 
the latter may seek exemption under Article IV rule 2(i) of the Hague-Visby Rules, which 
provides liability exemption in case of act or omission on the part of the shipper or owner 
of the goods. 
To the extent that the Rules are incorporated into a charter party, the shipowner 
may also seek exemption from liability under the same provision for the charterer’s 
negligence in loading or discharging which operations, under the FIOS(T) clause, are the 
responsibility of the shipowner. 441F441F110 This, however, depends on the fact whether the 
charterer is also an owner of the cargo. If this is so, then he may have recourse to Article 
IV rule 2(i). On the contrary, where there are three parties involved – the shipowner, the 
charterer, and the cargo owner – then the charterer is neither a shipper, nor a cargo 
owner. In this situation, it is held that the shipowner cannot resort to the respective 
provision of the Rules. Case law has rejected any attempt to adapt the meaning of the 
Rules to fit to the circumstances under such a charter party so that the reference to “the 
shipper or owner of the goods” in Article IV rule 2(i) HVR could be taken as a reference 
to the charterer.442F442F111 As Dillon L.J. unambiguously stated: “Where […] there are three 
parties and the charterer is not the shipper or owner of the goods, I can see no reason for 
doing such violence to the language of art. IV”.443F443F112 
4.5 Summary 
The wording of Article III rule 2 is at odds with existing practices in international 
shipping. Moreover, there are discrepancies among different legal systems as to how to 
handle this oddity. The recapitulation of the English law cases discussed above points to 
the general conclusion that a purposive construction of Article III rule 2 prevails over a 
literal construction, where the former permits the commercial practice of transferring 
both the performance and the responsibility for loading, handling, stowing and 
unloading the cargo. 
The early cases of “Pyrene v Scindia” and “Renton v Palmyra” bestowed upon the 
parties freedom of contract with respect to the allocation of their cargo-related 
                                                                                                                                                   
Theodora Nikaki – ‘The effect of the FIOS clause of NYPE 1946 charterparties on owners’ duty to provide a 
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obligations under a bill of lading, whereas the standard of performing these duties 
remains invariable. That is, parties may define in their contract of carriage the scope of 
the carrier’s cargo-related obligations, i.e. they may transfer the responsibility to load, 
stow, trim and/or discharge. However, the party who has undertaken to perform these 
duties must do so “properly and carefully”. This is so, because English courts applied a 
purposive approach to Art. III rule 2, rather than a literal reading of the text – they 
embraced the view that the Rules do not define the scope of the obligations of the carrier 
over the cargo, but they merely refer to the manner in which these obligations must be 
performed. The reason why the decisions in “Pyrene v Scindia” and “Renton v Palmyra” 
are paramount to the jurisprudence on the admissibility of FIOS(T) arrangements, is 
because they allow Courts in further cases to distinguish between, on the one hand, 
exempting clauses (which are void under Art.III rule 8) and, on the other hand, clauses 
that define the services to be performed by the contractual parties (which are 
permissible under the Rules). 
The “Jordan II” case essentially applied the approach in the latter two cases and 
confirmed that free-in-free-out agreements were valid and not stricken down by Art. III 
rule 8 of the Hague-Visby Rules. The case did not bring a change in the law but 
contributed to the forging of a well-established jurisprudence, supporting the validity of 
a FIOS(T) clause, which will be difficult to overturn in the future. Furthermore, the 
protection afforded to shipowners provided in The “Jordan II” case was extended in The 
“Eems Solar” case, where the incorporated charterparty FIOST clause did refer solely to 
the charterer but did not make an express reference to the shipper or receiver, and 
nevertheless the Court held this clause to constitute a valid transfer of the obligation to 
stow from the shipowners to the bill of lading holder. 
The study on cases involving free-in-free-out arrangements in charter party 
agreements explored the extent to which the proviso “under the supervision of the 
captain” is capable of compromising an effective transfer of the obligation and 
responsibility to load, stow and discharge, when it is inserted in a FIO(S) clause. The 
“Court Line v Canadian Transport” and the following cases examined in section 4.7 
confirmed that a right to intervention on behalf of the master in and of itself is a matter 
of course, which suggests that the master may intervene even when the words “under 
the supervision of the captain” are not contained in the respective clause. In this sense, 
contracting out the shipowner’s obligations to load, stow and/or discharge the cargo will 
not be qualified simply by inserting those words into a FIO(S) clause. In practice, these 
words alone have no bearing on the apportionment of liability for damaged or loss cargo 
under a FIOS(T) clause. The transfer of liability for the operations in question will 
actually be invalidated only when the master, in exercising his right to intervene, 
actually limits the control of the charterer regarding the performance of the tasks 
mentioned. 
On the other hand, when the abovementioned proviso is worded “under the 
supervision and responsibility of the captain”, the primary responsibility for loading, 
stowing and/or discharge shifts back to the shipowners but to the extent that the master 
can possibly avoid the damage by exercising his right to supervise and control the 
charterers’ performance of the cargo-related operations (i.e. that the matters are within 
the “master’s province”). 




Bottom line, the party that is primarily responsible under the FIOS(T) clause for 
the cargo-related operation can be relieved from responsibility if the damage or loss is 
caused by the intervention of the other party and this is valid under both types of 
wording – “under the supervision of the master” as well as “under the responsibility of 
the master”. The difference is that while the former wording is not capable of qualifying 
the transfer of duties under the FIOS(T) clause, the latter one shifts the risk and 
responsibility back to the shipowner. 
5. The approach taken in the Rotterdam Rules 
One of the big challenges to any international convention in the maritime world is 
to balance between the freedom of contract and the protection of cargo interests. 
Therefore, commercially-driven exceptions to the strict liability of the carrier, such as 
FIOS(T) clauses, are an indispensable part in the process of achieving unification of the 
rules governing carriage of goods by sea. It should not be forgotten that the purpose of 
FIOS(T) clauses stretches beyond than merely relieving a shipowner from responsibility 
to perform his duties to load, handle, stow and/or unload the goods. Such a provision 
does not solely intend to place more obligations on the charterers, shippers or 
consignees, either. A free-in-free-out arrangement can actually be of charterers’ interests 
since the latter may have better business relationship with the stevedoring companies at 
the ports of loading and discharge, allowing the charterers to benefit from more 
profitable stevedoring rates (e.g. due to volume rebates) as opposed to the rates offered to 
shipowners, which will ultimately be incorporated into the freight payable by the 
charterers.444F444F113 Also, it is very often the case that, for commercial reasons, charterers are 
better qualified and more familiar than shipowners with the particular characteristics of 
the cargo shipped and with the precautions that have to be taken during loading or 
discharge. 
The provision in the Rotterdam Rules which statutorily allows the transfer of 
certain cargo-related obligation from the carrier to the charterer/shipper/consignee is set 
forth in Article 13.2: 
Article 13 
[…] 
2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this article, and without 
prejudice to the other provisions in chapter 4 and to chapters 5 to 7, 
the carrier and the shipper may agree that the loading, handling, 
stowing or unloading of the goods is to be performed by the shipper, 
the documentary shipper or the consignee. Such an agreement shall 
be referred to in the contract particulars. 
Although the drafters of the Rotterdam Rules expressed their concern that most 
of the cargo damage in international shipping occurs precisely during loading or 
unloading the goods,445F445F114 the new Convention allows the carrier and the shipper to agree 
                                               
113 Dr. Theodora Nikaki – ‘The effect of the FIOS clause of NYPE 1946 charterparties on owners’ duty to 
provide a seaworthy vessel’, Journal of International Maritime Law, Vol. 13 (2007), Issue 1, p. 29 at p. 38. 
114 UNCITRAL Report of Working Group III (Transport Law) on the work of its twenty-first session (Vienna, 
14-25 January 2008), Doc A/CN.9/645, para 44. 
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that these four tasks mentioned above be performed by the shipper, the documentary 
shipper or the consignee, who will be the liable party in case of a failure to properly and 
carefully effect these duties.  
Of all the nine tasks enlisted in Article 13.1, the provision allows carriers to 
contract out the following duties: to load, handle, stow, and unload the cargo. The 
Rotterdam Rules, thus, recognize the contractual freedom of the parties to agree on who 
will perform each of the cargo-related duties listed therein. In this regard, Article 13.2 is 
very close to the English interpretation of Article III rule 2 of the Hague-Visby Rules446F446F115 
in a sense that a FIOS(T) clause transfers not only the costs for performing the 
respective duties but it also transfers the responsibility to perform them, which means 
that the carrier is essentially contracting out liability.  
The derogation introduced by Article 13.2 is subject only to the condition that a 
free-in-free-out agreement shall be referred to in the contract particulars. Such reference 
actually represents a FIOS(T) clause, or a variation of it, which shall be incorporated in 
or ascertainable from the negotiable transport document. By force of Article 58.2, a bill of 
lading holder other than the shipper will not assume any liability for unloading if the 
contract particulars do not refer to the consignee’s obligation to unload. 447F447F116 The rationale 
behind that strict requirement for incorporation by reference is the protection of the 
consignee who should be informed and well aware of that contractual arrangement. In 
view of the definition in Article 1.23 that contract particulars means “any information 
relating to the contract of carriage or to the goods (including terms, notations, signatures 
and endorsements) that is in a transport document or an electronic transport record”, it 
can be inferred that the reference required by Article 13.2 should be in writing. The 
wording of the provision leaves it unclear, however, whether a general incorporation of 
charter party terms (e.g., “as per charterparty”) can qualify for such a reference. 448F448F117 
It is important to underline that Article 13.2 allows the carrier to delegate the 
operations in question only to the shipper, documentary shipper, or the consignee. In 
case loading, handling, stowing and unloading are performed by some other party, the 
carrier remains responsible for any failures therein unless these other parties are 
authorities or other third parties who are required to act by law or regulations within 
the meaning of Article 12.2, upon which the carrier’s responsibility ceases. In addition, 
by force of Article 17.3 (i) 449F449F118 the carrier will still be liable when, under the contract of 
carriage, any of the loading, handling, stowing, and unloading has been agreed to be 
performed by the shipper, documentary shipper or the consignee, and nevertheless these 
tasks are carried out by the carrier or a performing party on behalf of that same shipper, 
                                               
115 See Chapter II, section 3.3 supra. 
116 Article 58.2 reads: “A holder that is not the shipper and that exercises any right under the contract of 
carriage assumes any liabilities imposed on it under the contract of carriage to the extent that such  liabilities 
are incorporated in or ascertainable from the negotiable transport document or the negotiable electronic 
transport record.” 
117 Yvonne Baatz, Charles DeBattista, Filippo Lorenzon, Andrew Serdy, Hilton Staniland, Michael Tsimplis 
– ‘The Rotterdam Rules: A Practical Annotation’, Informa Law (2009), ISBN 1843118246, Chapter 4, p. 36. 
118 Article 17.3 (i) reads: “The carrier is also relieved of all or part of its liability pursuant to paragraph 1 of 
this article if, alternatively to proving the absence of fault as provided in paragraph 2 of this article, it proves 
that one or more of the following events or circumstances caused or contributed to the loss, damage, or delay: 
(i) Loading, handling, stowing, or unloading of the goods performed pursuant to an agreement in accordance 
with article 13, paragraph 2, unless the carrier or a performing party performs such activity on behalf of the 
shipper, the documentary shipper or the consignee;” 




documentary shipper or the consignee. This provision will be triggered in cases where, 
for instance, the carrier performs these operations but it is the shipper or consignee who 
pays for them. It covers also the situation where under a FIO clause the shipper 
performs loading but the consignee does not perform unloading and it is the carrier who 
discharges the cargo on behalf of the consignee. Allowing the carrier to perform an 
operation on behalf of the cargo interests and then escape liability was highly criticized 
and the Working Group expressed its misgivings about such a proposal. 450F450F119 It is the very 
same reason why the words “or on behalf of the shipper, the controlling party of the 
consignee” dropped out from draft Article 13.2. To sum up, the carrier will be relived 
from liability when he delegates the duties in question not only upon compliance with 
Article 13.2 but also when it is not him or his employees who in fact performs these 
duties. 
Equally important, Article 13.2 was a subject to a considerable debate within the 
Working Group, in particular, because it was feared that such a provision could be used 
in an abusive manner by shipowners in an attempt to escape liability for cargo that was 
damaged upon loading, stowing or discharging: 
[Paragraph 2] deviated for instance from the Hague-Visby Rules. It 
was also said that such an innovative provision should be amended so 
as to preclude carriers from routinely disclaiming liability for damage 
to the goods that occurred during the operations contemplated in the 
draft article. The potential risk involved in abuse of those clauses was 
said to be significant. Another concern raised in connection with 
paragraph 2 was that it was not clear whether and to what extent the 
types of clauses it contemplated would affect the carrier’s period of 
responsibility. There was strong support for the deletion of paragraph 
2 so as to solve those problems. 451F451F
120  
It is relevant to point out that the UNCITRAL adapted the particular draft article 
to ensure that those misgivings would not be justified. Therefore, inserting a FIOS(T) 
clause in a contract of carriage under the Rotterdam Rules does not limit the period of 
responsibility of the carrier, which was actually one of the main concerns of the 
UNCITRAL delegations in the Working Group during the drafting of the Rules. 452F452F121 The 
fear of some delegations to that effect even led to a proposal that the second sentence of 
Article 13.2 should have been understood as a reference to a separate agreement 
between the parties thereto and not part of the original contract. 453F453F122 However, not enough 
support was accumulated for such an amendment of this second paragraph. 
Why was the period of responsibility so important to the delegations during the 
negotiation process? The answer to that question lies in the result which the Rotterdam 
Rules achieved by not reducing the carrier’s period of responsibility under a FIOS(T) 
clause that is, a carrier will still be held responsible during loading and unloading for 
                                               
119 Working Group III (Transport Law), 9th session (New York, 15-26 April 2002) – UNCITRAL Report of the 
Working Group on Transport Law on the work of its ninth session, p. 37, para 121. 
120 Working Group III (Transport Law), 21st session (Vienna, 14-25 January 2008) – UNCITRAL Report of 
the Working Group (Transport Law) on the work of its twenty-first session, para. 44. 
121 Working Group III (Transport Law), 21st session (Vienna, 14-25 January 2008) – UNCITRAL Report of 
the Working Group (Transport Law) on the work of its twenty-first session, para. 47. 
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other matters that stay outside the contractually negotiated transfer of responsibilities. 
An example of such a responsibility is the duty of care regarding the goods. 
In conclusion, the proviso in Article 13.2 is important for unification of law 
because it made clear that FIOS(T) clauses are valid under certain circumstances and 
that they not only transfer the costs for loading, handling, stowing and unloading from 
the carrier to the cargo interests but they also transfer the responsibility for the proper 
and careful execution of these duties. What is more, the drafters found the right balance 
between carriers’ and shippers’ interests by leaving the processes of loading and 
unloading under such a clause within the period of responsibility of the carrier. In this 
way the Rotterdam Rules clarified an area of shipping law which was unclear and not 
equally interpreted in different jurisdictions, while in the same time the Rules 
adequately considered nowadays commercial practices. 
6. Conclusion 
The architecture of the Hague-Visby Rules, in particular Article III rule 2 and 
Article III rule 8, makes it look on the surface that any clause, which limits the cargo-
related responsibilities of the carrier, is null and void. However, it was evidenced that 
English courts tend to move away from such literal construction of the Rules. One 
obvious reason for courts being reluctant to ban the FIOS(T) clause is that such an 
outcome would lead to absurd results where a shipper who, following an existing 
commercial practice, carries out loading and stowing, could then hold the carrier liable 
for the shipper’s own failure to fulfil his contractual obligations. 454F454F123 
Secondly, a literal construction of Article III rule 2 combined with Article III rule 
8 was not in line with the object of the Rules as outlined in Renton v Palmyra.455F455F124 This is 
confirmed also by the Travaux Préparatoires of the Hague Rules. At the Diplomatic 
Conference held in 1923, the chairman of the sub-committee Mr. Louis Franck noticed in 
respect of Article III rule 2 the following: “Article III(2) contained an essential clause [...] 
[which prevents] the inclusion of every clause permitting the shipowner, without incurring 
responsibility, to fail in this essential duty of overseeing the preservation of the goods from 
the point of view of successful stowage, loading, and unloading […]. That was the main 
element of the convention because it was in this way that, in the past, the use of immunity 
clauses had given cause for the greatest criticism.” 456F456F125 The latter sentence is very 
indicative of the intention of the drafters – the rule is aimed at preventing immunity 
clauses which would exonerate carriers from liability for non-fulfillment of the 
obligations Article III rule 2. However, the drafters do not seem to have had in mind to 
ban an existing and common commercial practice to delegate contractually some of the 
cargo-related tasks from the carrier to the shipper. It is unlikely that the object of the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules is to create provisions that go against commercial practices 
                                               
123 N.J. Margetson – ‘Liability of the Carrier Under the Hague (Visby) Rules for Cargo Damage Caused by 
Unseaworthiness of Its Containers’, (2008) 14 JIML 153, at p. 159. 
124 Renton v Palmyra (The “Caspiana”), [1956] 2 Lloyd’s Law Reports 379 at p. 390. 
125 Comité Maritime International – ‘The Travaux Préparatoires Of The International Convention For The 
Unification Of Certain Rules Of Law Relating To Bills Of Lading Of 25 August 1924 The Hague Rules And 
Of The Protocols Of 23 February 1968 And 21 December 1979 The Hague-Visby Rules’, p. 186. 




commonly carried out by shipowners, shipper, bankers, and insurers. Accordingly, 
English courts did not see such a clause as an immunity clause and preferred a 
purposive construction over a literal one. In other words, their approach and 
interpretation of the Rules with regard to the FIOS(T) clause was based on purpose 
rather than cause. 
However, as it was established above, all FIOS(T) clauses are usually strictly 
scrutinized by courts even in jurisdictions where free in-free out arrangements are 
permitted. This also has to do with the object of the Rules – there must be a balance of 
the interests of carriers and cargo interests. Therefore, if the clause leaves both parties 
on an equal footing, for example the consignee has knowingly consented to such an 
arrangement, then the clause is less likely to be struck as being contrary to Article III 







The Carrier’s Obligations over 
Deck Cargo 
1. Introduction 
The current chapter will focus on the obligations of the carrier under the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules over cargo that is carried on deck. Particular attention will be 
paid on the relationship between carriers and cargo interests in matters related to such 
cargo, and also between shipowners and charterers, as well as on the legislative and 
judicial issues that arise in the various situations of deck carriage.  
The discussion will be begin with a concise description of the notions “deck” and 
“deck cargo” (section 2), followed by the position on deck carriage under the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules (section 3), which forms the current regulatory framework. 
The current law on deck cargo (section 4) will be stated, while carrying out a risk 
analysis related to deck carriage taking into account factual and technical data. In 
particular, the risk assessment will attempt to “measure” the evolved views on deck 
carriage; secondly, the changes in ship design and their impact on the carriage on deck 
will be analyzed; thirdly, the advent of containerization will be referred to so far as it has 
affected the traditional deck cargo doctrine; finally, it will be observed how the changes 
in the views relating to deck cargo have affected the traditional notion of a custom to 
carry on deck, the required agreement to carry on deck, and the statutory obligations of 
the carrier to do so. The emphasis in this section will be put on how technology, 
innovations, and modern shipping practices have changed the views on deck cargo and 
have widened the gap with the existing statutory rules. 
Furthermore, the evolving views on deck cargo will be examined (section 5) as, 
like in the previous chapters, the focus will be primarily on English law, which is 
distinctively restrictive to deck cargo. This detour is to show how courts have interpreted 
this aspect of the carriage of goods throughout the years in the light of the old doctrine 
becoming increasingly incompatible with the current shipping practices. The particular 
issues that will be addressed will be the relation between the various deck cargo 
provisions and the carrier’s obligations over the cargo under the Rules as well as 
problems related to deck cargo provisions coupled with a FIOS(T) clause. 
The next section is dedicated to how the carriage of goods on deck is treated in 
other jurisdictions (section 6) and to what extent they have adapted to the evolving law 
on deck carriage. 
Finally, the approach towards the carriage on deck under the Rotterdam Rules is 
examined (section 7), with a commentary on the feasibility of such provisions and on 




whether they could be applicable against the background of the changed views on deck 
carriage. 
2. What is deck cargo? 
The carriage of goods on deck is a specific way of transporting goods on a sea 
vessel and, therefore, it is treated and regulated differently compared to cargo stowed 
below deck. In broad terms, deck cargo designates cargo that is carried in any space that 
is uncovered on the weather deck of a ship instead of being carried inside the ship. 457F457F1 If 
the cargo is stowed in a permanent steel enclosure, even if this location is designated in 
the plans of the shipbuilder as above the weather deck (e.g. a hatch-trunk, a bridge deck, 
or a hospital space), the cargo is nevertheless considered to be carried below deck. 458F458F2 A 
definition of a deck was to be found in the CMI’s early instrument on general average, 
the York Rules (1864), and in its successor the York & Antwerp Rules (1877), both of 
which are now superseded by new revisions of those Rules. The relevant article reads: 
Rule I – Jettison of Deck Cargo 
[…] 
Every structure not built in with the frame of the vessel shall be 
considered to be a part of the deck of the vessel. 
A definition of deck carriage can be derived from the W. Tetley’s description of 
“under deck” citing Lossiebank (Massce & Co. Inc. v Bank Line) 1938 AMC 1033 (Sup. 
Ct. of Cal. 1938): “Under deck means not exposed to the elements; in other words, the 
cargo is completely protected by the ship’s structure”.459F459F3 
What makes it so peculiar and distinct to carry cargo that way, is that the goods 
stowed on deck are not protected by the ship’s structure like those goods that are carried 
below deck. Thus, shipments on deck are directly exposed to adverse elements such as 
bad weather conditions, be it heavy rains and high winds, snow, due or haze; seawater 
splashing aboard; uncontrolled temperature as well as scorching heat due to direct 
sunlight. The risk of damaging such cargo or losing it overboard during carriage is, 
therefore, substantially greater. So is the risk of the vessel being damaged or rendered 
unseaworthy because of poorly stowed or lashed cargo, which is shifting and rolling 
across the weather deck. Therefore, shipowners who are carrying deck cargo are often 
advised to avoid, as much as possible, adverse weather conditions and perils of the sea 
that can be foreseen, while still maintaining the interests of charterers and cargo 
owners. 
It may seem thus far that carrying goods on deck is unreasonable because no 
party has an interest in taking more risks and additionally endangering the cargo 
carried by exposing it directly to the perils of the sea. Yet, cargo has been and is still 
carried on deck either in break bulk,460F460F4 or in containers,461F461F5 or as a project cargo462F462F6 – in the 
                                               
1 The carriage below deck is also known as ‘belly cargo’, although that term is typical for air cargo and it is 
rarely used in sea transportation. 
2 Arnold W. Knauth – ‘The American Law of Ocean Bills of Lading’, Third Edition (1947), p. 194. 
3 William Tetley – ‘Marine Cargo Claims’ (4th edition), Les Editions Yvon Blais Inc. (2008), Volume 1, 
Chapter 31, p. 1569. 
4 This can be, for instance, timber cargo or concrete blocks carried on deck. 
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latter case the cargo is usually lashed directly to the deck of the ship, carefully balanced 
for safety of the vessel, and sometimes covered with materials for protection of the cargo. 
The reasons why contractual parties may agree on a carriage on deck vary inasmuch as 
the deck cargo itself – from explosives to lumber and cattle. 463F463F7 
Firstly, for some cargoes there are requirements imposed by law to be carried on 
deck. This is especially the case with the transportation of hazardous cargoes, which 
should be in compliance with the IMDG Code. 464F464F8 The Code distinguishes between 5 
stowage categories and some of them are restricted to stowage on deck only. 465F465F9 Also, some 
dangerous goods are not allowed to be discharged and stored in a warehouse at the port 
of destination and that is why they have to be discharged and transferred directly from 
the deck of a docked ship to waiting container trucks or trains so that this cargo can 
immediately leave the port.466F466F10 
For other cargoes, deck stowage may be necessitated by technical requirements 
and convenience. Various out-of-gauge cargoes that need more space, may not fit in the 
cargo hold of the ship, or may not go through the hatches, and, therefore, they need to be 
stowed on deck. Such cargo may include aircrafts, trucks, locomotives, coaches, 
windmills, huge critical pieces of equipment, and detached parts of bigger machinery. 
There may also be commercial considerations for the carriage of goods on deck 
and these are related to the space aboard the vessel and the carrier’s pursuit to 
maximize profits. Deck carriage, on the other hand, may be preferred by sellers or 
buyers of the goods, too, simply for efficiency reasons. Cargo stowed on deck is generally 
more quickly and easier to load and discharge. 
3. The position under the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules – deck 
carriage as an exception to the Rules 
The carriage of goods on deck is yet another exception to the Hague/Hague-Visby 
Rules. The regulation of deck cargo has deliberately been left out of the scope of the 
Rules because such cargo has traditionally been seen as potentially hazardous in 
                                                                                                                                                   
5 For containerized cargo, see Chapter V. 
6 Project cargo is a general term broadly describing large, bulky and heavy cargo that cannot be transported 
in a container. These may be cranes, wind power plants, various kinds of turbines, and ship propellers. 
7 Although livestock carriage often takes place on deck for safety and ventilation reasons, this type of 
carriage, being an exception to the Hague Rules and the Hague-Visby Rules (Art .I(c)) regardless whether on 
deck or below deck, is beyond the scope of the current thesis. 
8 The International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code is a uniform international code for the 
transport of dangerous goods and marine pollutants by sea, written under the auspices of the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO). The Code contains mandatory instructions on terminology, packaging, 
labeling, placarding, markings, stowage, segregation, ventilation, handling, training of shore-based 
personnel, and emergency response. It covers cargo that is considered dangerous due to its flammable, 
corrosive, poisonous or other hazardous nature and properties. The IMDG Code, which supplements the 
principles laid down in the SOLAS and MARPOL conventions, has been changed and updated every two 
years in order to keep pace with the shipping industry. The Code’s latest edition is the IMDG Code 2014 
(Amendment 37-14). 
9 See IMDG Code Section 7.1.3. 
10 For example, substances liable to spontaneous combustion (IMDG Code, Class 4.2), and also some 
oxidizing substances (IMDG Code, Class 5.1) such as barium permanganate (UN 1448), potassium chlorate 
(UN 1485), sodium chlorate (UN 1495), zinc chlorate (UN 1513), and ammonium nitrate (UN 1942), are 
allowed only on the basis of direct discharge by the South Africa’s Transnet National Port Authority (TNPA). 




comparison with cargo carried below deck. 467F467F11 In America, for example, the exclusion of 
deck cargo from the application of the US COGSA 1936 was explained with the need to 
relieve the Baltic timber trade from regulation by giving them more freedom of 
contract.468F468F12 
The exclusion from the scope of the Rules is defined in a rather technical way. 
Cargo which is stated in the contract of carriage as carried on deck and which is indeed 
so carried is excluded from the scope of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. Although 
excluded from the Rules, however, deck cargo may well be regulated under national 
law.469F469F13 Unless the on-deck carriage is excluded from the ambit of the Rules, there is a 
breach of the carrier’s implied obligation to carry the goods below deck. This is the 
conclusion inferred by reading together Article I(c) and Article III rule 8. While the 
former provision excludes deck cargo from the definition of goods to which the Rules 
apply, the latter forbids parties to contract out from the Rules or to lessen their 
liabilities as laid down therein. 
Article I 
In these Rules the following words are employed, with the meanings 
set out below: 
[… ] 
(c) ‘Goods’ includes goods, wares, merchandise, and articles of every 
kind whatsoever except live animals and cargo which by the contract 
of carriage is stated as being carried on deck and is so carried 
[emphasis added]. 
The definition is clearly drafted to encompass within the ambit of the Rules any 
possible kind of property that can be carried by sea with two exceptions: live animals and 
deck cargo. Because of the specific risks that these two categories pose during 
transportation, they are distinguished from the other types of cargo and are taken out of 
the liability regime established by the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. Instead, freedom of 
contract will apply to the carriage of these categories, subject to the mandatory 
provisions of the applicable law. Therefore, cargo that is stated to be carried on deck and 
is so carried is exempted from the provisions of the Hague-Visby Rules (unless the 
parties expressly chose to contractually incorporate the Rules), and carriers can protect 
themselves from exposure to liability through inserting in their contract of carriage 
various exception and limitation clauses, which would otherwise be invalidated by 
Article III rule 8 of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. 
The exclusion of deck cargo from the Rules is based on the following 
interpretation of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules’ provisions. Since “deck cargo” is not 
considered “goods” within the definition provided (Article I(c)), the bill of lading does not 
refer to the carriage of goods and, hence, it does not refer to a contract of carriage within 
the meaning of the Rules (Article I(b)). The provisions of the Rules do not, therefore, 
apply to such a contract of carriage of deck cargo, because the Rules “shall apply to every 
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Quarterly (2000), p. 295. 
12 Arnold W. Knauth – ‘The American Law of Ocean Bills of Lading’, Third Edition (1947), p. 193. 
13 See section 8 below. 
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bill of lading relating to the carriage of goods” (Article X; emphasis added). This 
interpretation is also upheld and confirmed in The “BBC Greenland”.470F470F14 
However, the mere stowage and carriage of goods on the weather deck of a vessel 
do not necessarily make these goods “deck cargo” within the meaning provided in the 
Rules. If one looks closely into Article I(c), it could be seen that there are two conditions 
that need to be satisfied in order goods to be considered “deck cargo” and, hence, to be 
excluded from the scope of the Convention. The first one is the presence of an express 
statement that goods are loaded and carried on board, which must be unequivocally 
inserted on the face of the bill of lading. The second condition is that the goods are 
actually so carried. While the second requirement is a matter of fact, the first one is a 
matter of contract and it is this first condition that has been the cause for many disputes 
and has given rise to various issues before courts. 471F471F15 The rationale behind such a strict 
requirement for an express written statement in the contract of carriage is that, absent 
such a statement, the carrier will be unable to prove the agreement that he made with 
the shipper that the cargo would be carried on deck. The express, genuine and clear 
written consent of the shipper, on the other hand, is needed because, once the shipment 
is exempted from the Hague-Visby Rules, the parties lose all their rights and defences 
under the Convention. It is very important that the shipper was sufficiently informed 
and that he unequivocally agreed on such terms of carriage. 
3.1 Deck carriage performed within the ambit of the Rules: undeclared 
(unauthorized) stowage on deck 
Considering the abovementioned observations, the Rules will still be applicable if 
there is an express statement or notation on the face of the bill of lading but the goods 
have been, nevertheless, carried below deck. This is simply because the second, factual 
condition in Article I(c) has not been fulfilled. An important remark is that the Rules will 
still apply even when declared deck cargo (meaning that goods are stated as carried on 
deck and are so carried) has been for some part of the voyage carried on deck, but then 
re-stowed under deck.472F472F16 A pertinent question is at what point of time does the 
application of the Rules start – do the Rules apply as of the initial loading of the goods on 
deck, meaning that they shall apply retrospectively, or do they apply only as of the time 
when the goods were re-stowed? The view expressed by the authors of ‘Voyage Charters’ 
and by those of ‘Carver on Bills of Lading’ supports the latter proposition, namely that 
the Rules apply as of the moment when the goods are re-stowed below-deck because this 
is the moment when these goods become “goods” within the meaning of Article I(c), 
whereas it has been underlined that the definition of “contract of carriage” in Article I(b) 
has been limited by the words “in so far as such document relates to the carriage of goods 
by sea”, which indicates that during the time when the declared deck cargo is carried on 
deck, up until the re-stowage below deck, the cargo does not fall within the definition of 
                                               
14 Sideridraulic Systems SpA and Another v BBC Chartering & Logistic GmbH & Co KG (The “BBC 
Greenland”) – [2012] 1 Lloyd’s Law Reports 230, at p. 232, para 2. 
15 The Rhone: Analysis and Comments, JIML 12 [2006] 1 13, at p.14. 
16 Julian Cooke, Timothy Young QC, John Kimball, LeRoy Lambert, Andrew Taylor, David Martowski – 
‘Voyage Charters’ (4th Edition, 2014), Chapter 85, para 85.75. 




“goods” and, therefore, the Rules are not applicable. 473F473F17 They become applicable after the 
goods are re-stowed below deck, when the cargo actually becomes “goods” within the 
meaning of Article I(c). The same principle would apply vice versa – when the declared 
deck cargo was initially loaded and carried under deck, and then, at a later stage during 
the voyage, re-stowed on deck. In this case, the Rules are applicable only with regard to 
the first part of the voyage when the cargo is considered “goods” within Article I(c), and 
they do not apply once the declared deck cargo is re-stowed on-deck. 
This principle does not run contrary to the ‘tackle to tackle’ scope in Article I(e) 
because “loading” of the goods, within the meaning of that article, can be considered to 
be the re-stowing of the cargo below deck; or, in the second scenario, the “discharge” of 
the cargo can relate to the re-stowing of the goods on deck. The re-stowage itself, below 
or above deck, may constitute a breach of the contract of carriage but it may well not be 
a breach, depending on the terms of the contract, the nature of the goods carried, the 
nature of the stowage and lashing as well as on the specific circumstances and the 
parties’ intention. However, any re-stowage during a voyage should be performed 
“properly and carefully” in accordance with the obligation set forth in Article III rule 2 of 
the Rules.474F474F18 
Furthermore, the Rules will also apply when part of the cargo is stowed on deck 
and another part is stowed below deck, without making it clear in the notation on the 
bill of lading precisely which part of the cargo will be stowed on deck. 475F475F19 The problems 
that can arise in this case are associated with the identification of the cargo that will be 
carried on deck and that, accordingly, will bear higher risks. The cargo interests, thus, 
cannot determine the value of the cargo carried on deck, and cannot assess the 
pertaining risks; neither can they make an informed consent that the cargo will be 
carried on deck. Therefore, and also in the light of The “Rhone”, it seems that unless the 
consignments of on-deck and below-deck cargo are separate, or unless the notation on 
the face of the bill of lading is clear as to exactly which part of the cargo will be stowed 
on deck, the Hague/Hague Visby Rules will be applicable to the entire shipment, and 
none of the goods carried will be considered “deck cargo” within the meaning of Article 
I(c).476F476F20 
All things considered, it is important to note that, throughout this chapter, the 
term “deck cargo” is used by the author merely to signify the fact that the goods are 
actually located on the deck of a sea vessel; i.e. the natural meaning of the words is 
employed. In cases where reference has to be made to the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules’ 
definition of “deck cargo”, this is explicitly stated, or, else, the words 
                                               
17 See: Julian Cooke, Timothy Young QC, John Kimball, LeRoy Lambert, Andrew Taylor, David Martowski – 
‘Voyage Charters’ (4th Edition, 2014), Chapter 85, para 85.75; and Sir Guenter H. Treitel Q.C., Francis M.B. 
Reynolds Q.C. – ‘Carver on Bills of Lading’ (2nd Edition, 2005), Chapter 9, para 9–116. However, see an 
opposing view in ‘Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of Lading’ (20th Edition, 1996), Chapter XX, p. 424, 
where the authors “prefer the view that, when once the contract has become a “contract of carriage” within 
the meaning of this Rule [Art. I(b)], the Rules apply and relate back to the beginning of the carriage of the 
good, i.e. the beginning of the loading.” 
18 Julian Cooke, Timothy Young QC, John Kimball, LeRoy Lambert, Andrew Taylor, David Martowski – 
‘Voyage Charters’ (4th Edition, 2014), Chapter 85, para 85.75 (ibid.) 
19 ‘Carver on Bills of Lading’ (2nd Edition), Sweet & Maxwell Ltd (2005), London, p. 558, para 9–116. 
20 Timberwest Forest Ltd v Gearbulk Pool Ltd (The “Rhone”) – 2003 BCCA 39 (Court of Appeal for British 
Columbia) – Lloyd’s Maritime Law Newsletter [2005] 681, p. 2. See: Section 5.3 infra. 
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“authorized/declared deck cargo” are used. Conversely, the opposite term 
“unauthorized/undeclared deck cargo” or “wrongful deck carriage” is used to indicate 
that goods have been stowed and carried on deck but that they do not qualify for “deck 
cargo” within the meaning of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. In that regard, while some 
authors draw a distinction between “undeclared deck carriage” and “unauthorized deck 
carriage477F477F21 (the former designating cargo shipped on deck under a “liberty to stow on 
deck” clause478F478F22 but without a statement or notation on the bill of lading stating whether 
the cargo is actually carried on deck, and the latter relating to cargo carried on deck 
without any clause permitting deck-carriage and any statement or notation on the bill of 
lading), the two terms will be employed in the current thesis as synonyms, which 
generally describe cargo carried on deck that fail to satisfy the requirements of Article 
I(c) to be excluded from the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. The same applies mutatis 
mutandis to the terms “declared deck cargo” and “authorized deck cargo”. 
3.1.1 Clause Paramount 
The Hague/Hague-Visby Rules may be applicable to authorized carriage on deck 
as well. This is achieved through a Clause Paramount 479F479F23, which will incorporate the 
Rules under Article X(c). 480F480F24 But then these Rules, once incorporated in the contract of 
carriage, will apply to cargo which is stated as being carried on deck and is so carried, 
which renders the Rules inapplicable by force of the very same Rules. This conundrum is 
particularly addressed by authors and it is underlined that when the Hague-Visby Rules 
are incorporated in an on-deck bill of lading, it is very important that parties expressly 
exclude the provision in Article I(c) which excepts deck cargo from the Rules. 481F481F25 This is 
also noted in English legislation, where contracts that provide for deck carriage and in 
the same time incorporate the Rules, are indeed subject to the Hague-Visby Rules, 
ignoring the exception for deck cargo: 
If and so far as the contract contained in or evidenced by a bill of 
lading or receipt within paragraph (a) or (b) of subsection (6) above 
applies to deck cargo and live animals, the Rules as given the force of 
law by that subsection shall have effect as if Article I (c) did not 
exclude deck cargo and live animals. 
In this subsection ‘deck cargo’ means cargo which by the contract of 
carriage is stated as being carried on deck and is so carried. 482F482F
26
 
What is more, this article goes beyond the mere statutory solution of the problem 
caused by inserting a Clause Paramount into an on-deck bill of lading. The way it is 
drafted, the provision suggests that, under English law, any authorized carriage of cargo 
                                               
21 See: James B. Wooder – ‘Deck Cargo: Old Vices and New Law’, 22 J. Mar. L. & Com. 131 (January 1991); 
R. Glenn Bauer – ‘Deck Cargo: Pitfalls to Avoid Under American Law in Clausing Your Bills of Lading’, 22 J. 
Mar. L. & Com. 287 (April 1991). 
22 See section 4.3 below. 
23 For the Clause Paramount, see Chapter I, section 2.1.3. 
24 Article X: “The provisions of these Rules shall apply to every bill of lading relating to the carriage of goods 
between ports in two different States if […] (c) the contract contained in or evidenced by the bill of lading 
provides that these Rules or legislation of any State giving effect to them are to govern the contract”. 
25 James B. Wooder – ‘Deck Cargo: Old Vices and New Law’, 22 J. Mar. L. & Com. 131 (January 1991), at p. 
133-134. 
26 UK COGSA (1971), section 1(7). 




on deck, to which the Hague-Visby Rules applicable through a Clause Paramount, will 
be governed by the Rules as if they have the force of law: 
Without prejudice to Article X(c) of the Rules, the Rules shall have the 
force of law in relation to: 
 a) any bill of lading if the contract contained in or evidenced by 
it expressly provides that the Rules shall govern the contract […] 483 F483F
27
 
Thus, contractual incorporation of the Rules, in particular in cases of deck cargo, 
has the same effect and the same outcome as if the Rules apply by force of law. 
For a General Paramount Clause to effectively incorporate the Rules into the 
contract of the carriage that involves deck cargo, it is not sufficient that the clause is 
only included in the bill of lading but it must also expressly refer that it applies to deck 
carriage as well. A sole Clause Paramount will incorporate the Rules when goods are 
carried below deck but it will not extend the Rules to cases of carriage above deck. 484F484F28 In 
other words, the clause does not supersede the exclusion of a deck carriage from the 
scope of the Rules under Article I(c). Conversely, a Clause Paramount will incorporate 
the Rules in a contract of carriage of deck cargo if it expressly shows that the parties 
indeed agreed that the Rules will be applicable to the on-deck carriage.485F485F29 An 
incorporation of the Rules will, thus, be successful with the insertion, for example, of the 
following clause: 
2. General Paramount Clause 
The Hague Rules contained in the International Convention for the 
Unification of Certain Rules relating to bills of lading, dated Brussels 
25
th
 August 1924 as enacted in the country of shipment shall apply to 
this contract. 
9. Live animals and deck cargo 
shall be carried subject to the Hague Rules as referred to in clause 2 
hereof with the exception that notwithstanding anything contained in 
clause 19 the carrier shall not be liable for any loss or damage 
resulting from any act, neglect or default of his servants in the 
management of such animals and deck cargo.486F486F
30 
3.2 Deck carriage performed outside the ambit of the Rules: declared 
(authorized) stowage on deck 
If cargo carried on deck complies with the two requirements of Article I(c), 
namely that it is stated as being carried on deck and is so carried, then such carriage is 
no longer within the ambit of the Hague or Hague-Visby Rules but, instead, it is subject 
to freedom of contract. Thus, the carrier’s responsibility will, in general, be the same for 
goods stowed below deck and for goods stowed on deck. What is more, in the case of “deck 
cargo” within the meaning of Article I(c) of the Rules, the parties to the contract of 
carriage are at liberty to negotiate their own terms and conditions and to determine 
their liability and obligations, or to choose another liability regime, which would 
                                               
27 UK COGSA (1971), section 1(6). 
28 See: The “BBC Greenland” [2012] 1 Lloyd’s Law Reports 230. 
29 See: The “Tilia Gorthon” [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Law Reports 552. 
30 The “Tilia Gorthon” [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Law Reports 552, at p. 553-554. 
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otherwise not be applicable. In particular, the carrier may invoke contract clauses that, 
otherwise, would be contrary to the Rules and, thus, struck by Article III rule 8. Another 
consequence of the exclusion of the application of the Rules is that on-deck carriage of 
cargo, other than cargo carried in the regular containerized trade where the Rules are in 
practice rendered contractually applicable, 487F487F31 will be rendered subject to national law, 
which differs quite a lot from one country to another. 488F488F32 Accordingly, the admissibility of 
any contractual provision exculpating the carrier for damage or loss to deck cargo will be 
assessed depending on the applicable national law. 
Considering the foregoing, the most natural consequence for a carrier is to be 
tempted to insert in the bills of lading clauses that exempt him from all liability 
whatsoever not only with regard to the “deck cargo” but also with regard to negligence 
and seaworthiness. However, such clauses are not always welcomed by courts. It is 
common knowledge that English courts, for example, tend to afford more leeway to 
parties to shape their contractual relationship, whereas courts in the US tend to be more 
restrictive when it comes to freedom of contract. If we apply this division to deck 
carriage, the result is that a clause exempting the carrier from all liability whatsoever 
may be allowed in England but struck down in the USA as contrary to public policy.489F489F33 
Such a clause, which attempts to contract out all liability whatsoever, may also be 
considered null and void under civil law as against the general assumption of good faith 
and fair dealing in contracts. Therefore, parties must be careful in which court they 
bring an action, and private international law plays a very important role in that 
respect. 
Courts in England tend to construe restrictively statements or notations on the 
bills of lading stating that the cargo will be carried on deck, which are intended to 
produce the effect of excepting the carriage from the Rules. The rather high standards 
can be explained with the need of protection of shippers, consignees or third-party bills of 
lading holders. As already stated above, they all must be well informed about the risks 
involved in the shipment. 490F490F34 Thus, if an on-deck statement, which purports to exclude the 
carriage from the ambit of the Rules, is unclear or ambiguous, the Court will apply the 
contra proferentem rule and construe this statement or notation, as well as any 
ambiguity, against the party which drafted it, namely the carrier. 491F491F35 Moreover, it is the 
carrier who bears the burden of proof to establish, should there be any ambiguity, that 
the statement is indeed one that in fact states on-deck carriage.492F492F36 
The standard for assessing  the admissibility of a statement that cargo will be 
carried on deck varies from a case to case but, as an example, the following notation in 
                                               
31 The carriage of containerized cargo will be further discussed in more details in Chapter V on the carriage 
of containers. 
32 For an informative comparison of the deck cargo regimes in several European jurisdictions, see section 6. 
33 R. Glenn Bauer – ‘Deck Cargo: Pitfalls to Avoid Under American Law in Clausing Your Bills of Lading’, 22 
J. Mar. L. & Com. 287 (April 1991), at p. 288-289. 
34 See: Section 5 above. 
35 Sideridraulic Systems SpA and Another v BBC Chartering & Logistic GmbH & Co KG (The “BBC 
Greenland”) – [2012] 1 Lloyd’s Law Reports 230, at p. 235, para 21. 
36 The “BBC Greenland” – [2012] 1 Lloyd’s Law Reports 230, at p. 235, para 21 (ibid.). 




The “BBC Greenland”493F493F37 was accepted by the court as a valid notation, which excluded 
the goods from the Hague-Visby Rules for being “deck cargo”: 
MASTER’S REMARKS 
— ALL CARGO LOADED FROM OPEN STORAGE AREA 
ALL CARGO CARRIED ON DECK AT SHIPPER’ S / CHARTERER’S / 
RECEIVER’S RISK AS TO PERILS INHERENT IN SUCH CARRIAGE, ANY 
WARRANTY OF SEAWORTHINESS OF THE VESSEL ESPRESSLY WAIVED 
BY THE SHIPPER / CHARTERER / RECEIVER. 
AND IN ALL OTHER RESPECTS SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE 
UNITED STATES CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA ACT 1936. […] 
The carriage was a second shipment of sand filter tanks for a water treatment 
plant from Italy to Alabama between the same parties under a fixture recap, which 
stated “shipment under/on deck in owners’ option, deck cargo at merchant risk and b/l to 
be marked accordingly”.494F494F38 The first shipment of 13 tanks, most of which carried on deck, 
was completed without incidents. The current case concerned the second shipment of 10 
filter tanks, which were carried on the deck of BBC Greenland under a bill of lading with 
the above notation on its face. On the reverse of the bill, there were terms which 
provided for the application of the Hague Rules as enacted in the country of shipment 
(which was Italy, where the Hague-Visby Rules were enacted), and for London 
arbitration and the application of English law. 
During the journey, one tank was lost and another was damaged. One of the main 
questions was whether this provision on the bill of lading was to be interpreted as a 
statement which sufficiently specifies that the tanks were indeed carried on deck, or 
whether it was a mere warning of the perils inherent in such carriage. The Court held 
that the tanks were “deck cargo” within the meaning of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. 
What the Court took into consideration was, first, the master’s remark on the face of the 
bill of lading, which was construed as a statement of fact regarding the mode of carriage, 
and which was not considered ambiguous; secondly, the previous business conducted 
between the parties where the same remark could only be understood as an on-deck 
statement; thirdly, that a reasonable third-party transferee of the bill of lading would be 
able to ascertain from the terms on the bill whether the cargo was in fact carried on deck 
or under deck.495F495F39 
As a result, the Hague-Visby Rules did not apply to the carriage because the 
parties did not extend their application to cover deck cargo as well, which they could 
have done. The Court, however, underlined obiter that if the cargo had been carried 
below deck, then the Hague-Visby Rules would have applied with the force of law. Yet, 
under the circumstances in the present case, the “deck cargo” notation excluded the 
Rules, whereas US COGSA 1936 applied because the bill of lading expressly provided so. 
US COGSA 1936, on which the parties expressly agreed on the face of the bill, was 
considered by the Court as a different and inconsistent regime to the Hague/Hague-
                                               
37 The “BBC Greenland” – [2012] 1 Lloyd’s Law Reports 230. 
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Visby Rules.496F496F40 Consequently, the carrier could pursue liability exemption under the 
exemption clause contained in the on-deck statement on the face of the bill of lading, or 
pursue limitation of liability under the US COGSA 1936, which is generally more 
favourable to carriers compared to the limitation of liability provision set forth in the 
Hague-Visby Rules. Also, the contractual provision that the parties may commence suit 
in a US court of proper jurisdiction if US COGSA 1936 is applicable to the contract, was 
also upheld. Again, the English court pointed out that the parties contractually bestowed 
exclusive jurisdiction upon American courts only in the event that the US COGSA 1936 
would apply to the carriage; therefore, should the Hague-Visby Rules were applicable 
(i.e. should cargo been not considered “deck cargo”), then American courts would not 
have had jurisdiction.497F497F41 
This case is a good example of how dramatic the changes may be for the parties 
involved, from a legal perspective, if a statement or a notation on the face of the bill of 
lading is regarded by the Court as a statement for “deck cargo” within the meaning of 
Article I(c) of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. 
However, whether cargo carried on deck is considered “deck cargo” for the 
purpose of the Hague-Visby Rules is not always subject to the same determinants. 
Although there is an apparently uniform distinction between authorized and 
unauthorized deck carriage, it is not all black and white when courts have to consider 
whether certain carriage on deck is legal or not. One has to put this distinction between 
legal and illegal deck carriage into the particular context in order to reach an objective 
assessment of the legality of the deck cargo. 
Most importantly, courts will assess three major factors when drawing the line 
between legal and illegal deck cargo. Firstly, it must be established how objectionable 
the increase of the risk is when cargo is carried on deck. This comes down to the question 
whether the cargo is suitable for being loaded and carried on deck. As stated elsewhere, 
the risk varies as it could be significantly minimized in certain trades, but it could also 
well be significant, for example, for sensitive goods that are not suited for transportation 
on the weather deck. Similarly, the type and design of the vessel has also bearing on the 
increase of the risk with regard to the carriage of cargo on deck. The second factor that is 
to be weighed is how objectionable the liability exemption clauses are. In particular, it 
must be established whether carriers – in their attempt to limit or exclude liability 
altogether – have impaired the balance of interests of the carrier and of the cargo 
owners.498F498F42 Thirdly, due regard must be given to the issue of how clearly all those risks 
and exemptions pertaining to deck cargo have been communicated to the cargo interests. 
In other words, is the shipper aware of such carriage arrangements? 
 Perhaps what makes deck cargo so difficult from a legal point of view is 
that these different factors stated hereabove are weighed differently under different 
jurisdictions. Hence, there are different results in adjudicating. 
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4. Current law on deck cargo: how technology and modern 
practices remodeled the old doctrine 
The previous section sought to establish that, under the traditional deck cargo 
doctrine reflected in the Hague-Visby Rules, there was a clear connection between a 
clean bill of lading and the obligation to stow the cargo below deck. 
This, however, has changed throughout time, and the evolvement in the views on 
deck cargo happened gradually, fostered by the trade, technological and shipping 
developments. The major risk-determining factors related to deck cargo are the nature of 
the cargo and the nature of the carrying vessel, both of which have substantially evolved 
in the 20th century. The leading liability regime, on the other hand, has not changed 
since 1924 as the 1968 amendment did not introduce any revision of the Rules as far as 
deck carriage is concerned. However, courts interpreted the Rules differently throughout 
the years in accordance with the prevailing views on deck cargo at that time. 499F499F43 
Especially with respect to containerized cargo, a different rule has evolved, which 
renders the old doctrine on deck cargo inapplicable in many jurisdictions. 500F500F44 English 
courts, in particular, have come a long way struggling to catch up with the developments 
in the shipping world and to close the gap between a legislation based on shipping 
realities that date back almost a century ago, on the one hand, and the modern-time 
business and trade practices, on the other. 
Currently, there are three permissible ways to carry cargo on deck – by custom, 
by an agreement, or by a convention. 501F501F45 The following sub-sections will review each of 
these authorized ways of deck carriage, preceded by a factual analysis of the risks 
relating to deck cargo. 
4.1 Factual study 
4.1.1 Assessing the risk of carrying on deck 
Merely 100 years ago, when the Hague Rules were drafted, and well before the 
advent of containerization, stowage of cargo on the weather deck substantially 
augmented the risk for the goods, which could be either washed away or damaged as a 
result of breaking-wave impact or of the intensified forces exerted on the deck cargo 
because of pitching, rolling, yawing. Furthermore, vessels were exposed to a greater 
degree to forces exerted by wind and waves as a result of the cargo towering from the 
weather deck upwards, which diminished the vessel’s stability whereby listing and even 
capsizing was much more likely. Such augmented forces, acting on the vessel, could even 
result in losing her rudder and thus rendering her unseaworthy. 
Given the design of the vessels at that time, which were mostly shaped to carry 
goods below deck, all those risks were inherent to the carriage on deck, and that is why 
the carrier was usually held liable for stowing goods on deck and, in some jurisdictions, 
                                               
43 For the evolving views on deck cargo under English law, see section 5. 
44 Croake, D. J. in Encyclopedia Britannica v Steamship Hong Kong Producer [1968] A.M.C. 169 at p. 170: 
“The court recognizes that there has been an increase in the use of containers in the shipping industry. The 
United States Supreme Court in constituting the meaning of the term “clean” bill of lading had indicated that 
a general port custom permitting above deck stowage could modify the meaning of a “clean” bill.” 
45 ‘Voyage charters’ (3rd edition), Informa London (2007), p.962, para 85.71. 
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it was not extraordinary to apply the deviation rule to a carriage on deck. 502F502F46 Accordingly, 
the views on deck cargo were quite negative and the doctrine in that time, as observed 
supra, was very restrictive. It is, thus, obvious that the doctrine on deck cargo is closely 
related to the risks, to which the goods carried on deck are subjected. Therefore, in order 
to assess the current law on deck cargo, a factual background will be carried out in order 
to see to what extent those past risks related to deck cargo have been mitigated 
nowadays, given the modern shipping practices and innovations. 
Undoubtedly, containerization is a central issue when discussing the nowadays’ 
risks posed by the carriage of goods on deck. The fact that there are bigger and bigger 
container vessels being built as the current capacity of the biggest container ships today 
reaches up to 20 000 containers, it is obvious that the problem of on-deck stowage of 
containers will be of even growing importance in the future. The types of goods that can 
be transported in a container are almost limitless and that is why containerization 
comprises the vast majority of the cargo transported by sea nowadays. Besides the 
changes that it brought to the shipping industry, the container significantly has reduced 
some of the risks inherent to the stowage on deck such as damage, loss or pilferage. The 
structure of the container affords extra protection in comparison to other packaging 
materials. What is more, the so called “reefer” containers, for example, provide constant 
refrigeration of the cargo packed inside, while being water and light resistant as well as 
fully operational at outside temperature of up to 50°C. 503F503F47 This allows perishable goods to 
last for much longer. Another example of the diminished risk provided by the 
containerized shipments is that today it is sufficiently safe to transport in containers, 
below or above deck, of relatively sensitive pieces of cargo such as family cars. 
Automobiles can be now shipped not only via a ro-ro vessel, but also on a container 
vessel, which is an evidence of the reduced risks and safety provided by the “box”. 
Statistical data reveals the quantitative aspects of the risks related to the 
carriage of cargo on deck and shows how much these risks have shrunk in the recent 
years due to the technological advancements, the innovative ship designs, and the 
ceaseless efforts of the shipping industry to improve safety.  
Although comprehensive statistics about deck cargo that has been lost overboard 
does not exist, the World Shipping Council (WSC) carried out a survey among its 
members, which can be quite indicative considering the fact that the WSC’s members 
represent approximately 90% of the global containership capacity. 504F504F48 The survey was 
conducted in 2011 and was later updated in 2014 as each survey comprised statistical 
data for a period of three consecutive years. The results from the first survey showed 
that for the period 2008-2010 there were approximately 350 containers lost per year on 
average, without counting the catastrophic losses. 505F505F49 The data for the period covering the 
                                               
46 See section 5.1.3 below. 
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years 2011-2013 revealed 733 containers lost at sea per year on average. Considering the 
total number of containers shipped annually at that time, which was about 100 million 
and 120 million containers, respectively, the lost containers represent only a negligible 
fragment of the total amount of containerized cargo shipped worldwide. To be precise, 
these amount to about 0.00035% of all containers worldwide during the first survey 
period, and about 0.00061% with regard to the second survey period. Although there 
seems to be a significant rise in the number of containers lost overboard, the loss of deck 
cargo in terms of percentage has actually negligibly changed when taking into account 
the increase in the total quantity of containers carried by sea worldwide from 100 to 120 
million containers during the second survey period.  
And to be even more accurate, it has to be reminded that the world’s total 
container shipments, obviously, comprise both containers carried below deck and 
containers carried on deck. That is why, in order to more accurately measure the risk of 
carrying goods on deck, we have to give an account of the losses related only to the total 
amount of containers carried on deck, which can safely be assumed to be approximately 
half of the entire seagoing container trade. 506F506F50 In other words, to reflect the precise 
fraction of the lost containers carried on deck, we have to double those percentages that 
were stated above. But even in this case, or even if we triple them, the fraction of deck 
containers lost overboard is so minute that it better be measured not per cent but per 
mille (‰) or even in parts per million (ppm). 
These encouraging results as regards containerized goods carried on deck are 
largely due to the advancement of the shipping industry nowadays and the practices and 
projects carried out towards enhancing cargo safety. In particular, the seafaring industry 
has been targeting the major reasons for loss of or damage to deck containers, namely 
improper packing, poor stowage, insufficient lashing as well as structural failure of the 
container.507F507F51 
However, it must be admitted that the losses of or damage to containers stowed 
on deck still surpass the losses of or damage to containers stowed in the hold below deck. 
Besides the cargo-related damages or losses, incidents with containers may endanger the 
                                                                                                                                                   
disasters are the M/V Rena (2011), which ran aground and broke in two with the aft section sunk, and the 
MOL Comfort (2013), which broke in two and sank together with all containers on board. Accordingly, data 
from such catastrophic events could not highlight and express in numbers the additional risks to which deck 
cargo is exposed as opposed to cargo stowed below deck, and that is why it will be disregarded. The WSC 
safety survey can be found at: http://www.worldshipping.org/industry-
issues/safety/Containers_Overboard__Final.pdf, and the updated results in 2014 of the containers lost at sea 
are accessible at http://www.worldshipping.org/industry-issues/safety/Containers_Lost_at_Sea_-
_2014_Update_Final_for_Dist.pdf. 
50 Such assumption can be made on the basis of the ship design of nowadays container vessels. For example, 
the design of the Germanischer Lloyd and the Korean yard Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) for a 13,000+ 
TEU container vessel provides for 6,230 containers stowed below deck and 7,210 containers stowed on deck. 
51 Examples of efforts targeting flaws affecting deck carriage are: the 2006-2009 project Lashing@Sea 
promoted by the Maritime Research Institute of the Netherlands (MARIN) aimed towards preventing 
lashing failure and improving the lashing procedures and rules; the 2008 guide with best practices Safe 
Transport of Containers by Sea issued by the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) and the World 
Shipping Council (WSC); the new Code of Practice for Packing of Cargo Transport Units (CTU Code) for the 
handling and packing of shipping containers, which is a joint product of the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO), International Labour Organization (ILO), and the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe (UNECE); a WSC project to amend the ISO standards of containers so that the 
latter are accordingly marked and easy to identify if they have reduced stacking capacity, thus preventing 
structural failure of the container. 
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safety of the vessel or of other vessels, especially smaller crafts and fishing boats.508F 508F52 
Semi-submerged containers may become a threat to navigation and to the environment 
as well, especially if they are used for the shipment of hazardous cargo. 
Therefore, the major causes for accidents with containerized vessels will be 
examined below because they are the gist of the risks associated with the carriage of 
cargo on deck. These reveal the qualitative aspects of the risks of carrying goods on deck 
and are mainly associated with stowage and securing of the cargo on deck. 
With regard to securing, the vessel M/V Santa Clara I, which lost 21 containers 
off the cost of New Jersey, US in early 1992, is a prominent example. This was a major 
accident because four of the containers comprised hazardous cargo (arsenic trioxide). The 
subsequent thorough investigation conducted by the Coast Guard revealed that the 
reason for the misfortune was a failure in securing the cargo which was attributed to a 
human error coupled with bad weather. 509F509F53 In particular, the report revealed both 
mechanical and operational weaknesses. The former included: insufficient wire lashings; 
improper installations of those lashings; use of damaged lashing gear; improper stowage 
of 20-foot containers in a 40-foot cell, which left each container unsecured on one end; 
loose hatch covers (being the foundation of the on-deck tiers of containers), which 
allowed for lateral movements of the stow. The operational weaknesses consisted of: non-
compliance with the recommended international standards on cargo securing – the 
IMO’s Cargo Securing Manual; lashing of the deck cargo performed underway during 
heavy weather, meaning that the standard of care prescribed by Article III rule 2 of the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules was not met; failure to make an accurate assessment of the 
storm and the wind, and to take appropriate actions to avoid the deteriorating weather, 
meaning that the master has failed in navigating the ship. 
As a result of that accident, it was recommended that the International Maritime 
Organization’s (IMO) voluntary guidelines on cargo securing be adopted as mandatory 
regulations part of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). 510F510F54 
This took place in the 1994 amendments to SOLAS. 
As far as stowage is concerned, these operations are vital for the safety of the 
cargo and of the vessel herself. In practice, heavier containers must be stowed on the 
bottom, whereas the upper tiers must consist mainly of light containers. This on-deck 
stowage system minimizes the risk of collapsing of containers as a result of excessive 
loads on the lower tiers, and it also diminishes the forces and the acceleration acting on 
the gear securing the upper tiers of containers. 511F511F55 In this way, the vessel’s stability is also 
optimized. Unfortunately, there are several drawbacks pertaining to these safety 
policies. 
                                               
52 For example, the 500 containers lost from Svendborg Maersk in 2014 in the Bay of Biscay were considered 
a serious threat by the French maritime authorities, which required Maersk to conduct a search to locate 
and pull back the lost containers. Even containers on the sea bottom were seen as a danger for local 
fishermen, whereas empty containers were considered to be able to float on the surface for weeks. 
53 The Santa Clara I case study is accessible at: 
http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/hmcrp/hmcrp_w002CS.pdf. 
54 See SOLAS Chapter VI/5.6 on stowage and securing.  
55 ‘On Deck Stowage of Containers’, American Institute of Marine Underwriters (AIMU), Technical Services 
Committee, at p. 11; available at: https://www.aimu.org/aimupapers/OnDeck.pdf. 




First, there is no internationally recognized standard to define a heavy or a light 
container, which does not help container operators to plan accordingly. The lack of 
international regulations to that regard also lead to undesirable discretion as to which 
container is considered heavy and which light. 
Secondly, the stowage and securing plans aboard a container vessel assume, but 
cannot guarantee, that the cargo within the container is properly stowed and secured as 
the latter task is outside the carrier’s obligations over the cargo. To that regard, heavy 
equipment that is not properly secured within a container may pose serious risks to the 
entire stow as it may break loose, pierce the container wall, and come outside damaging 
adjacent containers stowed on deck. Such incidents may often lead to a domino effect as 
well.512F512F56 However, the drawback of the carrier not being familiar with the contents of the 
container and whether the goods inside have been properly secured and stowed, does not 
apply to the situation where it is the carrier who has supplied, stuffed, and loaded the 
container on deck. In this case, those specific risks described to deck carriage do not exist 
as the carrier will be fully familiar with the weight distribution and the securing 
specification of the containerized goods. 
Thirdly, in practice carriers often continue accepting additional cargo when the 
vessel has berthed and the contracted cargo is already being loaded. This means that if 
heavy containers arrive late, they may well be placed on top of a tier, which undermines 
all the safety precautions of the stowing plans and makes them virtually obsolete. 513F513F57 
In the fourth place, a common problem to nowadays container shipping is the 
misdeclaration of the weight of a container. Often containers are overloaded, which 
creates the same risks as the ones outlined in the previous setback. A prominent 
example of the risks that accompany overloaded containers is the 2007 accident with 
MSC Napoli in the English Channel. An investigation conducted by the UK Maritime 
Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) revealed that 137 out of the 660 containers 
stowed on deck were overloaded (e.g. heavier cargo was loaded than what was 
declared).514F514F58 This means that about 20% of the deck cargo was in fact weighing more than 
what was recorded on the bill of lading and, accordingly, on the cargo manifest. The 
difference varied from 3 to 20 tonnes as the total surplus of weight was 312 tonnes. The 
result was that the container vessel sustained catastrophic structural damages, which 
led to an ingress of water into the ship through an opening in the starboard forward of 
the engine room, and eventually the crew was forced to abandon the vessel. 
A similar accident occurred with the container ship M/V Deneb, which suffered in 
2011 a critical stability accident at the Port of Algeciras, Spain. The vessel started listing 
to her starboard until the entire starboard and bow were submerged. It was later 
established that, out of the 163 containers on-board, there were 16 that had an actual 
weight that exceeded the declared weight, and they were stowed high above on deck. 
Thus about one-tenth of the containers were misdeclared and they were deck cargo. This 
                                               
56 ‘On Deck Stowage of Containers’, American Institute of Marine Underwriters (AIMU), Technical Services 
Committee, at p. 13; available at: https://www.aimu.org/aimupapers/OnDeck.pdf. 
57 ‘On Deck Stowage of Containers’, American Institute of Marine Underwriters (AIMU), Technical Services 
Committee, at p. 13; available at: https://www.aimu.org/aimupapers/OnDeck.pdf. (ibid.) 
58 The MAIB report on the Structural failure of container vessel MSC Napoli and subsequent beaching, 
accessible at: https://assets.digital.cabinet-office.gov.uk/media/547c703ced915d4c0d000087/NapoliReport.pdf, 
p. 29. 
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excess in weight ranged from 1.9 times to 6.7 times as the total surplus weight of the 16 
misdeclared containers amounted to 278 tons instead of the declared 93 tons. Coupled 
with the fact that the overweight containers were stowed on deck, which additionally 
affected the stability of the vessel, the overall 4 times higher weight of the 16 
misdeclared containers was considered the prime reason for the accident. 515F515F59 
To summarize, the statistical data adduced to measure the risks of deck carriage 
points to the conclusion that deck cargo in the beginning of the 21st century enjoys 
considerably higher protection than before, which is a result of the developments in the 
industry as well as of the purposeful efforts of international bodies towards improvement 
of stowage, securing, and lashing. Furthermore, the analysis of shipping losses evidences 
that among the main reasons there are insufficient knowledge, inadequate skills, human 
errors as well as failure to understand or apply stowage and securing regulations. None 
of these, however, is inherent to deck carriage. On the contrary, the following sub-section 
will evidence that some ship designs may even reduce the human factor when it comes to 
securing the cargo on deck. 
4.1.2 Ship design 
As implied supra, the risks related to deck carriage are greater in older vessels. 
At the beginning of the container transport, containers were shipped mostly on general 
cargo vessels, which posed considerable risks. What is more, this was equally true for 
containers stowed under deck as well because the cargo holds of those ships were not 
designed for the carriage of such huge units such as the TEUs or FEUs, which caused all 
kinds of stowage problems, especially when containers of different sizes were loaded next 
to or on top of each other. 516F516F60 However, nowadays there are many types of cargo vessels 
designed to carry containers: multipurpose container vessels, semi-container vessels, all-
container vessels, feeder vessels, open-hatch container vessels, etc. Regardless of the 
type, modern container vessels are broader amidships and, thus, they can counter 
stability issues that arise from the heavy and tall loads on deck. 
Today’s container vessels are specially built to carry containers on board. Their 
hull is designed to have numerous cells within a hold as well as specially-created vertical 
slots where containers are stowed. There is no separation between the holds in such a 
vessel, instead every hold has cell guides which are, in essence, vertical rails that allow 
the containers to be stacked vertically one on top of the other. Where the below-deck 
containers are fixed by means of these rails, above-deck containers may be secured 
either with manually-applied lashings or tension rods, or with the same cell guide 
structure that is applied below deck. Such ships are referred to as “fully cellular” or 
“purpose-built”, and their design provides to stow more than half of the containers on 
deck, while for the smaller vessels the figure can even go up to three-quarters of the 
containerized cargo.517F517F61 
                                               
59 The technical report and the investigation of the capsizing of M/V Deneb are available at: 
http://www.fomento.gob.es/NR/rdonlyres/7501ACC9-94FA-44B7-B543-
B66873C31A16/114289/ITA202012DenebINGOPTIMIZADOWEB.pdf  
60 W. David Angus – ‘Legal Implications of “The Container Revolution” in International Carriage of Goods’, 
McGill Law Journal (1968), Vol. 14, No.3, pp. 395-429, at p. 405. 
61 ‘On Deck Stowage of Containers’, American Institute of Marine Underwriters (AIMU), Technical Services 
Committee, at p. 18; available at: https://www.aimu.org/aimupapers/OnDeck.pdf. 




Two major points can be inferred from this factual information. First, since a 
considerable part of the cargo shipped on a modern container vessel is carried on deck, 
there is nowadays little significance in the distinction between carriage on deck and 
below deck. Secondly, while it must be admitted that deck cargo-related accidents still 
occur (but so does accidents with below-deck cargo), the ever growing number of 
containers transported over sea, of which a huge percentage on deck, is a clear indication 
that the risks taken in such a carriage are not unreasonable. 
Furthermore, some of nowadays’ container vessels are even missing hatch covers 
and are, therefore, open-hatch container ships.518F518F62 So, in a sense, such vessels cannot be 
said to transport cargo on deck since the latter is in fact missing. However, provided that 
such a shipment exposes the cargo to the same risks as the carriage of goods on the 
weather deck, it is considered deck carriage as well regardless that the containers are 
actually loaded on the tanktop and stowed in tiers upwards up to several levels above 
“the deck” as the cell guides extend to the full technically-permissible height of the deck 
cargo to reach even the uppermost part of a container tier (a vertical stack). 519F519F63 This 
increases the safety of the containers stowed “above deck” as those containers, stowed in 
the higher part of a tier, are well secured to the fixed cell guides and no manual lashing 
with cables or rods is needed, which would be the case, for example, with on-deck 
containers stowed on the hatch cover of a conventional container vessel. Besides 
minimizing the risk of containers shifting, collapsing, or being washed overboard, a 
hatchless design provides several other important advantages: firstly, by eliminating the 
hatches, the deadweight tonnage 520F520F64 of the vessel is increased, meaning that she can carry 
more cargo, while in the same time the vessel’s stability is improved as significant 
weight is removed from the upper part of the hull; secondly, without having the need to 
open or close hatches, loading and discharge operations are performed much faster 
which diminishes costs; thirdly, an entire tier of containers is at any time accessible, 
whereas on conventional container vessels with hatch covers it is required to first unload 
the on-deck containers and open the hatches before having access to the containers 
stowed below deck.521F521F65 With regard to the vessel’s protection from rainwater or seawater 
getting into the hold, open-top container ships are either equipped with rain-protection 
roof made of lightweight steel or with bilge pumps that are taking the water out of the 
hold and thus preserving ship’s stability and protecting the stowed containers. 
Smaller container vessels, designed to carry between 100 and 800 containers, 
generally referred to as feeder vessels, pose additional risks to the cargo stowed on deck 
as their freeboard is significantly lower as compared to bigger container vessels. This 
means that the cargo stowed on the deck of such vessel is exposed to a bigger extent to 
                                               
62 These are also known as open top or hatchless container ships. Although there is a vast variety of vessels 
designed to transport containers, most open-hatch containerships still have two forward holds covered with 
hatches, which are intended for the carriage of special, non-containerized, or hazardous cargo. 
63 ‘On Deck Stowage of Containers’, American Institute of Marine Underwriters (AIMU), Technical Services 
Committee, at p. 7; available at: https://www.aimu.org/aimupapers/OnDeck.pdf. 
64 Deadweight tonnage (DWT) is a measurement of weight that describes the carrying capacity of a vessel 
figured by metric tons. It equals the displacement “loaded” minus the displacement “light”, where the former 
is the actual weight, which is displaced by a loaded vessel when floating, and the latter represents the 
weight displaced by a floating vessel (including fuel and supplies) when there is no cargo on board. 
65 ‘Open-Top Container Ships’, American Institute of Marine Underwriters (AIMU), Technical Services 
Committee, at p. 1-2; available at: http://www.aimu.org/aimupapers/OPEN.pdf. 
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sea water and to damage of breaking waves as well as wetting. A concession must be 
made that feeder ships, like all coasters, 522F522F66 usually call at smaller ports and their service 
is involved in regional or coastal trade, meaning that they are less likely to encounter 
adverse weather conditions to the same extent as, for example, a trans-oceanic container 
vessel crossing the North Atlantic. Nevertheless, it can be generally assumed that 
smaller container vessels, with their low freeboard, afford less protection to deck cargo 
from wetting damage or breaking waves. 
Besides container ships, there are nowadays a myriad of other vessels that are 
designed to carry goods on deck. These are, for example, general cargo vessels, cellular 
vessels, supply vessels, bulk vessels capable of carrying non-bulk cargo, heavy-lift ships, 
semi-submersible ships, freight ships carrying packaged or break bulk cargoes, etc. 
Furthermore, there are other trades where combined transport units, apart from 
containers, are carried both below and on deck. Depending on the method in which the 
cargo is handled in the particular trade, the carrying vessels have acquired the 
respective name. Examples of such vessels are the ro/ro (roll-on/roll-off)523F523F67, the lo/lo (lift-
on/lift-off)524F524F68, sto-ro (stow and roll) 525F525F69, flo/flo (float-on/float-off)526F526F70, wo/wo (walk-on/walk-
off).527F527F71 
4.1.3 Conclusion 
To sum up, this reality check shows that the risks posed to deck cargo differ 
significantly nowadays as compared to the beginning of the 20th century, when the 
Hague Rules were drafted. Back in those times, deck cargo was viewed as an inherently 
risky shipping arrangement and that is why it was vital that the shipper had expressly 
consented to assuming all the risks pertaining to deck carriage by means of an express 
agreement stated on the face of the bills of lading. 528F528F72 However, while a century ago all 
risks were inherent to the carriage on deck, nowadays the risks consist of operational 
risks, which can be more easily described as operational and mechanical weaknesses; 
meaning that these risks do not originate from deck carriage per se. Therefore, deck 
carriage as such is no longer so risky as to restrict it altogether. What is more, the 
numbers of lost deck containers suggest that the loss of deck cargo is ever less likely, and 
the risks related to the carriage on deck have nowadays diminished to such an extent as 
to justify such practice. 
                                               
66 The term “coasters” refers to smaller ships, regardless of the category of cargo they carry, which usually do 
not go on ocean-crossing routes as their service is restricted to coastal trades. Such vessels have significantly 
shallow hulls, which allows them to pass through reefs or underwater rocks, which are unapproachable for 
ocean-crossing vessels. 
67 On a ro-ro vessel, cargo is loaded or discharged on wheels. This method of cargo handling is most often 
employed in the ferry traffic. 
68 The cargo is loaded or discharged by means of the vessel’s on-board loading gear, which lifts the cargo on 
and off. Such on-board gear may comprise derricks, cranes, or gantries. 
69 The cargo is either ‘rolled on’ or ‘lifted on’ but then it is stowed on board the vessel in a conventional 
manner, using forklift trucks. 
70 Cargo is loaded either by means of a floating dock-like holds, or via the vessels (a semi-submersible ship) 
semi-submerging under the cargo and then refloating and lifting it onto the predetermined on-deck space. 
Discharging takes place following the same method but in the reverse. 
71 This method of cargo handling allows live cargo to walk on and off the vessel. It refers to the carriage of 
live animals but the term is employed also to passenger vessels. 
72 See section 5.1 on the traditional doctrine on deck carriage. 




Furthermore, the examples of ship designs that were provided demonstrate how a 
modern design can not only enhance the versatility of the vessel but it can also ensure 
additional safeguards to cargo carried on the deck of modern vessels. In particular, 
current container vessels are technologically advanced, and their hull design reduces the 
risk of listing and capsizing. Also, as far as ocean-going container vessels are concerned, 
the risks are considerably minimized with regard to loss of or damage to the cargo as a 
result of a breaking wave or of the rolling, pitching, or yawing motion of the vessel 
during a storm. 
Thus, the results of this factual study (i.e. that risks related to deck cargo have 
significantly diminished) allude to the presumption that the interpretation of the 
contract of carriage by the courts should not be so restrictive anymore. With regard to 
English law, this development towards a less restrictive regime will be observed in 
section 5, whereas section 6 will summarize to what extent the traditional doctrine on 
deck cargo is still applicable in various other jurisdictions. 
4.2 Deck cargo as a custom in the trade 
4.2.1 Containerization 
The invention of the container, also called the box, revolutionized the shipping 
world and global trade.529F529F73 It introduced dramatic changes in both the supply chains and 
the way of transporting vast quantities of goods over sea. With regard to the subject 
matter of the current chapter, it is sufficient to note that containers and containerization 
has turned the carriage of goods on deck much into a norm rather than an exception and 
courts have begun to recognize that position. 
Throughout the years there has been a debate whether the carriage of containers 
on deck has turned into a customary practice. As early as in the 1960s, there were 
proponents of the argument that carriers had the general liberty to stow containers on 
deck based on a well-established custom and usage concerning containerized cargo, 
which was considered tantamount to an implied claused in the contract of carriage, with 
which shippers were deemed to have agreed.530F530F74 Similarly, today’s authors are of the 
opinion that shipping containers on the deck of a vessel that is specially designed to 
carry containers has nowadays turned into a recognized custom in the container trade. 531F531F75 
Such carriage can be exercised under a general liberty clause, meaning that no express 
statement or notice is needed on the face of the bill of lading, making deck carriage of 
containers not an exception but an alteration of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. This 
alteration of the Rules is overall considered permissible but uniformity in that respect is 
not present. 
The lack of uniformity is largely due to the fact that the concept of authorized 
(legal) deck cargo, as derived from the Hague-Visby Rules, is not equally perceived and 
                                               
73 The carriage of containerized cargo will be further discussed in more details in Chapter V on the carriage 
of containers. 
74 W. David Angus – ‘Legal Implications of “The Container Revolution” in International Carriage of Goods’, 
McGill Law Journal (1968), Vol. 14, No.3, pp. 395-429, at p. 403. Note, however, the decision of Charles 
Brieant, Jr., D.J. in The “Mormacvega”, [1973] 1 Lloyd’s Reports 267: “the practice [of carrying containers on 
deck], however, was not sufficiently ancient to make it a trade custom”. 
75 A.T.M. Nesarul Hoque – ‘Container on deck: an international standard banking practice?’, DCInsight, Vol. 
19, No. 4, October-December 2013. 
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applied in the various jurisdictions and also in the various situations of deck carriage. 
With regard to the various circumstances of carriage on deck, open-hatch (hatchless) 
containership, for example, cannot be deemed to be capable of transporting cargo on deck 
illegally. That is to say, in such cases, the literal interpretation of Article I(c) of the Rules 
becomes obsolete and unnecessary. As far as the differing views of various jurisdictions 
are concerned, the notion of authorized and unauthorized deck carriage may vary 
depending on the courts’ interpretation of how clearly the intended deck carriage has 
been communicated from the carrier to the shipper (i.e. the presence of an informed 
agreement). 
In Belgium, for instance, there is a strict adherence to the traditional doctrine on 
deck cargo even with regard to container vessels. Belgian courts are very harsh towards 
carriers when loss or damage is caused as a result of undeclared deck cargo even if it has 
been stowed in containers on the deck of a specially-built container vessel unless this 
vessel is of the type of an open-top (hatchless) container vessel – only in that latter case, 
an exception will be made from the judicial practice on deck cargo. 532F532F76 Thus, under Belgian 
jurisprudence, a clean bill of lading will almost always signify that the cargo is stowed 
below the deck, and should cargo is carried on deck, a third party holder does not have to 
prove negligence on behalf of the carrier to hold him liable. The very act of stowing on 
deck under a clean bill of lading represents an act of negligence under Belgian law and 
the carrier cannot rely neither on the liability limitation and exceptions in the Hague-
Visby Rules, nor or on any liability-exemption clauses in the bill of lading. 533F533F77 This is an 
example of how the changed standard in defining the difference between authorized 
(legal) and unauthorized (illegal) deck carriage has an impact upon the acceptability of 
any attempted exemption clauses. Sections 5 and 6 below reveal further the non-uniform 
approach towards what constitutes authorized deck cargo within the meaning of the 
Hague-Visby Rules, which in the end creates different rules on national level, which in 
some instances may overprotect deck cargo interests but in others may provide them 
with insufficient protection. 
Regardless of the lack of uniformity in the treatment, the carriage of containers 
on deck is nowadays largely accepted as an inherent characteristic of the container 
trade, and that is why it is considered as authorized deck carriage regulated by the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules notwithstanding that there will be normally no statements or 
notations on the bill of lading as to the precise location of the container. 534F534F78 An exception 
to that general rule can be made only for goods that require under-deck stowage. 
Moreover, the impressive share of containerized shipments nowadays (more than 85% of 
the total cargo), and the fact that in container arrangements there inevitably are 
containers stowed on deck, also suggest a well-established custom of deck carriage 
within that trade.535F535F79 
                                               
76 Clive Van Aerde – ‘The Belgian Courts hold Carriers fully liable’, The Swedish Club Letter, No. I – 2003, 
p. 14. 
77 Clive Van Aerde – ‘The Belgian Courts hold Carriers fully liable’, The Swedish Club Letter, No. I – 2003, 
p. 14. 
78 ‘Voyage charters’ (4th edition), Informa London (2014), p. 1018, para 85.74. 
79 A.T.M. Nesarul Hoque – ‘Container on deck: an international standard banking practice?’, DCInsight, Vol. 
19, No. 4, October-December 2013. 




 For the current chapter, it is of material importance to underline that while the 
industry practice is to include in the contract of carriage a statement “carried on deck”, 
which represents the express agreement between the parties and excludes the 
application of the Rules, this practice is not exercised when containerized cargo is 
carried on deck.536F536F80 On the contrary, depending on the trade, contracts of carriage related 
to containers carried on deck very often provide for the application of the Hague/Hague-
Visby Rules.537F537F81 The rationale behind the absence of a deck statement or notation is that 
in the containerized trade it is sometimes not known, by the time the B/L is issued, 
where exactly the container will be placed – on deck or below deck. That is to say, there 
are some specific organizational and operational difficulties – such as the weight of the 
container and its destination – that prevent it to be ascertained in advance whether a 
container will be stowed on deck or in the hold. Instead, this usually becomes clear as 
late as in the moment of loading, which makes it impossible for a carrier to comply with 
the formalities required by Article I(c) of the Hague-Visby Rules in order deck cargo to be 
considered legally carried. 538F538F82 
Moreover, issuing on-deck B/L in advance is not wise because it will render the 
cargo not a subject to the Hague-Visby Rules and thus such a bill may not be accepted by 
banks, which may impair credit payment arrangements such as a letter of credit. 
That is why nowadays container liner carriers issue bills of lading without an “on 
deck” notation but only relying on a liberty clause to stow on deck. Below is an example 
from the Maersk terms and conditions relating to deck stowage: 
18. Optional Stowage, Deck Cargo and Livestock 
18.1 The Goods may be packed by the Carrier in Containers and 
consolidated with other goods in Containers. 
18.2 Goods whether packed in Containers or not, may be carried on 
deck or under deck without notice to the Merchant. The Carrier shall 
not be required to note, mark or stamp on the bill of lading any 
statement of such on deck carriage. Save as provided in clause 18.3, 
such Goods (except livestock) carried on or under deck and whether 
or not stated to be carried on deck shall participate in general 
average and shall be deemed to be within the definition of goods for 
the purpose of the Hague Rules or US COGSA and shall be carried 
subject to such Rules or Act, whichever is applicable. 
18.3 Goods (not being Goods stowed in Containers other than flats or 
pallets) which are stated herein to be carried on deck and livestock, 
whether or not carried on deck, are carried without responsibility on 
the part of the Carrier for loss or damage of whatsoever nature or 
delay arising during the Carriage whether caused by unseaworthiness 
                                               
80 Michael F. Sturley, Tomotaka Fujita, Gertjan van der Ziel – ‘The Rotterdam Rules: The UN Convention on 
Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea’, Sweet & Maxwell (2010), Chapter 
V, p. 125, para 5.125. 
81 Michael F. Sturley, Tomotaka Fujita, Gertjan van der Ziel – ‘The Rotterdam Rules: The UN Convention on 
Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea’, Sweet & Maxwell (2010), Chapter 
V, p. 125, para 5.125 (ibid.). 
82 Божидар Христов – „Отговорност на морския превозвач при контейнерните превози“, Библиотека 
„Българска търговско-промишлена палата“ (БТТП), София (1977), сигнатура №105, стр. 22. [Bozhidar 
Hristov – ‘The Responsibility of the Sea Carrier in Containerized Shipments’, issued by the Library to the 
Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (BCCI), Sofia (1977), signature №105, p.22.] 
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or negligence or any other cause whatsoever and neither the Hague 
Rules nor US COGSA shall apply. 539F539F
83
 
The shipper’s consent for deck stowage is deemed to be given upon acceptance of 
the carrier’s tariff rates. The rationale is that the freight for shipping on deck and the 
freight for shipping below deck differ and the rate for deck carriage is usually lower. 
Needless to elaborate much, the freight rate for cargo stowed below deck is higher than 
for cargo stowed above deck because, although the risks for deck cargo has significantly 
diminished as illustrated in section 4.1, the losses of containers shipped on deck still 
prevail over those of containers carried in the hold. This means that both deck cargo and 
goods stowed in the holds are subject to the same regime despite the differing risks. 
Consequently, when it comes to the protection afforded by the Rules to the cargo 
interests, the owners of deck cargo may be worse off as opposed to the owners of cargo 
stowed in the holds of the vessel. 540F540F84 
The logical question that arises then is whether a shipper can insist on under-
deck carriage. In other words, to what extent is a shipper able to regulate this part of the 
contract of carriage with a container liner operator and stipulate that his containers 
must be stowed below deck? In practice, shippers can have specific stowage requirements 
and arrangements, and demanding below-deck stowage is not only possible but also 
necessary, especially when the shipment consists of goods that are not suitable for deck 
carriage. An example of such cargo is sensitive electronic equipment or foodstuffs that 
may have to be carried in refrigerated or ventilated containers below deck in order to 
prevent damage from solar radiation, sea or rainwater, or excessive temperature 
variations. To request such a stowage arrangement, shippers must indicate their 
preference in the Export Cargo Shipping Instructions form that is provided by the 
carrier or the freight forwarder. It is important to note that, in practice, such shipping 
instructions are taken into consideration by the carrier if they are justified in the sense 
that the nature and properties of the goods stowed in the container indeed require below-
deck stowage.541F541F85 In other instances, carriers may ignore a shipper’s request to stow a 
container below deck when the carriage takes place on a regular container vessel. This 
was also noted by the US District Court (Southern District of New York) in the case The 
“Red Jacket”: 
Since this was a container ship, it was equipped to carry containers on 
the weather deck as well as in the hatches. Consequently, a request 
for below deck stowage, unless the cargo was marked dangerous, 
would be ignored. The Court finds that [the carrier] AEL was not 
negligent in stowing the ingots on deck. 542F542F
86 
4.2.2 Other trades 
There are other trades besides the container trade, where the carriage on deck 
has become a custom. The carriage of heavy logs on deck, for example, has been for a 
                                               
83 Available at: http://terms.maerskline.com/carriage. 
84 It must be conceded, however, that the Rules require the carrier to exercise a different standard of care, in 
accordance with Article III rule 2, when deck cargo is concerned. See section 5.3. 
85 Vlad Cioarec – ‘Containers as Deck Cargo’ (August 2005), available at: 
http://www.forwarderlaw.com/library/view.php?article_id=337.  
86 Houlden & Co, Ltd v SS Red Jacket (The “Red Jacket”), 582 F.2d 1271 (2d Cir, 1978), [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Law 
Reports 300. 




long time recognized as a custom in the trade. 543F543F87 In general, trades where such customs 
have been established comprise the transportation of all kinds of out-of-gauge cargo and 
certain kinds of bulky cargo which cannot be stowed in the hold because they would not 
even physically fit inside such as roundwood logs (timber), railway engines, cranes, wind 
turbine generators as well as oil platforms, drilling rigs, and even other sea-going 
vessels. In those instances, the carrying ship is specially designed for carriage on deck 
such as purpose-build log-carrying vessels, heavy-lift vessels, or semi-submersible 
vessels (flo/flo). Such vessels have much greater lifting capacity than conventional ships 
and their deck area is far more spacious in order to accommodate bigger and heavier 
cargoes. 
A custom should be distinguished from a practice. To be recognized as a custom, a 
practice must be not only common or usual but it must also conform to the certain 
requirements. In “Sormovskiy 3068”, it was established that a custom must be 
reasonable, certain, consistent with the contract, universally acquiesced, and it must not 
be contrary to law.544F544F88 What is more, a custom does not have to be applicable to all ships or 
trades but just to the particular vessel that is engaged in the particular trade. 545F545F89 A 
carrier, however, cannot rely on an established custom within a particular trade in order 
to exculpate himself for the carriage on deck if this is done in breach of an express 
agreement to carry below deck. The latter represents a breach of a condition and is, thus, 
a contract deviation that cannot be justified with an established custom within the trade. 
4.3 An express agreement between the parties to carry the goods on deck 
As pointed out in section 3, deck carriage is excepted from the Hague and Hague-
Visby Rules only when there is an express statement or notation on the face of the bill of 
lading that the cargo will be carried on deck, and when it is in fact carried on deck. An 
important remark is that a sufficiently clear statement is not needed in the occasion 
when the goods are subject to provisions which require the stowage on deck. This is 
because deck cargo is permissible also when it is required by a convention or arises out of 
statutory obligations for the carrier. In this case, the agreement between the parties to 
carry on deck is implied. This could be best illustrated by the carriage of dangerous 
goods and of solid bulk cargoes, which are regulated by the IMDG Code 546F546F90 and the IMSBC 
Code 547F547F91, respectively. 
                                               
87 Richard Williams – ‘The developing law relating to deck cargo’, (2005) 11 JIML, p 100 at p. 107. 
88 The Sormovsky 3068 [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 266, p. 275. 
89 Richard Williams – ‘The developing law relating to deck cargo’, (2005) 11 JIML, p 100 at p. 107. 
90 The International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code, issued by the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO), is a uniform international set of regulations for the safe carriage of hazardous cargo 
and marine pollutants. The Code aims at enhancing “the safe carriage of dangerous goods while facilitating 
the free unrestricted movement of such goods and preventing pollution to the environment” (The IMDG Code 
2012, Preamble, para 1.). It contains mandatory instructions on terminology, packaging, labelling, stowage, 
segregation, ventilation, and handling of cargo that is considered dangerous because of its flammable, 
corrosive, toxic or other hazardous nature. The Code classifies dangerous goods into 9 classes such as 
explosives (Class 1), gases (Class 2), flammable liquids (Class 3), flammable solids (Class 4), etc. Since 
dangerous cargo presents risks in maritime transport that emanate mostly from packaging, stowage, 
segregation, and separation, the Code specifies that such cargo must be stowed and segregated according to 
the cargo’s hazard, class, and compatibility. 
91 The IMDG Code is supported by a variety of international conventions, codes and recommendations, one of 
which is the International Maritime Solid Bulk Cargoes (IMSBC) Code, which is also mandatory. The Code 
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The IMDG Code distinguishes between 5 stowage categories: Category A, B, and 
E allow the carrier to stow the cargo both on deck and below deck, while Category C and 
D require that only on-deck stowage and carriage is performed. 548F548F92 Thus, for example, 
methyl iodide549F549F93 (Category C) and methyl bromoacetate 550F550F94 (Category D) must be stowed 
always on deck. The IMSBC Code, on the other hand, also have provisions on stowage 
and securing. Regulation 7 of the Code admits that solid bulk cargoes may be carried on 
deck as well: “Cargo, cargo units and cargo transport units carried on or under deck shall 
be so loaded, stowed and secured as to prevent as far as is practicable, throughout the 
voyage, damage or hazard to the ship and the persons on board, and loss of cargo 
overboard.” In particular, the Code provides 4 segregation terms for materials possessing 
chemical hazards: “away from”, “separated from”, “separated by a complete compartment 
or hold from”, and “separated longitudinally by an intervening complete compartment or hold 
from”. With regard to the first two terms, solid bulk cargoes may be stowed on deck as well provided 
that the safety precautions are fulfilled. 551F551F
95 
In other instances, however, the agreement between the parties must be 
evidenced by a statement in the bill of lading. The question which naturally follows is 
whether a clause inserted in the bill of lading, which allows the carrier to stow on deck, 
can qualify for such a statement or notation that proves the express agreement between 
the carrier and cargo interests. 
Both English case law and legal literature are unanimous on that matter. A 
“Liberty to Stow on Deck” clause is deemed to merely clarify where the goods may be 
stowed but it is not tantamount to a licence or permission to stow the goods on deck. 552F552F96 In 
Svenska Traktor v Maritime Agencies (Southampton), Lord Pilcher J held that a general 
liberty clause cannot qualify for a statement in the contract of carriage, within the 
meaning of Article I(c) of the Rules, that the goods are indeed carried on deck. He 
described such a statement, as opposed to a liberty clause, “as a notification and a 
warning to consignees and indorsees of the bill of lading to whom the property of the 
goods passed […] that the goods which they were to take were being shipped as deck 
cargo”.553F553F97 In the presence of such a statement indicating on-deck carriage, the cargo 
interests will be fully knowledgeable on the terms of the contract, whereas the insertion 
of a general liberty clause does not provide the same certainty as to where the cargo will 
actually be stowed and carried.  
                                                                                                                                                   
lays down both general and specific requirements for carrying solid bulk cargoes, and, if the substances are 
also considered dangerous goods, they are further regulated by the IMDG Code. 
92 These stowage categories are applicable for all classes of substances but for explosives, whereas for Class 1 
substances there are separate stowage categories: 01, 02, 03 (on deck in closed cargo transport unit, or below 
deck), 04 (on deck/below deck in closed cargo transport unit), and 05 (on deck only in closed cargo transport 
unit). 
93 The IMDG Code 2012, Chapter 3.2 – Dangerous Goods List, UN number 2644. 
94 The IMDG Code 2012, Chapter 3.2 – Dangerous Goods List, UN number 2643. 
95 See the IMSBC Code, Regulation 9.3.3: 1) “Away from”: Effectively segregated so that incompatible 
materials cannot interact dangerously in the event of an accident but may be carried in the same hold or 
compartment or on deck provided a minimum horizontal separation of 3 metres, projected vertically, is 
provided. 2) “Separated from”: In different holds when stowed under deck. Provided an intervening deck is 
resistant to fire and liquid, a vertical separation, i.e., in different compartments, may be accepted as 
equivalent to this segregation. 
96 Charles Debattista – ‘The Sale of Goods by Sea’, Second Edition (1998), ISBN: 0-406-02091-4, p. 148, fn. 
17. 
97 Svenska Traktor Aktiebolaget v Maritime Agencies (Southampton), Ltd. [1953] 2 QB 124, at p. 130. 




In Svenska Traktor v Maritime Agencies, the liberty clause at line 76 of the bill of 
lading read: 
Steamer has liberty to carry goods on deck and shipowners will not be 
responsible for any loss, damage, or claim arising therefrom. 
Interestingly, the clause was considered by the judge as one containing two parts, and it 
was the second part, the one relieving the shipowners from liability, which ran against 
the Rules and was, therefore, held null and void under Article III rule 8. The first part of 
the clause, the one preceding the conjunction “and”, was held to be valid subject to the 
carrier’s obligations under Article III rule 2. 554F554F98 The conclusion is that a “Liberty to Stow 
on Deck” clause is not equivalent to a statement within the meaning of Article I(c), and 
therefore it does not make deck cargo falling outside the definition of “goods” and, 
accordingly, outside the scope of the Hague and the Hague-Visby Rules. Nevertheless, a 
liberty clause, while not excluding the application of the Rules, allows the shipowners to 
stow the cargo on deck as long as they properly and carefully load, handle, stow, carry, 
keep and care for the goods concerned. 
 The decision in Svenska Traktor v Maritime Agencies, however, is strongly 
criticized by the learned Professor W. Tetley. 555F555F99 He argues that the on-deck shipment in 
that case was a fundamental breach of the contract, because the liberty clause would be 
valid only if it was accompanied by a statement on the face of the bill of lading that the 
goods are carried on deck. He considers a general liberty clause merely as an option 
which can be exercised by the carrier only when there is a statement of deck carriage in 
the bill of lading.556F556F100 Another reason, pointed out by W. Tetley as an irrefutable 
argument, for disagreeing with the Svenska Traktor v Maritime Agencies decision is that 
it ran against the principle that the typewritten wording on the face of the bill of lading 
(in this case, the absence of a statement) has precedence over the printed clauses (in this 
case, the general liberty clause at line 76). 557F557F101 While the first argument is logic and 
difficult to disagree with, had it not been for the recent developments on fundamental 
breach,558F558F102 Tetley’s second argument seems to be not that plausible and based on a weak 
foundation. In the opinion of the author of the current thesis, it is inaccurate to assume 
that the absence of a specific typewritten wording (i.e. a lack of a statement to carry 
goods on deck) can be used to demonstrate that there is actually a typewritten wording 
(equivalent to a statement to carry goods below deck) that goes contrary to the printed 
clauses in the bill of lading. In other words, Tetley’s argument that a clean bill of lading 
qualifies as a statement that the goods will be carried below deck can be challenged on 
the basis that a clean bill of lading evidences no more than the implied duty of the 
carrier to stow below deck. Certainly, a clean bill of lading requires the carrier, in the 
absence of other contractual provisions, to stow below deck, but it will be dubious to 
                                               
98 Svenska Traktor Aktiebolaget v Maritime Agencies (Southampton), Ltd. [1953] 2 QB 124, at p. 130-131. 
99 William Tetley – ‘Selected Problems of Maritime Law under the Hague Rules’, McGill Law Journal, April 
1963, p. 53. 
100 William Tetley – ‘Selected Problems of Maritime Law under the Hague Rules’, McGill Law Journal, April 
1963, p. 53 at p. 64. 
101 William Tetley – ‘Selected Problems of Maritime Law under the Hague Rules’, McGill Law Journal, April 
1963, p. 53 at p. 64. 
102 See: section 5.1.3 on fundamental breach infra. 
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consider it a statement that could contradict and supersede the printed clauses in the 
bill of lading. 
Furthermore, invalidating the non-responsibility part of the clause (being 
repugnant to Article III rule 2 and rule 8), while in the same time allowing the liberty 
part of the clause (being not contrary to the Rules), seems to be justified in the particular 
case by virtue of the provision which incorporates the Rules (as enacted in COGSA 1924) 
into the bill of lading contract in the Svenska Traktor v Maritime Agencies case. The 
clause, invoking the Rules, reads: “If, or to the extent that, any terms (sic) of this bill of 
lading is repugnant to or inconsistent with anything of such Act or Schedule, it shall be 
void” [emphasis added]. 
After having addressed these main points of criticism, it is important to say that 
the Svenska Traktor v Maritime Agencies cannot be regarded as an erroneous decision 
also in the light of a subsequent case – The “Antares” (1987), where unauthorized deck 
cargo was damaged during the journey but the fundamental breach argument of the 
cargo interests was conclusively denied. 559F559F103 
There are examples of other unusual clauses inserted by carriers in their bills of 
lading in an attempt to exclude their liability as well as ingenious legal devices which 
aim at compelling the shipper to assume the risk of damage resulting from on-deck 
carriage of the goods. This was the case in Encyclopedia Britannica v The Hong Kong 
Producer560F560F104, where containerized cargo was received on board in apparent good order 
and condition, and it was stowed on deck under a “short form” bill of lading, which did 
not make any mention, notice or statement of deck carriage. However, this short form 
referred to the carrier’s “regular form” bill of lading and expressly incorporated all of its 
terms.561F561F105 The shipper Encyclopedia Britannica was unaware that most of the cargo was 
stowed on deck. Nor did he know of the regular bill of lading, which contained, among 
others, Clause 13: 
13. Stowage On Deck, etc. […] 
The shipper represents that the goods covered by this bill of lading 
need not be stowed under deck and it is agreed that it is proper to 
and they may be stowed on deck unless the shipper informs the 
carrier in writing before delivery of the goods to the carrier that under 
deck stowage is required. 
With respect to goods carried on deck, all risk of loss or damage by 
peril inherent in or to incidental [sic] such carriage shall be borne by 
the shipper. . . 
                                               
103 Kenya Railways v. Antares Co. Pte Ltd. (The “Antares”) (Nos. 1 and 2) – [1986] 2 Lloyd's Rep 626; [1987] 1 
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536. 
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The carrier relied in his defence on that clause and contended that it allowed him 
to stow the goods on deck and, therefore, he was not in breach of contract and not liable 
for the damage to the cargo. However, the shipper received only the short form bill of 
lading, and no copy of the regular form was attached or issued together with it. 
Moreover, the short form was issued only after the cargo was already stowed on deck 
and, thus, the shipper had no opportunity to inform the carrier “in writing before 
delivery of the goods” that cargo should be stowed below deck as required by Clause 13. 
In effect, the clause assumed the features of an instrument which tacitly compelled an 
unaware shipper to unwillingly waive his right to have his goods stowed under deck and, 
thus, to waive virtually all his rights under the Hague Rules (in this case, the US 
COGSA) because, as shown so far, declared deck stowage is excepted from the Rules. The 
Clause Paramount inserted in the short form bill of lading also operated to that effect 
through the words “so far as they [the Rules] may be applicable”, which suggested that 
should deck carriage took place, the shipment would not be governed by the statutory 
liability regime. To summarize, the clause lessened the carrier’s liability and in the same 
time deprived the shipper of all the protection to which he was entitled under the Rules. 
The Court in that case ruled that Clause 13 was not an express agreement to stow on 
deck as the short form bill of lading did not indicate anything that the cargo would be 
stowed on deck. Therefore, the shipper was afforded with the statutory protection of the 
Rules (in this case, US COGSA), whereas the carrier was held to have issued a clean bill 
of lading and, by stowing the cargo on deck, he was in breach of the contract of carriage 
and was found liable. 
In conclusion, it suffices to say that stowing cargo on deck under a “liberty to stow 
on deck” clause will nowadays not be a breach of the contract. What is more, the carrier 
is under no duty to inform the shipper that the liberty has been exercised unless this is 
specified in the contract. 562F562F106 However, when a bill of lading gives the carrier only an 
option to carry the goods on deck, but there is no on-deck statement on the face of the 
bill, the Hague or Hague-Visby Rules will still apply and the carrier will be under the 
obligation to “properly and carefully” load, stow and carry the goods, which will not be 
considered “deck cargo” within the meaning of Article I(c) of the Rules. This means that, 
by agreeing to the “liberty to stow on deck” clause, the shipper agrees with assuming the 
typical risks that relate to the carriage of cargo on deck but he does not agree with, and 
is thus protected from negligence on behalf of the crew or from the vessel becoming 
uncargoworthy or unseaworthy because of the deck cargo. 
What is more, similarly to the position when there is a custom to carry goods on 
deck (section 4.2), a carrier cannot rely on a liberty clause inserted in the bill of lading in 
order to protect himself from claims for loss of or damage to deck cargo if deck carriage is 
done in breach of a pre-existing express contractual agreement to carry on deck. This 
could be the case where the parties stipulated in a charter party that the goods will be 
carried under deck but the carrier subsequently issues a claused bill of lading which 
provides the liberty to stow on deck. 
                                               
106 See: ‘Carver on Bills of Lading’ (2nd Edition), Sweet & Maxwell Ltd (2005), London, p. 556, para 9–113, fn. 
53. See also ‘Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of Lading’ (20th edition), Sweet & Maxwell (1996), Article 
88—Deck Cargo, p. 169. 
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On the other hand, unilateral declarations that take the form of clauses, which 
are disguised in another form of the transport document and kept away from the 
knowledge of the other party, do not constitute an agreement between the carrier and 
the shipper to stow goods on deck. In order to have a valid agreement for on-deck 
stowage, an informed consent on behalf of the shipper must be present. A weighty factor 
that courts take into account when establishing the level of knowledge of the shipper, is 
whether there have been any past dealings between the two parties. 563F563F107 What matters 
most, however, is the approach adopted in both cases Svenska Traktor v Maritime 
Agencies and The “Hong Kong Producer”, which requires strict compliance with the two 
conditions set forth in Article I(c) – the factual and also the contractual one. 564F564F108 Thus, the 
notation or statement on the face of the bill of lading must clearly state that the cargo 
“will” or “shall” be carried on deck, and not that it “may” be carried on deck.565F565F109 The latter 
notation will provide the carrier with discretion as to the mode of carriage but, from the 
perspective of the shipper, the consignee, or the receiver this is not sufficient information 
regarding the way of carriage. No consignee will know for certain whether the cargo will 
be carried below or above deck if it is stated on the B/L that the carrier “may” carry it on 
deck. 
Another important point is that clauses which allow a serious deviation from 
standard bill of lading provisions, such as the clause in The “Hong Kong Producer”, are 
subject to the contra proferentem rule.566F566F110 This means that a term that is not a standard 
term in the bill of lading, but was drafted by the carrier, should be construed narrowly 
and against him. 
5. The evolving views on deck cargo under English law: 
towards a less restrictive regime 
5.1 The traditional deck cargo doctrine – the implied duty of the carrier 
to carry the goods under deck 
Historically, the prohibition of loading and carrying cargo on deck dates back to 
early times. The Statute of Marseille (Statuts Municipaux de Marseille) from the year of 
1253 decreed on-deck carriage unlawful, regardless whether or not it had been agreed 
beforehand by the parties. 567F567F111 Later on, in the 15th century, the Hanseatic League and the 
Italian City-State of Genoa also declared stowage on deck an improper practice in their 
laws.568F568F112 
Since those early times, there has been a general rule that cargo should be 
carried below deck – either in the holds or in other usual carrying places – regardless 
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whether a bill of lading is issued. 569F569F113 Although this rule is nowadays not codified, it can be 
assumed that this is a general principle of maritime law, which, evidently, is derived 
from a long-standing custom that was passed on from port to port and has been 
uniformly applied. As pointed out by the learned Prof. Dr. Eric Van Hooydonk, general 
principles of maritime law constitute an important part of lex maritima as a source of 
maritime law.570F570F114 While lex maritima is of little practical importance nowadays, it still 
exists as one of the sources of maritime law, together with the CMI and IMO 
conventions, the self-regulating character of maritime law, and also national legislation. 
To exemplify, Prof. E. V. Hooydonk lists some of the general principles of maritime law 
such as the freedom of navigation; the freedom of maritime contract (being subject to 
express mandatory rules); the fundamental distinguishing characteristics of a ship; the 
application of the law of the flag to the property law status of the ship; the general duty 
of care of maritime contracting parties; the essential characteristics of charter parties, 
the bill of lading, and the sea waybill; the authority, powers and responsibility of the 
master of the ship; the humanitarian treatment of crew and stowaways; the principle of 
general average; the principle of “no cure no pay” in salvage law; and the duty to care for 
the environment.571F571F115 These general principles are universally accepted and have a 
binding force in both contractual usage and practice. 572F572F116 The principle of under deck 
carriage meets both of these requirements. Therefore, it follows that, according to the old 
doctrine on deck cargo, the carrier is always under the implied duty to stow the cargo 
below deck; this is his basic obligation.  
This rule, however, is subject to two exceptions. The carrier is authorized to stow 
goods on deck only when (1) there is an express agreement between the parties to the 
contract of carriage to that effect, or (2) there is a universal custom that is binding 
within a particular trade, or port of loading, to carry the goods on deck. 573F573F117 
This general rule to stow below deck, subject to an express agreement or a 
universal custom, has materialized in the pre-Hague Rules case law. In the old case of 
Royal Exchange Shipping v Dixon (1886) 574F574F118, the House of Lords ruled that there is an 
implied term inherent in any contract of carriage that the carrier should stow the goods 
below deck even if this is not manifested in the contract. According to that judgment, 
unless there is a legal requirement to stow on deck, an express agreement between the 
parties to do so, or a custom or practice to that effect, the only authorized location to 
stow the goods is below deck. The case involved the carriage of 125 bales of cotton under 
four bills of lading. While three of the bills of lading stipulated that goods will be carried 
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under deck, the fourth bill was silent on that matter. The House of Lords held not only 
that the under-deck term would be implied to the fourth bill of lading, but that it would 
have been implied to all four bills had they all been silent with regard to the manner of 
stowage. 
5.1.1 An agreement between the parties as an exception to the duty to 
carry under deck 
In order to override the general principle of below-deck carriage, the carrier has 
to fulfil the onerous burden of proving that there is an express agreement with the 
shipper that the goods will be carried on deck. Even when on-deck carriage is stated on 
the face of the bill of lading, that statement may not be held to express the true consent 
of the shipper to such an arrangement. The express agreement must not only be stated 
on the face of the bill of lading, but it must also be tantamount to a genuine and 
informed consent, clearly expressed by the shipper prior to sailing. 575F575F119 The reason why 
only a clear on-deck provision in the bill of lading is considered an express agreement is 
that such a clause provides certainty to the parties and allows them to assess their risk 
and responsibility over the cargo. 
A clean bill of lading issued by the master certainly precludes the carrier from 
proving that there has been an agreement between the parties to carry the cargo on 
deck.576F576F120 Even adducing any extrinsic evidence or oral testimony, in order to substantiate 
an on-deck agreement, will be futile and of no avail because of the basic principle that a 
clean bill of lading is an express agreement itself that the goods shall be carried below 
deck.577F577F121 This implies that a clean, or unclaused, bill of lading refers not only to the 
condition of the goods but also to the location where they are to be stowed – under deck. 
Exceptionally, in certain very unusual circumstances an oral promise of 
assurance to carry the goods below deck can be an enforceable contractual promise. 578F578F122 
The promise in Evans v Merzario was held binding against the specific background of the 
case – an assurance of below-deck carriage was given to the cargo owners, because, 
based on past dealings between the parties, this was the only condition upon which the 
cargo owners would have agreed to the carriage. 579F579F123 Here, the defendant was not the 
carrier but the freight forwarding company. The promise was used by the forwarding 
agent to induce the cargo owners to continue doing business together on the same terms, 
notwithstanding that the cargo of machines was now to be transported in containers 
instead of, as it had been previously, in crates on trailers. 
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 Although considered a binding obligation, the oral agreement did not constitute a 
collateral contract varying the terms of the written contract but it was “a new express 
term which was to be included thereafter in the contracts between the plaintiffs and the 
defendants”.580F580F124 Thus, the oral promise was interpreted as a legally binding new term, 
which was added to the standard printed conditions of the contract, and which the 
freight forwarders breached by accepting on-deck master bills of lading. 
However, when a carrier fails to prove an agreement with the cargo owners for 
on-deck carriage, and even when a clean bill of lading is issued, the carrier is still 
permitted to prove an existing accepted custom to carry goods on deck within a specific 
trade (see section 3.2). This is also what the freight forwarders in “Evans v Merzario” 
attempted to establish, although unsuccessfully – a customary practice to stow on deck 
in the then new container trade, which would have rendered the law on deck cargo 
inapplicable to the particular shipment.581F581F125 
5.1.2 A universal custom within a particular trade to carry the goods on 
deck 
The second exception to the under-deck rule is a pre-Hague Rules principle and is 
of little importance nowadays. It allows deck carriage in cases when there is a generally 
recognized custom within a particular trade that the goods may be stowed on deck. This 
means that, for certain goods, and provided that such a universal custom is present, the 
bill of lading doesn’t have to state that the cargo will actually be carried on deck. 
In Royal Exchange Shipping v Dixon, the owners of the screw steamer the 
Egyptian Monarch, carrying some of her cargo on deck from New Orleans to Liverpool, 
attempted to prove a custom to stow on deck. They relied on the practice of vessel owners 
who were trading between these two ports and who shipped goods on deck in violation of 
their contract of carriage, while accepting full responsibility for the consequences. 
However, the Honourable Law Lords held that, since the shipowners agreed to pay any 
damages resulting from this extensive practice established in Liverpool, the practice was 
actually tantamount to nothing more than a habit of stowing goods on deck in breach of 
the contract with the shipper and, thereafter, of paying for that breach. 582F582F126 Moreover, 
even if the cargo interests had been aware of that practice of deck shipment and had not 
objected to it, they would not have been regarded as having consented to a deck-carriage 
modification of their bills of lading contract, for “their non-interference merely implies 
that they do not think it necessary to prevent a deviation from the contract, because they 
are satisfied of the shipowner’s ability to make good all loss arising from his having 
broken it”.583F583F127 
To constitute a custom within a trade to carry cargo on deck, there must be 
something more than a frequent deck carriage. In Royal Exchange Shipping v Dixon, it 
was noted that, to establish such a custom, the evidence on the case must indicate a 
practice or usage which is general and universal within a certain trade and at the port of 
shipment, and which is known by anyone who is involved in this particular trade: 
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It is suggested that there is a practice which it must be taken that 
they knew. Now the only practice which it can be taken in law that 
they impliedly knew (that is, taken that they knew, although they did 
not) is a general practice; so general and universal in the trade and at 
the port from which these goods were taken, that everybody who 
ships cotton on board a ship at New Orleans for England must be 
taken to know that his goods probably will, or may probably be put 
on deck. [...] To say that there is a practice, or to say that there is a 
frequent practice, is only to say that it is sometimes done, leaving it 
open that as often, or oftener, it is not done. Such evidence as that is 
not evidence to go to a jury, upon which they would be justified in 
finding a general usage. 584F584F
128 
It can be concluded that in order to be relied on a universal custom within a 
particular trade (a trade purpose or port customs), there must be established a general 
and universal practice so that the particular trade is considered “customary”. In this 
way, any cargo owner will be aware that his goods are likely to be stowed on deck. 
However, relying on a universal custom to excuse on-deck carriage is a pre-Hague 
Rules principle and it has little application nowadays. This is because the Rules are not 
silent on that matter but explicitly require in Article I(c) that the goods should be 
explicitly stated on the bill of lading as carried on deck and also be so carried if parties 
want to exclude the application of the Rules in their contract. Therefore, under the 
Hague and Hague-Visby Rules, the carrier cannot excuse himself for deck carriage, 
relying on this old principle. 585F585F129 
Under charter parties, however, it is deemed permissible to load cargo on deck 
where the vessel is specially designed for such carriage. 586F586F130 In certain cases deck carriage 
is justified because of technological innovation and vessel design – e.g. purpose-built 
container vessels or other vessels designed for carriage on deck. For example, if a semi-
submersible vessel is carrying a platform, there will be no need to state anything in the 
bill of lading about the deck carriage. It is, of course, inconceivable to stow the platform 
in the ship’s holds. 
5.1.3 Deck carriage and the doctrines of fundamental breach and deviation 
5.1.3.1 Fundamental breach 
The doctrine of fundamental breach provides that if a party has committed a 
breach that goes to the root of the contract, there exists a rule of law which deprives the 
party at fault of any of the clauses set forth in the contract that are intended to except or 
limit that party’s liability for his failure to perform. The doctrine has its commercial 
origin in the 19th century and was applied in cases of serious contractual breaches such 
as a geographical deviation from the voyage or storing the goods in a different warehouse 
to the one agreed for in the contract. In such cases even causation was not necessary to 
trigger the application of the doctrine – the fact that loss or damage was not caused by 
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the fundamental breach was not a defence for the carrier. This was a much preferred 
and used rule of law in the past and up until the two milestone decisions House of Lords 
cases (Suisse Atlantique and Photo Production) which marked a cardinal change. 587F587F131 
Today, however, there has been a significant development in shipping law with 
respect to deck carriage and the doctrine of fundamental breach of the contract. This can 
be observed both in legal literature and in case law. To begin with, earlier editions of 
Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of Lading contained a passage, rendering 
unauthorized deck carriage equal to a fundamental breach: 
The effect of deck stowage not so authorized will be to set aside the 
exceptions of the charter or bill of lading, and to render the 
shipowner liable under his contract of carriage for damage happening 
to such goods. 588F588F
132
 
This approach589F589F133, however, is now considered old law because the doctrine that a 
breach of the contract can be of such a fundamental nature as to discharge all exceptions 
clauses, is no longer considered to exist after it was addressed and rejected in The 
“Antares”.590F590F134 In the vivid legal parlance of Lord Justice Lloyd, the death knell of the 
fundamental breach doctrine sounded in the Suisse Atlantique case591F591F135, while its corpse 
was buried in Photo Production v Securicor.592F592F136 
In the former case, it was established that the freedom of contract would be 
excessively restricted if there was a rule of law, which supported the prohibition and 
nullification of contractual defences in case of a fundamental breach. 593F593F137 The Court 
suggested that the terms and scope of the exception clause should be considered on a 
case-by-case basis, and that the contract of carriage should be construed as a whole, 
before establishing whether or not the exemption clauses were admissible to protect the 
carrier in the circumstances of a fundamental breach.594F594F138 
The House of Lords in Photo Production v Securicor confirmed this proposition, 
namely that it is a matter of construction of the contract when it comes to whether and 
to what extent limitation and exclusion clauses are to be applied to a case of 
fundamental breach or breach of a fundamental term. 595F595F139 Lord Wilberforce expressed his 
opinion that, no matter of the complexity of the case and of the contractual breach, the 
normal rules of contract law have plenty of resources to deal with these problems; hence, 
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there was no need of a specific rule of law to be judicially devised and applied to cases of 
fundamental breach.596F596F140 Thus, Photo Production v Securicor explicitly rejected the 
fundamental breach doctrine by preferring the “rule of construction” approach. 
The judgment in The “Antares” relied on these two cases and disapproved the rule 
related to deck cargo as set out in the earlier editions of Scrutton on Charterparties and 
Bills of Lading. The Court found no reasons to regard unauthorized deck stowage as a 
special case that is tantamount to a fundamental breach. Accordingly, this led to a 
change of the relevant passage in Scrutton so that later editions now represent the 
current law on deck carriage. Considering the developments stated in the cases 
hereinabove, the new passage has been considerably amended and it formulates the 
legal effects of unauthorized deck carriage as follows: 
The effect of deck stowage not so authorized is to render the 
shipowner liable under his contract of carriage for damage happening 
to such goods caused by such stowage. Whether exceptions […] apply 
to protect the shipowner is now a matter of construction… 597F597F
141
 
It is explicitly affirmed that there is no rule of law which renders carriage on deck 
a fundamental breach, depriving the carrier from all exceptions and limitation 
clauses.598F598F142 
The approach based on the “rule of construction” indeed does not nullify carrier’s 
defences but it doesn’t automatically uphold them, either. If exceptions clauses are 
devised to protect the carrier, provided that he honoured his obligation under the 
contract to carry below deck, then these clauses will not be available to him if he is in 
breach of these obligations and the wording of that clause does not cover such a 
breach.599F599F143 Conversely, if the clauses are envisaged to encompass cases when the contract 
has been breached by wrongfully stowing the goods above deck, then the clauses will be 
upheld. Expressed in The “Chanda”, this rule is based on contractual intention and it 
has been applied and preferred over the fundamental breach doctrine in several pivotal 
cases related to deck carriage such as Royal Exchange Shipping v Dixon, Evans v 
Merzario, The “Antares”, and The “Chanda”.600F600F144 However, the rule actually does no more 
than stating the obvious, and it fails on providing any guidance as to which exemption 
and limitation clauses are devised to protect the carrier in cases of wrongful on-deck 
carriage and which are not. Nevertheless, for the purpose of the current section, the 
merits of this assertion are that it confirms the death of the fundamental breach doctrine 
and upholds the application of the rule of construction in cases of unauthorized carriage 
on deck. As to the defences that are available to a carrier who breached his obligation to 
carry below deck, these will be discussed in section 4.5 infra. 
There is another argument for considering unauthorized deck carriage not a 
fundamental breach. And this argument lies in the beginning of Article III rule 2 of the 
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Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, which is invariably in the focus of the current thesis. The 
article, which sets forth the cargo-related obligations of the carrier, begins with the 
following proviso: “subject to the provisions of Article IV”. So, on the one hand, we have 
undeclared, i.e. unauthorized, deck carriage (that is, when there is no express agreement 
to stow on deck), which is considered to constitute a breach of Article III rule 2, and on 
the other hand we have the duties stated therein (to “properly and carefully load … stow, 
carry … care for … the goods carried”) to be subject to the exemptions and defences in 
Article IV. Therefore, unauthorized deck cargo cannot be considered a fundamental 
breach of the contract, but a only a breach, in respect of which the carrier can escape 
from liability by means of resorting to the defences provided in the Rules. The extent, to 
which a carrier can escape liability, depends, of course, on the specific circumstances and 
factual matrix of the case as well as on the rules of construction employed by the court. 
5.1.3.2 Deviation 
The doctrine of deviation originates from marine insurance law, where a vessel 
was deprived of her insurance cover if the shipowner geographically departed from the 
commercial route or unduly delayed the journey. 601F601F145 This was so because the insurers 
were not willing to cover risks that lie outside the prompt execution of the journey on the 
usual commercial route. The doctrine of deviation is a variation of the same doctrine on 
fundamental breach.602F602F146 With regard to the application of the doctrine from a practical 
perspective, shippers often utilize it in an effort to avoid statutory liability limitations 
such as the per package limitation in Article IV rule 5 of the Hague-Visby Rules. 
In America, the doctrine of deviation has expanded from a geographical concept to 
embrace also fundamental contractual aberrations. 603F603F147 Thus, on-deck carriage under a 
bill of lading, which does not expressly state that the cargo will be loaded on deck, is 
considered a technical, rather than a geographical deviation. 604F604F148 A technical deviation, 
also known as a quasi-deviation, indicates any variation in the conduct of the vessel, 
which increases the risk over the goods carried. 605F605F149 The consequences of a deviation are, 
in general, that a carrier cannot rely on the defences laid down in the bill of lading or in 
the Hague Rules and Hague-Visby Rules, except when the deviation was reasonable 
(Article IV rule 4), which is deemed to be a question of fact. A quasi deviation has the 
same results as the geographical deviation, because, under American law, the former is 
considered a fundamental breach, meaning that, in case of unauthorized deck carriage, 
the carrier is deprived of all of his benefits, defences, limitations and exclusions under 
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the bill of lading.606F606F150 Likewise, the carrier is deprived of many of his rights under the US 
COGSA, such as the limitation of liability (s.1304(5)) and the carrier-friendly 
presumption laid down in s.1303(6), except, however, for the one-year time limit.607F607F151 This 
was the case in American Dornier Machinery Corp and Anr v “MSC Gina” and Ors 608F608F152 
before the US District Court where the carriage of containers full with delicate and 
sophisticated equipment on the deck of a specially-designed containership was held to be 
a deviation because of a previous express agreement between the shipper and the carrier 
that, unless the cargo was stowed below deck, the shipper would be a priori informed for 
the impossibility of under-deck stowage, and the latter could choose to allow the 
shipment on deck, reschedule the shipment for another vessel, or cancel the booking and 
make an arrangement with another carrier without any penalty. Thus, the agreement 
did not provide the carriers with the liberty to stow on deck at their option but they had 
to communicate this with the shippers. This special agreement for under-deck stowage 
formed part of the contract of carriage, and, by breaching it, the carriers MSC breached a 
contractual term that goes to the root of the contract, which deprived them of all the 
defences under US COGSA, including the package limitation defence of $500 per 
package. However, the court allowed that the carriage of containers on the deck of 
specially-designed containership under a clean bill of lading was not considered an 
unreasonable deviation, pointing to previous cases, 609F609F153 but in the present case such 
carriage was coupled with a special stowage agreement which was part of the contract of 
carriage. 
The question of whether on-deck carriage of containers on a specially-designed 
container vessels amounted to an unreasonable deviation was discussed and decided in 
the earlier American case The “Mormacvega”.610F610F154 Two shipping containers with pallets of 
liquid “Teflon” were carried on deck from New York to Rotterdam under a clean bill of 
lading, absent a contractual provision or established custom to carry on deck. One of the 
containers was lost during the voyage. The first-instance court held that, given the fact 
that the Mormacvega was originally a general cargo ship but then converted into a 
combined vessel capable of carrying break bulk and containers, on-deck stowage was 
permitted. These substantial structural changes led the court to believe that the 
“[c]ontainers on the deck of the Mormacvega were not necessarily subject to greater risks 
than those stowed under deck”. 611F611F155 Thus, the court made an exception to the per se 
doctrine on unreasonable deviation for containerized vessel. The factual inquiry 
performed by the court in this case also shows how important the ship design is in 
determining the risk that pertains to the carriage of cargo on deck. 612F612F156 Furthermore, the 
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Court of Appeal agreed with and affirmed the decision of District Court, which was 
based, inter alia, on the following points: there was no oral agreement to require the 
carrier to stow below deck; the deck of a container vessel was exactly where shipping 
containers are reasonably to be carried; the vessel was specifically constructed to safely 
permit on-deck carriage of containers. 613F613F157 
Under English law, the application of the doctrine of deviation is considered 
highly uncertain and it is submitted that the doctrine’s scope is narrower, meaning that 
less events may be characterized as deviation under English law as compared to 
American law.614F614F158 Earlier English cases generally considered deviation as a breach, which 
goes to the root of the contract, and as such it made the carrier unable to rely on his 
limitation or exclusion clauses. A propos, some English authors also described 
undeclared deck carriage as akin to deviation. 615F615F159 However, early English cases are 
nowadays not considered to have established grounds for a rule of law which embodies 
the principle employed in those cases.616F616F160 Thus, deviation is not considered a special case 
but it rather obeys the ordinary principles of contract law. 617F617F161 What is more, nowadays 
there is no English authority which considers the wrongful deck on deck as a 
deviation.618F618F162 Moreover, carriage on deck was not held equivalent to an automatic case of 
res ipsa loquitur.619F619F163 The mere fact that goods are stowed on the weather deck does not 
mean in and of itself that the contract or the Rules have been breached. There must be a 
causal connection between the deck stowage and the damage or loss of such goods. 620F620F164 
With regard to other jurisdictions, the deviation principle does not apply in 
relation to deck cargo in the Netherlands, France, or Italy, where courts have decided 
that the carrier can rely on the Article IV rule 5 to limit his liability in deck cargo 
cases.621F621F165 
5.2 Interpreting the bill of lading 
Before rushing into the question of how courts interpret the various bills of lading 
provisions as well as of how far carriers may go to exclude their obligation to stow below 
deck or to limit or except their liability for unauthorized deck carriage, consideration 
must be given to a wider observation. In the following sections, one peculiarity will 
transpire about the legal consequences of deck carriage, and it is that the central 
problem in disputes, involving cargo carried on deck, is actually related to what the 
carrier has agreed to rather than to what he has actually done. As stated by the 
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Honourable Madam Levine J., the main goal of a commercial contract is to allocate 
among the parties the risks pertaining to the transaction, and, where the contract is 
insufficiently clear, it is up to the courts to establish who will bear the losses. 622F622F166 It is very 
important to identify what the parties have agreed to, because these contractual 
arrangements (in this case, the location where the goods will be stowed) create different 
obligations for the parties.  
The main issues related to the carrier’s implied obligation to stow the goods below 
deck are actually to be found in the bill of lading and its content. The transport 
document may contain provisions related to deck carriage, on the basis of which bills can 
be provisionally summarized into four categories: firstly, the bill of lading may expressly 
prohibit the carriage of goods on deck; secondly, it may allow carriage on deck by 
expressly stating that the cargo will be carried so; thirdly, it may only give an option, or 
a liberty, to the carrier to stow the goods on deck; lastly, the bill of lading may not 
address the matter of deck carriage at all, meaning that the master has issued a 
clean/unclaused bill of lading. 
5.2.1 Issuing a clean bill of lading 
It was already outlined that there is a general principle prescribing that a clean 
bill of lading requires that the goods shall be carried below deck. Although nothing in the 
Rules specifically stipulates so, this basic principle existed well before the Hague and the 
Hague-Visby Rules, as discussed in section 5.1 above, and it stems from the implied duty 
of the carrier to carry the goods under deck. Hence, whenever the contract of carriage is 
silent on where the goods shall be stowed, and provided that there is no agreement, 
custom or a statutory obligation to stow on deck, it is generally understood that the 
actual place of carriage will be below the weather deck of the vessel. 
The lack of a provision in the Hague-Visby Rules which explicitly stipulates the 
aforementioned requirement does not preclude one to infer that the Rules, too, postulate 
under-deck stowage when clean bill of lading is issued. This assumption can be made by 
reading together the Hague-Visby’s Article III rule 2, which obliges the carrier to stow 
the goods “properly and carefully”, and the basic principle of below-deck stowage, which 
has for a long time been recognized as the proper way of stowing the goods. 
It should be noted in that regard that while this section of the chapter focuses on 
the part of the bill of lading which addresses where cargo will be carried, in practice 
most bills of lading are actually silent as to the location of the goods. The reason why 
bills of lading usually do not expressly state whether the goods will be carried below deck 
or on deck is a commercial one. If the transport document is qualified with a statement 
for on-deck carriage, this may be problematic for the underlying contract of sale, in 
particular where the latter provides for a transaction effected through a documentary 
credit, which is known also as a Letter of Credit. 623F623F167 Sellers and buyers of goods very 
often resort to this type of a credit payment arrangement, because, by using a Letter of 
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Credit, the risk of non-payment falls on the issuing bank and not on the seller, whereas 
the buyer, on the other hand, is satisfied that the seller will be paid only if all terms and 
conditions in the Letter of Credit are met. Because the risk of non-payment falls upon 
them, banks are unwilling to accept claused bills of lading, stating that cargo will be 
carried on deck and, thus, jeopardizing the transaction. 
5.2.2 Issuing a claused bill of lading 
The strict approach applied in Svenska Traktor v Maritime Agencies and The 
“Hong Kong Producer” to liberty clauses and to ambiguous clauses in bills of lading, 
which lack an express on-deck statement, has been elaborated and expanded in The 
“Rhone”, where there was actually an on-deck notation on the bill of lading. 624F624F168 The case 
concerned the carriage of 1725 packages of lumber from Canada to Belgium, subject to 
the Hague-Visby Rules. Roughly half of the packages were consigned to receiver A, while 
the other half to receiver B. The lumber within the packages had differing 
measurements and differing price. Each of the two consignments were on a separate bill 
of lading but both bills contained the notation “Stowage: 86% OD [on deck] 14% UD 
[under deck]”, which reproduced the notation on the mate’s receipt and referred to the 
entire shipment. The bills contained exclusion clauses as well, stating that cargo carried 
on deck was at the risk of the cargo owners and the carrier was not to be held liable for 
loss or damage. The cargo in its entirety was loaded and carried both below and above 
deck, in accordance with the proportions laid down in the bills of lading. During the 
voyage, more than half of the shipped lumber was damaged, and it was later discovered 
that all of the damaged lumber was among the packages that were carried on deck. Some 
of the damaged packages were consigned to purchaser A, while others to purchaser B. 
The main question that appeared before the Canadian Court was whether the packages 
stowed on deck could be considered “goods”, and thus covered by the Hague-Visby Rules, 
or whether they were “deck cargo” within the meaning of Article I(c) and thus exempted 
from the Rules, which would enable the carrier to rely on the liability exclusion clauses. 
Both the first instance court and the Court of Appeal were unanimous that the 
on-deck notation on the bills of lading was not clear as to exactly which part of the cargo 
was carried on deck and which was not. The information on the bill of lading was in 
percentages and was precise with regard to volume but it was not certain with respect to 
value of the cargo. Such uncertainty in the notation was held to be equivalent to the 
absence of a notation in Svenska Traktor v Maritime Agencies, and, therefore, the same 
principles applied to the present case. 625F625F169 In particular, the problem in The “Rhone” was 
that the notation on the bills of lading referred to the entire shipment of lumber, and it 
could not be relied on with respect to each consignment, because the specific packages 
that were to be carried below and above deck could not be identified at the time when the 
contract was concluded. Thus, consignees could not determine the value of the cargo 
which was carried on deck and could not assess the respective risks which were involved 
in the particular bill of lading contract.  
Therefore, the Court held that no part of the shipment could be considered “deck 
cargo” within the meaning of the Rules. The notation was not sufficient to exclude the 
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goods carried on deck from the application of the Hague-Visby Rules in accordance with 
Article I(c), and as a result the carrier could not rely on the liability exclusion clauses in 
the bills of lading. This case illustrates how important the aforementioned factors 626F626F170 are 
and how they come into play when courts are evaluating whether a particular shipment 
qualifies for “deck cargo” within the meaning of the Hague-Visby Rules. Here, the court 
put great emphasis on the communication between the parties regarding the intended 
deck carriage, which was not sufficient to allow the cargo owners to evaluate the risks 
and to make an informed decision. Thus, since the carrier failed to properly 
communicate the risks pertaining to that shipment, the court found the carriage 
objectionable and not conforming to the requirements of the Hague-Visby Rules for “deck 
cargo”. 
Several other implications could be drawn from that ruling. First of all, the on-
deck notation or statement should be reliable for the respective shipment covered by the 
bill of lading and it should be clear and certain. The “Rhone” proves that even when 
there is a notation on the bills of lading, which states that the goods will be carried on 
deck, the results may still be the same as if there was no notation at all, if that notation 
is uncertain as to exactly which cargo will be carried above deck. Parties must be able to 
calculate with certainty the distribution of the risk between the cargo interests and the 
carrier. What is more, the shipper and the consignee, must be capable to calculate and 
assess their risks prospectively at the time of contracting, and not retrospectively after 
the damage has already been caused. 627F627F171 
5.3 Deck cargo and the obligation to care for the goods (Article III rule 2) 
It has been established that stowage in an inappropriate way may still be a 
breach of Article III rule 2 when it relates to cargo carried on deck even if there is an 
agreement that the cargo will be carried on deck but no express statement to that effect 
on the bill of lading. As already pointed out, unauthorized deck carriage constitutes a 
breach of Article III rule 2 in and of itself, whereas carriage, which has been agreed via a 
liberty clause to be performed on deck but absent a statement to that effect on the B/L, is 
not automatically considered breach of Article III rule 2. However, that may well be the 
case if the obligations stated in that article have not been discharged “properly and 
carefully”. 
In the abovementioned case Svenska Traktor v Maritime Agencies, the carrier 
shipped 50 tractors, of which 16 were stowed on deck the motor vessel Glory, and during 
the journey from Southampton to Stockholm one of the tractors was lost overboard in 
normal weather conditions. The Judge established that the first part of the liberty clause 
in the bill of lading allowed the shipowners to stow the goods on deck subject, however, 
to their obligation under Art III rule 2 properly and carefully to load, handle, stow, carry, 
keep and care for the goods. The evidence on that case proved that the tractor was lost as 
a result of poor stowage, and lack of reasonable care in lashing the cargo to the deck, 
indicating a breach of Article III rule 2, therefore. 628F628F172 
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Similarly, in the Canadian case The “Mahia”629F629F173, the plaintiff shipowners sought 
to establish an agreement between them and the shipper to carry dangerous goods on 
the deck of their vessel The Mahia. The case concerned the shipment of drums of sodium 
chlorate from Montreal, Canada to Melbourne, Australia where the drums, after an 
incident-free voyage, ignited upon discharge and the explosion damaged the vessel and 
caused a loss of life. It is noteworthy that the respective Canadian regulation for the 
carriage of dangerous goods in ships allowed the carriage of such goods on or under deck. 
Clause 12 of the export through bills of lading also allowed deck carriage and 
incorporated the Water-Carriage of Goods Act (1936), “notwithstanding Article I (e) of the 
Rules”. The shipowners, furthermore, relied on the fact that the bills contained the 
notation “On deck at shipper’s risk” in order to prove that they were given instructions by 
the shipper to stow the drums with the hazardous cargo on deck. 
Considering all evidence and testimony630F630F174, the Superior Court of Montreal held 
that the notation “On deck at shipper’s risk” alone was not enough evidence to prove that 
the plaintiff shipowners were instructed by the shipper to stow on deck, nor was it 
enough to establish an agreement to ship on deck. On the contrary, the reason for the 
explosion upon discharge was found not to originate from the on-deck carriage per se but 
from the failure of the shipowners to properly and carefully discharge their obligations 
under Article III rule 2. The master of the vessel was knowledgeable of the hazardous 
properties of sodium chlorate, in particular that it is soluble in water and as such it 
should be packed in watertight containers if carried on deck, and yet it was easily 
noticeable that the lids of the sodium chloride drums stowed on The Mahia were not 
watertight.631F631F175 Evidence also showed gross negligence and want of reasonable care during 
discharge operations, which was a direct cause of the accident. Consequently, the carrier 
was hold in breach of his obligations properly and carefully to load, handle, stow, carry, 
keep, care for and discharge the goods. The fact that the carrier had previously shipped 
thousands of tons of this particular cargo suggested that he knew or ought to have 
known the properties of sodium chlorate and, therefore, he could not rely on the defences 
provided in Article IV. Although the Court does not elaborate, it may seem fair to 
conclude that had the carrier not been knowledgeable of the hazardous cargo’s 
properties, he may have been entitled to the defence set forth in Article IV rule 6 of the 
Rules.632F632F176 
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5.4 The carrier’s defences against claims for damaged or lost deck cargo 
When a carrier fails to prove that he fulfilled his obligation properly and carefully 
to load, handle, stow and carry the goods because of unauthorized deck carriage, he is 
confronted with the issue to what extent he can rely on the exemptions and limitations 
set forth either in the contract of carriage or in the applicable liability regime. In 
general, the protection that a carrier may rely on is dependent on the terms in the 
contract of carriage and also of how these terms are evidenced in the bills of lading. In 
the case of deck carriage, however, it is difficult to give a straightforward answer 
whether the carrier would be dismantled of some or all of his defences if goods are 
carried “illegally” on deck. This is because, as pointed above, the concept of 
authorized/unauthorized deck cargo varies in the various circumstances. 
It is important to note that one of the main accomplishments of the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules is to eliminate clauses that excessively exclude carrier’s 
liability or exonerate the carrier from negligence and, instead, to introduce a fault-based 
regime with statutory liability exceptions and limitations, which can balance the 
interests of carriers and shipper. But when deck cargo is involved, it is left to national 
courts to define whether deck carriage is legal or not. That is why the term authorized 
deck cargo actually remains ambiguous. As will be seen in section 6, depending on the 
interpretation of the court, the increased risk that stems from stowage on deck may 
render the agreement to stow on deck not sufficiently well communicated and thus any 
exemption clauses null and void. Thus, a situation is created where courts in various 
jurisdictions protect to a different extent owners of cargo carried on deck and there no 
uniformity could be found at an international level. 
Under English law, statutory defences have generally been more warmly 
welcomed by courts, unlike contractual exceptions and limitations. 633F633F177 Furthermore, 
English courts do not consider unauthorized deck carriage as such a grave breach so as 
to deprive the carrier from all of the defences available under the Rules. A carrier who 
breached his obligation to stow below deck can rely to a different degree on a defence 
clause, depending whether it is a limitation or an exceptions clause. These general 
observations can be elaborated by examining the court rulings discussed below.  
5.4.1 Contractual defences and limitations 
Does the breach of the carrier’s obligation to carry below deck deprive him from 
reliance upon limitations or exceptions? This was precisely the issue which stood before 
the Court of Appeals in the aforementioned case Encyclopedia Britannica v The Hong 
Kong Producer, where the carrier sought to rely on the contractual defences, which he 
drafted himself.634F634F178 The plaintiff’s encyclopedias were carried in containers on the deck of 
the defendant’s steamship The Hong Kong Producer from New York to Tokyo, and upon 
arrival in Tokyo, it was found that the cargo suffered damage by seawater due to the 
heavy swells during the voyage. As shown supra 635F635F179, the carrier failed to prove that there 
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was an agreement to stow goods on deck. Part of the controversial on-deck clause will be 
quoted again: 
13. Stowage On Deck, etc. 
[…] 
With respect to goods carried on deck, all risk of loss or damage by 
peril inherent in or to incidental [sic] such carriage shall be borne by 
the shipper and the carrier shall have the benefit of all and the same 
rights, immunities, exemptions, and limitations as provided for in 
[Art.] 4 of the Hague rules or the corresponding provision of any Act 
that may be applicable, excepting subdivisions (1), (2) (j), (2) (q), (3) 
and (4) thereof [emphasis added]. 
What the carrier actually sought to achieve by drafting this provision, was 
actually not only to lessen his obligations and liabilities, but also to contractually afford 
himself all rights, immunities, exceptions, and limitations under the Article IV of the 
Hague Rules, excepting himself of the rules which place the burden of proof on the 
person claiming the benefit of that defence, i.e. the carrier.636F636F180 Since stowage on deck in 
that case was considered an unreasonable deviation, the carrier was deprived of all the 
benefits of the bill of lading and also of all the immunities set forth in Article IV, 
including the per package limitation. Therefore, the carrier was held liable for the full 
amount of the damages, regardless that the package limitation is said in the Rules to 
apply “in any event”. 
This judgment concurred with the milestone case Royal Exchange Shipping v 
Dixon (1886), which has a direct relevance to the issue of the carrier’s contractual 
defences under unauthorized carriage on deck. 637F637F181 As mentioned supra, a cargo of cotton 
was shipped on deck of the vessel the Egyptian Monarch, which ran aground during the 
voyage and, in order to get her free, the master properly jettisoned the deck cargo. All 
bills of lading contained, among others, “jettison” exceptions and the shipowners relied 
on them, claiming that, under the bills of lading, they were not liable for the jettisoned 
cargo, and also that the breach of contract in carrying on deck while under-deck carriage 
was contracted, was not the proximate cause for the damage. The Court disagreed and 
ruled that the breach of the contract disentitled the shipowners to the jettison exception: 
[T]his cotton was carried under a contract that it should be stowed 
under deck. The exception in the bills of lading of “jettison” cannot 
avail the shipowners, who broke their contract in stowing the cotton 




[A]t the time when jettison was made of those 125 bales, they were 
being carried in breach of the contract, and were not within the 
exceptions specified in the bills of lading, which have exclusive 
reference to goods safely stowed under hatches. In these 
circumstances I cannot doubt that the appellants are liable to pay to 
the respondents the value of the 125 bales, seeing that they cannot 
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make delivery in terms of their contract, and have no legal excuse for 
their failure to deliver. 639F639F
183
 
The quoted passage should not be, however, perceived as a general rule that the 
carrier’s contractual defences are always void when cargo is wrongfully carried on deck. 
The particular exemption clause in Royal Exchange Shipping v Dixon was referred 
exclusively to goods carried under deck. Thus, the bills of lading did not prescribe any 
“jettison” defences for the carrier in the circumstances of the case because the goods were 
carried above deck. In other words, the cargo was jettisoned in a way which fell outside 
the exemptions clause. This clause, thus, fits perfectly within the prescription of Mr. 
Justice Hirst in The “Chanda” [1989], which was held nearly one century later, stating 
that “clauses which are clearly intended to protect the shipowner provided he honours his 
contractual obligation to stow goods under deck do not apply if he is in breach of that 
obligation”.640F640F184 The “jettison” clause in Royal Exchange Shipping v Dixon (1886), on which 
Hirst, J. relied in his judgment in The “Chanda”, was indeed such a clause. Yet, Mr. 
Justice Hirst did not provide any guidance or yardstick as to which limitation or 
exceptions clauses embraced in their scope unauthorized carriage on deck (i.e. being, 
thus, applicable) and which did not (i.e. being, inapplicable, respectively). Instead, he 
erroneously assumed that all limitation and exception clauses had, in the circumstances 
of a wrongful on-deck carriage, a scope as the one mentioned hereinabove. This was one 
of the reasons why his judgment was later overruled and regarded as wrong.641F641F185 
Similarly, the Court of Appeal in Evans v Merzario held that the defendant 
forwarding agents were not entitled to rely on the exemptions contained in their printed 
conditions of carriage, which were standard for the forwarding trade. These exemptions 
contained in the trading conditions gave the forwarders, inter alia, the complete freedom 
in respect of means, route and procedure in the transportation of the goods. However, 
there was an oral promise given by the forwarders to the cargo interests, which produced 
a binding obligation to carry the goods below deck, and the forwarders’ failure to ensure 
that its sister company at the port of loading would arrange for under deck carriage was 
established to be the cause for the loss of the containerized cargo overboard. The 
Honourable Lords were unanimous that, since the damage resulted from a breach of the 
forwarders’ binding oral promise to carry the goods below deck, none of the exemption 
clauses in the printed conditions could protect the forwarding agents.642F642F186 To state 
otherwise would mean that the new contractual term, embodied in the oral promise, 
would be “illusory” and “stillborn”. 643F643F187 It is noteworthy that the conclusion that the breach 
of the oral promise overrode any liability exemptions (including a weight limitation 
clause of £50 per ton) was reached through interpreting the contract as a whole and not 
on the basis of the fundamental breach doctrine. 644F644F188 Another remark is that none of the 
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decisions cited above made a distinction between clauses which limited liability, on the 
one hand, and clauses which exempted from liability, on the other. Such differentiation 
is observed, however, in the defences available to the carrier under the Hague and 
Hague-Visby Rules set forth in the next section below. 
5.4.2 Defences and limitations under the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules 
5.4.2.1 The one-year time bar (Article III rule 6) 
The application of the one-year time limit contained in the Hague-Visby Rules 
was a central issue in The “Antares”, where unauthorized deck cargo was damaged 
during the voyage. On the facts of the case, machinery was shipped at Antwerp for 
carriage to Mombasa on the owner’s vessel Antares that was time-chartered by the 
Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC) on an NYPE form, which contained a demise 
clause. Upon discharge, it was discovered that cargo under one of the bills of lading was 
carried on deck, as a result of which it was seriously damaged. The bill of lading holders 
at first failed to identify the carrier correctly as they wrongly assumed that the 
charterers MSC, with whom they contracted for the carriage, were the owners of the 
vessel. When the plaintiff bill of lading holders finally identified the vessel owners, their 
claim was time-barred by force of Article III rule 6. In order to defeat the one year time 
bar, the plaintiffs argued that the carrier had committed a fundamental breach of the 
contract by carrying the cargo on deck, and, therefore, was not entitled to the defences 
provided in the Hague-Visby Rules. The Court held that the carrier was not precluded 
from relying on the one year time bar because Article III rule 6 had general applicability 
and the provision did not distinguish between fundamental and non-fundamental 
breaches, nor did it make any distinction between breaches which were equivalent to a 
deviation and breaches which were not.  
Furthermore, Lord Justice Lloyd, giving the leading judgment, underlined that 
under the provision the carrier shall be discharged from all liability “whatsoever” and “in 
any event” provided that suit is not brought within one year, and pointed to the fact that 
the wording of the Hague-Visby Rules’ Article III rule 6 is even wider than the old 
Article III rule 6 in the Hague Rules. 645F645F189 
Article III rule 6 (The Hague Rules 1924) Article III rule 6 (The Hague-Visby 
Rules)646F646F190 
[…] 
In any event the carrier and the ship shall be 
discharged from all liability in respect of loss or 
damage unless suit is brought within one year after 
delivery of the goods or the date when the goods 
should have been delivered [emphasis added]. 
[…] 
[…] 
Subject to paragraph 6bis the carrier and the ship shall 
in any event be discharged from all liability 
whatsoever in respect of the goods, unless suit is 
brought within one year of their delivery or of the date 
when they should have been delivered [emphasis 
added]. 
[…] 
In Scrutton647F647F191, this amendment, brought by the Visby protocol, is said to have the 
effect of applying the one-year time bar not only in cases of deviation but also even in 
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cases when there was intentional or reckless misconduct on behalf of the carrier within 
the meaning of Article IV rule 5(e). 648F648F192 The bottom line is that the one-year time limit will 
be valid in extreme circumstances, such as a deviation, a fundamental breach of the 
contract, or an intentional and reckless misconduct, and there is no reason to assume 
that courts will not apply it to a case of an unauthorized carriage of goods on deck. 
As Lord Justice Judge points out in another case, the one-year time limitation set 
forth in Article III rule 6 “does not, in the strictest sense, exclude liability”.649F649F193 It merely 
sets a contractual period which serves as a time bar for the shipper’s right to claim so 
that after this agreed period has expired, any liability against the carrier and the ship 
shall be discharged. This is the main reason why courts do not apply such a restrictive 
reasoning regarding the application of that provision. This is not the case, however, with 
the carrier’s defences set forth in the following two sections. 
5.4.2.2 The package limitation (Article IV rule 5) 
In cases of unauthorized deck carriage, the application of the package limitation 
(Article IV rule 5) is considered according to different standards compared to the 
application of the one-year time bar (Art III rule 6). Whereas the judgment in The 
“Antares” on the validity of the time bar has not been challenged, there are conflicting 
views in English case law with respect whether a carrier can avail himself of the package 
limitation defences in the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules. These two defences that are 
available to the carrier were considered of a different nature with regard to their 
application to an unauthorized carriage on deck. First, the one-year time bar does not 
affect the quantum of the limitations, and, secondly, if the package limitation is upheld 
in circumstances where the carrier has dramatically and wrongfully shifted the risk by 
stowing the goods on deck, the application of this defence would undermine the purpose 
of the carrier’s obligation to stow below deck. 650F650F194 
In The “Nea Tyhi”, Sheen J applied the Hague Rules’ package limitation provision 
to a contract of carriage contained in a bill of lading, incorporating the Rules and being 
claused “shipped under deck”, where the carrier nevertheless stowed and carried the 
goods above deck of the bulk carrier Nea Tyhi.651F651F195 As a result, the plywood cargo, which is 
generally “very liable to deteriorate if allowed to get damp [and] should never be shipped 
on deck”652F652F196, was damaged by rainwater. Accordingly, the defendant’s liability was limited 
under Article IV rule 5 of the Hague Rules from £15,280, what was initially claimed from 
the plaintiffs, to £14,000, being £100 per package for each of the 140 crates of plywood. 
However, the Court in The “Chanda” reached quite the opposite decision and 
considered the package limitation “repugnant to and inconsistent with the obligation to 
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stow below deck”, and as such it was held inapplicable. 653F653F197 This case was peculiar with the 
fact that the damage to the goods was found to be a result of a combination of several 
elements: (1) on-deck stowage, which caused waves hitting the cargo; (2) the positioning 
of the cargo on deck – it was stowed above hatch No. 1, which was the hatch nearest to 
the bow, where the “g” forces caused by the movement of the vessel were the greatest; (3) 
inadequate lashing, which was a contributory cause, as a result of which the cargo 
started shifting and hitting other cargo. The cargo consisted of a delicate equipment, 
which should have been below deck and as near as possible to the tipping centre of the 
vessel, which was under hatch No. 4, in order to prevent as much as possible any 
movement of the cargo. Instead, the cargo was stowed and positioned in the worst 
possible way, where it was subjected to maximum exposure to the violent sea and the 
harsh weather conditions. Hence, Mr. Justice Hirst held the defendant shipowners 
responsible on two separate grounds: stowing the cargo on deck and positioning it on the 
forward hatch, and, secondly, inadequate lashing. 654F654F198 
Although the judgment in The “Chanda” was subsequently criticized 655F655F199 and 
deemed as wrong, it was followed in the New Zealand case The “Pembroke”.656F656F200 The High 
Court of New Zealand endorsed Mr. Justice Hirst’s view on package limitation, applied 
in The “Chanda”, that “clauses which are clearly intended to protect the shipowner 
provided he honours his contractual obligation to stow goods under deck do not apply if 
he is in breach of that obligation [and] the package limitation clause falls fairly and 
squarely within this category”.657F657F201 Although the Court in The “Pembroke” struck the 
application of the package limitation, it did not provide any independent reasoning but 
relied entirely on the disputed The “Chanda”. 
The definitive verdict on the application of the package limitation under an 
unauthorized deck carriage was given in The “Kapitan Petko Voivoda” 658F658F202, which 
represents the current law. The owners and the charterers of the Bulgarian vessel 
Kapitan Petko Voivoda were sued for the partial damage and loss of cargo, which was 
wrongfully stowed on deck. The cargo owners contracted for the carriage of 34 excavators 
from Korea to Turkey. The contract of carriage was evidenced by six CONLINE bills of 
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lading, which contained a General Paramount Clause, incorporating the Hague Rules as 
enacted in Turkey, and none of the bills stated that the excavators would be stowed on 
deck. The contract was also partly evidenced by a fax, which provided that the carriage 
would be only under deck. The carrier stowed and lashed the goods accordingly and 
proceeded with the contractual journey but, when the vessel called at Xingang, China to 
load additional cargo, 26 of the excavators were discharged and then restowed on deck. 
On her way to Turkey, the vessel encountered heavy weather, which resulted in the loss 
of eight excavators, which broke free of their lashes and fell overboard, and also in some 
minor damage from wetting and rusting to several other excavators that were stowed on 
deck. 
The ruling in The “Kapitan Petko Voivoda” provides several solid arguments why 
the package limitation should prevail over a breach of the obligation to stow under deck. 
Firstly, Langley J. pointed out in the preliminary trial in the Commercial Court 
that a view was expressed in Carver on Bills of Lading659F659F203 that the Hague-Visby Rules 
contained their own “fundamental breach” provision, Article IV rule 5(e), which operated 
as an exception to the application of the limitation of liability, and, therefore, there was 
no justification in disapplying the package limitation provision in case of a wrongful deck 
carriage, because the Rules already had this defensive mechanism. 660F660F204 Regardless that 
the Hague Rules, and not the Hague-Visby Rules, were applicable to the present case, 
that was a valid point as to the intention of the drafters of the Convention. 
Secondly, the words “in any event” in Article IV rule 5 should be construed in 
their most natural meaning, which is “in every case”, regardless how serious a breach is 
involved in the case.661F661F205 A reference was made to the reasoning of Tuckey L.J. in The 
“Happy Ranger” that the words “in any event” are unlimited in scope, leaving little room 
for doubt whether they will apply to a case of a wrongful stowage on deck: 
However, I think that the words “in any event” mean what they say. 
They are unlimited in scope and I can see no reason for giving them 
anything other than their natural meaning. A limitation of liability is 
different in character from an exception. The words “in any event” do 
not appear in any of the other art. IV exemptions including r.6 and as 
a matter of construction I do not think they were intended to refer 
only to those events which give rise to the art. IV exemptions. 662F662F
206
 
Thirdly, the package limitation provision was held to apply in The “Happy 
Ranger”,663F663F207 where the carrier could limit his liability under Article IV rule 5, even 
though he breached his seaworthiness obligation under Article III rule 1, which is 
considered “overriding”.664F664F208 Even though the obligation to carry under deck is “an 
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extremely important obligation”, it cannot be said to be “overriding”. 665F665F209 Therefore, if 
deductive reasoning is applied to the foregoing two propositions, it can be safely 
concluded the limitation of liability provision will apply to a breach of the obligation to 
carry on deck as well. 
Eventually, The “Chanda” was overruled and the decision in The “Nea Tyhi” was 
approved, meaning that a carrier can limit his liability if he breaches his obligation to 
carry the goods under deck. 
5.4.2.3 The exceptions from liability in Article IV rule 2 
Unlike the package limitation clause in Article IV rule 5, the provisions in Article 
IV rule 2 represent a true exemption clause, and, although not impossible, it is unlikely 
that a carrier who breached his obligation to stow below deck, will be able to use the 
protection of the defences listed in that latter article. 666F666F210 The defendants in “The Kapitan 
Petko Voivoda” tried to rely, among others, on the peril of the sea (Article IV rule 2(c)) 
and the insufficiency of packing (Article IV rule 2(n)) defence but to no avail. The Court 
held that, if the cause for damage or loss is the carriage on deck and that would not have 
happened had the goods been carried below deck, a party cannot exclude his liability by 
resorting to Article IV rule 2. This is so because these defences should be interpreted to 
apply only to carriage below deck. 667F667F211 Thus, for example, the scope of Article IV rule 2 (c) 
covers perils of the sea which could cause damage or loss to cargo stowed below deck, and 
the defence does not stretch to the highly-risky carriage on deck. Similarly, the defence 
in Article IV rule 5(n) covers packing which should be sufficient for under-deck carriage, 
and it does not require packing to endure the carriage on deck. 
The “repugnancy” or “inconsistency” principle, employed by Hirst J. in The 
“Chanda”, although inappropriately used to reject the package limitation, is applicable 
to the liability exceptions in Article IV rule 2. 668F668F212 Accordingly, these exceptions provisions 
are “repugnant to and inconsistent with the obligation to stow below deck”.669F669F213 
5.5 Deck carriage under charter parties 
As already noted on a numerous occasions, 670F670F214 when the carriage is effected under 
a charterparty, the Hague or Hague-Visby Rules become facultative and their 
application depends on the intention of the parties, which is expressed by the presence or 
absence of a Clause Paramount in the charter party. In that sense, the contracting 
parties may exclude the operation of the Rules from their contract by agreeing to base 
their commercial relations on a charterparty, while not inserting a Clause Paramount in 
the charter.671F671F215 
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However, when a charter party incorporates the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules and 
encompasses deck cargo as well, what is the effect of Article I(c) of the Rules on this 
particular deck carriage? Could the “contract of carriage”, as stated in the Rules, refer to 
the charter party, and not only to the bills of lading? And if so, should there be a notation 
on the charter party in order to exclude the deck cargo from the ambit of the Rules as 
required by Article I(c)? The answer to both questions is no. Article I(c) does not apply to 
the carriage of deck cargo as between the shipowners and the charterers, and the 
“contract of carriage” is the relevant bill of lading. 672F672F216 It was held in The “Socol 3” that it 
would be difficult to apply the definition set forth in that article to a charter party, which 
is generally not concluded between parties in connection with loading of the cargo, 
because its subject is the vessel rather than the cargo. 673F673F217 A time charter, for example, 
can be concluded even before it is clear what cargo will be carried on deck and it cannot 
possibly contain an on-deck statement. Therefore, only a bill of lading, and not a charter 
party, can contain the on-deck statement or notation, to which Article I(c) refers. As 
pointed out by the authors of ‘Voyage Charters’, the process of incorporation of the Rules 
into a charter party should be “carried out intelligently in relation to the context and not 
mechanically”.674F674F218 
On the other hand, when the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules are not incorporated in a 
charter party, there will be no definition of “goods” and, therefore, any deck cargo will 
not be singled out as a specific type of carriage to which specific deck-cargo rules apply 
(as opposed to the general rules regulating the carriage of below-deck cargo). Subjecting 
below-deck cargo and on-deck cargo to the same rules is possible, of course, only if 
special rules, regulating deck cargo, are not expressly specified in the provisions of the 
charterparty. That is why, most charter parties contain a specific provision, or several 
provisions, related to deck carriage. These charterparty clauses, usually, describe and 
distribute the obligations of the parties with respect to the cargo carried on deck as well 
as the pertaining liabilities, should these obligations are not dully discharged by the 
relevant party. Accordingly, the carriage of deck cargo under charter parties have led to 
numerous disputes and prompted many decisions on the proper construction of various 
deck cargo clauses which attempt to shift the responsibility and the risk over cargo 
carried on deck. 
5.5.1 Voyage charter parties 
Under voyage charters, the responsibility for stowing deck cargo can be 
transferred to any party, depending on, as it is with all charter parties, what the 
shipowners and charterers have agreed on. For example, the Gencon charter, the most 
popular and most widely used voyage charter party in all kinds of trades and cargoes, 
provides that in case the shipment of deck cargo has been agreed between the parties, 
such carriage shall be at the charterer’s risk and responsibility. 675F675F219 The words “and 
responsibility” emphasize the position that should deck cargo be lost or damaged, the 
liability stays with the charterers. Yet, the charter party does not contain a liberty to 
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stow on deck, let alone an obligation to do so. It merely distributes the responsibility over 
the deck cargo if the parties agree on such carriage and insert a special provision to that 
effect. It is important to note in that regard that an agreement between the shipowners 
and the charterers to carry goods on deck cannot be a defence in an action by a third-
party bill of lading holder if that agreement is not incorporated in the bill. 
5.5.2 Time charter parties 
Under time charters, the liability issues that arise are more often related to 
FIOST clauses, i.e. clauses stipulating which party is to be held responsible for loading 
and stowing (clause 8 of NYPE), and not so much to deck cargo clauses. This is because 
deck stowage does not differ from below-deck stowage with respect to the question of who 
is the responsible for performing the operation. As discussed at great length in Chapter 
III, it is very often that time charter parties contain a clause which transfers the risk 
and the responsibilities over deck cargo from the shipowners to the charterers, and when 
the charterer’s obligation to “load, stow, and trim the cargo” has been subjected to “the 
supervision of the master”, the responsibility over the cargo does not revert back to the 
shipowners unless the words “…and responsibility” have been added. The interpretation 
of such a FIOST clause as well as its interaction with a deck cargo clause, laid down in 
the charter party, may appear problematic in certain instances, especially if the deck 
cargo clause puts the responsibility on another party contrary to what the FIOST clause 
states. In general, the two main issues that come before courts are whether or not the 
cause for the loss or damage of the deck cargo is poor stowage and lashing, or whether it 
is the unseaworthiness of the vessel. 
5.5.2.1 “at charterers’ risk” 
In general, such a clause, stating that deck cargo will be carried “at charterer’ 
risk”, will effectively transfer the responsibility over such cargo from the shipowners to 
the charterers.676F676F220 However, when deck cargo is said to be carried ‘at charterers’ risk’, 
disputes often arise as to the precise scope of these words. In The “Fantasy”, for example, 
such a clause, inserted in a NYPE time charter form, provided also for additional duties 
for the carrier:  
63.Deck Cargo: Charterers entitled to load deck cargo provided 
regulations permit. Deck cargo, if any, to be checked and protected by 
crew up to twice a day during sea passages, if required by charterers 
and/or circumstances deemed it appropriate. Same to be tightened 
up or replaced or additional lashing to be added appropriate to 
circumstances; such cargo to be carried at charterers’ risk. 677F677 F
221
 
The vessel The Fantasy was time chartered for the carriage of containerized cargo 
as all cargo was loaded and carried on deck. Because of adverse weather conditions, one 
container was washed overboard and 14 others were damaged, while the vessel herself 
was also damaged. The Court had to establish which party was responsible for the 
damage caused to and by the deck cargo, where the plaintiffs and the defendants agreed 
on the assumptions that the damage was a result of the negligent stowage and lashing, 
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on the one hand, and/or of the default on behalf of the crew during the voyage, on the 
other hand. 
Whereas the extra obligation for the shipowners in clause 63 relates to the period 
during the voyage and is applicable only to deck cargo, the charterparty contained also 
other obligations which related to the loading, stowage, and discharge of any cargo: 
8. That the Captain shall . . . render all customary assistance with 
ship’s crew and boats. The Captain (although appointed by the 
owners), shall be under the orders and directions of the Charterers as 
regards employment and agency; and Charterers are to load, stow 
and trim and discharge the cargo at their expense under the 
supervision of the Captain. . . 
42. Loading, Stowing and Discharging: The Master to supervise and 
be responsible for all loading, stowage and discharging operations. 
50. Loading, Stowing, Etc. In the event Charterers have 
representatives at load and/or discharge ports to advise Charterers’ 
requirements loading/stowing and or discharging, ship’s command to 
follow same regarding cargo operations as far as reasonably 
practicable subject to such requirements not impairing 
safety/stability of vessel and cargo or not risking damage to same; 
Master nevertheless to supervise and in all circumstances be 
responsible for loading, stowing, lashing and discharging in 
accordance with Clauses 8 and 42. . . 
With regard to clauses 8, 42, and 50 alone, it was already established in Chapter 
III on FIOS(T) 678F678F222 that the references to the master’s “responsibility” render the 
shipowners responsible for loading, stowage, and discharge, regardless that it is actually 
the charterers who employ and pay the stevedores for carrying out these operations. 
However, the Court was confronted with the argument that clause 63 on deck cargo, 
which was the only defence that the shipowners relied on, may qualify the obligations in 
clauses 8, 42, and 52, and negative the original transfer of responsibilities from 
charterers to shipowners with regard to cargo carried on deck. 679F679F223 In other words, what is 
the scope of the words “at charterer’s risk”, and do they also cover negligence with 
respect to deck carriage? 
The first Court held that the words “at charterer’s risk” are not sufficient to 
provide protection to the shipowners and exempt them from liability for negligence in 
performing the crew’s additional duties under clause 63 regarding the deck cargo.680F680F224 
However, it does not follow from this that the shipowners are liable also for negligence in 
carrying out the loading and stowing obligations that are set in clauses 8, 42, and 50. 
Here, the owner’s responsibility for loading and stowage collides with the charterer’s 
acceptance of the risk over deck cargo. After interpreting the inferred intention of the 
parties,681F681F225 Evans, L.J. held that the responsibility stayed with the charterers under 
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clause 8, while the transfer of responsibility from the charterers to the shipowners under 
clauses 42 and 50, was negatived with respect to deck cargo because of the wording in 
clause 63 (“…[deck] cargo to be carried at charterers’ risk”).682F682F226 The transfer of 
responsibility under clauses 42 and 50 was, thus, limited only to cargo which was carried 
below deck. Consequently, the charterers remained liable for negligent stowage, whereas 
the shipowners were held liable for the crew’s negligence in fulfilling the additional 
obligations required for deck cargo and set forth in clause 63 (as stated already, the very 
same clause could not absolve the shipowners from liability for negligence). In 
conclusion, it is worth mentioning that, although the words “at charterers’ risk” were not 
held to be sufficient to exempt from liability for negligence, Evans, L.J. pointed out that 
the scope of these words depended on the context in which they were found, and also 
that they might, nevertheless, relieve a shipowner from liability in case of a damage 
caused by third parties who were entrusted with the performance of the relevant 
operations.683F683F227 
With regard to deck cargo clauses (e.g. “at charterers’ risk”), which provide also 
for additional duties for the shipowners, such as the clause seen above in The “Fantasy”, 
namely that the owners have to check and protect the cargo during the voyage, or such 
as the deck cargo clause found in The “Visurgis”,684F684F228 which was coupled with the 
shipowners’ obligation to perform the lashing of the cargo, it was held that the protection 
afforded by the deck cargo clause ceases to shield the shipowners if it was established 
that the loss of or damage to the cargo resulted from the negligence of the crew to 
perform those the obligations. 685F685F229 
Later decisions provided a better shelter for carriers who were carrying deck 
cargo and who heavily relied on on-deck exclusion clauses. The Court in The “Danah” 
extended the protection afforded to carriers by a deck cargo clause, and held that 
“carried on deck at Shipper’s risk with responsibility for loss or damage howsoever 
caused” covered also negligence.686F686F230 Thus, the additional words “howsoever caused” 
ensure that negligence is also covered by a deck cargo clause. In this particular case, the 
clause was inserted in an addendum to extend the operation of a NYPE time 
charterparty. Again, the charter party provided in clause 8 that the “Charterers are to 
land [sic], discharge, stow, and trim the cargo at their expense under the supervision and 
responsibility of the Captain”. The Court rejected an argument of the charterers that the 
deck cargo clause was a mere direction as to what should be inserted in the bills of 
lading rather than a provision, which deals with the distribution of rights and 
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obligations between the shipowners and the charterers.687F687F231 The deck cargo clause was 
designed precisely to regulate the rights and obligations of the parties under the charter, 
and, considering the commercial purpose of a charterparty, it is incumbent upon the 
charterers to ensure that the distribution of these rights and obligations, as stated in the 
deck cargo clause, will be preserved in the bills of lading which the charterers sign with 
any third-party shippers. 688F688F232 An important remark is that the word “responsibility” in the 
deck cargo clause was held to refer only to damage to or loss of the goods, and it did not 
encompass a claim by the coastal authorities for the salvaging of hazardous cargo lost 
overboard.689F689F233 
What is more, a deck cargo exclusion clause may protect the shipowner from 
liability not only for negligence, but also even for unseaworthiness. In The Imvros,690F690F234 
Langley, J., affirmed the reasoning in The “Danah” and extended it to the effect that the 
words “whatsoever and howsoever caused” in a deck cargo provision in a NYPE time 
charter party transferred the liability for damaged or lost deck cargo to the charterers, 
even when that cargo rendered the vessel unseaworthy. 691F691F235 Thus, the protection of those 
words, relied not only to negligence but also to unseaworthiness. 692F692F236 The relevant charter 
party provision read: 
Additional Clause 91 
Deck Cargo 
Charterers are permitted to load cargo on the vessel’s deck and hatch 
covers provided always that the permissible loads on the deck/hatch 
covers are not exceeded, that the stability of the vessel permits, and 
that such cargo does not impair the seaworthiness or safe 
navigability of the vessel in any manner. Any extra fittings required 
for deck or hatch cover cargo are to be provided and paid for by the 
Charterers who are to load, stow, dunnage, lash and secure such 
cargo in their time and at their expense always to the entire 
satisfaction of the Master. The vessel is not to be held responsible for 
any loss of or damage to the cargo carried on deck whatsoever and 
howsoever caused. [emphasis added] 
The effective cause for the cargo being lost overboard was established to be 
insufficiency of lashing, which had been performed in contravention of the IMO Code of 
Practice for Ships Carrying Timber Deck Cargoes, and which rendered the vessel 
unseaworthy. In the present case, the cargo-related obligations were divided between the 
charterers and the shipowners. Like in The “Visurgis”, the charterers in The “Imvros” 
were responsible for loading and stowing (clause 8), while the vessel’s crew was 
responsible for lashing (additional clause 48). However, under the latter charterparty 
provision, in fulfilling their lashing obligations, the crew was considered charterers’ 
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servants. Thus, there was nothing to qualify the deck cargo clause, and the latter shifted 
the entire responsibility for the loss of the cargo over the charterers. 
Regardless of the decision in The “Imvros”, however, shipowners are advised to 
carefully draft their deck cargo clauses, and not solely to rely on the words “whatsoever 
and howsoever caused”, but to explicitly exclude liability for negligence and 
seaworthiness, because the law on construction of such deck-cargo clauses is far from 
settled and it is not unlikely that a future Court of Appeal might take a more restrictive 
approach towards them. 693F693F237 For instance, in the Canadian case The “Beltimer”, the 
Federal Court of Appeal held that the lack of an express reference to negligence in the 
liberty clause to stow goods on deck was the reason why this clause failed to exclude the 
carrier’s liability for negligence as well as for breaching the implied warranty of 
seaworthiness.694F694F238 
Similarly, the Court in The “Socol 3”, a case with a similar straightforward 
factual background, held that a deck-cargo exclusion clause in a NYPE time charter 
could not protect the shipowners from liability for their negligence or for the vessel’s 
unseaworthiness.695F695F239 It was established preliminarily by the arbitration tribunal that 
there were three causes for the loss of the deck cargo, and these were: (a) inadequate 
stowage of the cargo; (b) insufficient lashing and negligent care of the lashing during the 
voyage, and (c) the vessel’s instability due to the stowage of the deck cargo, which was 
known only to the shipowners. 696F696F240 The language of the respective deck cargo clause was 
found by the Court to lack an express reference to negligence or seaworthiness: 
Clause 13 
[…] 
(b) In the event of deck cargo being carried, the Owners are to be and 
are hereby indemnified by the Charterers for any loss and/or damage 
and/or liability of whatsoever nature caused to the Vessel as a result 
of the carriage of deck cargo and which would not have arisen had 
deck cargo not been loaded. [emphasis added]  
The Court outlined three factors for interpreting the exclusion clause as one not 
covering negligence and unseaworthiness: the language of the clause; the context, in 
which it was situated; and the fact that its content was realistic and meaningful if it did 
not cover negligence and unseaworthiness. Therefore, regardless of the words “and/or 
liability of whatsoever nature”, the clause was held not wide enough to cover a breach of 
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the seaworthiness obligation or negligence on behalf of the crew, but it only covered 
liability for damage to, or loss of the goods, which was directly caused by the carriage of 
the deck cargo. This was, thus, considered an exclusion clause which, if it was purported 
to effectively exclude negligence and unseaworthiness, must have had an unambiguous 
wording and clear intent to that effect. Bottom line, the deck-cargo exclusion clause did 
not cover negligence and unseaworthiness and, thus, this decision questioned whether 
The “Imvros” can still be considered good law. 
5.5.2.2 “at charterers’ own risk and expense” 
The case The “Darya Tara” 697F697F241 is another example of a clause, which transfers the 
responsibility over deck cargo from the shipowners to the charterers, where the Court 
was asked to consider the scope and the effect of the words “risk and expense”. This case 
concerned the issue of who should bear the financial consequences that have arisen from 
the shifting of a deck cargo. In particular, the vessel Darya Tara was time chartered on 
an amended NYPE form for a trip from Middlesbrough to Hong Kong and other ports in 
the Far East. The stowage of the cargo was adequate but, due to severe weather 
conditions during the voyage, the vessel had to seek port of refuge where the shifting 
deck cargo was restowed and secured. Thereby, additional costs were accrued, 
comprising additional expenses for relashing the cargo, extra bunkers, the vessel being 
off hire, and surveyors appointed by the shipowner’s P&I club. The charter party 
provisions, which were related to deck cargo, stated as follows: 
Line 25: Charterers to have the option to load a full deck cargo . . . at 
their own risk and expense subject to the Master’s approval. 
Clause 57. Vessel’s Description 
[…] 
(3) Charterers’ option deck cargo: OK—but vessel has no lashing 
materials on board and cargo to be loaded always at Charterers’ risk 
and expense. Furthermore all bills of lading to be claused accordingly. 
Whereas the owners contended that these provisions created a complete 
indemnity with regard to the deck cargo against any loss, the charterers argued that the 
words “risk and expense” had a more narrow scope and comprised the risk related only 
to the deck cargo and the expenses associated with loading at the load port. Mance J. 
held that the words “risk and expense” were not limited only to the period of loading at 
the original port of loading but they extended also to the entire carriage, including any 
restowing and relashing at an intermediate port or a port of refuge. 698F698F242 However, it was 
the deck cargo that was “at charterers’ risk and expense”, meaning that the words 
referred to the risk and expense that is related to the deck cargo particularly, and not to 
any risk and expense in general. The word “risk” is focused “on responsibility for the 
safety and condition of the cargo loaded on deck”, while “expense” focuses “on expenditure 
involved in the loading and […] (although not specifically mentioned) carriage of such 
cargo on deck”. 699F699F243 Thus, damages were recoverable in so far as they are related to the 
deck cargo, and, therefore, recovery was allowed of the fees for deck-cargo survey and 
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restowage but not of repairs to the ship, bunkers, or lost hire, which were brought about 
as a result of the ship’s deviation to the port of refuge. 
In conclusion, where the deck cargo is stated in the charter party as “at 
Charterers’ risk  and expense”, the responsibility of such cargo indeed shifts to the 
charterers, but the shipowners are not indemnified for any consequences whatsoever 
that may result from the carriage of goods on deck. However, authors assume that 
Clause 13(b) of the revised form of NYPE 1993 – “In the event of deck cargo being carried, 
the Owners are to be and are hereby indemnified by the Charterers for any loss and/or 
damage and/or liability of whatsoever nature caused to the Vessel as a result of the 
carriage of deck cargo and which would not have arisen had deck cargo not been loaded” 
– which provides wide considerably wider indemnity for the shipowners, might cover 
even the expenses of the shipowner which were not recoverable in The “Darya Tara”, 
such as bunkers and loss of hire, but this assumption is still unclear and cannot yet be 
argued with certainty.700F700F244 Some authors are even sceptical as to its effectiveness to cover 
all liability whatsoever.701F701F245 
6. Selected problems of deck carriage in other jurisdictions 
6.1 France 
The French law on deck cargo has been criticized by French scholars and 
practitioners for being persistently confusing, and the French jurisprudence adds up 
even more perplexity to the regulation of this type of carriage. 702F702F246 In essence, carriage of 
goods on deck in France is subject to two distinct regimes – the first one is governed by 
domestic law (droit interne), and the second one by international law (droit 
international).703F703F247 
6.1.1 Droit interne 
Under the first regime, the carrier is allowed to transport goods on deck only 
when the shipper has granted his consent to such carriage. When the shipper has 
consented to deck carriage, clauses related to damages and carrier’s liability are held 
valid by the court. Alternatively, absent such an acceptance on behalf of the shipper, the 
carriage on deck is considered irregular (fautif), and the carrier is then held liable and he 
can no longer invoke any clauses that exonerate him or limit his liability. Thus, the first 
regime governing deck carriage in France distinguishes between regular (non fautif) and 
irregular (fautif) deck carriage. 
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Two questions arise out of this requirement to seek the shipper’s consent: who is 
to establish the acceptance of the shipper, and how should this acceptance be 
established? With regard to the first issue, it is obvious that the burden of proof will rest 
on the carrier to establish that the shipper has consented to on-deck carriage. The 
second issue is, however, more difficult to settle. French law does not require a special 
acceptance on behalf of the shipper, and the shipper’s signature on a bill of lading, 
comprising an on-deck clause, is sufficient to establish an agreement for such carriage. 704F 704F248 
However, very often the bill of lading will not be signed by the shipper, because French 
law does not require anymore that the shipper signs the bills of lading. 705F705F249 In the 
particular case of carrying containerized cargo under French law, a carrier is facilitated 
by an express provision, according to which the shipper’s consent to deck carriage is 
deemed to have been given if two cumulative requirements are fulfilled: (1) the cargo 
must be stowed in containers, and (2) the vessel must be specifically equipped for such 
type of transport.706F706F250 Yet, this presumption does not apply to loading open-top containers 
on deck, and, according to French jurisprudence, such carriage is not only irregular but 
also inexcusable, meaning that the carrier is deprived of the possibility to rely on any 
exceptions or limitations. 707F707F251 Thus, the increase in the risk is considered so great when 
open-top containers are carried on deck, that French courts disregard in their 
assessment the other factors discussed previously, namely the level of knowledge of the 
cargo owners about such carriage and also how clearly any exemptions have been 
communicated to the latter. Under French national law, the carriage of open-top 
containers on deck is clearly considered a fundamental breach of the contract. 
6.1.2 Droit international 
The second regime, regulating deck cargo, relates to the applicable international 
law. The Brussels Convention of 1924, as amended, (The Hague/Hague-Visby Rules) is 
ratified and adopted by France and, as regards deck cargo, the interpretation of Article 
I(c) is prima facie similar to that, which we already observed under English law. “Cargo”, 
within the meaning of the Convention, includes all goods except live animals and cargo, 
which by the contract of carriage, is declared as carried on deck, and is in fact so 
transported [“la cargaison qui, par le contrat de transport, est déclarée comme mise sur le 
pont et, en fait, est ainsi transportée”]. French authors underline that the definition in 
Article I(c) merely denotes the scope of application of the Convention and, therefore, 
when considering deck cargo cases under the Convention, it is no longer correct to divide 
                                               
248 Yves Tassel – ‘Le régime juridique de la « pontée » : un arrêt d’espèce malheureux’, [Juin 2008] DMF 693, 
p. 538, at p. 540. 
249 Décret n°87-922 du 12 novembre 1987 modifiant le décret n° 66-1078 du 31 décembre 1966 sur les 
contrats d'affrètement et de transport maritimes, tel que modifié et complété par le décret n° 69-679 du 19 
juin 1969. [Decree n°87-922 from 12 November 1987, amending the decree n° 66-1078 from 31 December 
1966 on contracts of affreightment and maritime transport as amended and supplemented by the decree n° 
69-679 from 19 June 1969.] 
250 Loi du 18 juin 1966, art. 22: “Le consentement du chargeur est supposé donné en cas de chargement en 
conteneur à bord de navires munis d’installations appropriées pour ce type de transport”. [Law of 18 June 
1966, Art. 22: The consent of the shipper is assumed to be given in case of loading of containers on board of 
vessels, which are provided with appropriate equipment for this type of transportation.] 
251 Le Droit Maritime Française, 62e année,  n° 14, Juin 2010, p. 70, para. 76. See: Cour d’Appel de Paris 
(Pôle 5, 5e Ch.) – 11 février 2010 – Navire Contship Germany n°06-0653, where undeclared containerized 
deck cargo carried on a specially-designed container vessel was held an inexcusable breach because the 
containers were open-top (flat type). See also Cécile De Cet Bertin – ‘Obligations du transporteur en pontée’, 
[Octobre 2010] DMF 718, p. 796, at p. 802. 




such carriage into “regular” and “irregular” deck carriage because the Rules do not make 
such a distinction.708F708F252 
Thus, as previously observed, cargo, which is stated as carried on deck and is so 
carried, does not obey to the rules of the said Convention, and the carrier cannot avail 
himself of the defences and exceptions from responsibility stated therein because the 
Convention is inapplicable to that shipment; instead, the particular carriage is left to the 
contractual intention of the parties. On the contrary, if the deck carriage has not been 
agreed by the parties, the Convention will still apply. The resemblance with English law, 
however, ends up here. 
In the recent case of The “Ville de Tanya”, which was defined by French authors 
as “an unfortunate decision”,709F709F253 containers were carried on deck absent an agreement 
with the shipper, and during the journey they were lost overboard as a result of a 
typhoon which the vessel encountered on her way from China to Brazil. 710F710F254 The Court of 
Cassation was faced with, inter alia, the application of the Convention and with the 
carrier’s defences under Article IV rule 2. With regard to the first issue, the Court held 
that a valid agreement for on-deck carriage (capable of excluding the application of the 
Convention) requires not only a declaration on behalf of the carrier on the face of the bill 
of lading but also an acceptance on behalf of the shipper.711F711F255 This position, which is 
favourable to shippers and consignees, represents a shocking discrepancy with the 
wording of the Convention because, where the Rules say “declared”, French law says 
“accepted”. It seems that the Court of Cassation has imported an element from the first 
regime regulating deck cargo in France into the second regime.  
Thus, a simple clause declaring on-deck cargo will not suffice to exclude the 
Convention as French courts require the carrier to have informed the shipper of the on-
deck carriage and also to provide proof of this information, absent which international 
law (i.e. the Convention) will apply with all its rigour. 712F712F256 Thus, when the Brussels 
Convention is applied, a very puzzling approach is adopted with regard to establishing 
the shipper’s consent to carriage of goods on deck. The Aix-en-Provence Court of Appeal 
in the “Ville de Tanya” maintained the highly-criticized position that, in establishing the 
shipper’s acceptance, one should look in the Brussels Convention (the Rules). 713F713F257 This 
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position, which was later approved by the Court of Cassation, leads to the baffling 
situation where, in order to establish whether the on-deck declaration of the carrier is 
sufficient to exclude the Rules, one must refer to French law which requires the 
acceptance of the shipper, but in order to establish whether this acceptance is present, 
one must refer to the Rules – an approach which is far from being rational and is 
difficult to comprehend, even solely because of the absence in the said Convention of 
anything related to the shipper’s acceptance. 714F714F258 That is why the French Professor Y. 
Tassel compares this ruling to a “manifest error of law” [«erreur de droit manifeste»].715F715F259 It 
seems that the French courts overprotect the cargo owners as they give great importance 
to the factor how clearly the intended deck carriage has been agreed between the parties. 
The required level of knowledge of the shipper is raised to such an extent that not only a 
statement in the bill of lading is sufficient, but evidence of the shipper's consent is 
required as well. Such a rule, shaped by the French jurisprudence, is on the verge of 
being inconsistent with the wording of the Hague-Visby Rules. 
Another point of criticism is that the Court of Cassation confirmed that in cases of 
unauthorized deck carriage the carrier cannot avail himself of the liability exemptions in 
Article IV rule of the Rules. 716F716F260 There is one exception, namely that if the cargo is stowed 
on a ro-ro vessel, then the breach is not considered inexcusable, meaning that the carrier 
can limit his liability.717F717F261 In essence, such a complicated and carrier-unfriendly regime of 
deck carriage under French law leads to the question whether a possible future 
ratification of the Rotterdam Rules might provide a clearer and more balanced approach 
towards deck cargo.718F718F262 
6.2 Germany 
German maritime law is to be found in the Fifth Book of the Commercial Code – 
“Handelsgesetzbuch” (HGB), which entered into force on 1 January 1900 and which was 
mainly based, and basically unchanged, on the general German Commercial Code – 
“Allgemeine Deutsche Handelsgesetzbuch” (ADHGB), which dated back to 1861. Because 
the provisions of the HBG (i.e. the Commercial Code of the German Reich) were 
evidently outdated, several amendments were made throughout the years, and, for the 
purpose of the current sub-section, the most important revisions were the transmission 
of the 1924 Hague Rules and of the 1968 Visby Protocol. The Hague Rules entered into 
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force in Germany in 1939 by means of the Sea Freight Act of 1937 (“Seefrachtgesetz von 
1937”). Later, in 1986, the Hague-Visby Rules were incorporated in Germany’s maritime 
law by means of the law of 25 July 1986 (2. “Seerechtsänderungsgesetz”), which was the 
next maritime amendment of the HGB, after the 1937 amendment, with regard to the 
carriage of passengers and goods. 719F719F263 
6.2.1 Applicable regime 
The application of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules is quite peculiar in Germany 
since the country ratified the Hague Rules (1924) and incorporated them in its 
Commercial Code (HGB) but it did not ratify either of the two Visby Protocols 
(1968/1979). Thus, Germany still remains a contracting state to the Hague Rules, which 
were not applied directly but are to be found only in the framework of the HGB. The 
revised provisions of the HGB apply to all types of carriage – comprising both liner 
carriage (under bills of lading) and tramp carriage (under charter parties) as well as both 
international trade and national trade.720F720F264 
Although Germany is not a signatory state to the Visby Protocol of 1968 and has 
not formally ratified the Hague-Visby Rules, these were fully incorporated in the Fifth 
Book of the HGB in 1986. 721F721F265 In other words, the country has ratified the Hague Rules, 
and, though it does not adhere to the Visby Protocol, it has incorporated the provisions of 
the Visby Protocol in the German maritime law. Therefore, a vital question would arise 
for any maritime contracting party, and that would be whether the Brussels Convention 
1924 (The Hague Rules), to which Germany is still a party, is applicable, or whether 
domestic law, which conforms to the Hague-Visby Rules is to apply. Germany’s private 
international law offers a complicated provision, which settles this difficulty by providing 
choice of law rules for bills of lading. According to Article 6 of the Introductory Law to 
the Commercial Code (“Einführungsgesetz zum HGB”) (EGHB), Germany’s domestic 
law, which is modelled after the Hague-Visby Rules, will apply to all member states of 
the Visby Protocol as well as to states which are a party neither to the original Hague 
Rules nor to the Hague-Visby Rules, and also with regard to carriages from one German 
port to another provided that the ship flies the German flag. In particular, the provisions 
which embody the Hague-Visby Rules will apply when: (a) the bill of lading has been 
issued in a state party to the Hague-Visby Rules; or (b) the carriage is to or from a port 
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had completely given up on the Hamburg Rules. On the other hand, the country needed to modernize the 
outdated Hague Rules regime, and the wide incorporation of the provisions of the Visby Protocol was 
considered an appropriate step. As far as the ratification of the Hague-Visby Rules by the German 
Democratic Republic is concerned, that ratification expired when the country reunified with the Federal 
Republic of Germany. See: Rolf Herber – ‘German Law on the Carriage of Goods by Sea’, reprinted in ‘New 
Carriage of Goods By Sea: The Nordic Approach Including Comparisons With Some Other Jurisdictions’ (ed. 
by Hannu Honka), p. 343, at p. 346. 
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in such a state or in Germany; or (c) the bill of lading refers expressly to the Hague-
Visby Rules or to the law of a state which has incorporated the Hague-Visby Rules into 
its legislation.722F722F266 This comprehensive wording means that the Visby Protocol will apply 
in the vast majority of cases. 
However, the unamended Hague Rules will still apply with regard to contracting 
states to the Hague Rules – i.e. when the bill of lading is issued in such a state (including 
Germany), and: (1) the carriage is from a Hague Rules country (including Germany) to 
another Hague Rules country; or (2) the carriage is between two German ports provided 
that the vessel flies a foreign (i.e. non-German) flag; or (3) the carriage is from a country, 
which is neither a Hague Rules country nor a Hague-Visby Rules country, to a Hague 
Rules country.723F723F267 Such application of the unamended Rules, though in very limited 
situations, is because of the Germany’s obligations towards these Hague Rules states, 
which result, under international law, from the German ratification of the Brussels 
Convention 1924 (the original Hague Rules). 
6.2.2 The maritime law reform 
The amendments adopting the Hague and the Hague-Visby Rules were 
considered only a patch-up and were not adjusted to modern developments. 724F724F268 Therefore, 
an amendment was needed of the statutory provisions of Germany’s maritime law. This 
modernization of law came into existence with the latest revision of Germany’s maritime 
law (the Fifth Book of the HGB), which came into effect on 25 April 2013, after nearly a 
decade of discussions and considerations on a new maritime law reform in Germany. 725F725F269 
This complete revision of HGB’s Fifth Book modernized and simplified the German 
maritime law.726F726F270 An overview of the most significant changes to German maritime law is 
beyond the scope of the current thesis but what suffices to be said in relation to deck 
carriage are two important points. 
The first one relates to the executing carrier under German law and, in 
particular, who is to be held responsible for carriage on deck. German law distinguishes 
between a contractual carrier and an actual carrier, the latter being the person or 
company which in effect performs part or all of the transport but which cannot qualify as 
a contractual carrier. 727F727F271 Thus, the concept of an actual carrier includes sub-carriers, 
charterers (disponent owners), and terminal operators. According to Article 509 HGB, 
the actual carrier is jointly liable with the contractual carrier with regard to damages 
that occurred during the carriage performed by him as if he would be the contractual 
carrier. This statutory provision will apply when German law is applicable to the main 
contract between the owner (the contractual carrier) and the shipper, regardless of what 
has been agreed between the contractual carrier and the actual carrier in their separate 
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contract.728F728F272 Article 509 HGB will held the actual carrier (e.g. a terminal operator loading 
cargo on deck) responsible for damages, even when there is no direct contractual link 
between him and the cargo interests.729F729F273 
The second point, which is of importance to carriage of cargo on deck, is related to 
the incorporation of charterparty terms, such as a deck cargo clause, into bills of lading. 
According to Article 522 HGB, the terms of a charter party are validly incorporated in a 
bill of lading only if these terms are explicitly reproduced in the bill. On the contrary, a 
mere reference to those charterparty terms is not sufficient, under German law, to hold 
these terms valid under the bill of lading. For example, clause 1 of the conditions of 
carriage in CONGENBILL 2007 states that “All terms and conditions, liberties and 
exceptions of the Charter Party, dated as overleaf, including the Law and Arbitration 
Clause/Dispute Resolution Clause, are herewith incorporated.” Thus, the standard form 
of this BIMCO bill of lading, which is to be used with charter parties, contains general 
incorporation of charterparty terms which will not be valid under German law, and, 
therefore, the terms will not be accepted as clauses of the bill of lading. This means that 
under the revised German maritime law, charterers have to redraft their bills of lading 
so that the charterparty terms, which are envisaged to be incorporated, are written 
explicitly on the bill of lading. 
6.2.3 Deck carriage 
Under the revised German maritime law, cargo cannot be carried on deck unless 
there is an approval on behalf of the shipper. 730F730F274 However, it is important that, unlike 
under English law, the consent of the shipper under German law may be declared 
impliedly.731F731F275 For example, when on the face of the bill of lading there is an option to stow 
on deck, and if the shipper does not object to that optional deck stowage, this will be held 
as an acceptance to carriage on deck. 732F732F276 This means that, unlike English law and 
especially in contrast to French law where the shipper's consent is required, German law 
provides significantly less protection to deck cargo owners. Furthermore, Germany’s 
revised maritime law provisions took into account containerization, so when the cargo is 
carried in containers or in another type of a “loading device suitable for the carriage on 
deck”, and if the vessel is specifically equipped for deck carriage, such consent is not 
necessary.733F733F277 Again, in the container trade carried out by specially-built container 
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vessels, the traditional doctrine on deck cargo and its concept, requiring an informed 
consent and clear communication of the risks, are rendered inapplicable. 
In case of an unauthorized deck carriage, Article 500 HGB (Unauthorized loading 
on deck) states that there is a presumption of liability on the part of the carrier even if 
he is not at fault and the loss or damage is caused solely by the risks inherent in deck 
carriage.734F734F278 Moreover, the carrier cannot rely on any exemptions or limitations of 
liability if he has agreed with the shipper to transport the goods below deck but has, 
nevertheless, loaded them on deck. 735F735F279 
In case of authorized deck carriage, the carrier’s liability is excluded to the extent 
that the loss, damage or delay in delivery is due to the carriage on deck. 736F736F280 Damage that 
could arise because of deck carriage, depending on the circumstances of the case, is 
assumed to have resulted from deck carriage. This presumption, however, does not apply 
to cases of exceptionally great loss. 737F737F281 Equally important, the carrier cannot avail of this 
general deck-cargo exception from liability, either, when the loss, damage or delay in 
delivery of the goods is due to the fact that the carrier has not complied with any special 
instructions given to him by the consignor with respect to the carriage of the goods. 738F738F282 
The current German regime on deck cargo is likely to last for a considerable 
period of time provided that the last reform took place just a few years ago. Germany has 
not incorporated the Hamburg Rules, nor did it take the Rotterdam Rules into account. 
The latter may be adopted only in a further reform of Germany’s maritime law, “if [and 
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281 Article 427 HGB, para 2: “Ist ein Schaden eingetreten, der nach den Umständen des Falles aus einer der 
in Absatz 1 bezeichneten Gefahren entstehen konnte, so wird vermutet, daß der Schaden aus dieser Gefahr 
entstanden ist. Diese Vermutung gilt im Falle des Absatzes 1 Nr. 1 nicht bei außergewöhnlich großem 
Verlust.” [The occurrence of damages that could arise from the risks referred to in paragraph 1 to the 
circumstances of the case, it is assumed that the damages have resulted from this danger. This presumption 
does not apply in the case of paragraph 1, number 1 when there is an exceptionally great loss.] 
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with respect to the carriage of goods.] 




not when!] the Rotterdam Rules have been ratified by Germany”.739F739F283 For the time being, 
and considering the background of Germany’s current maritime law, this does not seem 
as a viable development. 
6.3 The Netherlands 
The Netherlands have ratified the Visby Protocols (1968/1979), and, thus, the 
country has applied the Hague-Visby Rules since 1982.740F740F284 The Rules are incorporated in 
Book 8 of the Dutch Civil Code, dedicated to Transport law and means of transport. 741F741F285 
The law regulating deck cargo is codified in Article 382 of Book 8: 
Article 8:382 Mandatory law in case of carriage under a bill of lading: 
1. Any clause in a contract of carriage under a bill of lading 
relieving the carrier or the ship from liability for loss of or damage to 
or in connection with goods arising from negligence, fault or failure in 
the duties and obligations provided for in Articles 8:381, 8:399, 8:411, 
8:414 paragraph 1, 8:492, 8:493 or 8:1712 or lessening such liability 
otherwise than in the way as provided for in the present Section 
(Section 8.5.2) or in Articles 8:361 up to and including 8:366, shall be 
null and void and of no effect. A clause as a result of which the benefit 
under an insurance policy belongs to the carrier or any clause with a 
similar necessary implication shall be deemed to be made in order to 
relieve the carrier from his liability. 
2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1, a clause as mentioned there 
shall be valid if it concerns: 
a. a permitted clause concerning general average; 
b. live animals; 
c. goods which actually are transported on the deck provided 




Article 382 reflects Article I(c) and Article III rule 8 of the Hague-Visby Rules. 
The first paragraph of the provision forbids parties to contract out from their obligations 
under Article 381 (the duty to exercise due diligence as to seaworthiness and care for the 
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284 Although the Netherlands was a party to the Hague Rules as of 1956, these Rules are nowadays 
denounced by the country. 
285 The relevant provisions are to be found in section II of Book 8 of the Civil Code, which is dedicated to 
maritime law. 
286 Burgerlijk Wetboek Boek 8, Artikel 382: 
1.Nietig is ieder beding in een vervoerovereenkomst onder cognossement, waardoor de vervoerder of 
het schip wordt ontheven van aansprakelijkheid voor verlies of beschadiging van of met betrekking tot zaken 
voortvloeiende uit nalatigheid, schuld of tekortkoming in het voldoen aan de verplichtingen in de artikelen 
381, 399, 411, 414 eerste lid, 492, 493 of in artikel 1712 voorzien of waardoor deze aansprakelijkheid mocht 
worden verminderd op andere wijze dan in deze afdeling of in de artikelen 361 tot en met 366 is voorzien. Een 
beding, krachtens hetwelk de uitkering op grond van een gesloten verzekering aan de vervoerder komt of elk 
ander beding van dergelijke strekking, wordt aangemerkt als te zijn gemaakt teneinde de vervoerder van zijn 
aansprakelijkheid te ontheffen. 
2.Niettegenstaande het eerste lid is een beding, als daar genoemd, geldig mits het betreft: 
a. een geoorloofd beding omtrent avarij-grosse; 
b. levende dieren; 
c. zaken, die feitelijk op het dek worden vervoerd mits deze in het cognossement als deklading 
zijn opgegeven. 
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cargo), Article 399 (the duty to issue a bill of lading), Article 411 (consignor’s duty to 
provide correct information), Article 414 paragraph 1 (over the evidential value of the 
bill of lading), Article 492 (legal presumption regarding the condition of the goods), 
Article 493 (duty to cooperate in inspection of goods and tallying of packages), and 
Article 1712 (time limitations under bills of lading), or to lessen howsoever the carrier’s 
liability as stated in the relevant provisions of Book 8, and renders any such clauses as 
null and void. Additionally, paragraph two, item c of Article 382 makes an exception to 
such clauses, notwithstanding paragraph 1, when “goods which actually are transported 
on the deck provided that they are specified in the bill of lading as deck cargo”. Thus, 
Article 382 paragraph 2 covers “deck cargo” within the meaning of the Article I(c) of the 
Rules, and deck cargo, which is not specified as such in the bill of lading, is a subject to 
the liability regime of the Hague-Visby Rules.743F743F287 
In essence, cargo should not be loaded on deck without the consent of the shipper, 
which is similar to the position under English law. However, under Dutch law, even 
when there is no consent on behalf of the shipper, the carrier can still prove that carriage 
on deck is not mishandling in and of itself if he manages to show that such carriage is 
not a breach of the contract in the light of the nature of the cargo, the nature of the 
means of transport, and other circumstances. However, if there has been an agreement 
for below-deck carriage, the carrier cannot rebut the assumption of mishandling and 
breach of contract.744F744F288 
In practice, an on-deck statement that the cargo is in fact carried on deck is 
accompanied by a ‘deck cargo at shipper’s risk’ clause.745F745F289 Dutch courts, however, 
interpret the scope of this clause controversially. Under English law, the same 
uncertainty was observed as to the width of this exception clause. In the Dutch case 
“Anna-Bella”, the Court in the Hague held that such a clause was considered as a 
complete exoneration from liability for damage to deck cargo for any cause whatsoever, 
and the entire risk shifted to the cargo interests. 746F746F290 Such a wide interpretation of the 
deck cargo clause was also observed in the case “Lijnbaansgracht” before the Court of 
Amsterdam.747F747F291 However, the court in “Jeannie” made a distinction between non-
responsibility clauses (wide enough to except any responsibility related to deck cargo) 
and shipper’s risk clauses (which covered only risks directly associated with the on-deck 
carriage, and does not except the carrier from his own fault such as insufficient lashing 
or wrong stowage).748F748F292 Furthermore, such a clause was held not to protect the carrier 
when damage to deck cargo was due to breach of the carrier’s unseaworthiness 
obligation.749F749F293 Nor will it be held a valid defence for the carrier when the damage to deck 
cargo is caused by the carrier’s negligence unless the parties have agreed to encompass 
negligence as well.750F750F294 Amidst these conflicting decisions, Dutch scholars tend to prefer 
the interpretation in the “Anna-Bella” decision, namely that the clause relieves the 
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carrier from liability even when he failed to carry out his duties to properly and carefully 
care for the cargo.751F751F295 
With regard to unauthorized deck carriage, the absence of such a clause, 
stipulating deck carriage, will render the carrier liable according to the liability 
provisions of the Hague-Visby Rules as incorporated in Book 8 of the Dutch Civil 
Code.752F752F296 This suggests that the doctrine of fundamental breach has no application 
whatsoever as far as deck cargo under Dutch law is concerned. 
6.4 Norway 
Norway has denounced the Hague Rules but the Hague-Visby Rules are active 
and are codified in Chapter 13 (Carriage of General Cargo) of the Norwegian Maritime 
Code of 24 June 1994. The Norwegian Maritime Code has a long legislative history and 
its provisions are very close, but not identical, to those of the maritime codes of the other 
Scandinavian countries (i.e. Sweden, Finland, and Denmark).753F753F297 
Section 263 of the Code governs carriage of goods on deck as follows: 
Section 263 Deck Cargo 
Goods can be carried on deck only if this is in accordance with the 
contract of carriage, custom of the trade or other usage in the trade 
in question or is required by statutory rules or regulations based on 
statutory rules. 
If, according to the contract, the goods may or shall be carried on 
deck, this shall be stated in the transport document. If this has not 
been done, the carrier has the burden of proving that carriage on 
deck was agreed. The carrier cannot invoke such an agreement 
against a third party who has acquired the bill of lading in good faith. 
Special rules on liability for deck cargo are contained in Section 284. 
The provision regulates deck carriage in a clear and consistent way, although it 
does not address specifically containerized cargo. According to Section 263, the carrier is 
permitted to load and carry cargo on deck only in three situations: (1) when such 
carriage is in accordance with the contract of carriage; (2) when it is in accordance with 
the custom of the trade or other usage in the trade in question; or (3) when deck carriage 
is required by law (e.g. applicable with regard to some dangerous goods). With regard to 
the first category of deck cargo, Section 263 requires that such deck carriage is stated in 
the transport document. A definition of a “transport document” is provided in Section 
251, which states that this means “a bill of lading (konnossement) or other document 
issued as evidence of the contract of carriage”. The term “other document” further refers 
to a sea waybill (sjøfraktbrev) which is defined in Section 308. Therefore, if the contract 
of carriages envisages deck carriage, the carrier is required to state that in the bill of 
lading or sea waybill. However, if he fails to insert such a statement, he is not 
automatically held liable but he has the burden of proving that an agreement to carry on 
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deck exists. If the contract of carriage is evidenced by and contained in a bill of lading, 
such failure to state deck cargo are, in general, more severe. 754F754F298 This is because an on-
deck agreement cannot be invoked with regard to a third party bill of lading holder who 
has acquired the bill of lading in good faith, and this bill of lading does not state that 
goods may or shall be carried on deck. 
The carrier is subject to different liability depending on whether deck cargo was 
in accordance with Section 263 or in breach of it. In the first case, when cargo was 
legitimately carried on deck, the normal liability rules of the Norwegian Maritime Code 
will apply. This means that legitimate deck cargo is governed by the same liability rules 
as under-deck cargo, which rules are laid down in Chapter V (The Carrier’s Liability for 
Damages) in sections 274-289.755F755F299 However, it is not possible to subject deck cargo to more 
lenient rules than below-deck cargo.756F756F300 
When the goods are carried on deck in breach of Section 263 (which will be the 
result also when the carrier cannot prove an agreement for deck carriage absent a 
statement in the transport document, or cannot invoke such an agreement against a 
third party), then the special rules on liability in Section 284 apply: 
Section 284 Liability for deck cargo 
If goods are carried on deck in breach of Section 263, the carrier is 
liable, irrespective of the provisions of Sections 275-278, for losses 
which are exclusively the consequence of the carriage on deck. 
Concerning the extent of the liability, Sections 280 and 283 apply. 
If goods have been carried on deck contrary to an express agreement 
for carriage under deck, there is no right to limitation of liability 
according to this Chapter. 
The provision bans the carrier in fault from relying on sections that would 
otherwise exonerate him such as in the cases of nautical fault or fire. The carrier is 
deprived of its defences, however, if the deck cargo has been damaged or lost for reasons 
which are exclusively the consequence of the deck carriage. Thus, for example, if cargo 
that is illegitimately carried on deck is damaged because of a navigational error, the 
carrier may exonerate himself, relying on the nautical fault defence, only if this 
navigational error equally affected on-deck and below-deck cargo, making it irrelevant, 
for establishing the cause of damage or lost, where the cargo was stowed. Section 284, 
however, preserves the carrier’s right to limit his liability in cases of illegitimate deck 
cargo. 
The right to limit liability is definitively lost in the specific case when carriage on 
deck took place contrary to an express written or oral agreement to carry under deck. 
This approach towards a carrier, who loads on deck in breach of an agreement with the 
shipper to carry below deck, is also to be found in the Rotterdam Rules. 757F757F301 
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Sweden has also denounced the Hague Rules and currently applies the Hague-
Visby Rules. The Swedish Maritime Code (2006) was last amended in 2013. The 
provision governing deck cargo has not been changed: 
Deck cargo 
Section 13. Goods may be carried on deck only if it is allowed by the 
contract of carriage, follows from any custom or usage of the trade in 
question or is required by any law or statutory provision 
If according to the contract the goods shall or may be carried on deck, 
this shall be indicated in the transport document. If this has not been 
done, the carrier must prove that carriage on deck has been agreed. 
The carrier may not invoke such agreement against any third party 
who has acquired the bill of lading in good faith. 
Special rules on liability for deck cargo are provided in section 34. 
Since the provision is essentially matching the respective section in the 
Norwegian Maritime Code, it will not be elaborated further. 
7. Deck cargo under the Rotterdam Rules 
7.1 A modernized approach to deck cargo 
From the previous sections, it is evident that the development of the law on deck 
cargo has come a long way. So are the vessels, the technology, and the entire shipping 
industry. In the early XX century, when the Hague Rules were negotiated, carriage of 
goods on deck was a very exceptional case because it bore substantial risks “that it is not 
fair to put upon the carrier”.758F758F302 Only in some specific trades, such as carriage of timber, 
was deck cargo not considered an unusual practice. This is also the reason behind the 
exclusion of deck carriage from the scope of the Hague Rules (Article I(c)).759F759F303 Already at 
the First Session of the Hague Conference, it was “pointed out [by the Chairman] that 
this trade was subject to such uncertainties that it did not seem possible to take account of 
them in a convention covering the carriage of goods in general.”760F760F304 Four decades later, the 
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drafters of the Visby Protocol (1968) also found it unnecessary to address deck carriage 
and to include provisions which regulate such type of sea carriage. 761F761F305 
The problem of deck carriage under the Hague-Visby Rules, however, is mainly 
that old principles are applied to new realities and to modern shipping practices. 762F762F306 
Nowadays deck carriage is no longer considered an improper system to transport goods 
by sea, and it is in fact a very common one with regard to both containerized and non-
containerized goods. With regard to deck cargo, there are two major developments that 
took place in the shipping industry and these are the container revolution and the 
consequent innovations in ship design.763F763F307 These two developments blurred the previously 
clear distinction between on-deck carriage and below-deck carriage; and the logic behind 
Article I(c) of the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules is based exactly on that distinction. 
Nowadays, however, undesirable results are yielded when applying these outdated deck 
cargo rules to the contemporary shipping practices, where even the notion of on-deck and 
under-deck is not that certain anymore, especially when applied to container vessels. 764F764F308 
For example, some container vessels do not have hatches covering their holds and that is 
why, in this case, the tanktop in the hold will be considered their “deck”. 765F765F309 
The Rotterdam Rules, on the other hand, take into account these developments, 
namely containerization and specialized deck vehicles of carriage, which are viewed as 
the ‘backbone’ of deck carriage. 766F766F310 The new Convention no longer excludes deck cargo 
from the regulatory regime. What is more, the Rotterdam Rules apply an all-embracing 




24. “Goods” means the wares, merchandise, and articles of every kind 
whatsoever that a carrier undertakes to carry under a contract of 
carriage and includes the packing and any equipment and container 
not supplied by or on behalf of the carrier. 
The definition provided in Article 1.24 suggests that whatsoever goods, in any 
manner of stowage and package, both below deck and on deck, authorized and 
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unauthorized, are subject to the Rotterdam Rules and governed by its provisions. 
Furthermore, the Convention offers a completely new set of rules that apply to deck 
cargo and that are codified in Article 25 entitled ‘Deck cargo on ships’, which is found in 
Chapter 6 of the Rules (‘Additional provisions relating to particular stages of carriage’). 
Under the Rotterdam Rules, deck cargo is no longer divided into authorized (declared) 
and unauthorized (undeclared) but into permissible and non-permissible deck carriage. 
7.2 Permissible deck carriage 
The first paragraph of Article 25 lists three categories of permissible carriage on deck: 
Article 25 
Deck cargo on ships 
1. Goods may be carried on the deck of a ship only if: 
(a) Such carriage is required by law; 
(b) They are carried in or on containers or vehicles that are fit for 
deck carriage, and the decks are specially fitted to carry such 
containers or vehicles; or 
(c) The carriage on deck is in accordance with the contract of 
carriage, or the customs, usages or practices of the trade in 
question. 
The phrase “only if” in Article 25.1 implies that deck carriage in all instances, 
other to the three circumstances indicated in (a), (b), and (c), will be considered non-
permissible and, hence, unauthorized. 
Article 25.1(a) allows carriage on deck in the various situations when this is 
required by law. This could be the case with dangerous cargo to which specific safety 
regulations apply (e.g. the IMDG Code or the IMSBC Code), which require that the 
particular hazardous substances are carried on deck only. 
Article 25.1(b) takes into account containerization. The provision governs deck 
carriage of goods that are carried in or on containers or vehicles that are fit for deck 
carriage provided that the deck of the vessel is specially fitted for such carriage, which 
means that it must cover certain technical standards for stowing, lashing, and securing 
the containers or vehicles. 768F768F312 Some authors refer to that quality of the vessel as “deck-
cargoworthiness”, and if she fails to cover these standards, the carrier will be liable. 769F 769F313 
On the other hand, the definition of a “container” and of a “vehicle” in Article 1.26 and 
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26. “Container” means any type of container, transportable tank or 
flat, swapbody, or any similar unit load used to consolidate goods, 
and any equipment ancillary to such unit load. 
27. “Vehicle” means a road or railroad cargo vehicle. 
The first definition is very broad and embraces, essentially, any type of containers 
including semi-closed and open-top containers. Similarly, the second definition includes 
both road cargo vehicles and rail cargo vehicles. This means that specialized 
containerships as well as ro-ro vessels, which normally carry cargo vehicles and trailers, 
comply with the requirements fall under the provision of Article 25.1(b). In essence, the 
provision offers the carrier flexibility as to where to stow the goods (below deck or under 
deck) provided that the cargo and the vessel meet the conditions set forth in the article. 
Article 25.1(c) permits carriage on deck when such carriage is in accordance with 
the contract of carriage or the customs, usages or practices of the trade in question. This 
agreement may be explicitly stipulated by the parties but it may also be implied in case 
there are usages, customs, or practices, according to which the cargo in a particular 
trade may be carried on deck. 770F770F314 An example of such shipments is the carriage of woods 
on deck as well as the carriage of large and out-of-gauge equipment such as yachts, wind 
mills, drilling platforms, etc. 
When the carriage on deck is governed by any of these three subsections of Article 
25.1, the carriage is permissible, meaning that it is permitted by the Rotterdam Rules 
and a breach of contract cannot result from such carriage. Under subparagraphs (a) and 
(c), carriage will be permissible regardless of the type of the vessel, whereas 
subparagraph (b) requires the use of specially designed ships which include not only 
container vessels but any other ships which are fitted to carry containers or deck-
carriage vehicles on board. 
Furthermore, one big difference of the Rotterdam Rules, as compared to the 
Hague-Visby Rules, is that the normal liability rules of the new Convention are equally 
applicable to all three types of deck cargo. The relevant Article 25.2 reads: 
Article 25 
Deck cargo on ships 
[…] 
2. The provisions of this Convention relating to the liability of the 
carrier apply to the loss of, damage to or delay in the delivery of 
goods carried on deck pursuant to paragraph 1 of this article, but the 
carrier is not liable for loss of or damage to such goods, or delay in 
their delivery, caused by the special risks involved in their carriage on 
deck when the goods are carried in accordance with subparagraphs 1 
(a) or (c) of this article. 
When speaking of the carrier’s obligations over deck cargo and the ensuing 
liability, it is worth reminding that the fact that goods are stowed on deck must be taken 
in consideration when assessing the duty to care for the cargo. Deck cargo is exposed to 
the weather elements and, therefore, it may require a higher duty of care (e.g. covering 
                                               
314 Michael F. Sturley, Tomotaka Fujita, Gertjan van der Ziel – ‘The Rotterdam Rules: The UN Convention 
on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea’, Sweet & Maxwell (2010), p. 
127 (ibid.). 




with tarpaulins to protect the goods from heat or rain) than cargo that is stowed below 
deck. However, the carrier, under the Rotterdam Rules, retains his right to limit liability 
and, furthermore, he will be excepted from liability for the loss of, damage to, or delay in 
the delivery of deck cargo, carried in accordance with subparagraphs 1(a) and 1(c), if 
these are caused by the special risks that are involved in deck carriage.  
Two points deserve attention with regard to paragraph 2 of Article 25. Firstly, 
this carrier-friendly qualification does not apply to containerized cargo and deck 
vehicles. It addresses only deck cargo that is required to be so carried by law 
(subparagraph 1(a)) and deck cargo, which is carried in accordance with the contract of 
carriage, or the customs, usages or practices in the particular trade (subparagraph 1(c)). 
The reason why not all three categories of deck cargo fall under this provision is 
probably that subparagraphs (a) and (c) leave no choice for the carrier and the shipper 
but to stow and carry the goods on deck, whereas subparagraph (b) allows for discretion 
as to the location of the cargo. Secondly, the Rotterdam Rules do not provide a definition 
of “special risks” but, presumably, these are the inherent risks that are associated with 
cargo being washed overboard or damaged because of the exposure to weather and 
seawater as the most important factors in assessing those risks are the nature of the 
cargo and the circumstances of the voyage. 771F771F315 In that sense, if the risks are likely to 
appear both to below-deck cargo and to on-deck cargo, then these risks are not “special 
risks” (e.g. fire caused by the nature of an adjacent cargo). On the contrary, if the risks 
are specific to carriage on deck, then the exception from liability provision in paragraph 
2 will apply (e.g. fire caused by the natural elements such as a lightening or seawater 
causing a chemical reaction). Thus, the qualification in Article 25.2 represents a 
specialized version of the liability provision in Article 17.2 to the extent that the cause 
for loss, damage or delay cannot be attributed to the carrier. 772F772F316  
Finally, there is a widely shared view that, besides these three categories listed 
under (a), (b), and (c), there is also a fourth category in Article 25 and this is namely any 
deck carriage, which is not governed by one of these three subsections.773F773F317 Grounds for 
recognizing such a category of deck carriage is Article 25.3, which speaks of “goods 
carried on deck in cases other than those permitted pursuant to paragraph 1 of this 
article”. In the current thesis, however, any on-deck shipment that is not covered by 
Article 25.1 will be regarded as non-permissible deck carriage as opposed to the three 
categories listed in paragraph 1. 
7.3 Non-permissible deck carriage and the carrier’s liability 
As already explained in Chapter II, section 5.6 above, the Rotterdam Rules apply 
a fault-based system of establishing liability and available defences. And this system 
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applies to all the three categories of permissible deck cargo outlined in subparagraphs 
(a) to (c), with the abovementioned exceptions and stipulations. 
This is not the case, however, with non-permissible deck carriage. Paragraph 3 of 
Article 25 contains a special provision for all other types of deck carriage that are not 
covered by the first paragraph: 
Article 25 
Deck cargo on ships 
[…] 
3. If the goods have been carried on deck in cases other than those 
permitted pursuant to paragraph 1 of this article, the carrier is liable 
for loss of or damage to the goods or delay in their delivery that is 
exclusively caused by their carriage on deck, and is not entitled to the 
defences provided for in article 17. 
When the goods are carried on deck in non-permitted circumstances under the 
Rotterdam Rules, the carrier is liability and he cannot rely on any defences provided for 
in Article 17, when the loss of, damage to, or delay in the delivery of the deck cargo is 
exclusively caused by the carriage on deck. The phrase “exclusively caused” again refers 
to the special risks that are inherent in the carriage on deck (i.e. seawater and weather 
elements).774F774F318 The exclusive causation also means that the carrier will lose his defences 
under Article 17 only when the non-permissible deck carriage is the sole reason for the 
loss, damage or delay in the delivery. Conversely, if, besides the non-permissible deck 
carriage, there is another cause for the loss, damage or delay in the delivery, then Article 
17 will fully apply to the entire shipment regardless of Article 25.3. Moreover, the carrier 
retains his right to limit his liability under Article 59. 
However, the carrier will further lose his right to limit liability if he carries goods 
on deck in breach of an express agreement with the shipper to carry the goods below 
deck, and the loss, damage or delay in delivery are caused by that carriage on deck: 
Article 25 
Deck cargo on ships 
[…] 
5. If the carrier and shipper expressly agreed that the goods would be 
carried under deck, the carrier is not entitled to the benefit of the 
limitation of liability for any loss of, damage to or delay in the delivery 
of the goods to the extent that such loss, damage, or delay resulted 
from their carriage on deck. 
It can be assumed that, in this case, the carrier will also lose its right to rely on 
the defences in Article 17 since such non-permissible deck carriage falls outside the 
permitted categories of deck cargo, and is, thus, also struck by Article 25.3. 
Article 25 also contains a rule in paragraph 4, which protects third party bill of 
lading holders: 
Article 25 
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Deck cargo on ships 
[…] 
4. The carrier is not entitled to invoke subparagraph 1 (c) of this 
article against a third party that has acquired a negotiable transport 
document or a negotiable electronic transport record in good faith, 
unless the contract particulars state that the goods may be carried on 
deck. 
This rule enshrines the principle of “the informed consent” observed supra in the 
regulation of deck carriage under the Hague-Visby Rules – a party must know what he 
or she has agreed on in their contract. Accordingly, the permissible deck carriage in 
Article 25.1(c) of the Rotterdam Rules, and therefore the exception in Article 25.2, does 
not apply as between a carrier and a third party who acquired a negotiable transport 
document in good faith if the contract particulars do not state that the goods may be 
carried on deck. This means that the carriage in accordance with an express or implied 
agreement will become non-permissible and, as such, it will be subject to the same rules 
as those laid down in Article 25.3 described above. On the other hand, the word “may” in 
Article 25.3 refers to a liberty clause to carry on deck, meaning that no express 
statement or notice is required on the bill of lading that the goods will be carried on 
deck. A liberty clause inserted in the bill suffices for the carriage to be covered by Article 
25.1(c), which allows the carrier to invoke the exclusion of liability under Article 25.2, 
provided that the specific conditions for that are met. Another important point derived 
from reading the wording of the provision is that paragraph 4 does not apply to non-
negotiable bills of lading, meaning that a third party holder will be protected only under 
negotiable transport documents. 
Considering Article 25.3 and 25.5, it is evident that the Rotterdam Rules do not 
apply the doctrine of fundamental breach or the doctrine of deviation.775F775F319 However, some 
of the consequences of non-permissible deck carriage resemble those of a fundamental 
breach of the contract of carriage. 
7.4 Assessment of the Rotterdam Rules’ position on deck cargo 
The law on deck cargo is one good example of an area of law that is handled in a 
superior manner under the Rotterdam Rules than under the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, 
where it is not addressed at all. The new Convention regulates and accepts deck carriage 
as a permissible practice as long as it conforms to certain requirements, failing which 
there will be a breach of the contract of carriage. Article 25 of the Rotterdam Rules 
recognizes the advent of containerization and it also “was welcomed as an appropriate 
apportionment of liability in conformity with the freedom of contract regime”.776F776F320 Probably 
the most important characteristic of the Rotterdam Rules’ approach towards deck cargo 
is rendering an account of the containerization and of the subsequent technological 
transformation, which reduced the risks that pertain to deck carriage. What is more, the 
new Convention managed to efficiently distribute these risks between the parties to the 
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contract of carriage. If the Rotterdam Rules gain the worldwide support, it is likely that 
the current diversity of national rules related to deck cargo will be unified in an 
international regime. 
Before leaving the problem of the Rotterdam Rules’ position on deck cargo, 
consideration must be given to another observation. Historically, the rules governing on-
deck carriage has been left outside the scope of the international regimes and 
instruments (e.g. the Hague-Visby Rules, Article I(c); York Rules 1864 and York-
Antwerp Rules 1877 and 1890), which regulate maritime transport. As stated in the 
beginning of the chapter, this was done on purpose because such transportation has a 
very special nature and was accompanied by immense risks in the past. However, one 
can notice that regulating deck carriage has gradually been included in international 
conventions. The change is seen in several international agreements: the Hamburg 
Rules (Article 9), The Rotterdam Rules (Article 25), and The York-Antwerp Rules 1924, 
where “Rule I: Jettison of Cargo” has changed, omitting the description of deck stated 
previously therein: "Every structure not built in with the frame of the vessel shall be 
considered to be a part of the deck of the vessel.” 
The table below will summarize the change with regard to deck cargo observed in 
the York/York-Antwerp Rules, which set maritime rules that codify the law of general 
average.777F777F321 Rule I of these rules is dedicated to the Jettison of Deck Cargo, and it has 
undergone a significant transformation throughout the years.  
 RULE I 
JETTISON OF DECK CARGO 
York Rules 1864 A jettison of timber or deals, or any other description of wood 
cargo, carried on the deck of a ship in pursuance of a general 
custom of the trade in which the ship is then engaged, shall be 
made good as general average in like manner as if such cargo had 
been jettisoned from below deck. 
No jettison of deck cargo other than timber or deals, or other 
wood cargo, so carried as aforesaid, shall be made good as 
general average. 
Every structure not built in with the frame of the vessel shall be 
considered to be a part of the deck of the vessel. 
York & Antwerp Rules 1877 No jettison of deck cargo shall be made good as general average. 
Every structure not built in with the frame of the vessel shall be 
considered to be a part of the deck of the vessel. 
York-Antwerp Rules 1890 No change. 
York-Antwerp Rules 1924 No jettison of cargo shall be made good as general average, 
unless such cargo is carried in accordance with the recognized 
custom of the trade. 
York-Antwerp Rules 1950 No change. 
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York-Antwerp Rules 1974 No change. 
York-Antwerp Rules 1994 No change. 
York-Antwerp Rules 2004 No change. 
Table 1:  Rule I on Jettison of Deck Cargo in the York/York-Antwerp Rules. 
As evident, in the York Rules 1864, the rule initially excluded deck cargo from the 
scope of the instrument. There was, however, one exception, namely the carriage of 
wooden products on deck pursuant to a general custom within that trade. Later on, the 
York & Antwerp Rules 1877 amended the article so that deck carriage was excluded 
altogether from the rules on general average. The York-Antwerp Rules 1890 preserved 
the article unamended. However, the York-Antwerp Rules 1924 omitted the provision, 
defining “deck carriage”, and modified the article so that cargo carried on deck “in 
accordance with the recognized custom of the trade” fell within the provisions of the 
Rules. No other change in that article was observed in the next four editions of the York-
Antwerp Rules. 
8. Conclusion 
In this chapter it has been shown that the kernel of the obligations obligation of 
the carrier over deck cargo is mostly buried in the bill of lading and in the way courts 
interpret its terms in the context of the statutory regulations. For determining whether 
or not a carrier is liable for loss of or damage to cargo stowed and carried on deck, the 
starting point of reference is precisely the terms of the bills of lading as well as to what 
extent and how the bill evidences the terms of the contract of carriage. The latter is 
particularly important with regard to third-party B/L holders. 
Although the current law on deck cargo is steadily departing from the traditional 
doctrine and although the old views on deck cargo are becoming increasingly 
inapplicable in certain trades, courts can still harshly punish carriers who, for example, 
have issued a clean bill of lading for the on-deck shipment of containers carried on a 
specially-built container vessel. Other courts, however, put more emphasis on the factual 
enquiry and take the stance that the nature of the cargo as well as “technological 
innovation and vessel design may justify stowage other than below deck”.778F778F322  
Unfortunately, it was established that no uniformity could be found in the UK, 
the US, and under civil law when it comes to treatment of cargo stowed on deck. Perhaps 
the main culprit for having sets of rules on deck cargo which stem from the same 
Convention but which differ so much, is the lack of conceptualization of the terms “legal” 
and “illegal” deck cargo. Obviously, the standards whether cargo is authorized to be 
carried or deck or not vary quite substantially as some courts still tenaciously require 
any deck cargo to be specifically mentioned on the face of the bill of lading regardless of 
an established custom in the trade, while others apply a less restrictive approach and 
depart from the old doctrine of deck cargo. This lack of uniformity on the concept of 
legal/illegal deck cargo has resulted in courts interpreting differently the scheme 
established by Article I(c) of the Hague-Visby Rules and placing non-uniform burden on 
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the carrier and on the cargo interests. Objective construction of the HVR leads to the 
observation that the Rules afford less protection to owners of deck cargo owners as 
opposed to owners of below-deck cargo, or even no protection, if such carriage and the 
pertaining risks have been communicated accordingly and the Rules have been excluded. 
Perhaps this is the reason why courts in some jurisdictions such as Belgium have taken 
the other extreme and overprotect cargo owners when deck carriage is involved. In 
practice, this non-uniformity in adjudication is translated into disputes with often 
unpredictable outcomes and solutions that are difficult to foresee by the parties. In legal 
terms, the various and differing approaches to deck cargo at national level deprave the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules regime of its essential purpose – to set up an equilibrium 
balancing the interests of the carrier and the shipper, which is uniform, easy to 
prognosticate, and capable of being applied to any situation. 
This is another piece of evidence that leaving deck carriage outside the ambit of 
the Hague Rules may have been an appropriate approach a century ago but nowadays 
the lack of a uniform and harmonized statutory regulation for that type of carriage has 
become a disadvantage for the shipping industry. In that regard, the regulation of deck 
cargo under the Rotterdam Rules could turn into a good model of how this aspect of 
shipping law can be modernized.779F779F323 
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The Carrier’s Obligations over 
Containerized Cargo 
1. Introduction 
The carriage of cargo in containers and the process of containerization take a 
special place in the world of shipping. Introduced in the second half of the XX century, 
shipping containers are an innovative and unique concept, both in technological and 
economic terms, which changed the entire transportation and distribution chain. 
Containerization, which commenced in 1960s and 1970s, is deemed to be as important a 
milestone for the shipping industry as the transition from sailing to steaming in the 
1860s and 1870s.780F780F1 As such, the carriage of goods in containers is an area which consists 
of numerous interesting legal problems which do not typically arise in other types of 
shipment, especially with regard to the obligations of the carrier over the cargo. This is 
mainly due to the fact that the whole transportation system became much more complex 
and more parties and actors were involved in the process of container carriage. 
Moreover, the legal issues that containers brought to the shipping industry are only in 
part addressed by international conventions and by national courts. Thus, 
containerization became another source of legal difficulties which have given rise to a 
demand for a uniform set of rules. 
Since containers had an unparalleled impact on international trade, international 
relations, and social development, and because of the irreversible changes they brought 
to the modern world, the current chapter will aim at going beyond addressing the 
problems of the carrier’s obligations over containerized cargo. Therefore, it will first 
provide background information on the advent, history, and development of 
containerized shipping (section 2). Then, it will familiarize the reader with certain 
technical parameters of the shipping container, such as size, dimensions, types, and use, 
as well as with the impressive vessels that carry thousands of metal boxes across the 
globe, and also with the pertaining infrastructure which has allowed the container 
revolution to actually come about (section 3). Being introduced to the technicalities of the 
carriage of containerized cargo, one will be more capable of grasping any intricacy or 
subtlety related to the carrier’s obligations over goods shipped in the various container 
boxes that cross the oceans every day, every hour, and every minute. 
From there, the discussion will focus on the problem of conceptualizing the 
container and whether it can be defined as a package for the purpose of the Hague Rules 
and the Hague-Visby Rules (section 4); followed by the carrier’s period of responsibility 
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over containerized shipments (section 5) as well as the obligations set in Article III rule 2 
HVR (properly and carefully load, handle, stow, etc.) as applied to containerized cargo 
(section 6). The problem of weighing the containers as well as who owes that duty will be 
addressed in section 7. The regulation of containerized shipments under the Rotterdam 
Rules, and the impact on the carrier’s obligations thereof, are finally considered in 
section 8. 
2. The fascinating world of containers 
2.1 History of the container revolution 
This sub-section intentionally targets the container revolution, which took place 
in the second half of the 20th century, and not the history of containers, which dates back 
a long time ago. Indeed, the use of one or another form of containers can be traced all the 
way back to the Egyptians who used to load on their ships dry cargo packaged in straw 
baskets or liquid cargo stowed in amphoras. 781F781F2 Cargo handling methods later evolved into 
wooden crates, barrels and bags, depending on the goods to be carried, but efficiency was 
still impeded mostly by the lack of a better power source than manpower. 782F782F3 Up until the 
middle of the 20th century, loading and unloading goods was a very slow, expensive and 
labour-intensive process, which also had a negative impact on the cargo ship schedules. 
As seen, the concept of grouping cargo into one receptacle was not new but it was 
the insight of one man to employ containers in a specific way, which revolutionized 
shipping. The nowadays concept of containerization as a system of intermodal freight 
transport carried out through the usage of shipping containers is mainly due to Malcom 
Purcell McLean (1913 - 2001), an American trucking entrepreneur from North Carolina. 
The first ship to carry containers on board was the SS Ideal X, which sailed on 26 
April 1956 from Port Newark, New Jersey to Houston, Texas, where there stood 58 
trucks awaiting the shipment of trailers. This 5-day coastwise voyage was the first time 
when a ship was carrying containers on a scheduled trip (although she was also carrying 
15,000tons of bulk petroleum), and it turned out to be a milestone in modern maritime 
history. The Ideal X was registered in the US and was flying the flag of the Pan-Atlantic 
Steamship Corp.783F783F4 She was actually not a true container vessel but a T-2 tanker784F784F5 built in 
1945 in California. The ship was 524 feet (160 meters) long and had a capacity of 10,572 
gross registered tons.785F785F6 She was one of the T-2 tankers acquired by McLean in 1955 and 
refitted, the other vessel called Amena.786F786F7 
                                               
2 Dr. Salvatore R. Mercogliano – ‘The Container Revolution’, Sea History 114, Spring 2006, at p. 8. 
3 Dr. Salvatore R. Mercogliano – ‘The Container Revolution’, Sea History 114, Spring 2006, at p. 8. (ibid.) 
4 By that time McLean had acquired the Pan-American Steamship Corp. out of Mobile, Alabama, a 
subsidiary of Waterman Steamship. To do that, McLean had sold his shares in McLean Trucking. Several 
months after the acquisition of Pan-Atlantic, McLean bought also Waterman. 
5 Under the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, the then newly-established US Maritime Commission 
distinguished between nine categories of vessels, each of them designated with a specific code letter such as 
“P” for passenger ships, “B” for barges, and “L” for bulk carriers engaged in the trade in the Great Lakes. 
Two categories were involved in the early carriage of containers – “T” for tankers and “C” for oceangoing 
cargo ships. The numbers after the letter ran from 1 to 4 and indicated the size of the vessel as the higher 
the number, the bigger the vessel. 
6 Before the advent of containerization, seagoing vessels were mainly measured by size, volume, and weight. 
Gross registered tonnage and net registered tonnage are a measurement of volume (one register ton is equal 
CHAPTER V: THE CARRIER’S OBLIGATIONS OVER CONTAINERIZED CARGO 
 
209 
McLean ordered the construction of an additional and temporary, so called, spar 
deck787F787F8 above the existing weather deck (a technique known as “Mechano” decking), to 
which 58 brand-new trailers were fastened. 788F788F9 Although by that time these were generally 
called “trailers”, they were in essence 58 reinforced half-truck-size containers.789F789F10 They 
were directly secured to the spar deck and were not stowed on top of one another. 790F790F11 It 
must be underlined that McLean was not the first to envisage loading cargo-carrying 
vehicles on a ship. He was using a concept that was developed by Seatrain Lines in 1929 
when the founder of Seatrain Lines and a World War I aviator, Graham M. Brush, 
started offering a service of carrying up to 100 railcars on both the lower and the main 
deck of the ocean vessel, which were equipped with parallel rail tracks that allowed the 
railcars to be stowed with their wheels and running gear attached. 791F791F12 Moreover, a concept 
similar to McLean’s was employed by the US military during World War II – namely to 
convert a tanker to carry, across the North Atlantic to Europe, not only fuel but also 
various large and bulky cargo on the weather deck.792F792F13  
Although Malcom McLean did not start from scratch as the concept of carrying 
trailer trucks was not genuinely his, McLean’s initial idea differed substantially to those 
early attempts to revolutionize sea carriage. He intended to put not the entire trailer 
trucks on board the ship but only the trailers themselves. However commercially viable 
the roll-on/roll-off service seemed to be, McLean soon realized that too much cargo space 
would be lost because of the wheels and undercarriage of the truck trailers; the so called 
“broken stowage”. Therefore, McLean transformed this concept into an even more radical 
idea of loading on board the Ideal X only the containers, leaving the detachable running 
gear of the trailer behind. After the sea journey the containers would be reattached to a 
different chassis once the ship was to reach the port of destination six days later. The 
                                                                                                                                                   
to 100 cubic feet or 2.83m3). The former designates the total enclosed space or internal capacity of a vessel, 
including all spaces below the upper deck as well as permanently closed-in spaces on the deck. The latter 
measures the earning power of the vessel when carrying cargo. That is, net tonnage is equal to the gross 
tonnage minus the volume of such spaces that have no earning capacity or room for cargo (e.g. fuel 
compartments, engine room, crew’s quarter, bridge). On the other hand, displacement tonnage and 
deadweight tonnage are a measurement of weight. The first one designates the actual weight which a vessel 
displaces when floating at any given draft such as “light” (includes fuel and supplies but no cargo) or 
“loaded” (includes fuel, supplies, and cargo). The deadweight tonnage (DWT) measures the carrying capacity 
of the vessel figured by weight. Thus, the DWT is the difference between “displacement loaded” and 
“displacement light”. However, with the introduction of the fully cellular container vessels, the carrying 
capacity of such ships started being designated with the number of containers (TEUs) that the ship can 
carry. 
7 McLean took advantage of a US post-war programme, through which the government was selling cheaply 
World War II tankers to promote the maritime industry. Although the programme was targeting traditional 
shipping lines, and not starters such as McLean’s Pam-Atlantic, he managed to break through. See: Marc 
Levinson – ‘The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy Bigger’, 
Princeton University Press (2006), pp. 47-48, fn. 22 
8 А light deck fitted over the upper deck 
9 Brian J. Cudahy – ‘Box Boats: How Container Ships Changed the World’, Fordham University Press, New 
York (2006), p. xi. 
10 Robert Mottley – ‘McLean: A retrospective’, American Shipper: The Monthly Journal of International 
Logistics, April 2006, at pp. 8-25, at p. 16. 
11 Brian J. Cudahy – ‘Box Boats: How Container Ships Changed the World’, Fordham University Press, New 
York (2006), pp. 29-30. 
12 Robert Mottley – ‘McLean: A retrospective’, American Shipper: The Monthly Journal of International 
Logistics, April 2006, at pp. 8-25, at p. 10. 
13 Brian J. Cudahy – ‘Box Boats: How Container Ships Changed the World’, Fordham University Press, New 
York (2006), p. 23. 




containers were hoisted by cranes, loaded on, and then unloaded from the weather deck 
of the vessel. Thus, through this unconventional and creative idea, Malcom McLean 
indeed managed to think outside the box, both literally and metaphorically. 
McLean became a pioneer in this specific and novel method of transport that was 
employed for the first time on his Ideal-X, a tanker refitted with a cargo deck. The 
containers carried on the spar deck of McLean’s vessel were custom built and were 33 
feet long, a size which is not common nowadays. The cost savings were evident from the 
very beginning. McLean employees calculated that the price for loading cargo dropped 
from $5.83 per ton, which were the 1956 figures for loading loose cargo on an average-
size vessel, to only $0.16 per ton for the cargo loaded on the Ideal-X.793F793F14 
McLean, however, did not stop there as he wanted to acquire a ship that was 
capable of carrying containers only, unlike the T-2 tankers, which were suited for 
carriage of fuel in the tanks and of not more than 58 containers on the specifically-built 
spar deck. He picked six war-time C-2 general cargo vessels and converted them into 
fully operational container vessels, the first one having the name Gateway City.794F794F15 
Vertical steel rails were attached into the holds and containers were now able to be 
placed on top of the other – this was the beginning of what later came to be the cellular 
containership. Hatch covers were also renewed so that containers could be stacked on 
top of the hatch covers, as deck cargo, and not only in the holds. In terms of capacity, the 
result was astounding – Gateway City was capable of carrying 226 containers, which is a 
fourfold increase, compared to Ideal X. Furthermore, unlike the Ideal X, the Gateway 
City was equipped with two movable gantry cranes on-board, which made the new 
container vessel completely independent on the port infrastructure. In general, the 
design of these renovated C-2 vessels was very innovative as it was not based on any 
previous naval architecture.795F795F16 The new vessels outmatched in any way previous general 
cargo ships. While a conventional break-bulk carrier required the engagement of over 
150 stevedores for four full day, it was estimated that it would take only 14 stevedores 
and a single eight-hour shift to unload and load full cargo on the Gateway City.796F796F17 
Moreover, the containers protected the goods from pilferage and provided for less 
shifting of the cargo in an event of a stormy weather. With all those advantages at hand, 
the first fully-cellular container line began regular operation in 1957. 797F797F18 
In 1960, McLean dropped the Pan-Atlantic name and logo and his intermodal 
company was renamed into Sea-Land Service Inc., which is deemed to be a better 
representation of the company’s operations. In 1966, ten years after the maiden voyage 
of Ideal-X, the first international containership voyage took place and it was undertaken 
                                               
14 Marc Levinson – ‘The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy 
Bigger’, Princeton University Press (2006), p. 52. 
15 Brian J. Cudahy – ‘Box Boats: How Container Ships Changed the World’, Fordham University Press, New 
York (2006), pp. 32-33. 
16 Brian J. Cudahy – ‘Box Boats: How Container Ships Changed the World’, Fordham University Press, New 
York (2006), p. 33. 
17 Brian J. Cudahy – ‘Box Boats: How Container Ships Changed the World’, Fordham University Press, New 
York (2006), p. 35. 
18 Robert Mottley – ‘McLean: A retrospective’, American Shipper: The Monthly Journal of International 
Logistics, April 2006, at pp. 8-25, at p. 16. 
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by a vessel owned by McLean’s Sea-Land. The Fairland sailed from Port Elizabeth, USA 
to Rotterdam, the Netherlands, with 236 containers on board. 798F798F19 
In early 1970s, or about ten years after the company was established, Sea-Land 
made a decision to abandon the method of loading and unloading the containers via 
hoisting them above the ship through on-board cranes, but instead decided to rely 
entirely on shoreside cranes in order to save precious deck space on board the vessel and 
in order to ensure a more efficient and faster loading and discharging operations, which 
the latter was more capable of in comparison with on-board cranes.799F799F20 Container ships 
that have on-board cranes are generally called “geared”, while those that do not have 
cranes are classified as “gearless”. Evidently, already in the dawn of containerization 
there were indications that container shipping would advance and progress, and Sea-
Land’s decision to some extent marked the beginning of a process of building bigger and 
bigger vessels with increasing TEU capacity. 800F800F21 Nowadays, SeaLand Service is part of the 
biggest container operator in the world – Maersk Lines (a daughter company of the A.P. 
Moeller Group). 
McLean’s concept of moving freight was not adopted quickly. The advantages of 
the containerization were not widely seen up until the Vietnam War, which proved the 
valuable assets achieved through this system. In 1966, the US military contracted with 
McLean’s company to ship military equipment first from the USA to Bordeaux, France, 
and Hamburg, Germany, and then from the USA to Vietnam. The efficiency of 
containerships and containerized cargo then emerged. By the end of the war (1973) 
about 80% of all cargo shipped throughout the Vietnam War was transported in 
containers.801F801F22 
It suffices to say that Malcom McLean is the inventor of the shipping container as 
we know it today, and that he was the driving force behind the container revolution, 
which changed the entire system of transportation. It is submitted that McLean’s biggest 
contribution was his managerial insight that the true business of transport companies 
was to move freight rather than to operate seagoing vessels or road or rail cars. 802F802F23 
McLean’s merits are probably best summarized by Charles R. Cushing (a naval architect 
whom McLean hired in 1961 as a mechanical engineer at Sea-Land), when he delivered 
one of the eulogies at McLean’s memorial service on May 30, 2001: “McLean 
revolutionized and sped up the entire transportation chain and reduced its cost, so that 
people throughout the entire world are now able to bring their handiwork to the global 
markets. The result has been a steady and identifiable increase in the standard of living 
in the developing countries and elsewhere throughout the world.”803F803F24  
                                               
19 Source: the World Shipping Council, http://www.worldshipping.org/about-the-industry/history-of-
containerization/industry-globalization. 
20 Brian J. Cudahy – ‘Box Boats: How Container Ships Changed the World’, Fordham University Press, New 
York (2006), p. 94. 
21 See: section 3.2 below. 
22 Dr. Salvatore R. Mercogliano – ‘The Container Revolution’, Sea History 114, Spring 2006, at p. 10. 
23 Marc Levinson – ‘The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy 
Bigger’, Princeton University Press (2006), p. xi. 
24 Charles R. Cushing – ‘Eulogy for Malcom McLean’, May 30, 2001; unpublished paper in the holdings of the 
McLean Foundation, Alexandria, Va., partially cited in Brian J. Cudahy – ‘Box Boats: How Container Ships 
Changed the World’ at p. 205 and in Robert Mottley – ‘McLean: A retrospective’, American Shipper: The 
Monthly Journal of International Logistics, April 2006, pp. 8-25. 




2.2 Impact on the world economy 
Although the thesis is centered around the carrier’s cargo-related obligations 
prescribed by the Hague-Visby Rules and, thus, the topic of multimodalism is beyond the 
scope of the current research (the latter being restricted to the sea leg of the journey), it 
should be noted that the true effect of containerized carriage is attained to the fullest 
extent when the carriage starts from the point where goods are manufactured and ends 
where the warehouse of the receiver is, namely when the carriage is on a door-to-door 
basis. This is achieved indeed through a combination of sea carriage and road, railroad, 
and/or air carriage. That is why, when considering in this section how containers have 
affected the world around us, one must take into account that the substantial socio-
economic changes brought should be regarded from the perspective of multimodalism. 
Since the carriage of goods has always been an activity with critical socio-
economic importance, a revolutionary modification of the transportation process such as 
the introduction of containers will inevitably play a fundamental role in many 
commercial, industrial, and social processes as well. 804F804F25 Thus, the impact of containers on 
the world economy is not confined simply within a product’s final cost but has had far-
reaching consequences. 
The reason why the process of containerization is commonly referred to as the 
container revolution is that, by becoming the dominant method of transportation, the 
shipping container had a thorough impact on the evolution of ship design, on the size 
and location of ports around the world as well as on the relationship and integrity of 
various modes of transport. Containerization also reached that far as to affect production 
processes and distribution and supply chains. 
To answer whether the increase of world trade backed the advent of containers or 
whether it was the other way around is like answering the centuries-old riddle about 
what comes first, the chicken or the egg. Similarly, it is difficult to say whether 
containerization brought manufacturing from North America to Asia, or whether this 
shift was merely facilitated by container shipping. It is a fact, however, that after the 
end of World War II international commerce rose significantly and authors see that 
growth as a result of the globalization processes, the enhanced methods of production 
such as mechanization as well as a result of improved management of the production 
lines.805F805F26 It is fair to say that containerization, on the one hand, and globalization, on the 
other, share a reciprocal relationship, and neither of them has occurred irrespective of 
other factors at the time. Some research even suggest that the advent of containerized 
transport has given a bigger boost to globalization than all the trade agreements signed 
internationally in the second half of the 20th century.806F806F27 
All things considered, there are a few distinctive changes that containerization 
brought about in present-day world economy. 
                                               
25 Alessandro Olivo, Massimo Di Francesco, Roberto Devoto – ‘Intermodal freight transportation. The 
problem of empty containers in transportation service production’, European Transport/Trasporti Europei, IX 
(2003) 24, pp. 49-53, at p. 49. 
26 Dr. Salvatore R. Mercogliano – ‘The Container Revolution’, Sea History 114, Spring 2006, at p. 8. 
27 The Economist – ‘The Humble Hero: Containers have been more important for globalisation than freer 
trade’, May 18, 2013. 
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First of all, the highly-automated system of intermodal shipping containers made 
transportation so cheap that the world could afford distribution chains bringing 
commodities from all around the world into even the remotest places. This was not viable 
prior to the advent of containerization. Therefore, what makes the container so special is 
not the aluminum or steel box itself but the utility it brings. 
Secondly, containers changed forever how and where goods are manufactured. As 
a result, the process of containerization caused vast changes on the labour market. Not 
only did a lot of longshoremen lose their job, but many workers involved in various 
manufacturing processes and in wholesale also suffered a job loss as the marine 
geography and the economic geography changed. This process emerged because many 
jobs had been previously highly dependent on the presence of a nearby port. And ports 
that did not make the necessary investments to respond to the advent of containerization 
slowly started to declined and lose importance. 807F807F28 After the container revolution made 
freight so cheap, manufacturers no longer needed to have their production close to their 
customers in big population centers and thus accrue substantial costs. On the contrary, 
manufacturing processes moved to smaller towns, not necessarily close to a port, where 
they could benefit from lower costs for wages and land. 808F808F29 
Thirdly, the cheap freight induced by containerization, and the fact that the 
physical proximity to suppliers and customer was no longer an advantage, made many 
domestic companies reach the world markets and become international companies. 809F809F30 
Thus, the container revolution boosted world trade and the economy in general. 
Companies were now able to reach undeveloped areas that had previously been 
considered too remote to be affected by and involved in world trade. Thus, trade between 
nations simply increased and became more integrated, and this trade was progressively 
taking place by means of containers. All these processes come back and they, in itself, 
are a factor for expanding the container industry and explain containerization has never 
stopped growing. It won’t be far-fetched to conclude that world trade and container 
transport coexist in a symbiosis. 
In the fourth place, containerization managed to integrate East Asia into the 
world economy and as a result the North Atlantic was no longer the only place trade was 
concentrated. What is more, although shipping of containers kicked off in the US, this 
industry later began to be dominated by European and Asian operators. Shipowners 
flying under the US flag faced incremental problems of local protected markets and the 
overregulation of the sector, which barred them from competing worldwide in this fast-
changing industry.810F810F31 
Finally, although no one in the early days expected to see it, containers have 
become a major threat not only to the process of shipping as a whole but also to national 
                                               
28 Examples of cities which declined as a centre of maritime commerce are New York (US) and Liverpool 
(UK). Examples of an opposite development are Los Angeles (US), Hong Kong (PRC), Rotterdam (NL), and 
Singapore, which turned into huge transportation hubs. 
29 Marc Levinson – ‘The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy 
Bigger’, Princeton University Press (2006), p. 2. 
30 Marc Levinson – ‘The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy 
Bigger’, Princeton University Press (2006), p. 3. 
31 Marc Levinson – ‘The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy 
Bigger’, Princeton University Press (2006), p. xiii. 




security. While the metal boxes afford significant security for the cargo as regards theft 
and damage, their overall security is, on the other hand, undermined by the possibility 
that containers may be used by terrorists as a tool to implement large-scale attacks by 
concealing, for example, a “dirty bomb”, a biological or a radiological weapon inside a 
container, which would have devastating consequences. 811F811F32 
Apart from these visible and tremendous changes that the introduction of 
containers brought to the world economy, to the distribution chains, and to the shipping 
industry, in particular, there is one less conspicuous transformation which seems to be 
overlooked. One of the most important contributory features of containers is obviously 
that they have sustainably diminished cargo damage by unitizing and grouping the 
goods into one steel or aluminium box. 812F812F33 Thus, by affording more protection to the cargo 
owners, containers have silently changed the balance between carrier interests, on the 
one hand, and cargo interests, on the other. Needless to say, this balance is the 
foundation of the Hague-Visby Rules, which, like the Rotterdam Rules and like any 
other international convention, is a product of an international compromise. Therefore, 
without anyone anticipating, the cargo interests, being traditionally the weaker party, 
are no longer in need of the same statutory protection as envisaged by the drafters of the 
Rules in 1924. In other words, the configuration between the interests of the parties has 
been changed and the current law does not always reflect its current state. It is precisely 
this less apparent point, namely the modified foundation of the Rules brought by 
containerization, which is the root of all legal problems discussed later in this chapter.  
2.3 Containerization today 
Containerized shipments have risen dramatically since the metal boxes were first 
introduced to the world of shipping in the late 1950s. 813F813F34 In the same time, concentration 
on the liner market has also significantly increased as shipping companies tend to 
operate bigger and bigger container vessels and also to offer combined service in order to 
answer the transport needs of an ever globalized world. 814F814F35 Higher concentration means a 
small number of companies controlling a bigger share of the product and geographical 
market, which, in essence, means an oligopolistic market. Actually, the construction of 
bigger container vessels contributes to the process of concentration on the liner market. 
The reason is that larger ships are capital intensive and can hardly be afforded by 
smaller shipping companies because of the substantial sunk costs associated with the 
                                               
32 Michael D. Greenberg, Peter Chalk, Henri W. Willis, Ivan Khilko, David S. Ortiz – ‘Maritime Terrorism: 
Risk and Liability’, published by RAND Corporation (2006), Chapter 7: Risks of Maritime Terrorism Attacks 
Against Container Shipping, pp. 111-132.  
33 However, note that it is often remarked that, by means of containerization, the problems associated with 
cargo damage have merely been shifted from one big container (being the vessel) to numerous smaller ones. 
See UK P&I – “Container matters: The container revolution of the 1960s was deemed to be the solution to 
limiting cargo damage, but has experience proved otherwise?”, a supplement to LP News 13, published in 
September 2000. 
34 Only for the period 1996-2014, the global containerized trade has grown from 50 million TEUs to over 160 
million TEUs per year, meaning that for nearly two decades the containers shipped throughout the world 
have increased with the staggering 220%. Source: UNCTAD – Review of Maritime Transport 2014, p. 17. 
35 Meifeng Luo, Lixian Fan and Wesley W. Wilson – ‘Firm growth and market concentration in liner 
shipping’, Journal of Transport Economics and Policy (JTEP), Volume 48, Number 1, 1 January 2014, pp. 
171-187, at p. 172. 
CHAPTER V: THE CARRIER’S OBLIGATIONS OVER CONTAINERIZED CARGO 
 
215 
construction of such a vessel. 815F815F36 It is no accident that the CEO of Maersk, the largest 
container operator, has predicted that the domination of the big companies on the 
market will make competition almost impossible for small and mid-size container 
shipping companies (operators controlling 3 to 5% market share), also in the light of the 
overcapacity of TEUs available, which was further fostered by the construction of ultra 
large container vessels.816F816F37 
Nowadays, the entire global economy is dependent on the swift and efficient 
exchange of goods. And the system of intermodal shipping has turned into a crucial 
element of today’s international trade. Almost any goods as well as bulk and liquid cargo 
are capable of being transported in a container. That is why containers represent today 
the biggest and the most quickly growing category of cargo transport at most ports 
worldwide.817F817F38 
Containerization represents not just an innovative product but an entirely new 
system with numerous advantages such as: its speed and predictability, because 
containers reduce the time in which a ship stays in port; its economy of scales; and its 
ability to reach virtually the remotest places, because a container is optimized to be 
carried by any component of the transportation network. 818F818F39 Furthermore, containers 
reduce the possibility of pilferage and provide better security for the cargo. They also 
provide better protection for the cargo from the weather and atmospheric conditions, and 
reduce the physical handling of the cargo during loading and unloading. In that sense, 
containers protect also the goods from damage that may occur during handling 
operations at the port. These major factors turned the shipping container into a vital 
element of today’s world economy. 
The essence of containers is that they allow cargo to be transported to remote 
areas at minimum costs, thus shrinking today’s world and in the same time expanding 
human choice. Shipping costs have nowadays indeed shrunk dramatically because of the 
introduction of containers. For example, the costs for shipping a full 40-foot container 
from China to the United States in 2006 were estimated to be as low as $2,000. 819F819F40 
Shippers may benefit from even lower freight rates, when carriers try to avoid 
unprofitable movement of empty containers and are thus willing to offer enticing prices 
as long as reallocation of empty containers is prevented. 820F820F41 This stems from the fact that 
commerce and the resulting traffic of containers is rarely balanced, which exposes 
carriers to risks associated with the movement of empty containers – a process that 
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generates only costs and no income. It has been estimated that about 20% of the world 
container throughput consists of empty containers.821F821F42 
At the same time, the container industry is not static. As it will be observed 
below, the constant innovation in containers and container vessels keeps that sector of 
the shipping industry developing. This is fostered by the growth of world trade – it is 
estimated that by 2020 the global container traffic will reach 371 million TEU. 822F822F43 There is 
one distinctive route, through which containerized trade flows and this is the East-West 
route, where the biggest economies of scale can be achieved. It is estimated that about 
85% of the containers carried around the world are transported along that route, and 
those vessels do not even enter the Southern hemisphere while circumnavigating the 
planet.823F823F44 Conversely, the trade lanes along the less voluminous North-South route serve 
ports situated in developing countries as well as small island developing states (SIDS), 
which can hardly afford investing in the port infrastructure that is necessary to support 
the bigger container vessels.824F824F45 
With the introduction of a new transportation system, and with the 
commissioning of construction of ever larger vessels, new shipping perils appear on the 
horizon. Although the number of claims is reported to have shrunk in the recent years, 
the ever growing capacity of container vessels poses inherent threats. 825F825F46 One of them is 
the increasing value of the cargo carried on a single vessel. Today’s container vessel is 
capable of carrying cargo worth of nearly $1 billion. 826F826F47 Therefore, a possible disaster 
leading to loss of a fully laden container vessel with all her cargo could expose cargo 
insurers, as well as P&I insurers, to claims for a staggering amount. 
3. Technical parameters 
This section deals with the technical aspects of container transport, in particular 
the technicalities associated with size, structure and type of shipping containers and the 
vessels that carry them as well as the infrastructure that supports the whole process. To 
begin with, when talking about container ships, one must take into account that there is 
a vast array of vessels designed to carry containers as well as a vast array of container 
types. 
3.1 Containers – size, dimensions, design, and types 
3.1.1 Size and dimensions 
Containers, also referred to as shipping containers, standard ISO containers 
(isotainers), intermodal containers, cargo containers, Connex boxes, or less formally 
known simply as “boxes”, are typically expressed as TEU, which stands for a “trailer 
equivalent unit” or a “twenty-foot equivalent unit”, and designates a trailer that is 20 
                                               
42 Mark Garrett (editor) – ‘Encyclopedia of Transportation: Social Science and Policy’, SAGE Publications, 
Inc. (2014), Volume 1, p. 412. 
43 Tom Schox – ‘Containing a Problem’, Maritime Risk International, Vol. 28, Issue 9, 2014, pp. 16-17.  
44 UNCTAD – Review of Maritime Transport 2014, p. xiii. 
45 UNCTAD – Review of Maritime Transport 2014, p. 71. 
46 Tom Schox – ‘Containing a Problem’, Maritime Risk International, Vol. 28, Issue 9, 2014, pp. 16-17 (ibid.). 
47 Tom Schox – ‘Containing a Problem’, Maritime Risk International, Vol. 28, Issue 9, 2014, pp. 16-17 (ibid.). 
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feet long (6.1 meters), has a cubic capacity of approximately 33 cubic meters, and a 
carrying capacity of about 28 metric tons. 827F827F48 But setting standardized size and 
dimensions, however, was not an easy task. 
Already in the early years of container shipping, there were serious obstacles, one 
of them being the lack of standardization. 828F828F49 Various companies used containers with 
different size. For example, Matson Navigation Company on the US West Coast used 24-
foot containers, while McLean’s new company Sea-Land used 35-foot containers. In 
Europe, on the other hand, containers represented a wooden crate reinforced with 
steel.829F829F50 Since containers differed so much, they couldn’t be interchangeable and the true 
effect of containerization could not be revealed. 
In the late 1950s, the American Standards Association (ASA) 830F830F51 and the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) began working towards achieving 
uniformity in container specifications. Since there was no consensus on which standard 
should be applied internationally, a considerable amount of time and effort were needed 
before an informal international agreement was reached in 1967 and the standardized 
ISO container was adopted. 831F831F52 With regard to size, decimal-based guidelines emerged, 
which means that containers could have length that is divisible by ten (e.g. 10 feet, 20 
feet, 30 feet), whereas the maximum length was 40 feet. 832F832F53 The other dimensions of the 
shipping container were also standardized, namely the width was 8 feet (2.44 meters), 
while the height of a standard ISO container was originally set to be 8 feet as well, 
largely in order to suit most of the railway tunnels. The current standard for a 
container’s height is, however, 8.6 feet (2.59 meters). 833F833F54 Thus, the dimensions of a TEU 
are set at 20’ x 8’ x 8.6’, and of the FEU at 40’ x 8’ x 8.6’. 
Further agreement was reached that two 20-foot containers placed one next to 
each other end-to-end would have exactly the same length as one 40-foot container. 
Similarly, any refrigeration equipment of a refrigerated container (reefer) should not be 
protruding with the effect that the original dimensions of the container are preserved. 834F834F55 
Since 1961, when ISO set uniform standards for all shipping containers, the industry 
practice has shown preference towards the 20-foot (TEU) and 40-foot containers (FEU), 
whereas 10-foot and 30-foot containers did not gain popularity. The TEU is so commonly 
used that it has nowadays become a standard reference for measurement of volume of 
cargo or ship capacity. Today, there are still non-standardized containers in use, 
                                               
48 Prem Nath Dhar – ‘Global Cargo Management: Concept, Typology, Law and Policy’, Kanishka Publishers, 
Distributors (2008), p.2 
49 The development of containerized trade created the necessity of establishing international standards for 
container safety. In 1972, the Convention for Safe Containers (CSC) was adopted, which entered into force in 
1977. 
50 Marc Levinson – ‘The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy 
Bigger’, Princeton University Press (2006), p. 127. 
51 After 1966, this non-profit organization was reorganized and renamed into American National Standards 
Institute (ANSI). 
52 W. David Angus – ‘Legal Implications of “The Container Revolution” in International Carriage of Goods’, 
McGill Law Journal (1968), Vol. 14, No.3, pp. 395-429, at p. 415. 
53 Brian J. Cudahy – ‘Box Boats: How Container Ships Changed the World’, Fordham University Press, New 
York (2006), p. 40. 
54 The arrival of hi-cube containers raised the height to 9.6 feet (2.90 meters). 
55 Brian J. Cudahy – ‘Box Boats: How Container Ships Changed the World’, Fordham University Press, New 
York (2006), p. 40. 




although rarely, such as the 48-foot and the 53-foot container as well as other non-
decimal lengths. 
Industry-wide standards were introduced not only with regard to size and 
dimensions but also with regard to the strength of the shipping container so that 
containers can be stacked on top of one another. Also, they had to be able to endure not 
only sea voyages but also road and railway voyages (where the exerted forces exerted 
higher) and that is why the end wall of the container had to be stronger. 
3.1.2 Anatomy of a container 
Shipping containers are usually made of aluminium or steel and each container is 
manufactured according to the ISO specifications and requirements, regardless of the 
country of manufacture.835F835F56 Therefore, the life of every container starts as a big role of 
steel, which is then unrolled and cut into sheets that are subsequently corrugated. A 
single container has a rectangular shape and consists of numerous components which 
add up to the structural rigidness. A standard shipping container weighs about two tons 
and has a maximum payload of about 22 tons, which means that the maximum gross 
weight (the tare weight of the container plus the weight of the cargo) is about 24 tons. 836F836F57 
The average lifespan of a container, during which it can effectively be used in shipping, 
is between 12 and 15 years as about 10% of the containers worldwide are repaired every 
year.837F837F58 
A standard dry cargo TEU is made up of a roof, two sidewalls, an end-wall, a 
floor, cross members, top rails and bottom rails, corner posts, corner castings, and a door 
assembly. The roof, the two sidewall panels, and the end-wall panel of the container are 
all made of corrugated aluminum or of corrugated Corten steel sheets, both of which 
have a high thermal conductivity. That results in the temperatures inside the container 
raising too much in the warm seasons or plummeting sharply in the cold seasons. The 
corrugated profile of the sheets ensures added strength and rigidity, while the Corten 
type of steel, known also as weathering steel, is corrosion-resistant and provides 
protection against the damaging effect of the salty seawater. Standard general-purpose 
containers have vents on one or both ends, which are in essence openings that provide 
ventilation.838F838F59 
The floor is made of a solid underlying frame and bottom cross members – they 
are the structural components which serve as a support for the container floor, and 
which have forklift pockets that allow a container to be lifted and carried by a forklift 
truck. The cross members, known also as floor supports, are covered by laminated 
flooring of marine plywood, which has durable properties in humid and wet conditions 
                                               
56 Although containerization was born in the USA, the first shipping containers were manufactured by 
Japan and Europe. Later on, production of containers embraced also South Korea, Honk Kong, and Taiwan. 
After China entered into the industry of container production in 1980, it has steadily increased its market 
share as nowadays the country has become the world’s largest manufacturer of ISO containers with a share 
of over 80%. Source: ISBU Association, http://www.isbu-
info.org/all_about_shipping_containers_industry.htm. 
57 These figures differ per container type. For example, the gross container weight of a FEU and of a 20-foot 
flat-rack container is about 30 tons. See: William V. Packard – ‘Cargoes’, 2nd edition (2005), p. 32. 
58 European Commission (Customs 2002 Programme) – ‘Good Practice Guide for Sea Container Control’, 
Chapter 1: General Approach to Container Control, p. 15. 
59 German Insurance Association (GDV) – ‘Container Handbook’ (2012), section 3.1.1.1 Container design and 
types. 
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and is resistant to delaminating and fungal attack. The floor of a container is the weight-
bearing element, and it must be strong enough to withstand the weight of the cargo 
inside the container, especially when the container is being lifted. Almost any container 
has securing points in the floor as well as on the wools so that cargo can be accordingly 
fastened and secured inside the container. 839F839F60 
The top and bottom rails, 840F840F61 the corner posts as well as the frames enclosing the 
front end and the rear end (where the door assembly is mounted), form the integral 
frame of the container. These are the load-carrying elements of the container, 
particularly when it comes to external load.841F841F62 In other words, the design of a shipping 
container provides strength to the frame of the container, which is the element that 
preserves the structural integrity, and not to the side walls. 842F842F63 Thus, it is the steel 
framework of a container and the vertical corner posts that allow several heavy 
containers to be stowed one atop the other, without the lower containers being smashed. 
The corner posts ensure that the weight of upper containers is distributed between the 
four corners of the container and, hence, no pressure is exerted on the top wall of the 
container. 
Another critical part of a container’s design is the corner castings. 843F843F64 They are 
located at all the eight corners, and their main function is to allow a container to be 
handled by a gantry crane, which attaches to the corner castings in order to lift the 
container. Corner castings play also an important role in stacking containers and 
attaching them to the deck of a seagoing vessel or to one another. This is done by means 
of twist locks which secure, for example, the top corner castings of one container to the 
floor corner castings of another container. 
The door assembly of a standard shipping container is attached to the rear-end 
frame by means of four or five hinges per door, and it is locked by means of four locking 
bars (lock rods). As containers are always stowed longitudinally on a container vessel, 
the door assembly is facing rearwards. Both the right-hand door and the left-hand door 
must be able to open to 180 degrees. Each door has two lock rods, and the sequence of 
opening is first the right-hand door, and then the left-hand door. On the left-hand door of 
every container there is a Safety Approval Plate (CSC plate) mounted, which is required 
by the Convention for Safe Containers.844F844F65 Every single shipping container must have this 
CSC plate installed, also known as a consolidated data plate, which serves as a passport 
of the container. The plate must include the following information in English or in 
French language: 
                                               
60 Capt. R.E. Thomas – ‘Thomas’ Stowage’, 2nd edition (1985), p. 52. 
61 The top rails are also known as headers while the bottom rails are sometimes referred to as sills. 
62 That is why, while one FEU is allowed to be stowed on two TEUs, two 20-foot containers should never be 
stowed on top of a 40-foot container unless there is a frame or platform which can support the weight of the 
two 20-foot containers. Otherwise, the top of the FEU, not being a load-carrying element of the container’s 
design, would collapse under the weight of the two TEUs. 
63 Capt. R.E. Thomas – ‘Thomas’ Stowage’, 2nd edition (1985), p. 52. 
64 This is the widely-used term for the elements located in the corners of a container, although they do not 
need to be installed through a process of casting. 
65 The Convention for Safe Containers (CSC), 1972 was developed and drafted by the International Maritime 
Organization. Its latest amendment (IMO Resolution MSC.355(92) adopted at London on 21 June 2013) 
entered into force on July 1, 2014. The Convention ensures that shipping containers that operate worldwide 
are subject to the same set of safety regulations. 




 “CSC SAFETY APPROVAL” 
 Country of approval and approval reference 
 Date (month and year) of manufacture 
 Manufacturer’s identification number of the container or, in the 
case of existing containers for which that number is unknown, the 
number allotted by the Administration 845F845F
66
 
 Maximum operating gross weight (kilograms and lbs.) 
 Allowable stacking weight for 1.8 g (kilograms and lbs.) 
 Transverse racking test load value (kilograms and lbs.). 846F846F
67
 
The approval reference on the CSC plate certifies that the container is designed 
and built according to the ISO requirements for dimensions and strength, and that it has 
been regularly maintained and is in a condition to be transported on board a seagoing 
vessel. Furthermore, the identification number is given to each and every container that 
is involved in commercial shipping. This is a unique unit number, known also as a box 
number, and it serves as a serial number of the container and allows to be established 
who the manufacturer of the container is, who is using it as well as where the container 
is located around the world at any given point of time. 847F847F68 A shipping container’s 
identification number always starts with a 4-letter prefix which usually ends up with a 
U, followed by a seven-digit number [XXX-U-123456-1]. The first three letters indicate 
the owner of the container, the forth letter indicates the product group, 848F848F69 whereas the 
first six digits signify the serial number and the last digit is the check digit, which is 
derived by a mathematical formula.849F849F70 Every identification number is unique in the sense 
that no two containers can have the same number. 
3.1.3 Types of containers 
Containers come in a variety of forms, shapes and uses. 850F850F71 The type of container 
employed in a given shipment mainly depends on the type of the products being carried 
or the special services that they need, or on the method of stuffing and handling of the 
container. Below, examples will be given of the most popular designs of shipping 
containers. An important characteristic is that almost all types of containers, regardless 
of the structural differences, share the same ISO-standardized external length, width 
and height.851F851F72 However, not all types of container are suitable to form part of a container 
stow on a vessel.852F852F73 
                                               
66 Prior to the 2014 amendment of the CSC, the identification number showed the owner of the container. 
67 Convention for Safe Containers (CSC), 1972, Annex I, Regulations for the Testing, Inspection, Approval 
and Maintenance of Containers, Regulation 1, paragraph 2, item (a). 
68 Source: the World Shipping Council, http://www.worldshipping.org/about-the-industry/containers. 
69 In this case, U stands for a “freight container” and is to be found on all freight containers. The letter J 
stands for detachable freight container-related equipment, while Z indicates trailers and chassis.  
70 German Insurance Association (GDV) – ‘Container Handbook’ (2012), section 3.3 Identification system. 
71 For a detailed technical specification about the different types of containers, see: European Commission 
(Customs 2002 Programme) – ‘Good Practice Guide for Sea Container Control’, Chapter 3: Container 
Specifications.  
72 An exception is the half height shipping container, which is half the height of a standard dry cargo 
container, namely 4.3 feet. These containers are used primarily for heavy cargo per cubic meter such as coal 
or stones. Another exception is the high-cube container, which is 9.6 feet tall although otherwise similar in 
structure to the standard dry cargo container. High-cubes are most often 40 feet long. 
73 Containers are manufactured in accordance with the ISO 668 standard, which classifies intermodal 
freight shipping containers and provides standardized size and weight. However, there is a variety of sizes 
and types under that standard. 
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The most common type of a container is the standard dry cargo container, also 
known as the general purpose container or the closed box container, which is designed 
for the transportation of dry materials. This container is ISO-standardized and, while its 
length may differ between 20 feet, 40 feet, 10 feet, or 30 feet, its width and height is 
always 8 feet and 8.6 feet respectively. The standard dry cargo container usually has 
doors at only one end. 
The next three types of containers are envisaged to carry out of gauge cargo 
(OOG). These are goods and materials that extend beyond the standardized ISO 
dimensions of a shipping container for general purpose. Such cargo is, therefore, carried 
on flat rack containers, platforms, and open top containers. 
Flat rack containers, or flat racks, are used for the transportation of cargo that is 
either overwidth or overheight, or both. They have the same dimensions as the 
abovementioned container type, and usually come in lengths of 20 and 40 feet but, unlike 
standard dry cargo containers, flat racks are missing a roof and their sides are 
collapsible. In some types of flat rack containers even the ends can be collapsed. These 
are called Collapsible Flat Racks and are, thus, converted into platforms. In essence, 
these platform containers have the shape and size roughly of a floor of a standard 
shipping container, with the exception that platform containers have much stronger base 
construction. Hence, they are appropriate for the carriage of heavy equipment and 
machinery, large vehicles, boats or other pleasure crafts that are being fastened to the 
flat rack. Cargo transported via flat racks or platform containers must be able to 
withstand moisture. 
Open top containers, or open tops, has a convertible top. This means that the 
container’s roof, which consists of portable roof-bows covered with tarpaulin, can be 
completely removed. The removable roof-bows serve not only to support the tarpaulin on 
top, but also to strengthen the roof and to add to the overall structural integrity of the 
container. The open top allows easy stuffing of the container as the interior is easily 
accessible through the top. Open tops are used the carriage of overheight and bulky 
cargo such as logs or odd-sized machinery as well as all kind of heavy cargo that can be 
loaded in the container only by means of an overhead crane. 
Open end containers, also known as tunnel containers, have doors on both ends, 
which facilitates greatly loading and unloading the cargo in and out of the container. 
Open side containers are used for easy stuffing of the cargo into the container. 
They are provided with doors located at either side of the container, which allows for a 
completely open side. This facilitates loading of overwidth materials which cannot be 
loaded easily through the normal door or through the roof. The usual cargo transported 
into such containers is vegetables and other edibles as well as pallets and unitized cargo. 
Hardtop containers are available as 20-foot and 40-foot and are equipped with a 
removable steel roof, which is fitted with a forklift rings so that the roof could be 
removed by means of a forklift or crane. Thus, the container can be opened and closed 
much faster than a soft-top container (i.e. an open top container), which facilitates 
handling. The steel roof weighs about 450 kg (990 lbs.) and, if needed, it can be lashed to 
a side-wall and stowed upright inside the container during transport, thus leaving the 
top of the container open and, at the same time, occupying little space in the container – 




it reduces the container width by only 13 cm. If required, tarpaulings could be utilized to 
cover the open top of the container. Moreover, if required for stuffing purposes, the 
removable roof can be manually uplifted by means of locking handles, without the need 
of using a forklift or a ladder, thus providing additional 7 cm. This increases the loading 
height and allows the carriage of over-height cargoes as well as heavy-load cargoes since 
the floor of the hardtop container is reinforced. Goods can be loaded both through the 
door opening and through the roof opening. The cargo can also be better lashed and 
secured as hardtop containers have more lashing points than standard dry cargo 
containers. 
Another type of a special container, and a very popular one, is the refrigerated 
container, commonly known as a reefer. These temperature-regulating shipping 
containers are used to maintain certain pre-cooled cargo temperature and not to cool 
down the products or warm them up. Reefers have their integral refrigeration unit, 
which is dependent on external power. That is why refrigerated containers are to be 
found on deck where there are power points and where the reefers and their 
refrigeration equipment can easily be inspected during the journey. While temperature 
inside can be maintained up to 30°C and as low as -60°C, reefers are also equipped with 
a dehumidification system which guarantees the desired humidity in the container. 
These containers are generally set at their pre-determined temperature when they are 
loaded on board.853F853F74 Also, refrigerated containers are fully functional at outside 
temperatures of up to 50°C. 854F854F75 A vast array of goods can be carried in a reefer, mostly 
perishable products such as meat, fish, seafood, dairy products, fruits, vegetables as well 
as fresh flowers, chemicals and pharmaceuticals. Those can be carried also in insulated 
or thermal containers that are lacking a refrigeration unit but also provide for 
temperature control due to their construction which is similar to the concept of the 
“thermos” bottle. Another way to maintain temperature is to connect such thermal 
containers to the vessel’s refrigerating system by means of coupling units. 855F855F76 
Tank containers, known also as flexitanks or liquid bulk containers, are designed 
to carry a variety of bulk liquids such as chemicals but also vegetable oil and wine. They 
consist of an ISO framework, in which one or more cylindrical or spherical tanks are 
mounted. 
The so called “bulktainer”, or dry bulk container, is a container which is designed 
to carry cargo in bulk. It resembles a standard dry cargo container but it has hatches on 
the top that enable bulk cargo to be loaded into the container directly. The bulktainer 
also has gates at the bottom in order for the cargo to be discharged when the container is 
tipped or lifted above the ground. 
Half height containers, as the name suggests, have half the height of the above 
mentioned containers that is, they are 4.3 feet high. The other dimensions are preserved. 
                                               
74 Germanischer Lloyd Aktiengesellschaft – “Guidelines for the Carriage of Refrigerated Containers on 
Board Ships”, Hamburg (2003), Section 1, para. A(4).  
75 Germanischer Lloyd Aktiengesellschaft – “Guidelines for the Carriage of Refrigerated Containers on Board 
Ships”, Hamburg (2003), Section 1, para. A(3). 
76 R. C. Springall – ‘The transport of goods in refrigerated containers: an Australian perspective’, Lloyd’s 
Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly, May 1987, Part 2, p. 216, at p. 222. 
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These containers are used for high-density cargoes, the weight of which cannot be 
supported by a standard dry cargo container. 856F856F77 
3.2 Container vessels and the necessary infrastructure 
3.2.1 Container ship design 
The introduction of containers was a technological progress, which resulted in a 
gradual switch from general cargo vessels to specially designed container vessels. 
Figures show that while the container-vessel fleet takes in 1980 only a tiny 1.6% share of 
the world’s deadweight tonnage, in the year of 2000 the share of containerships is 
already 8%, and in 2014 it is 12.8%. 857F857F78 On the other hand, the world fleet of general cargo 
vessels has dropped from 17% in 1980 to 4.6% in 2014. 858F858F79 
As seen above, containers can be successfully carried on board general cargo 
vessels as long as the boxes are properly secured and lashed to ensure the sound loading 
and stowage of the containers. However, much of the containers are nowadays carried on 
purpose-built vessels that are designed exclusively for their carriage. Only these vessels, 
designed exclusive for the carriage of container, are designated as container ships. 
Vessels, which transport shipping containers as part of a mixed cargo, are referred to as 
“suitable for the carriage of containers in holds xxx and x”. 
A major technological advent in the construction of container vessels came in the 
late 1960s with the introduction of cellular container ships, 859F859F80 which have holds that are 
equipped with vertical rails (the cell guides). These vessels made possible for cargo space 
to be optimally used and container stowage to be much more efficient. 
As pointed out in section 2.3, from the perspective of maritime economics, the 
construction of bigger container vessels leads to concentration on the market of liner 
shipping. On the other hand, the bigger the vessel the bigger economies of scale, which 
translates into an efficient and reliable transportation service, offered at a low cost. 
Besides the lower freight rates, large container vessels are also characterized by the fact 
that they are usually offering service along major shipping routes, where demand is 
significantly big and where the full capacity and benefits of the vessel can be exploited. 860F860F81 
There are several other driving factors, which have caused container-carrying 
capacity to rise constantly. One of the reasons for container vessels getting bigger and 
bigger can be traced back to the oil crisis in 1970s, as a result of which the average speed 
of containerships dropped within a decade from 25 to 20 knots in order fuel to be saved. 861F861F82 
Now that the practice of slow steaming had made it obsolete to pursue ship designs that 
                                               
77 Capt. R.E. Thomas – ‘Thomas’ Stowage’, 2nd edition (1985), pp. 52-53. 
78 UNCTAD – Review of Maritime Transport 2014, p. 29. 
79 UNCTAD – Review of Maritime Transport 2014, p. 29 (ibid.) 
80 Known as gearless ships, these are purpose-built container vessels deprived of any cargo gear. 
81 Meifeng Luo, Lixian Fan and Wesley W. Wilson – ‘Firm growth and market concentration in liner 
shipping’, Journal of Transport Economics and Policy (JTEP), Volume 48, Number 1, 1 January 2014, pp. 
171-187, at p. 180. 
82 Marc Levinson – ‘The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy 
Bigger’, Princeton University Press (2006), p. 234. 




would allow higher speed, naval engineers could instead focus on increasing the payload 
of container vessels.862F862F83 
Secondly, globalization processes and the increase in world trade have also an 
impact on the growth of containerization. With the world economy getting bigger, and 
with nations increasingly trading with one another, there is more cargo to be 
transported. Naturally, when cargo, which is primarily moved by means of containers, 
has risen, so is the demand for containers and container-carrying vessels. This reverse 
impact is another example of the symbiosis between containerization and globalization. 
Thirdly, the significant economies of scale, the increased operating efficiency (e.g. 
fuel efficiency) as well as the optimized environmental impact – all benefits that are 
achieved through the employment of bigger container vessels – have directly led to a 
staggering growth in the size of container ships and to a continual increase in their 
capacity. For example, in 2005 the largest containership was Hapag-Lloyd’s Colombo 
Express – 1,099 feet (335 meters) long and 141 feet (43 meters) wide – which was capable 
of carrying 8,449 TEUs. The ship’s capacity was double the capacity of any of McLean’s 
Econships (4,258 TEUs) that had been the biggest container vessels at the time when 
they had been acquired in 1984. 863F863F84 In other words, the capacity of container vessels had 
doubled for a period of about 20 years between 1984 and 2005, which is a period that is 
even shorter than the lifespan of a containership. 864F864F85 Interestingly, the largest container 
vessel in 2015 is MSC Oscar, 1,297 feet long (395.4 meters) and 194 feet wide (59 
meters), with a capacity of 19,224 TEUs – more than double the capacity of the Colombo 
Express launched in 2005. This means that the pace in shipbuilding has nowadays 
increased even more as it has taken twice less time to double the capacity of the existing 
biggest container vessel.865F865F86 
Apart from the incredible pace of the shipbuilding industry, the overall increase 
in container-capacity since the beginning of the container revolution is also striking: the 
container-carrying capacity is estimated to have increased by about 1,200% in the last 50 
                                               
83 The financial crisis in 2008-2009 resulted in a further drop of the cruising speed of container vessels as 
shipping companies introduced the so called slow steaming, which takes place at the rate of 18-20 knots. 
Two main advantages stem from cutting sailing speed – these are the reduction of oil consumption (less tons 
of bunkers used per day) and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Nowadays, there are four main 
containership speed classes. Normal speed is considered to be 20-25 knots (37-46 km/h), which is the optimal 
design speed for a containership. Slow steaming is in the range of 18-20 knots (33-37 km/h), which provides 
fuel savings but extends cruising time; more than half of the container vessels operate with that speed. 
Extra slow steaming (super slow steaming or economical speed) is carried out at the speed of 15-18 knots 
(28-33 km/h) and it decreases fuel consumption even further but is applied on shorter distances because the 
travelling time is substantially extended. Lastly, the minimal cost class allows steaming at 12-15 knots (22-
28 km/h) and it is the lowest technically-possible speed as any speed slower than that does not bring any 
further fuel economies. However, such a slow speed is not commercially viable. See: T. Notteboom and P. 
Cariou – ‘Fuel surcharge practices of container shipping lines: Is it about cost recovery or revenue making?’, 
IAME Conference, Copenhagen, 24-26 June 2009. 
84 Brian J. Cudahy – ‘Box Boats: How Container Ships Changed the World’, Fordham University Press, New 
York (2006), p. 241. 
85 The average lifespan of a container vessel is about 26 years. Source: the World Shipping Council, 
http://www.worldshipping.org/about-the-industry/liner-ships/container-ship-design. 
86 To be precise, Colombo Express’s capacity of 8,449 TEUs was doubled already in 2013 when Maersk 
acquired their Triple-E class container vessels, each with capacity of over 18,000 TEUs. Therefore, it took 
only eight years for the shipping industry to produce a vessel that can carry twice the amount of containers 
that the biggest container vessel in 2005 was capable of transporting. 
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years.866F866F87 This growth in size and capacity, however, are not limitless. Container vessels 
must be able to enter world’s major ports and, therefore, draft, length and width has to 
be not excessively big in order for the ship to be able to call at the particular port and use 
its infrastructure. In particular, the beam of future container vessels may be constrained 
by the reach of the new-generation shore-based gantry cranes which have to have access 
up to the outermost row of containers. Cranes were traditionally designed to reach up to 
13 containers wide but today’s state-of-the-art container vessels require cranes that have 
much greater reach – 22-23 containers wide.867F867F88 
By September 2015, there are over 6,000 liner vessels, 5,145 of which are fully 
cellular ships.868F868F89 Today, there are four categories of container vessels according to their 
capacity: feeder vessels (<1000 TEUs), handy-size vessels (1,000-3,000 TEUs), Panamax 
vessels869F869F90 (up to 4,000 TEUs), and post-Panamax vessels (up to about 19,000 TEUs). The 
post-Panamax category has constantly been changed as major container operators are 
persistently ordering vessels with an enhanced design allowing greater capacity. The 
crown for the world’s biggest container vessel has been quickly passed from one vessel to 
another in the recent years. As of 2013 up to late 2014, Maersk Triple-E vessels, with 
their capacity of 18,270 TEUs, were the biggest containerships by the time with 
staggering size and tonnage (400 meters long; 59 meters beam; 16 meters draft; 165,000 
DWT). Then, in November 2014, CSCL Globe, owned by the Shanghai-based China 
Shipping Container Line (CSCL), set a new record with its capacity of 19,100 TEUs and 
increased tonnage (184,320 DWT). But her reign didn’t last for long as only two months 
later, in January 2015, MSC Oscar, operated by the Mediterranean Shipping Company 
(MSC) and capable of carrying 19,224 TEUs, was christened. 
This is to show that container ships continue to get bigger in terms of carrying 
capacity. What is more, the trend to design and construct container vessels with bigger 
and bigger capacity is here to stay. Maersk Line, the biggest container operator and a 
subsidiary of the oil and shipping giant A.P. Møller-Mærsk Group, already announced 
that they ordered 11 new container vessels, which will have a capacity of 19,630 TEUs 
each, and which will be employed in the busiest trade route – Asia-Europe.870F870F91 
Furthermore, industry experts predict that next-generation container vessels will have a 
capacity of 22 to 24 thousand TEUs and length of up to 400-450 meters.871F871F92 Any further 
extension of the length of container vessels, however, is deemed unlikely because of the 
steeply rising additional costs associated with constructing longer ships, which will start 
                                               
87 Source: the World Shipping Council, http://www.worldshipping.org/about-the-industry/liner-
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88 UNCTAD – Review of Maritime Transport 2014, pp. 70-71. 
89 Alphaliner – Cellular Fleet September 2015. Available at: http://www.alphaliner.com/top100/  
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running contrary to the economies of scale. 872F872F93 And it is precisely the economy of scales 
which has been the main driving factor for the development of bigger containerships. 
3.2.2 Critical infrastructure 
The growth of containerships runs in parallel with the development of ports and 
local infrastructure, with the automatization of a lot of the operations during loading, 
stowing, and discharging as well as with the introduction of powerful computer systems 
and software that are capable of tracking the containers and of developing detailed 
stowage plans for the placement and positioning of those containers on board in the most 
efficient way873F873F94 and also with regard to the vessel’s stability. Automation has also played 
a great role in ports. Automated stacking systems boost even further the productivity at 
the shore. Higher productivity means more containers being serviced and moved per 
hour, which allows seaborne trade to take place faster. Without computer systems to 
instantly locate a container amidst the thousands of other containers lying in a container 
terminal, the whole transportation of containerized goods would be nearly halted. That 
is why it is a vital prerequisite that each and every container involved in the 
transportation industry have an identification number. 874F874F95 
Cranes also deserve a special merit and are as important as containerships when 
it comes to the quick loading or discharging of containerized cargo. In order to efficiently 
serve today’s big container vessels, gantry cranes are installed on rails that run in 
parallel to the berthed vessel so that both the fore and the aft sections can be accessed. 
Gantry cranes can be up to 430 feet (131 meters) tall and, in order to reach out the 
outermost row of containers, they are able to embrace the beam of any container vessel, 
some of which are wider than the Panama Canal. Each crane is guided by an operator 
located in a cabin high on the crane. The crane lifts a container by means of a spreader. 
This is a device with a rectangular frame, which corresponds to the size of a container’s 
roof, and which attaches to the four corners of the metal box. The spreader is able to 
reach every container through a trolley, to which it is hanged, and which moves along 
the beam of the vessel. In this way, an average crane is able to move about 30-40 
containers per hour from the ship to the dock or vice versa, which means that a 
container is loaded every two minutes. For comparison, it took seven minutes for the 
crane to load a container on the Ideal-X back in 1956.875F875F96 
It is thus far obvious that the containerized service has become an ever more 
integrated process, which includes the construction of container terminals with suitable 
berth facilities and the necessary draught, container depots and container freight 
stations as well as sophisticated hardware and software equipment. Container traffic 
has shaped three categories of ports nowadays: hubs, also known as load centers, which 
service the biggest container vessels, operating at great distances, and where containers 
are transhipped to smaller ports; direct ports, which service bigger vessels but do not 
                                               
93 UNCTAD – Review of Maritime Transport 2014, p. 71 (ibid.) 
94 An example is stowing reefer containers in bays where there are electrical plugs to supply power to the 
refrigerating equipment; or stowing containers carrying hazardous cargo away from other containers which 
may pose risks of explosion or other adverse effects if they interact with each other. 
95 See: section 3.1.2. 
96 Marc Levinson – ‘The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy 
Bigger’, Princeton University Press (2006), p. 51. 
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perform transhipment, and feeder ports, which serve smaller vessels that operate 
between the feeder port and the closest load centers. 876F876F97 
3.2.3 Stowage planning and positioning of containers 
Stowage planning is required in order to allocate space for a container on board a 
containership taking into account the order of the port of calls and the port where the 
container has to be discharged as well as the size, type, and weight of the container, and, 
in some instances, the nature of the cargo (e.g. hazardous cargo, out of gauge cargo, 
refrigerated goods). Nowadays, this process is mostly performed by computers and 
software systems such as CASP (Computer Automated Stowage Planning) and Bulko. In 
general, all containers are segregated by destination as the containers destined for the 
farthest destination go to the bottom of the vessel, while those that are to be discharged 
at the next port of call go to the top. In a similar fashion, containers are segregated by 
weight as the heavier the box the more to the bottom it will be stowed and vice versa. 
To stow thousands of containers within a few hours, taking into account all 
characteristics of every container, has now turned into a task within the bounds of 
possibility mostly due to the increasing automatization of processes and also to the 
smart and universally applied system of locating, positioning and stowing a container, 
known as the bay-row-tier system.877F877F98  
 According to that system, each and every container on board a containership has 
a stow position, or also known as a cell position. The position is recorded in a concise 
manner through digits (e.g. 090284), and this short inscription reveals information such 
as whether it is a TEU or a FEU, whether it is stowed under deck or on deck, and also 
whether it is stowed at the port side or at the starboard side. The stow position of the 
container on board the ship is expressed through numerical coordinates that consist of 
six digits. The first two digits give information about the bay in which the container is 
stowed; the second couple of digits shows the row in which the container is positioned, 
and the last two digits indicates the tier. Therefore, to understand a stow position, one 
must be familiar with the notions bay, row, and tier as employed in containerized 
carriage and also how these are marked on the stowage plan. The stowage plan 
represents a full cross-sectional view of the containership, and the number of cross-
sectional views is equal to the number of bays on board the ship. 
Bays generally split a containership into compartments that run from the bow to 
the stern of the vessel. Thus, a bay is a compartment with the shape of the profile (the 
cross sectional view) of a containership, and it comprises both under deck and on deck 
space. Depending on the size of the container vessel, bays are designated with a number 
ranging from 01 to 40, where Bay 01 is the bay on the front of the vessel and Bay 40 is 
the bay on the aft. A single bay of, for example, the 2013 Triple-E type container vessels 
has a capacity of up to 459 TEUs. 878F878F99 
A row is a layer of containers that is situated lengthwise the vessel, namely it 
runs along the ship. Accordingly, the row number designates the container’s position 
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across the beam of a container vessel. Depending on the structure of the ship, rows are 
designated with numbers which start at 01 if the number of rows is even or at 00 if the 
number of rows is odd. In the latter case, Row 00 is situated in the middle of the bay (the 
center line of the vessel), around which the other rows are situated in a progressing 
order as odd-numbered rows progress rightwards and even-numbered rows progress 
leftwards. If rows start at 01, then Row 01 and Row 02 are located in the centerline of 
the vessel, with the other rows located following the same principle. 
Tiers are, essentially, vertical layers of containers. The tier expresses the level on 
which a container is loaded or, in other words, how high the container is stowed. Tier 
numbers start from 02 for containers stowed under deck and increase per two – e.g. Tier 
04, Tier 06, Tier 08, and so on. Tier numbers for containers stowed on deck start from 80 
and also increase by two – Tier 82, Tier 84, Tier 86, etc. Therefore, tiers are always 
expressed with even tier numbers. 
Thus, knowing the bay, row, and tier allows identifying the precise location where 
the container is stowed. Extra information is provided by the numbers themselves 
depending on whether they are even or odd numbers. For example, odd bay numbers 
(such as Bay 1, Bay 3, Bay 5) indicate that it is a 20-foot stow, whereas even bay 
numbers (such as Bay 2, Bay 4, Bay 6) shows that it is a 40-foot stow.879F879F100 With regard to 
rows, as stated, Row 01, together with Row 02, is centred in the middle of the bay, and 
all odd numbers (Row 3, Row 5, Row 7) progress outwards towards the right, while all 
even number (Row 2, Row 4, Row 6) progress outwards towards the left. Given that each 
plan is viewed from behind of the vessel, namely from the stern, odd numbered Rows are 
located closer to the starboard while even numbered rows are located closer to the port. 
Applying this system to the example provided above, 090284, it means that the 
container is a TEU stowed in Bay 09, Row 02, and Tier 84, the latter showing that it is 
stowed on deck. Another example, 400502 is a 40-foot container, because the bay number 
is even, and it is stowed on Bay 40, the last bay on the stern, Row 05, and Tier 02, which 
is the bottommost tier under deck. 
The stowage position, as expressed in numbers, is usually written down in the 
shipping documents, which allows, after the journey has been completed, verifying where 
exactly the container was stowed and carried, and this could be valuable evidence when 
establishing the factual setting in a subsequent lawsuit for cargo damage, for example. 
On an average post-Panamax container vessel, underdeck stowage reaches up to 
eleven containers high, while containers that are stacked on deck reach up to ten 
containers high and 22-23 containers across. They are usually interlocked with fittings. 
                                               
100 The rationale behind this numbering is as follows. All 20-foot containers (TEU) are assigned odd bay 
numbers – 01, 03, 05, 07, 09, etc. Thus, when a 40-foot container (FEU) is loaded, it will be sitting across two 
neighbouring bays – for example, Bay 05 and Bay 07. That is why the FEU will be given a bay number 06, 
while in the stowage plan (also known as the bay plan, which represents a full cross-sectional view of the 
vessel) the FEU will be shown as sitting on Bay 05 and the corresponding slot on the adjacent Bay 07 will be 
marked with X to signify that the slot is not available for stowing another container because it is occupied by 
the FEU as well. 
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4. The concept of containers – is a container considered a 
package for the purpose of the Hague and Hague-Visby 
Rules? 
In order to define the specific character of the carrier’s obligations over cargo 
carried in containers, one has to establish the legal content of the metal box itself. In the 
above sections, the nature of the shipping container was analyzed from technical and 
economic perspective but the kernel of the matter lies in the legal conceptualization of 
containers. While earlier maritime legislation unsurprisingly did not address containers, 
present-time conventions fell under the influence of containerization. In that regard, 
containers also have an impact on the carrier’s obligations over the cargo prescribed by 
the Hague-Visby Rules. 
Existing international conventions are unsuccessful in giving a clear and uniform 
answer to what constitutes a container, and that leaves to the courts plenty of leeway for 
interpretation.880F880F101 To begin with, it is not easy to define a container either as part of the 
vessel or as cargo. Authorities in various situations have considered containers 
differently and have viewed them as, for example, “detachable storage compartments of 
the ship”,881F881F102 “a large metal object, functionally part of the ship”,882F882F103 “a modern substitute 
for the hold of the vessel”,883F883F104 “a functional package”,884F884F105 “a sophisticated form of 
package”,885F885F106 or as “an instrument of transportation service”.886F886F107 This divergence is mainly 
due to the fact there are a lot of variables involved in containerized shipments, namely 
what are the carriage conditions (FCL/LCL); who has supplied the container; what type 
of a container ship is used for the carriage, etc.  
A decisive factor in determining the nature of containers seems to be where one puts 
the accent. One interesting opinion, for example, stresses on the fact that containers are being 
used not solely to consolidate and accommodate cargo but also to secure adjacent containers 
by stacking them one on top the other and lashing them together, which leads to the 
conclusion that the carrier’s obligation to load, stow, secure, and lash the cargo on board 
cannot be performed without the use of containers. 887F887F
108
 Looked from that angle, containers 
indeed seem to draw nearer to the concept of being part of the vessel. Although the author of 
the current academic thesis has not found similar reasoning in case law, it represents a very 
interesting view and a well substantiated one. 
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Another resemblance between a seagoing vessel and a carrier-supplied container is the 
concept of container demurrage, which can be likened to the demurrage paid with regard to a 
ship. 888F888F
109
 In essence, they both represent liquidated damages for late return of preliminarily 
provided equipment or property that is supplied by the carrier or shipowner for the purpose of 
the carriage of the cargo. The container demurrage is charged by the shipping lines when their 
customers hold the container at the container terminal for longer than the agreed free days. If 
the container is held by the customer outside the container terminal for longer than the agreed 
time, then he will be levied detention charges. Thus, container demurrage (usually levied for 
import cargo)889F889F
110
 is charged on the basis of the agreed period between the discharge from the 
vessel until gate-out of the full container, whereas container detention charges for import 
cargo 890F890 F
111
 are levied with regard to the period between gate-out of the full container up until 
gate-in of the empty container. 891F891F
112
 Very often the charge type will be merged, which is called a 
Merged Demurrage & Detention Time (merged D&D). 892F892F
113
 It relates to the duration of the two 
periods combined and applied on the basis described above as well as in accordance with 
whether it is an import or an export cargo. In effect, demurrage relates to a container which 
has cargo in it, whereas detention is related to an empty container, and both are charged after 
the free time has expired. 
The questions of whether a container is a package or not, and whether it is part of 
the vessel or part of the cargo, are not necessarily overlapping and will not always lead 
to the same answer although they may seem identical at first sight. In general, when a 
container is characterized as a package, it will be thought of as part of the cargo, while 
when it is not considered a package, it will be perceived as part of the vessel. However, it 
could be the case that a shipper-supplied container (i.e. part of the cargo) is not 
considered a package for limitation purposes. As it will be shown in this section, a 
straightforward solution to conceptualizing containers cannot easily be found. 
A definition of a container can be found in a few international instruments. First 




For the purpose of the present Convention, unless expressly provided 
otherwise: 
1. ““Container”” means an article of transport equipment: 
(a) of a permanent character and accordingly strong enough to be 
suitable for repeated use; 
(b) specially designed to facilitate the transport of goods, by one 
or more modes of transport, without intermediate reloading; 
                                               
109 See Chapter I, section 2.2.3 above. 
110 Container demurrage with regard to export cargo comprises the period between gate-in of the full 
container until loading on board the vessel. 
111 Accordingly, the period relevant for container detention charges for export cargo is between the picking of 
the empty container by the merchant at the terminal until gate-in of the full container. 
112 See, for example, the general terms of CMA CGM on: https://www.cma-
cgm.com/ebusiness/tariffs/demurrage-detention. 
113 It is also known as combined demurrage/detention. 
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(c) designed to be secured and/or readily handled, having corner 
fittings for these purposes; 
(d) of a size such that the area enclosed by the four outer bottom 
corners is either: 
(i) at least 14 sq.m. (150 sq.ft.) or 
(ii) at least 7 sq.m. (75 sq.ft.) if it is fitted with top corner fittings; 
the term “container” includes neither vehicles nor packaging; however, 
containers when carried on chassis are included.893F893F
114
 
It is evident that containers, at least from a safety perspective, are not 
characterized as packaging or vehicles. The ISO international standard for shipping 
containers, furthermore, has a very similar definition. According to ISO 668:2013(E), a 
freight container is also an article of transport equipment, which is: 
a) of a permanent character and accordingly strong enough to be 
suitable for repeated use; 
b) specially designed to facilitate the carriage of goods by one or 
more modes of transport, without intermediate reloading; 
c) fitted with devices permitting its ready handling, particularly its 
transfer from one mode of transport to another; 
d) so designed as to be easy to fill and empty; 
e) having an internal volume of 1 m3 (35,3ft3) or more 
Note 1 to entry: The term "freight container" does not include vehicles 
or conventional packing. 
While the definition in both conventions reveals that vehicles and packaging do 
not qualify for a container, it still remains unclear whether a container, consolidating 
goods, can be considered a package for the purpose of limiting the carrier’s liability and 
also with regard to the application of the carrier’s cargo-related obligations. And 
establishing how the law defines containers is vital for the operation of the relevant 
Hague and the Hague-Visby Rules’ provisions, especially those addressing carrier’s 
responsibilities and liabilities. A useful discussion about the legal nature of containers 
can be found in the debate whether a container is a package or not for the purpose of 
limitation of liability. In this regard, the 1924 Convention and the 1968 Visby 
amendments vary to such a degree that both instruments deserve to be discussed and 
analyzed separately. 
4.1 The Hague Rules 
Although the issue of the proper construction of the Hague Rules regarding what 
constitutes a “package” has been in the centre of disputes between cargo underwriters 
and P&I clubs since the dawn of containerization, it has not been approached by English 
law until the late 1990s. 894F894F115 Much earlier before that, however, American courts were 
confronted with this problem and produced conflicting solutions. 
When US courts were faced with the issue whether a container is a COGSA 
package, they usually took into account three main factors: the ownership of the 
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container, the information on the bill of lading, and the nature and physical 
characteristics of the cargo inside the container. 895F895F116 There are three distinct standpoints 
of American courts with regard to the status of containers in US COGSA, which is the 
US enactment of the Hague Rules, and each of these standpoints puts more or less 
emphasis on the factors just mentioned. These three separate views will be discussed in 
a nutshell and they are as follows. 
Firstly, the decisions in Leather’s Best Inc v S.S. Mormaclynx896F896F117 and Shinko Boeki 
Co. v S.S. Pioneer Moon 897F897F118 strongly maintain the proposition that carrier-owned 
containers whose contents are fully disclosed are not considered a “package” within the 
meaning of COGSA but are “functionally part of the ship”.898F898F119 This view reflects the 
traditional reluctance of US courts to consider containers as packages, because such an 
approach may allow carriers and their P&I insurers to abuse the package limitation 
provision (§ 1304(5) of US COGSA, which is the equivalent of Article IV rule 5 of the 
Hague Rules) and virtually nullify it by rendering it meaningless – a cargo claim for a 
monetary compensation for a single package would not even justify the litigation 
costs.899F899F120 However, this first US approach to classify containers, namely not considering a 
container a “package”, is a satisfactory solution to possible problems that may arise in 
LCL shipments when a container holds packaged cargo of more than one shippers and/or 
consignees. Thus, this view relies highly on the party who stuffed the container. If it was 
the carrier to consolidate the cargo in the container, the court will not allow the 
container to be characterized as a package and any such provision will be struck by § 
1303(8), which is the equivalent of Article III rule 8. Conversely, if it was the shipper to 
stuff and seal the container without enumerating the contents on the bill of lading, it is 
very likely that the container will be treated as a package by courts. 900F900F121 
The second view, which is highly criticized, is enshrined in the rulings of Royal 
Typewriter v M/V Kulmerland901F901F122 and Cameco v S.S. American Legion,902F902F123 which 
introduced the so called functional economics test. According to that test, a container 
could be considered a functional package provided that the cartons or packaging units 
inside were not solid enough to withstand the carriage of break bulk, and the container 
was thus essential for the preservation of those cartons or packaging units. Accordingly, 
the opposite presumption is created if the individual cartons or wrappings stowed inside 
the container meet the abovementioned criteria that is, they are sturdy enough to 
withstand break bulk carriage. In that latter case, it is the packaging units inside the 
container that are considered packages within COGSA, and not the container itself. 
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Thus, this “functional package unit” test comes down to whether the cargo owner’s 
packages are functional, i.e. usable, for overseas shipment. 
This is a dubious solution because neither the Hague Rules nor US COGSA hint 
that goods within a container may be considered as carried in packages, or not, based on 
a vague standard of how durable the packaging is. Furthermore, the presumption 
created by the functional economics test in both instances can be rebutted if there is 
evidence of the intention of the contracting parties to the opposite effect. Thus, the 
parties’ intent is decisive according to this view, which is another serious flaw because 
contractual parties cannot be expected to arrive at a characterization of containers that 
is always sound and consistent with the wording and purpose of the statute. This is a 
duty for the court to do through interpretation. 903F903F124 Besides, a rule that is dependent on 
the parties’ intention undermines the negotiability of the bill of lading because a prudent 
third party B/L holder would have great difficulties establishing the corresponding 
intent solely from the four corners of the bill. Thus, he will be unsure if his shipment is 
characterized as a single package, and also uncertain of the risks he undertakes. 904F904F125 
In The “Aegis Spirit”, Beeks D.J. held carrier-owned containers to be not a 
package within the meaning of COGSA, thus sharing the reasoning expressed in The 
Mormaclynx and The Shinko Boeki. The functional economic test found in earlier US 
decisions was rejected, and the fundamental factor was no longer the ‘parties’ intent but 
the legislative intent of the drafters and the court’s interpretation. The district judge 
submitted that it was according to the plain and ordinary meaning of the term to 
consider the cartons inside the container as “packages” for the purpose of COGSA. 905F905F126 
Containers, on the other hand, were deemed to be conceptually different than packages: 
I would liken these containers to detachable stowage compartments 
of the ship. They simply serve to divide the ship’s overall cargo space 
into smaller more serviceable loci. Shipper’s packages are quite 
literally “stowed” in the containers utilizing stevedoring practices and 




 If this reasoning is objectively tested, then the comparison seems to have some 
shortcomings. One fails to see how a ship’s stowage compartment could be lost at sea 
during a stormy weather; how it could be owned by a party that is not the shipowner; 
and how it could be loaded and unloaded hundreds of miles away from the port. 
Obviously, there is more than a cargo space involved when we are talking about shipping 
containers. Regardless of these imperfections in Beeks D.J.’s parallel between a 
container and a ship’s detachable stowage compartment, the clear distinction expressed 
by the judge between shipper-packaged cargo, on the one hand, and carrier-owned 
containers, on the other, suggests that there is a possibility for a container to be 
eventually considered as a “package” if it is owned and stuffed by the cargo interests. 
However, such possibility was not elaborated by the court:  
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[…] the appropriate application of the COGSA package limitation to 
containers owned by a shipper or any person other than the carrier 
such as a freight forwarder must await future determination. 907F907F
128
 
The third approach to classifying containers as a COGSA package or not has been 
shaped in three cases from the Second Circuit – Mitsui,908F908F129 Binladen,909F909F130 and Monica 
Textile.910F910F131 The rule enshrined was later modified by two lower courts from the Southern 
District of New York – Orient Overseas,911F911F132 and Alternative Glass Supplies.912F912F133 In essence, 
the rule is that “when a bill of lading explicitly discloses on its face the number of units 
within a container, and those units may reasonably be considered COGSA packages, 
then each of the units and not the container constitutes a COGSA package” [emphasis 
added].913F913F134 What is peculiar about this approach is that it sets a two-pronged standard 
whereby the reasoning is separated into two parts – the first one being the contractual 
agreement between the parties as evidenced in the bill of lading and the second one 
being the external evidence which is to indicate whether the contents of the container 
are packaged or not. Those other additional pieces of evidence are believed to be found in 
invoices, testimony, and photographic materials. 914F914F135 Both parts of the inquiry must be 
satisfied in order for the court to held the agreement between the parties valid. Thus, a 
shipment, which is listed in the bill as “2 containers said to contain 30 bundles of ingots” 
but the ingots are in fact only stacked and are neither strapped together nor secured in 
any way, is considered as two packages. 915F915F136 An exception to this rule is allowed when the 
parties expressly and unequivocally agreed to the contrary, namely that the container is 
the COGSA package, but such an agreement will require more than boilerplate wording 
in the B/L or inscribing the number of containers under the column “number of 
packages”.916F916F137 Furthermore, when a bill of lading does not list the contents inside the 
container as packaged, a court may look only in the contract of carriage and neglect the 
physical characteristics of the cargo inside a container – in this case the container will 
also be the COGSA package even if it has not been listed as such in the bill as long as no 
item or unit is described in the B/L as packaged for transport even if some of those units 
have in fact been prepared for shipment. 917F917F138 That is, even if packaged items are stowed 
inside the container they will not be eligible to be considered packages since they were 
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not disclosed in the bill of lading. 918F918F139 Remarkably, those cases leaned in their reasoning 
also on the Visby Protocol in order to support international uniformity 919F919F140 but the results 
are, nevertheless, a rather non-uniform and fact-oriented approach which is formed on a 
case-by-case basis. 
Having considered the three distinct views on containers, it is safe to conclude 
that they do not provide a definite solution to the issue of establishing whether the 
container is or is not a package. These American decisions, forming seemingly 
contradictory views on containers, are deemed to suffer from a “yoyo” effect, which is a 
serious obstacle for the predictability of court decisions involving damaged or lost 
containerized cargo.920F920F141 However, it is submitted that US courts nowadays generally 
consider a COGSA package to be each package inside of a container which is enumerated 
as such on the face of the bill of lading, or at least which could be reasonably considered 
as a COGSA package.921F921F142 Conversely, the container is considered a COGSA package if the 
above conditions are not fulfilled or if extrinsic evidence contradicts the number of 
packages that is shown on the face of the bill. 922F922F143 This test summarizes the third view 
discussed above, and it is more oriented towards the intention of the parties, at least if 
compared to the functional economics test, while at the same time it seems to stand close 
to the approach codified in the Hague-Visby Rules.923F923F144 
The decision in The “River Gurara”, which was the first reported English case to 
address the problem of whether a container is a “package” or not, concerned a voyage 
from West Africa to Europe, which ended up with the total loss of the vessel and her 
cargo near the Portuguese coast.924F924F145 Most of the goods were carried in containers and 
disputes arose whether the carrier could rely on a bill of lading clause, which stipulated 
that shipper-packed containers were considered “packages” within the meaning of the 
Hague Rules, thus allowing the carrier to limit his liability to £100 per container in 
accordance with Article IV rule 5 of the Hague Rules. 925F925F146 The containers were stuffed by 
the shippers privately and they were listed in the bill of lading as “said to contain” a 
certain amount of packaged items. Cargo interests, on the other hand, insisted that the 
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packaged units inside the containers were to be considered the “package”, resulting in a 
substantially bigger amount of indemnity. 926F926F147 
Both the first instance court and the Court of Appeal ruled in favour of the cargo 
owners, upholding their claim that it was not the containers but the packaged items 
inside that counted as “packages” for the purpose of the Hague Rules. These rulings, 
however, were based on different foundation and, although leading to the same outcome 
for the specific case, they would produce different results if their reasoning was applied 
to different circumstances. In particular, Colman J. firstly ruled that a container could 
not to be considered as the “package” solely because the carrier had been unable to verify 
the contents of the container, expressed by the “said to contain” clause on the face of the 
bill. The latter clause simply disqualified the shipper’s statement in the B/L from being a 
prima facie evidence.927F927F148 Thus, once the carrier signs a bill of lading, stating a number of 
container and a number of packaged items stuffed inside, the smaller packages are 
considered a “package” for the purpose of the Hague Rules. Moreover, if the packaged 
units inside the container contain even smaller packaged units, then it is the smallest 
consolidating item that qualifies for a “package” within the meaning of the Hague 
Rules.928F928F149 Conversely, if the bill of lading does not describe packaged contents of the 
container or makes it unclear whether the goods inside the container are separately 
packed, then it is the container that qualifies as a “package”. 929F929F150 Therefore, according to 
the approach upheld by the first instance court, the test whether a container is a 
package or not is the content of the bills of lading. Applying this reasoning to the facts in 
The “River Gurara”, the clause in the bill of lading, which considered containers as 
“packages”, was null and void under Article III rule 8, because “[its] only purpose is to 
achieve the very result which Art.III, rule 8 is there to prevent”.930F930F151 From this it follows 
that if a carrier wants to characterize the container as a package, then the shipment 
should be described in the bill of lading as “one container”, whereas any clause which 
attempts to define the container as a package for the purpose of the Rules will be struck 
down by Article III rule 8 even if it was the shipper who stuffed the container. 
The Court of Appeal upheld the decision but the reasoning of the Honourable 
Lords differed to a significant degree from the of the first-instance judge. Phillips L.J. 
did not accept the agreement of the parties, enshrined in the description on the face of 
the bill of lading, as a basis for determining what the relevant “package” is. Instead, 
because of the “said to contain” clause, the number of packages was dependant on 
whether a consignee could objectively prove the number of packages inside a container 
regardless whether this was described in the bill of lading. 931F931F152 In particular, Philips L.J. 
considered it erroneous to use the description in the bill of lading as a reference point 
whether the container is a package or not, because this would allow carriers to 
circumvent Hague Rules provision on limitation by describing the cargo in a way that 
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constitutes the container as a package regardless of what actually it is inside. Thus, the 
approach by Colman J. was not upheld, and currently, under the Hague Rules, the 
number of packages depends on the actual content stowed inside the container and not 
on the number of packages and units as described in the bill of lading. 
To sum up, the two decisions reached the same outcome – what constitutes a 
package within the meaning of the Rules are the smaller units that are larger 
numerically. However, these two decisions are very divergent if, in similar 
circumstances, there is no enumeration on the bill of lading of the packages inside the 
container. According to the approach of Colman J., the container will be considered the 
“package”, whereas according to the view of Phillips L.J., the packaged items inside the 
container will constitute a “package” provided the consignee can objectively prove the 
number of packages that have been loaded inside the container. 
A final important remark is necessary to be made on the bearing of the clause 
“said to contain” on the B/L statement about the container and the cargo inside. As 
observed in The “River Gurara”, this clause, if inserted, is a qualification of the 
statement about the quantity and quality of the containerized cargo. With regard to the 
application of the Hague or Hague-Visby Rules, such a clause will negate the effect of 
any statement or declaration concerning the contents of a container as a prima facie 
evidence vis-à-vis the shipper, or as a conclusive evidence vis-à-vis a third party bill of 
lading holder acting in good faith within the meaning of Article III rule 4 of the Hague-
Visby Rules.932F932F153 Also, the difference between the clauses “Said to Contain” (STC) and 
“Shippers Load, Stow and Count” (SLAC) is almost non-existent as to the effect they 
produce. While the STC clause designates that the cargo description in the B/L has been 
furnished by the shipper and the carrier has had no means of checking or verifying it, 
the SLAC clause indicates that the cargo has been packed and stowed into the container 
by the shipper as well as counted by him, with the carrier, again, not having any means 
of checking or verifying it. Therefore, the first clause is more focused on the quantity of 
cargo and the cargo itself, whereas the second clause stresses on the quantity and on 
how the cargo has been stowed inside the container. 
In the Australian case The “Esmeralda 1”, a “said to contain” clause was found to 
strip the relevant declaration on the bill of lading from being a prima facie evidence as to 
the quantity of the cargo inside a container. 933F933F154 In this way, the clause precluded the 
defendant carriers from being estopped to deny vis-à-vis the consignee the stated 
quantity of units inside the container. On the facts, an FCL/FCL shipment of one 
container consisting of 437 boxes was packed and sealed by the shipper in Brazil, and 
upon opening the container by the consignee in Sydney, Australia, it was established 
that 118 of the boxes were missing due to pilferage. Being no longer a prima facie 
evidence, the declaration on the face of the bill of lading with regard to the quantity of 
the goods shipped, was refuted by documentary and external evidence which showed 
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that the missing cargo was stolen before the container was sealed by the shipper, and, 
accordingly, before it came into the custody of the carrier. 934F934F155 
4.2 The Hague-Visby Rules 
An attempt for the more comprehensive regulation of containerized shipments at 
an international level was made in the 1968 Visby Protocol, which amended the original 
Hague Rules. The container clause in the Hague-Visby Rules is one of the major 
amendments to the original Hague Rules. 935F935F156 At the diplomatic conference for drafting 
the Protocol, it was even suggested by the Scandinavian delegations and the US 
delegation that Article IV rule 5 should be thoroughly altered so that the package 
limitation to the carrier’s liability is removed and only the weight limitation is preserved 
for limiting the carrier’s liability. 936F936F157 Eventually, this proposal was rejected and a 
compromise was reached to preserve the Article. The problem of conceptualizing 
containers was instead dealt with through a specific provision, which was absent in the 
original version of the Convention. Article IV rule 5(c) of the Visby Protocol establishes a 
straightforward rule stipulating under what circumstances a container shall be 
considered a “package” for the purpose of the Rules, or a consolidating unit: 
Where a container, a pallet or similar article of transport is used to 
consolidate goods, the number of packages or units enumerated in 
the bill of lading as packed in such article of transport shall be 
deemed the number of packages or units for the purpose of this 
paragraph as far as these packages or units are concerned. Except as 
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aforesaid such article of transport shall be considered the package or 
unit. 
In other words, if the packages within the containers are enumerated on the face 
of the bill of lading, then these are considered the numbers of packages, and if they are 
not – it is the container that is the package within the meaning of the Rules. The 
approach enshrined in this Visby provision resembles the view of Colman J. in The 
“River Gurara”. It is submitted that the enumeration for the purpose of Article IV rule 5 
(c) will be valid even when the number of packages is qualified by a “said to contain” (stc) 
clause, and this will certainly be the case if the carrier has modified the freight rate as a 
result of such enumeration. 937F937F158 Thus, one has to look solely at the shipping document in 
order to establish whether the container is a package or a consolidating unit, regardless 
of who has stuffed the container. However the question of who has packed the container 
will not lose significance because it remains vital for the evidentiary burden and for 
adducing evidence in parallel to the facts stated in the bills of lading. 
Therefore, in the presence of an enumeration of the packages within a container, 
any clause which attempts to define the container as a package, such as the clause in 
The “River Gurara”, will be held null and void under Article III rule 8. 
Two notions need to be clarified with regard to the wording of Article IV rule 5 (c), 
and these are the meaning of the words “enumerated” and “as packed”. In the Australian 
case El Greco, enumeration is submitted to be numbers on the face of the bill of lading 
regardless whether these numbers are expressed in words or through digits. 938F938F159 The 
enumeration on the face of the bill of lading must give a clear indication of the number of 
packages or “units as packed”, or, otherwise, in case it cannot be established what 
numbers of packages or units are packed in the container, the latter will be considered 
the package.939F939F160 Thus, if there is no sufficiently clear enumeration, a container will be 
viewed as a package and, in that sense, as part of the cargo; conversely, if the “packages” 
or “units as packed” are enumerated on the bill of lading, the container will be 
considered as an article of transport consolidating the goods and, in that sense, as part of 
the ship.940F940F161 Therefore, it can be presumed that under the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules 
containers are viewed as a concept that has a dual nature. 
Then, Article IV rule 5(c) presents a further issue – what exactly is to be 
enumerated in the B/L box “Description of cargo/Number of packages” in order for a 
container not to be considered a “package”, or vice versa as the case may be? Obviously, 
an enumeration of a specified number of pallets, crates, cartons, bales, bundles, parcels 
or bags easily qualifies for a package. But where should the line be drawn between a 
package (i.e. a packed unit) and a loose unit? As mentioned, the Rules refer to “packages” 
or “units as packed”. The presence of the word “unit” (which existed in the 1924 Hague 
Rules package limitation as well) is explained with the need to clarify the rule laid down 
                                               
158 See: Simon Baughen – ‘Shipping Law’, 6th edition (2015), p. 125, fn. 200; John F. Wilson – ‘Carriage of 
Goods by Sea’, 7th edition (2010), p. 200; The “River Gurara” [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Law Reports 225, at p. 234, 
Phillips L.J. 
159 El Greco v Mediterranean Shipping Company, [2004] 2 Lloyd’s Law Reports 537, at p. 583, para. 263. 
160 El Greco v Mediterranean Shipping Company, [2004] 2 Lloyd’s Law Reports 537, at p. 586, para. 284. 
161 El Greco v Mediterranean Shipping Company, [2004] 2 Lloyd’s Law Reports 537, at p. 586, para. 280 and 
282. 




in Art IV r. 5(c), and it is not considered as a proviso or a qualification to that rule. 941F941F162 
Allsop J. held that the addition of the word prevented any future disputes with regard to 
the extent and nature of the wrapping and the packaging material so that the rule would 
cover even unpackaged and unboxed articles as long as these are packed together. The 
rule does not cover, however, loose articles or individual pieces. 942F942F163 These individual loose 
articles must be packed in order to qualify for a “package” within the meaning of the 
Hague-Visby Rules.943F943F164 The approach in Article IV rule 5(c) provides a clear-cut solution 
to the problem that under certain circumstances can seem strange – for example, “1 
container said to contain 50 televisions” will be considered 1 package only, while “1 
container said to contain 50 televisions in boxes” would be 50 packages, although 
television sets are in practice always carried in boxes. 
So the subtle question that follows is where one can draw the line between a 
shipment consisting of a certain number of packages within a container and a shipment 
consisting of individual pieces of cargo stowed in the container. In Bekol B.V. v Terracina 
Shipping Corporation,944F944F165 which was the only English court decision to discuss the notion 
of a “package” until The ”River Gurara”, Leggatt J. held that in order for individual 
pieces to be considered as a package, they have to be either packed up in a receptacle, or 
compactly tied up together. 945F945F166 For example, while individual pieces of timber will be 
considered articles when carried loose, the same will no longer be considered individual 
articles of cargo when they are lashed together with straps. In this case they will turn 
into a “package” for the purpose of the Rules. Furthermore, stacking units or items does 
not form a package within the meaning of the Rules. 946F946F167 
To summarize, the container clause introduced in the Hague-Visby Rules follows 
the approach of the first instance court in The “River Gurara” (Colman J.), which is of 
the position that the decisive factor in determining whether a container is a package or 
not is what is indicated on the bill of lading. Furthermore, courts have interpreted this 
provision to the effect that in order to distinguish a package (a unit as packed) from a 
loose unit, the packed units must be stated in the bill of lading as units as packed (e.g. 50 
TV sets in boxes) if these units are to be considered a package for the purpose of 
limitation. Additionally, even unpacked units, when tied or lashed together, may form a 
package if they are described so in the bills of lading. That being clarified, it is worth 
pointing to the advantages and shortcomings of the container clause in today’s practice. 
To begin with, the provision in Article IV rule 5(c) has two distinctive advantages 
over the earlier attempts, under the Hague Rules, to characterize the container as a 
package or not. First of all, with regard to bill of lading holders, one has to simply look at 
the shipping document in order to establish whether the containerized cargo is a single 
package, or whether the container holds numerous packages as understood under the 
Rules. This way, a prudent third party bill of lading owner can easily assess the risks 
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pertaining to the respective shipment. Also, by attaching the contents of the container to 
the information in the bill of lading, in the sense that the contents of the container as 
described in the bill of lading is not modified by the surrounding circumstances, 
uniformity and certainty are promoted. 
Secondly, with regard to carriers and shippers, these parties are thus given 
freedom in their contract of carriage to choose between themselves how the containerized 
shipment will be characterized – as a single package or as a certain number of packages 
stowed inside a shipping container.947F947F168 Obviously, if there is no enumeration of packages 
inside a container, and the metal box is considered the package, then it is most likely 
that the limitation of liability will be calculated per gross weight (2 units of account per 
kilo) instead of per package (666.67 SDR per package) because in most instances the 
former will be the higher. 948F948F169 This is eloquently summarized by K. Diplock L.J. at the 7th 
Plenary Session on 22 February 1968 during the negotiations and drafting of the Visby 
Protocol: “A container is a package which may contain other packages. It may contain for 
example 100 crates of various kinds of merchandise. The problem is where you have a 
container which contains inside it other traditional packages or units, is the liability 
going to be calculated upon the container as the package, which would almost certainly 
involve the weight basis, or is it to be calculated on the individual packages within the 
container as if they were stowed in the traditional way in the hold? […] It is for the 
shipper and the carrier to decide whether they want the particular container to be treated 
as the package for the purpose of limitation of weight, or whether they want the smaller 
packages or units in it to be so treated; and no doubt when the latter alternative is taken, 
that is to say the individual packages are to be treated as separate units, a higher rate of 
freight will be payable than when the container is to be the unit – a higher rate of freight 
because the maximum liability, may itself be higher. A very simple answer then: it is for 
the parties to the contract of carriage to decide what shall be the unit.” 949F949F170 This proposition 
that dates back to the late 1960s is still supported by authors today, namely that case 
law does not point to a definitive answer whether a container is part of the vessel but it 
is rather the construction of the particular bill of lading which will give the correct 
answer.950F950F171 In other words, there is no general rule as to the status of the container, 
whereas the proper interpretation of the contract of carriage as well as of the facts will 
determine the status of the container and type of vessel. 951F951F172 
The container clause, however, has one fundamental problem, at least when it 
comes to limitation of liability. By making the description on the bill of lading the 
decisive factor, Article IV rule 5(c) renders the rules on limitation in that same article 
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not that significant. As pointed out by Prof. E. Røsæg, the number of packages 
mentioned in the bill of lading becomes a more important issue than the limitation 
amounts itself.952F952F173 Therefore, the container clause opens the door to contracting parties, 
although not that apparently, to get outside the grip of the Rules by deciding themselves 
what will be considered a package through the cargo description on the bill of lading. 
Again, that goes to show that the introduction of containers has stirred the balance 
between cargo interests and carrier interests as established with the 1924 Convention, 
among whose major goals is safeguarding the weaker party. 
5. The period of responsibility of the carrier under the Hague-
Visby Rules and the carriage of containers 
5.1 Modification of the traditional contractual model 
Besides the social, economic, and technical aspects of the impact that 
containerization caused to the modern world of shipping and logistics, 953F953F174 this means of 
carriage also brought about changes to the traditional model of the contract of carriage. 
The often straightforward and express contractual relationship between a shipper and a 
carrier, evidenced in an ocean bill of lading, has been modified by this new concept of 
transportation that shipping containers brought. The main element of these contractual 
changes is that use of containers extended the traditional contractual service and took it 
beyond the traditional sea carriage service. The so called tackle-to-tackle rule, typical of 
the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules, is no longer decisive for determining the period of 
responsibility of a sea carrier since containerized goods may be often transhipped, stored 
into a warehouse before being loaded or after being discharged and prior to delivery to 
the consignee, or they may be carried via different modes of transport such as road, rail 
or air, which could take place both before and after the sea leg of the journey. In many of 
these cases, the carrier’s period of responsibility may be extended to periods of time that 
precede or follow the sea carriage, while the goods are not actually aboard the vessel. 
Thus, the introduction of containerized transport has brought in new problems 
associated with the application of maritime legislation to carriage that may not be 
exclusively maritime. 
However, unlike the discussions in Chapter IV above, many of which were centred 
around whether a specified matter fell within the scope of the Hague-Visby Rules or not, 
the problems arising out of containerized carriage are subject to and dealt with by the 
Rules. It has to be conceded, though, that the Rules were drafted in a period when 
containers were not involved in international trade, and, therefore, did not fully address 
this type of carriage. Yet, the extension of the contractual service beyond the sea 
carriage does not run contrary to the Hague-Visby Rules. Article VII of both the Hague 
Rules and the Hague-Visby Rules retains the carrier’s and shipper’s right to agree on 
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174 See: section 2 and section 3 above. 
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contractual terms that extend the carrier’s period of responsibility. 954F954F175 This, in fact, can 
happen quite often as there is currently no international multimodal convention to 
govern solely such carriage. When it comes to the applicability of the Rules to 
multimodal transport, an essential factor is the issuance of a bill of lading or a similar 
document of title because their scope of application depends on the latter. 955F955F176 A very 
interesting comment made by the Dutch scholar Marian Hoeks refers to the nature of 
such multimodal (combined transport) bills of lading and points to the fact that they may 
not have all the features of a bill of lading as explained in Chapter I of the current thesis. 
While there is no dispute that such bills evidence the receipt of the goods and evidence 
the contract of carriage, their function as a document of title may be compromised where 
the predominant component of the multimodal transport is not the sea carriage. 956F956F177 The 
rationale behind such doubts is that a bill of lading cannot be a document of title, in the 
sense that it confers constructive possession in the goods it refers to, if these goods are in 
most of the time no in the physical possession of the contractual multimodal carrier. 957F957F178 
In the opinion of the author of the present thesis, however, what matters for the transfer 
of constructive possession is not the physical possession of the goods but rather the 
capacity to control the movement of the goods and their delivery under the contract of 
carriage in a way so that the party vested with constructive possession assumes a legal 
position as if he is a party with actual possession. 
In essence, there are two main types of expanded contracts with regard to the 
carriage of containers, and these will be thoroughly discussed below. In the first case, a 
through bill of lading is issued by a principal carrier, which will usually contain a 
transhipment clause.958F958F179 In the second case, the contract of carriage will be evidenced by 
a combined transport bill of lading issued by a carrier or a freight forwarder and it will 
provide that the carrier or freight forwarder, as the case may be, will be responsible for 
the entire journey including the non-maritime legs of the carriage. 
5.2 The carrier’s period of responsibility under a through B/L and a 
combined B/L 
Traditionally, transport that takes place in several stages – whether only by sea 
(transhipment) or by several modes of transport (multimodal) – is covered by a multi-
stage bill, which can be of two main types: through bills of lading and combined 
transport bills of lading.959F959F180 
Very often the transport of containers will involve two or more successive carriers, 
which requires the issue of a through bill of lading. This bill has two broad categories. 
                                               
175 Hague-Visby Rules, Article VII: “Nothing herein contained shall prevent a carrier or a shipper from 
entering into any agreement, stipulation, condition, reservation or exemption as to the responsibility and 
liability of the carrier or the ship for the loss or damage to, or in connection with, the custody and care and 
handling of goods prior to the loading on, and subsequent to the discharge from, the ship on which the goods 
are carried by sea.” 
176 Marian Hoeks – ‘Multimodal Transport Law: The law applicable to the multimodal contract for the 
carriage of goods’, Kluwer law International (2010), ISBN 978-90-411-3246-8, Chapter 3, at p. 105. 
177 Marian Hoeks – ‘Multimodal Transport Law: The law applicable to the multimodal contract for the 
carriage of goods’, Kluwer law International (2010), ISBN 978-90-411-3246-8, Chapter 8, at pp. 252-253. 
178 Ibid. 
179 S. Baughen – ‘Shipping Law’,  4th edition (2009), p.13. 
180 Richard Aikens, Richard Lord, Michael Bools – ‘Bills of Lading’, Informa Law (2006), p. 314, para 11.7. 




Depending on the terms of the bill of lading and the underlying background and factual 
matrix, the principal carrier who issued the bill may be responsible for the entire 
carriage from the point of receipt through and up to the point of delivery, or each carrier 
may be responsible for the particular period during which the cargo is in his custody. In 
the former, case the carrier issuing the bill of lading contracts for the entire journey as a 
principal with the shipper, and the carrier’s obligations towards the shipper remain 
under the contractual terms even after transhipment takes place to a vessel, to which 
the principal carrier has sub-contracted the relevant stage of the carriage. In the latter 
case, the through bill of lading will provide that the carrier will act as a principal only 
for that part of the sea journey which he personally performs, meaning that the carrier’s 
responsibility is confined to the period within which the goods are in his custody, 
whereas for the other sea stages of the journey he is acting only as an agent of the 
shipper when contracting with other sea carriers to perform their relevant stage. 960F960F181 
If the successive carriages, however, involve more than one mode of transport, 
then a combined bill of lading is issued, which is also known as a combined transport bill 
of lading or a multimodal transport document. Issued by a carrier or by a freight 
forwarder,961F961F182 the combined bills of lading usually contain a term specifying that the 
carrier or freight forwarder will be responsible for the door-to-door delivery of the goods. 
Thus, the carrier issuing the bill will act as a principal for the entire contractual service, 
although he may subcontract one or more (non-maritime) parts of the voyage to other 
carriers. The successive air, road, rail, or sea carriers are considered subcontractors and 
agents of the principal carrier or freight forwarder who issued the combined bill of lading 
and whose responsibility and liability under the contract of carriage cover the entire 
journey comprising all modes of transportation. 
The principal carrier’s responsibilities and liabilities will be governed by the law 
of the place where the loss or damage occurred and of the law applicable to the mode of 
transport that was being used at that time. 962F962F183 Naturally, the sea carrier’s responsibilities 
and liabilities will be governed by the Hague-Visby Rules (or by another applicable 
maritime liability regime) for the sea leg of the combined carriage. 963F963F184 The other legs of 
the journey will be governed by the relevant mandatory unimodal transport convention, 
each of which embodies a different liability regime. 964F964F185 
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Having clarified the two major contractual arrangements in the container trade, 
it is worth emphasizing that there is not always much value in scrutinizing exact 
definitions alone unless their meaning is applied to the concrete terms of the contract of 
carriage. Although the distinctions between the various kinds of bills of lading have legal 
importance, which affects the rights and obligations under the particular bill, some 
definitions of bills of lading may have only a commercial and descriptive significance for 
the particular trade. In modern container shipping, in particular, bills of lading are 
drafted in an interchangeable form and they contain terms that can cover various types 
of carriage – either a port-to-port carriage, or a through carriage, or a combined 
transport carriage.965F965F186 Furthermore, the through bills of lading have often a loose 
meaning and there can be different types of such bills of lading. They can, for example, 
contain and evidence a contract of carriage that covers more than one mode of transport 
as long as at least one of the legs is a conventional sea carriage, which could also be 
performed by various sea carriers via a process of transhipment. 966F966F187 Thus, very often 
what matters for determining the carriers period of responsibility is the contents and 
substance of the bill of lading rather the its name and form. 
It has to be noted, however, that in practice freight forwarders, when acting as 
shipper’s agents in contracting with separate carriers, often exclude their personal 
liability for damaged or lost cargo during transhipment from one stage to another, which 
translates into the cargo owner assuming the risk. 967F967F188 This is usually done by inserting in 
the through bill of lading a clause, saying “transhipment at shipper’s risk”. Therefore, it 
is difficult to draw general rules and principles that are directly applicable to the sea 
carrier’s period of responsibility. Instead, the relevant clauses in the through bills of 
lading must be the guiding marks in assessing the period when the carrier’s obligations 
are owed. 
An important terminological differentiation that has to be taken into account 
when combined transport is involved, is the difference between intermodal shipping and 
multimodal shipping. As is the case with through B/L and combined B/L, both terms 
have more commercial than legal significance. However, they are not interchangeable 
despite the fact that they look similar. Intermodal carriage designates transportation of 
cargo, which involves several modes of transport and multiple transport providers, with 
each of which the shipper signs a separate and independent contract of carriage for the 
single journey. With regard, to the sea leg, the sea carrier will usually issue a port-to-
port bill of lading and will be responsible only for that part of the journey. 
Multimodal carriage, on the other hand, describes a similar arrangement but in 
this case the different transport providers operate under a single contract of carriage. 
That is, in a multimodal carriage, the combined transport operator (a principal carrier or 
a freight forwarder) will issue a combined transport bill of lading and will operate under 
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one contract of carriage on a door-to-door basis, and he will be solely liable for damaged 
or lost cargo throughout the whole journey. In this case, as mentioned above, the 
combined transport operator will negotiate separate contracts with various unimodal 
carriers but there will not be a contractual link between these actual carriers and the 
cargo owners. 
5.3 Contractual terms designating the container service 
When the principal carrier or freight forwarder issues a multimodal transport 
document, the latter will designate whether the period of responsibility stretches door-
to-door or from door to Container Yard (CY) or Container Freight Station (CFS), or from 
CY or CFS to door. In other words, the period of responsibility is dependent upon the 
type of service offered to the clients of the shipping line or container operator. 
Generally, there are two types of container services, namely Full Container Load 
(FCL) and Less than Container Load (LCL), which are also known as movement codes, 
and they determine the terms on which a container is made available. FCL designates 
that the full capacity of the container will be used by a single cargo owner, and in this 
case it is usually the cargo interests (shipper and consignee) who pack and unpack the 
container, respectively. The container may be owned by the carrier or by the shipper but 
more often it is the carrier who supplies containers to their clients. 968F968F189 In this case, the 
carrier will deliver an empty container to the shipper’s premises, whereas the 
responsibility for packing and unpacking, as well as the pertaining liability, rests with 
the cargo interests. Then the fully stuffed container will be taken from the shipper’s 
premises to the sea carrier’s depot. The inland carriage to the carrier’s depot, known as 
the pre-carriage, will be taken care of either by the carrier (carrier’s haulage), which will 
be the case under an ‘FCL door’ contract, or by the shipper (merchant’s haulage) if the 
contract is ‘FCL depot’. 969F969F190 The same stipulations apply for the on-carriage, namely the 
inland carriage from terminal to door after the container has been picked from the port, 
in accordance with the specific contractual term found in the bill of lading. 
LCL, on the other hand, indicates that the space in the container is used for the 
transportation of various cargoes, owned by multiple shippers and consignees. It is the 
shipping line, in this case, that is responsible and held liable for packing the container 
and for the subsequent unpacking. Under LCL terms, the shippers usually bring their 
cargo to the shipping line’s packing station, known as the Container Freight Station 
(CFS), where the shipping line will pack the cargo of several shippers and stuff it into a 
container. 
A service similar to LCL is called Groupage, where cargo of multiple shippers is 
also packed in one container with the only difference that this is done not by the 
shipping line but by a Groupage operator. The Groupage operator will book a container 
with the shipping line and will issue his own house bill of lading to the cargo interests, 
while obtaining the master bill of lading from the carrier. Therefore, LCL shipments are 
consolidated by the shipping line (the carrier), whereas Groupage shipments are 
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consolidated by a consolidator (the Groupage operator). In the former case, no house bills 
of lading will be involved. 
In the containerized trade, the FCL and LCL are often inserted as terms of the 
contract of carriage. The two terms can be used in a combination depending on the 
situation and on the needs of the client. FCL/FCL stands for one shipper and one 
consignee, where the cargo is packed in the container by the shipper in his premises and, 
likewise, unpacked by the consignee. Very often, however, the arrangements for packing 
of the container are different from the arrangements for the equivalent operation that 
takes place when the ship has arrived the port of destination. 
Thus, FCL/LCL indicates that there is one shipper but multiply consignees, 
meaning that the container will be packed in the container by a single shipper in the 
shipper’s premises but the container will be then unpacked at the CFS by the shipping 
line. 
Similarly, LCL/FCL shows that there are multiple shippers who deliver their 
cargo at the CFS to be packed by the shipping line but there is only one consignee to 
receive the cargo in the container, and thus the container is unpacked in the consignee’s 
premises. 
As explained, LCL/LCL describes a situation where a container is packed with 
goods from multiple shippers and destined to multiple consignees. In this case, the 
container is packed and unpacked by the shipping line in its CFS. 
These terms are also used in combination with the words “door”, “depot” or “port” 
in order to describe the movement of the container. 970F970F191 For example, the bill of lading 
notation FCL door/LCL depot will denote a situation where the carrier will provide an 
empty FCL container to the shipper’s premises, where the container will be packed by 
the shipper, and then the stuffed FCL will be taken to the carrier’s Container Freight 
Station (CFS) on a carrier’s haulage basis (the haulier is a sub-contractor of the carrier). 
From there, the FCL container will proceed by sea to its destination – the CFS in the 
import country, where the container will be opened and unpacked, and where delivery 
will take place. For comparison, a LCL door/LCL depot annotation will describe a similar 
movement with the exception that the carrier initially does not provide an empty FCL 
container to the shipper but instead collects the uncontainerized cargo from the shipper 
and takes it to the CFS for consolidation and stowing into the container. Under FCL 
port/LCL depot terms, the stuffed FCL container will be delivered by the shipper aside 
the vessel at the port of loading (on a merchant’s haulage basis), and then in the import 
country the container will be unpacked by the carrier’s agents at the CFS where delivery 
to the consignee on an LCL basis will take place. If the B/L annotation is FCL port/FCL 
depot, then, after the sea carriage, the FCL container will be delivered at the CFS to the 
consignee, who will then take it to his premises where the FCL container will be opened 
and unpacked. In that case, the FCL container may well be provided either by the 
carrier or by the shipper. Therefore, the empty container is eventually returned back to 
the carrier’s CFS in the import country or elsewhere if the parties so agreed. These latter 
examples illustrate that the FCL and LCL terms, designating the contractual service, 
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define the period of responsibility of the carrier but they do not, however, provide 
information as to which party has provided the container. 
Furthermore, there are additional delivery terms, which designate where the 
carrier’s contractual obligations start and where they cease. These are CY/CY, CY/CFS, 
CFS/CY, and CFS/CFS. Although they sound similar, there is a significant difference 
between the two notions. The Container Yard (CY) is simply the area in a port or in a 
container terminal where containers are stored either before being loaded on a vessel, or 
after having been unloaded from her. The Container Freight Station (CFS), on the other 
hand, is the warehouse where cargo owned by various exporters or importers is 
consolidated upon export or deconsolidated upon import, either by the shipping line or by 
a Groupage operator. 
Therefore, CY/CY means that there is one FCL shipper at the port of loading and 
one FCL consignee at the port of discharge, while the contractual obligations of the 
carrier are on a port-to-port basis that is, they begin and end at the respective container 
yard of the named ports (e.g. Hamburg CY/Rotterdam CY). 
Bills of lading with a notation CY/CFS indicate that there is one FCL shipper at 
the port of loading and multiple LCL consignees at the port of discharge. While the 
carrier’s responsibility begins at container yard at the port of loading, it ends at the 
container freight station at the port of discharge. 
Similarly, CFS/CY shows that there are multiple LCL shippers at the port of 
loading and one FCL consignee at the port of discharge. Accordingly, the carrier’s 
responsibility begins at the container freight station at the port of loading and ends at 
the container yard at the port of discharge. 
With regard to CFS/CFS terms, it is worth noting that, although they designate 
that the period of responsibility commences and ends at the container freight station at 
the port of loading and discharge, respectively, there is a difference in the case of LCL 
shipments as opposed to Groupage shipments. Under LCL shipments, it is the shipping 
line that is held responsible and the contract of carriage will be evidenced by the line’s 
bills of lading. In the case of Groupage shipments, however, it is the Groupage operator 
(the consolidator) who is responsible vis-à-vis the cargo owners, and the contract of 
carriage is evidenced by the House bills of lading issued by him. The shipping line in this 
case will be held responsible vis-à-vis the Groupage operator, and the Master bills of 
lading issued by the shipping line to the consolidator will have CY/CY terms. 
Again, like FCL and LCL terms, CY and CFS terms also do not designate the 
party that owns or has provided the container but are focused on the period of 
responsibility of the carrier. On the other hand, the difference between those terms, very 
simplified, is that the FCL and LCL terms are more centred around what is going to be 
transported, while the CY and CFS terms are rather focused on the where the cargo will 
be carried, meaning that the latter terms bear geographical significance. 
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6. “Properly and carefully load, handle, stow, carry, keep, care 
for and discharge” applied to containerized cargo 
6.1 Article III rule 2 applied to containers 
When taking into account the obligations of the carrier over containerized cargo, 
it should be underlined that the Hague Rules were elaborated and drafted at a time 
when container shipments by sea were completely unknown. Naturally, the provisions of 
the 1924 Convention are directed at regulating the carrier’s obligations and liability over 
cargo which was common at the time – bulk cargo and break bulk cargo. This is 
considered to be the main reason why difficulties arise when the Rules are applied to the 
specific character of containerized shipments. 971F971F192 These difficulties are manifested by the 
fact that the liability of the carrier with regard to fulfilling his obligations to provide 
suitable and cargoworthy containers is determined differently under different legal 
systems.972F972F193 
In considering who is responsible for the fitness and suitability of the containers, 
in which the goods are carried, a central role plays the fact who has supplied those 
containers.973F973F194 As observed in section 5.3 above, under an LCL shipment, it is the carrier 
who provides the container, and thus it is fairly easy to conclude that the responsibility 
for that container stays with him. 
However, in an FCL shipment, although it is always the shipper who will pack 
and stow the goods inside the box, the container can be provided either by the shipper, or 
by the carrier who would supply an empty container to the shipper.  
In the first instance, when the shipper supplies the container, it is his 
responsibility to provide a suitable and fit container. However, it should be noted that 
when shipper-supplied containers have visible external defects, the carrier may still be 
held responsible for not rectifying or improving these deficiencies if they lead to cargo 
damage or loss.974F974F195 That is why carriers are advised to dispose with a system for spotting 
unfit containers.975F975F196 Furthermore, when the container is provided by the shipper, he will 
either supply its own container or one that was borrowed, rented, or leased from a third 
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party. In both cases, the shipper is using the container as packaging of the goods and 
this is substantiated by the fact that, in practice, transport companies are held liable not 
only for damage to the cargo inside the container but also for material damage to the 
container itself under the corresponding carriage conditions. 976F976F197 Therefore, when 
assessing the amount of liability, the gross weight of the shipment is calculated, 
meaning the total weight of the cargo plus the weight of the container. 977F977F198 In fact, when 
shipper-supplied containers are carried (this is usually the case with tank containers), 
those are considered goods (i.e. part of the cargo) regardless whether there is cargo inside 
them or not.978F978F199 Therefore, if such containers are lost or damaged, the carrier will be held 
liable with respect to those containers apart from other liability that may arise with 
regard to any cargo damage. Interestingly, with regard to damage to shipper-supplied 
containers, a carrier could be exposed to “unlimited” liability although, in principle, he 
may have under the Hague-Visby Rules the right to limit. This is so because of the 
relevant provisions of the Rules coupled with the specific characteristics of shipping 
containers, which were already laid down in section 3. Thus, in such a case, the higher 
weight limitation under Article IV rule 2(a) will apply, and considering the fact that an 
average container weighs about 2 tons, the liability limitation will be around 4,000 SDR, 
which well exceeds the average market price of a shipping container. 979F979F200 So, with the 
exception of some refrigerated containers which may have extremely expensive 
equipment, most merchant-supplied containers that a carrier uses as a bailee, will in 
effect not fall under the umbrella of the weight limitation provisions of the Rules. It 
must be conceded, however, that in practice most often the shipping containers are 
provided by the carrier who either owns them or has leased them. 980F980F201 
This leads to the second instance mentioned hereinabove, namely, when the 
carrier supplies an empty FCL to the shipper. In this case, the carrier remains 
responsible under the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules to provide a suitable container that is 
fit for the intended journey. The container should be in a good condition an all pertaining 
systems, such as a refrigerating system on a reefer container, should be operational and 
in good working order.981F981F202 Reefers, for example, undergo a pre-trip inspection before they 
are released to the cargo owners in order to ensure that the temperature unit of the 
container is functioning properly and to establish whether there is any structural 
damage. 
To sum up, the general rule is that regardless of which party stuffs the container, 
or, in other words, regardless whether it is an FCL or an LCL shipment, when it is the 
carrier to supply a container, it is his duty to provide a container in good order and 
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condition.982F982F203 Furthermore, the fact that the shipper has been granted the opportunity to 
examine the container before shipment does not negate this duty of the carrier. 983F983F204 The 
container must be fit for the intended carriage, and any damage or loss of cargo which 
results from a faulty container supplied by the carrier is considered breach of either 
Article III rule 1 or Article III rule 2. What is more, as mentioned above, even in the case 
when the FCL container is provided by the shipper, the carrier may still be found liable 
for breach of Article III rule 2 if he accepts a container in a manifestly poor state and 
does not make any reservations on the bill of lading. 984F984F205 
When the containerized cargo has been damaged or lost due to a defect of the 
laden container, the carrier may be held liable either for breach of his seaworthiness 
obligation (Art.III r.1) or for breach of his duty of care (Art.III r.2), mainly depending on 
the circumstances of the case and, in particular, on whether the container is considered 
part of the vessel or part of the cargo. The US case The “Red Jacket”,985F985F206 held by the 
Southern District of New York, is a good example of the interplay between the two 
duties. The defendant carrier was transporting cargo of ingots stowed in 50 containers 
on board the steamship Red Jacket. An accident took place en route during a heavy 
winter storm in the Northern Pacific, which, although very harsh, was not unexpected in 
the particular area for that part of year. 986F986F207 One specific, allegedly faulty, container which 
was eight years old and had already been on 20 to 30 voyages, was supplied by the 
carrier to the shipper on an FCL house-to-house basis, and it was established that this 
container was the cause for the disaster. The integrity of the container was compromised 
during the storm and this led to a domino effect causing the collapse of an entire stow of 
50 containers located on deck. 987F987F208 As a result, 43 of the containers were swept overboard 
and the remaining 7 were damaged. 
The Court established that the cargo was stowed inside the container in a 
negligent manner by the shipper. The ingots were alleged to be stowed unsecured and in 
a loose manner, which allowed them to move and to repeatedly strike the base of the left 
corner-post of the container (a weight bearing element of any container). Because of that, 
the post separated from the container and the container’s whole left wall collapsed. 988F988F209 
However, the Court did not find enough evidence to support the argument that the 
shipper’s improper and negligent stowage constituted the proximate cause for the 
accident because there were ingots in other containers as well that were stowed even 
more poorly.989F989F210 Instead, the carrier-supplied container was found to be unseaworthy and 
not fit for the intended voyage because it had evident major structural damage visible to 
the carrier before the beginning of the journey. Thus, the carrier’s negligence to permit 
this old and weakened container to be loaded on board the vessel was found to be the 
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proximate cause of the cargo loss and the accompanying cargo damage. 990F990F211 As a result, 
the carrier was found to have breached its obligation under US COGSA § 1303(1) to 
exercise due diligence to make the ship seaworthy. 
The renowned Swiss author Prof. von Ziegler criticizes this decision as one, which 
has reached a justified result but which is based on poor legal grounds. 991F991F212 Interestingly, 
Von Ziegler asserts that, although the carrier is responsible for empty FCL containers, 
the provision of such a container by the carrier to the shipper is a separate contract sui 
generis which is not subject to the lex specialis of the Hague Rules, and the 
unseaworthiness of the carrier-supplied container is actually a breach of this separate 
contract.992F992F213 In the opinion of the author of the present thesis, however, such a 
proposition is misleading if it is promulgated as a general rule and, certainly, does not 
apply to the facts of The “Red Jacket” case. Von Ziegler’s reasoning could apply to the 
particular situation where such a separate and additional container lease agreement 
indeed exists between a carrier and a shipper but this is rather an additional legal 
relationship which does not affect the carrier’s obligations under the bill of lading. 993F993F214 
Whereas, under a contract of carriage, without any additional lease agreements (what 
was the case in The Red Jacket), it is generally accepted that, regardless of which party 
supplies the container, there is no distinct or autonomous contract for the supply of the 
container in parallel to the contract of carriage. 994F994F215 Therefore, no additional contractual 
rights or obligations can be derived for the carrier in addition to the existing ones under 
the bills of lading and the applicable maritime transport rules. 
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Furthermore, von Ziegler makes the important observation that the carrier’s duty 
to provide a suitable LCL container stems not from his duty to exercise due diligence to 
provide a seaworthy vessel under Article III rule 1, but from the carrier’s duty of care 
over the cargo under Article III rule 2. 995F995F216 The rationale is that such a container is not 
part of the ship within the meaning of Art. III r. 1, which points once again to how 
important the classification of a container is – whether it is considered part of the vessel 
or part of the cargo. What is more, if a container provided by the carrier to the shipper is 
in an impeccable state but is not suitable in all aspects to carry the cargo (e.g. if a 
standard container is used when a reefer or a ventilated container is needed), the carrier 
may not be held liable for breaching his duty under Article III rule 1 but instead he could 
be held accountable under Article III rule 2 and, therefore, he will be able to excuse 
himself and benefit from the liability exemptions in Article IV rule 2 (m) and (n) HR 
referring to inherent vice of the goods and insufficiency of packing, respectively. 996F996F217 The 
reason is that it is usually the shipper who is expected to give appropriate instructions 
and to determine the type of container. 997F997F218 
The opposite view was taken by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands in the 
NDS Provider, where the duty to exercise due diligence to make the ship seaworthy was 
extended also to FCL containers that were provided by the carrier to the shipper. 998F998F219 In 
that case, an analogy was made between a carrier-supplied container and a hold of the 
ship, to which Article III rule 1 applies. The judgment was substantiated with Article 14 
(Specific obligations applicable to the voyage by sea) of the Rotterdam Rules. 999F999F220 However, 
such an approach was criticized by Dutch authors for being too far-reaching.1000F1000F221 The main 
remark is that any reasoning to that regard should take into consideration the fact that 
empty FCL containers, when provided to the shipper, will be out of sight and control of 
the sea carrier, which presupposes that the carrier would have to inspect and check each 
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and every FCL container that comes back from the shipper’s premises in order for the 
carrier to avoid any liability risks stemming from the high standard set by the Supreme 
Court by extending the duty in Article III rule 1 to containers. 1001F1001F222 This is obviously not 
feasible, given the amount and speed of the container trade. Therefore, it has been 
submitted that an alternative solution could be that the contract of carriage determines 
the liability for damage or loss of goods caused by faulty containers. 1002F1002F223 In the NDS 
Provider, however, the Supreme Court struck down a liability exemption clause for 
unsuitable containers as a clause that is contrary to Article III rule 8 of the Rules. 
Another relevant point worthy of being discussed is the introduction of weight 
limitation by the Hague-Visby Rules as an alternative limitation, which has certain 
implications also for containerized shipments. Certainly, the kilo limitation favours and 
is related to bulk cargo because obviously no packages can be described in the bill of 
lading for such type of cargo. A unit of bulk cargo is associated with weight or volume 
and as such it is not covered by the package limitation. The reason for excluding bulk 
cargo from the package limitation is said to be associated with the traditional dislike of 
liability-exemption clauses that favoured the carrier and that the Rules actually sought 
to prevent.1003F1003F224 Furthermore, the word “unit” is understood as a shipping unit and most 
European courts have not endorsed the interpretation of the word “unit” as comprising 
the notion of “freight unit”. 1004F1004F225 
In the case of containerized carriage, however, either limitation – package or 
weight limitation – could be applicable, “whichever is the higher”.1005F1005F226 Literature points to 
a convenient means of determining which of the two limitation rules will apply to the 
specific cargo depending on the weight of the goods. 1006F1006F227 Provided that cargo loss or 
damage is high enough to trigger weight limitation (i.e. it is more than 2 SDR per kg), 
the line above which the weight limitation would apply is weight of 334 kg of the 
package or unit, which equals 668 SDR, being a higher amount than the unit limitation 
of 666.67 SDR per package. Accordingly, all goods that weigh less than 334 kg will 
trigger the unit limitation, being the higher one in that case. 1007F1007F228 This is a valuable 
starting point in assessing the amount of liability for unitized shipments. Let us take for 
example the following scenario – a container is stuffed with three boxes (each having a 
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value of 2000 SDR), which are stated on the bill of lading as separate packages under the 
container clause. It happens that the first box of cargo is completely damaged (2000 
SDR) while the other two boxes are each only one-fourth damaged (500 SDR), which 
makes the total damage 3000 SDR. Let us assume that each box weighs less than 334 
kg, then the unit limitation will apply as being the higher one. In this case, the carrier 
will be able to limit his liability to 2000 SDR, being the number of packages multiplied 
by 666.67 SDR per package. An important point here is that the carrier cannot apply the 
per package limitation with regard to the damage to each package separately but he can 
limit on the basis of the number of packages regardless of the amount of damage each 
box has sustained. To illustrate this point, the carrier in this example cannot limit his 
liability in the following fashion: 666.67 SDR with regard to the first box which is 
completely damaged; 500 SDR, which is the amount of the damage for the second box; 
and, similarly, another 500 SDR which is the amount of the damage of the third box, 
which eventually would result in a total limitation of 1666.67 SDR. However, this is not 
the mechanism prescribed by the Rules. As stated, the carrier in this example can limit 
his liability for the damaged cargo in the container to the amount of 2000 SDR, being the 
package limitation amount multiplied by the number of packages carried in the 
container. 
To illustrate the importance of the weight limitation, let us assume that the same 
consignment under the same facts is carried under the bills of lading, but this time as a 
single package – the container. Therefore, the package limitation will not be applicable 
since there will be only one package (tantamount to unit limitation of 666.67 SDR), while 
the entire consignment will certainly weigh more than the required 334 kg given the fact 
that only the tare weight of the container exceeds by far this figure. 
Furthermore, the discussion about the proper and careful loading, stowage, 
securing, and care for containers must consider that they are actually very fragile units. 
As observed in section 3, the technical parameters of containers reveal that, with the 
exception of their corner posts and framework, they are of a more fragile construction 
than they appear. Containers, as well as containerships and all seagoing vessels, are 
subject to six motions – three linear motions and three rotational motions. These are: 
surging (a linear motion along the longitudinal axis of the vessel, which is a forward 
motion), swaying (a linear motion along the transverse axis, which is a sideways motion), 
heaving (a linear motion along the vertical axis; a vertical motion), rolling (a rotational 
motion around the longitudinal axis), pitching (a rotational motion around the 
transverse axis), and yawing (a rotational motion around the vertical axis, which 
represents a momentary deflection from the projected course). 1008F1008F229 In a stormy weather, 
the rolling, pitching and heaving of the ship produce the greatest forces that affect her 
and the containers on board, in particular. 1009F1009F230 This is the reason why containers are 
stowed longitudinally and not athwart ship. In the latter case, the rolling motion of the 
ship would cause cargo to be thrown against the doors, which might have as a result the 
collapse of the entire stow of containers. 1010F1010F231 What is more, the forces produced by all these 
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vertical and horizontal motions augment and are of greater magnitude when exerted on 
containers and their lashing if the steel boxes are stowed either, for example, higher up 
in the stack, or at the bow and on the stern of the vessel. Besides, while adequate 
protection is taken care about the forces that make cargo move longitudinally (fore-and-
aft), it has been reported that the vertical movement of the vessel has been wholly 
neglected.1011F1011F232 Heaving, pitching and rolling, particularly, provide vertical acceleration 
and deceleration forces that act on the cargo and may reach value of 2g, meaning that 
the lashing and securing arrangements will have to sustain two times the static weight 
of the cargo.1012F1012F233 The provisions of Article III rule 2 requires taking all this information 
into account when stowing and securing the containers on board regardless whether 
these are shipper-supplied or carrier-supplied containers. Here, the issue which party 
provided the container plays an irrelevant role. In any event, carriers must properly and 
carefully stow containers while taking into account any relevant information, most 
notably the stowing weight that a container can bear so that no weight limit is exceeded 
and no heavy containers are stowed in the upper tiers. 
Strictly speaking, the standard of “properly and carefully” should comply with the 
specific nature of the carriage of containers and, therefore, must consider the 
aforementioned characteristics of containerized shipments. This requirement is actually 
not relevant only to containers but, as already observed in Chapter II, applies in general 
to any cargo – the carrier must care for the cargo “in accordance with a sound system” 1013F1013F234 
and “in the appropriate manner looking to the actual nature of the consignment”.1014F1014F235 
Containers, however, are a unique means of transport and as such they give rise to 
additional and previously unknown stowage issues. For example, cargo’s weight should 
be evenly distributed in the container, while the centre of gravity should be as low as 
possible and near to the centre of the container. 1015F1015F236 Also, either half of the container 
should not carry more than 60% of the cargo. 1016F1016F237 Besides, loading containers on board a 
vessel requires specific knowledge regarding container stowage, lashing and securing. 
Absent such knowledge, the carrier may be held liable for breaching his obligation under 
Article III rule 2 to properly and carefully handle, stow, carry, keep, and care for the 
containerized cargo. 
The carrier’s cargo-related obligations under Article III rule 2 of the Rules may be 
said to have a higher standard, compared to the carriage of general cargo, when the 
cargo is carried in containers. For example, a carrier may have far greater 
responsibilities when the carriage involves refrigerated carrying systems. In this case, it 
is required that a qualified reefer engineer or an electrician is present on board so that 
the refrigerating equipment and the reefers can be monitored, maintained and, if 
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needed, repaired.1017F1017F238 A refrigerated container may have very complex equipment such as 
a controlled atmosphere system, which can maintain atmospheric conditions that are 
different than normal through lowering oxygen levels and increasing carbon dioxide, 
which increases the practical storage life (PSL) of the perishable goods. 1018F1018F239 Such a 
controlled atmosphere system is also accompanied by adequate safety systems because 
the atmospheric conditions created inside the container may be fatal to human beings. 
A particular difficulty is that when reefers have their own power supply, there 
could be only one amongst tens of other reefer containers that is malfunctioning, while 
the rest are showing no indication of any failure. Situations like this require constant 
supervision and checking. For some products, maintaining the precise temperature 
within the reefer is vital, failing which the goods inside may be considered a total loss. It 
must not be forgotten that some perishable goods like fruits, meat, fish, vegetables or 
flowers have a short life, and it has been ascertained that they can spend more than half 
of their so-called practical storage life (PSL) in transit inside a refrigerated container. 1019F1019F240 
Reefers are generally designed to carry frozen and chilled products, 1020F1020F241 and while frozen 
products do not suffer that much from over-cooling, chilled products require a specific 
temperature that is encountered in their natural growing are and, if the refrigerated 
container temperature is lower than that, these products may be exposed to chilling 
injury.1021F1021F242 Furthermore, some goods that are to be carried in a refrigerated container 
must be pre-cooled to the correct temperature for carriage before being stowed in the 
container. Stowing warm cargo in a cooled reefer may have adverse effects to other 
adjacent cargo in the container; that is why cargo of mixed temperature should not be 
stowed in the container. 1022F1022F243 Finally, stowage of the chilled or frozen goods inside the 
container is also equally important – the stowed cargo must not block any air inflows as 
the air circulation in the container is vital for the proper operation of the cooling 
systems. In each refrigerated container, there is a red mark signifying that cargo should 
not be stowed above that line so that air can freely flow there. However, stowage is often 
not under the control of the carrier, and not within his responsibilities, because he only 
receives a sealed shipper-supplied container that was packed by the shipper and is “said 
to contain” certain cargo. 
Some of the most common technical failures of containers that occur in practice 
are associated with holes or tears in the side panels; broken or compromised door hinges, 
locks or seals; cracked corner castings/fittings; problematic retracting of the roof bows of 
open-top containers; wrong temperature setting, poor temperature monitoring and/or 
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wrong use of temperature controls of reefer containers; inadequate ventilation; container 
overloading and/or exceeding stack weights; poor distribution of cargo weight within the 
container; poor stowage of containers (e.g. heavy containers stowed on light 
containers).1023F1023F244 
In conclusion, when carriage of goods into containers is involved, the application 
of Article III rule 2 is largely dependent on whether the container has been supplied by 
the shipper or by the carrier, and also on whose responsibility it was to pack and/or 
unpack the container.1024F1024F245 For example, if the container was stuffed by the shipper and the 
goods inside were found to have been damaged as a result of poor stowage, then the 
carrier is unlikely to be held in breach of his respective obligations under Article III rule 
2. Besides, he will normally be able to invoke the defences in Article IV rule 2 (i), (n), and 
(q) which relate to damage arising out of act or omission of the shipper, insufficiency of 
packing or any other cause arising without the actual fault of the carrier. In that 
context, the Rules, and in particular the obligation to “properly and carefully […] carry, 
keep and care for the goods carried”, do not seem to impose a duty on the carrier to open 
and inspect the contents of a container that was stuffed by the shipper. In Reechel v 
Italia di Navigazioni, an open-top FEU was stuffed by the shipper and carried on an 
FCL term.1025F1025F246 After the container was discharged at the port of destination, it smashed 
the small truck, to which it was attached on the way to the container depot in the 
vicinity of the port. The accident happened upon a manoeuvre of the truck and it was 
due to a poor stowage inside the container, causing the death of the truck driver. The 
District Court held, among others, that the carrier was under no duty to open and 
examine a container supplied by the shipper. This American decision does not seem to 
contravene the English approach as there is no English ruling, either, to interpret 
Article III rule 2 so as to impose such an obligation on the carrier. On the other hand, a 
carrier may be held liable for breaching his obligations under Article III rule 2 if he 
accepts cargo stuffed in a container provided by the shipper in a poor condition, without 
the carrier noting any reservation on the shipping document. 1026F1026F247 
6.2 Article III rule 2 applied to the cargo inside containers 
The act of stuffing the container by the carrier is often equated with the process of 
loading of a vessel.1027F1027F248 This proposition supports the view that carrier-supplied containers 
are part of the ship rather than part of the cargo. When cargo is stuffed into a container 
by the carrier, this operation must also be done “properly and carefully”, which means 
that it must be carried out with the utilization of appropriate bracing, blocking and 
dunnaging in the container.1028F1028F249 
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In particular, Article III rule 2 requires a carrier to stuff any container in 
accordance with all applicable standards and regulations such as the SOLAS Convention 
and the IMDG Code. Faulty stuffing of the container, however, could be a breach of both 
Article III rule 1 and Article III rule 2. In Kapitan Sakharov, for example, the carrier 
was held liable for stowing a tank container containing isopentene, a highly-flammable 
substance, below deck and without mechanical ventilation, which was contrary to the 
provisions of the abovementioned international instruments as well as to MOPOG, the 
Russian Regulations for Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Sea. 1029F1029F250 The relevant provisions 
of the IMDG required such hazardous cargo to be stowed either in a mechanically 
ventilated space or on deck. Stowing the cargo in tank containers under deck was thus a 
breach by the carrier. In that particular case, however, the failure to meet these 
regulations caused the carrier to be held in breach of not only Article III rule 2 but also 
of his seaworthiness obligation. While it was submitted that non-compliance with such 
codes and regulations does not necessarily constitute want of due diligence to provide a 
seaworthy vessel, the judge in Kapitan Sakharov held that, considering the fact that the 
particular stowage also contravened the vessel’s technical certificate coupled with the 
fact that the non-compliance was so plainly unreasonable, the carrier must be expected 
to have been aware of the dire consequences and, therefore, was held liable for not 
exercising due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel. 1030F1030F251 This case is also an example of 
a carrier crossing the line between bad stowage and unseaworthiness as well as an 
example of the fact that establishing the moment of such crossing may become even 
more difficult in containerized shipments. 1031F1031F252 
On the other hand, the carrier will not be held liable for damage to goods that 
have been stuffed into the container by the shipper. 1032F1032F253 Obviously, a carrier is not under 
the same obligation, namely to properly and carefully stuff the container, when the 
process of stuffing the container is responsibility of the shipper and is carried out by him 
under the contract of carriage. Here, one cannot allude to a transfer of the obligation to 
load and stow the goods within the meaning of a FIOS(T) clause, 1033F1033F254 because stuffing the 
goods into a container is not the same as loading the container aboard the vessel, 
although a parallel between the two was made in the beginning of this sub-section. 
However, the burden of proof in case of shipper-packed containers is on the carrier, who 
has to prove that the damage caused was a result of, for example, an act or omission of 
the shipper or of insufficiency of packing, in order to avail himself of the protection under 
Article IV rule 2(i), (n) or (q). 1034F1034F255 This is the situation when damage or loss of the cargo 
was caused by a defect in the shipper-supplied container as seen in section 6.1 above, or 
by the manner of stowage of the goods inside the container. In these cases, the carrier 
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still has to resort to the respective Hague-Visby Rules defences in Article IV because, 
regardless that it was the shipper to stuff the container, the carrier is bound to fulfil his 
bundle of obligations under Article III rule 2 nevertheless, and it is he who bears the 
evidential burden that he has not breached any of those obligations. 
However, the carrier will still be responsible vis-à-vis third party cargo owners for 
faulty stowage inside the container performed by the shipper, when the negligently 
stowed goods have led to damage to nearby containerized cargo. In the Dutch case 
Boknis, an open-top container laden with steel rolls was carried from Rotterdam to 
Southampton.1035F1035F256 The vessel encountered severe winter storm and, as a result of the 
rolling and pitching motions of the vessel, the 20 tons of steel rolls, which were 
negligently stowed in the container by the shipper, started shifting and hitting the walls 
and the doors of the container.1036F1036F257 The steel cargo eventually broke out of the container 
and the container itself also broke loose, which resulted in damage to other adjacent 
containers and their contents. Moreover, the steel rolls pierced the hull of the vessel, 
which caused sea water to enter the hold and this inflicted further damage to the cargo 
stowed in that hold.1037F1037F258 The insufficient stowage of the steel rolls was established as there 
were no traces left of any stowage materials. The Court in Rotterdam held that the 
carrier could not exculpate himself vis-à-vis other cargo interests with the defence under 
Article IV rule 2 (q) by stating that the shipper’s negligent stowage was the result of 
damage. Considering the damage caused also by the shifting container, the carrier was 
held liable for insufficient care for stowage and seaworthiness. 1038F1038F259 
Containers packed by the shipper are usually sealed, which is a useful way to 
allocate responsibilities and losses. The number of the seal is indicated also on the 
transport document, and if the seal is intact, it creates a presumption that the loss or 
damage inside the container did not occur due to the carrier’s fault but happened before 
shipment or after delivery of the cargo. Conversely, if the seal is found to be broken upon 
delivery, then the carrier will be held responsible for the damaged or missing goods 
unless the carrier could prove that the loss or damage occurred outside the time when 
the carrier had custody of the goods. 1039F1039F260 
A shipper-packed container will usually be evidenced in the bill of lading as “one 
container in apparent good order and condition said to contain […] as declared by the 
shipper”. Such a notation does not bind the carrier to the description and condition of the 
contents of the container, which means that, in the presence of such a notation, the 
words “shipped in good order and condition” or “shipped in apparent good order and 
condition” will not constitute an estoppel towards an endorsee of the bill of lading, which 
would otherwise prevent the carrier from proving that the containerized cargo was not in 
good order and condition.1040F1040F261 Absent such a notation, the carrier will face a very onerous 
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burden of proof, and he could escape being bound to the B/L representation regarding the 
description and condition of the containerized goods only by either proving that the 
respective statement was untrue, or proving that the third party bill of lading holder did 
not act upon having faith in the B/L statement. 1041F1041F262 
Nowadays most bills of lading contain clauses that expressly provide that when 
the bill relates to shipper-packed containers, then that bill functions as a receipt only for 
the container and not for the cargo stowed inside. 1042F1042F263 The following table will summarize 
the relevant B/L clauses of various carriers. 
Maersk Line, Multimodal transport bill of lading 
Clause 11. Shipper-Packed Containers 
If a Container has not been packed by the Carrier: 
11.1 This bill of lading shall be a receipt only for such 
a Container; 
11.2 The Carrier shall not be liable for loss of or 
damage to the contents and the Merchant shall 
indemnify the Carrier against any injury, loss, 
damage, liability or expense whatsoever incurred by 
the Carrier if such loss of or damage to the contents 
and/or such injury, loss, damage, liability or expense 
has been caused by any matter beyond his control 
including, inter alia, without prejudice to the 
generality of this exclusion: 
 (a) the manner in which the Container has 
been packed; or 
 (b) the unsuitability of the Goods for carriage 
in Containers; or 
 (c) the unsuitability or defective condition of 
the Container; or 
 (d) the incorrect setting of any thermostatic, 
ventilation, or other special controls thereof, 
provided that, if the Container has been supplied by 
the Carrier, this unsuitability or defective condition 
could have been apparent upon reasonable 
inspection by the Merchant at or prior to the time the 
Container was packed. 
11.3 The Merchant is responsible for the packing and 
sealing of all shipper packed Containers and, if a 
shipper packed Container is delivered by the Carrier 
with any original seal intact, the Carrier shall not be 
liable for any shortage of Goods ascertained at 
delivery. 
11.4 The Shipper shall inspect Containers before 
packing them and the use of Containers shall be 
MSC, Bill of Lading Standard Terms and Conditions 
Clause 11. MERCHANT-PACKED CONTAINERS 
If a Container has not been packed by or on behalf of 
the Carrier: 
11.1 The Merchant shall inspect the Container for 
suitability for carriage of the Goods before packing it. 
The Merchant's use of the Container shall be prima 
facie evidence of its being sound and suitable for use. 
11.2 The Carrier shall not be liable for loss of or 
damage to the Goods caused by: 
 (a) the manner in which the Goods have 
been packed, stowed, stuffed or secured in the 
Container, or 
 (b) the unsuitability of the Goods for carriage 
in the Container supplied or for carriage by Container 
between the Ports or Places specified herein, or 
 (c) the unsuitability or defective condition of 
the Container or the incorrect setting of any 
refrigeration controls thereof, provided that, if the 
Container has been supplied by or on behalf of the 
Carrier, this unsuitability or defective condition would 
have been apparent upon inspection by the Merchant 
at or prior to the time when the Container was 
packed, or 
 (d) packing refrigerated Goods that are not 
properly pre-cooled to the correct temperature for 
carriage or before the refrigerated Container has 
been properly pre-cooled to the correct carrying 
temperature. 
11.3 The Merchant is responsible for the packing and 
sealing of all Merchant-packed Containers and, if a 
Merchant-packed Container is delivered by the 
Carrier with an original seal as affixed by the 
Merchant or customs or security control intact, or the 
Carrier can establish bona fide circumstances in 
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prima facie evidence of their being sound and 
suitable for use. 
which the original seal was replaced, the Carrier shall 
not be liable for any shortage of Goods ascertained 
upon delivery. 
11.4 The Merchant shall indemnify the Carrier against 
any loss, damage, liability or expense whatsoever and 
howsoever arising caused by one or more of the 
matters referred to in clause 11. 2, including but not 
limited to damage to Container, other cargo and the 
Vessel. 
CMA CGM, Bill of Lading Terms and Conditions 
Clause 23. SHIPPER-PACKED CONTAINERS 
If a Container has not been packed by or on behalf of 
the Carrier: 
(1) The Carrier shall not be liable for loss of or 
damage to the Goods caused by: 
 (a) the manner in which the Goods has been 
packed, stowed, stuffed or secured, or 
 (b) the unsuitability of the Goods for 
Carriage in the Container supplied, or 
 (c) the unsuitability or defective condition of 
the Container or the incorrect setting of any 
refrigeration controls thereof, provided that, if the 
Container has been supplied by or on behalf of the 
Carrier, this unsuitability or defective condition would 
have been apparent upon inspection by the Merchant 
at or prior to the time when the Container was 
packed, or 
 (d) packing refrigerated Goods that are not 
at the correct temperature for Carriage. 
(2) The Shipper is responsible for the packing and 
sealing of all Shipper-packed Containers and, if a 
Shipper-packed Container is delivered by the Carrier 
with its original seal as affixed by the Shipper intact, 
the Carrier shall not be liable for any shortage of 
Goods ascertained at delivery. 
(3) The Merchant shall indemnify the Carrier against 
any loss, damage, liability or expense whatsoever and 
howsoever arising caused by one or more of the 
matters referred to in Clause 23 (1), save that, if the 
loss, damage liability or expense was caused by a 
matter referred to in Clause 23 (1) (c), the Merchant 
shall not be liable to indemnify the Carrier in respect 
thereof unless the proviso referred to in that Clause 
applies. 
Evergreen Line, Bill of Lading (Revised May 2012) 
Clause 10. Shipper-Packed Containers 
If a Container has not been filled, packed, stuffed or 
loaded by the Carrier, the Carrier shall not be liable 
for loss or damage to the contents and the Merchant 
shall indemnify the Carrier against any loss, damage, 
liability or expense incurred by the Carrier, if such 
loss, damage, liability or expense has been caused by: 
 (a) the manner in which the Container has 
been filled, packed, stuffed or loaded; or 
 (b) the unsuitability of the contents for 
carriage in Containers; or 
 (c) the unsuitability or defective condition of 
the Container arising without any want of due 
diligence on the part of the Carrier to make the 
Container reasonably fit for the purpose for which it 
is required; or 
 (d) the unsuitability or defective condition of 
the Container which would have been apparent upon 
reasonable inspection by the Merchant at or prior to 
the time when the Container was filled, packed, 
stuffed or loaded, or 
 (e) the discovery of any drugs, narcotics or 
other illegal substances within Containers packed by 
the Merchant or inside Goods supplied by the 
Merchant, and shall indemnify the Carrier in respect 
thereof. 
Any reference in this Bill to Shipped on Board or 
Clean on Board relates solely to the Containers and 
not to the contents thereof. 
[…] 
UPS Ocean Freight Services, Multimodal Transport or 
Port To Port Shipment Conditions 
Clause 11. CONTAINERS NOT PACKED BY CARRIER 
COSCO, Container Lines Bill of Lading (amended 
24/8/2001) 
Clause 10. MERCHANT-STUFFED CONTAINER 
CHAPTER V: THE CARRIER’S OBLIGATIONS OVER CONTAINERIZED CARGO 
 
263 
If a Container has not been packed or filled, or the 
Goods, whether or not in a container, have not been 
prepared or packaged for transportation by or on 
behalf of Carrier, the provisions of this Clause shall 
apply. 
Carrier shall not be liable for loss of or damage to the 
contents and Merchant shall indemnify Carrier 
against any loss, damage, liability or expense incurred 
by Carrier if such loss, damage, liability or expense 
has been caused by: 
 (a) the manner in which the Container has 
been packed or filled; or 
 (b) the unsuitability of the Goods for 
Carriage in Containers or for importation or delivery 
at destination; or 
 (c) the unsuitability or defective condition of 
any Container supplied by or on behalf of Carrier, (i) 
arising without any want of due diligence on the part 
of Carrier to make the Container reasonably fit for 
the purpose for which it is required, or (ii) which 
would have been apparent on a reasonable 
inspection by Merchant at or prior to the time when 
the Container was packed or filled; or 
 (d) the unsuitability or defective condition of 
any Container not supplied by or on behalf of Carrier; 
or 
 (e) the lack of proper description or 
preparation or packing of the Goods for 
transportation. 
(1) If a Container has not been stuffed by or on behalf 
of the Carrier, the Carrier shall not be liable for loss of 
or damage to the Goods and the Merchant shall 
indemnify the Carrier against any loss, damage, 
liability or expense incurred by the Carrier if such 
loss, damage, liability or expense has been caused by: 
 (a) the manner in which the Container has 
been filled, packed, loaded or stuffed, or 
 (b) the unsuitability of the Goods for carriage 
in the Container, or 
 (c) the unsuitability or defective condition of 
the Container, provided that, if the Container had 
been supplied by or on behalf of the Carrier, this 
unsuitability or defective condition could have been 
apparent upon inspection by the Merchant at or prior 
to the time when the Container was filled, packed, 
loaded or stuffed. 
(2) If a Merchant-stuffed Container is delivered by the 
Carrier with its seal intact, such delivery shall 
constitute full and complete performance of the 
Carrier's obligations hereunder and the Carrier shall 
not be liable for any loss or shortage of the Goods 
ascertained at delivery. 
(3) The Merchant shall inspect Containers before 
stuffing them and the use of a Container shall be 
prima facie evidence of its being suitable and without 
defect. 
These particular clauses are generally common in bills of lading. Despite the 
slight difference in their wording, there is evidently a resemblance as to the content of 
the terms, which confirms the findings reached in sections 6.1 and 6.2 thus far. Namely, 
with regard to shipper-packed containers, the carrier is not liable for faulty packing of 
the container; for the unsuitability of the goods for containerized carriage; for the 
unsuitability or defective condition of the containers (provided there is no want of due 
diligence on behalf of the carrier), and for the incorrect setting of refrigeration controls or 
any thermostatic ventilation intended for the carriage of refrigerated goods, including on 
carrier-supplied containers, provided that any incorrect settings would have been 
apparent upon inspection by the shipper before or at the time of packing. 
7. The problem of weighing the containers: who owes that 
duty? 
Container weight verification has been an obstruction for the industry for a long 
time. Generally, each container comes on-board with a manifest which shows its 
contents but no carrier can vouch for what is inside the container and to what extent the 




manifest list is correct. As already pointed out, the carrier is under no obligation to open 
and inspect containers. What is more, misdeclared cargo in a container may become 
inaccessible once loaded on the container vessel. Likewise, a sea carrier can hardly verify 
the weight of a container and, what is more, under the Hague-Visby Rules he owes no 
such duty. 
The weight factor, however, is of utmost importance for the stability of the vessel, 
hence for the safety of the entire voyage. Usually, in order to maintain the vessel’s 
stability and to evenly distribute the cargo weight, the heaviest containers are placed at 
the bottom (either on deck or under deck), while lighter containers are stowed on top. 
When containers are overweight, the ensuing damages may well exceed, for example, the 
damages to the cargo stowed in the misdeclared container, the damages to the 
surrounding on-shore infrastructure due to a falling overweight container which the 
crane could not support because it exceeded the crane’s load limit, or the damages to the 
hatches of the vessel. In reality, overweight containers can have devastating 
consequences with cargo losses for millions of euros and the total loss of the vessel as 
well as the possible loss of human life. Accidents with vessels such as MSC Napoli and 
M/V Deneb show the gravity of such misdeclaration of containers. 1043F1043F264 The problem is not 
to be underestimated also because it has been reported that 10% of the containers 
involved in world trade have weight that has wrongly been declared by the shipper when 
the container is presented for loading. 1044F1044F265 Whether misstatement of container weight is 
caused by ignorance, negligence or a deliberate intention (e.g. to evade duty), it is 
commonly believed that there is less room for an error in trades which involve 
homogenous cargo because such regular shipments consist of units that have pre-set 
weight.1045F1045F266 Conversely, smaller shippers and irregular shipments of varied type of cargo 
pose a greater risk because they have a bigger error-margin.1046F1046F267 
Another problem which is caused by overweight containers and the ensuing 
stability issues is that shipping lines often may refuse to ship a particular cargo 
providing reasons such as “due to stability constraints we had to short ship your 
cargo”.1047F1047F268 
More serious discrepancies in container weight between what has been verified 
and what has actually been loaded may even lead to the entire stowage plan becoming 
obsolete in the sense that the vessel’s stability is seriously compromised, which also 
means that the carrier can be held liable for breaching his obligation under Article III 
rule 1 to exercise due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel. Furthermore, 
misdeclaration of a container’s weight may well affect not only the carrier’s obligation to 
exercise due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel, but also his obligations under 
Article III rule 2. The stowage plan drawn by the master is based on the figures 
furnished by the shipper. If those figures are incorrect, the entire stowage plan could be 
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erroneous, resulting in an unbalanced distribution of weight as a result of which a 
container or an entire stack of containers may collapse. 1048F1048F269 In essence, overweight 
containers risk making any stowage plan not reliable, and that is why the industry has 
been for a long time in need for means of ascertaining and verifying the information 
provided by shippers as to the weight of the containerized cargo. 
Given the nature of container shipping, the master has no means to very whether 
the information provided by the shipper is accurate. Moreover, nowadays’ big container 
vessels capable of carrying over 18,000 TEUs make it virtually impossible for a master to 
control the weight of every single shipping container, while preserving one of the major 
merits of container shipping – speed. However, if a master can ascertain that a 
container’s weight is inaccurately stated, or if he has a suspicion thereof, he is obliged to 
refuse the shipment of the particular cargo, especially if such a container is threatening 
to exceed the permissible stack capacity.1049F1049F270 
The IMO has taken the issue with overweight containers very seriously and the 
necessary changes to the SOLAS convention were implemented. First, in September 
2013, the sub-committee on Dangerous Goods, Solid Cargoes and Containers passed 
draft guidelines for implementation of Mandatory Container Weighing Regulations, 
which was approved by the IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) in May 2014 at its 
93rd session. The new paragraphs of the amended Regulation 2 of SOLAS Chapter VI 
(Carriage of Cargoes and Oil Fuels) impose a mandatory weight verification requirement 
on shippers. This means that it will not be the carrier’s responsibility to weigh the 
containers loaded or to verify the figures submitted by the shipper. 
The change, which will turn container weight verification into a condition prior to 
loading, will become legally binding as of July 1, 2016. An exception to the provision is 
provided for containers that are carried on a chassis or on a trailer when transported on 
a ro-ro basis in short international voyages. 1050F1050F271 For all other containerized shipments, the 
shipper named on an ocean carrier’s bill of lading is obliged to verify the gross mass of 
every packed container by using either of the following two methods. The first one is by 
using calibrated and certified equipment to weigh the container itself (e.g. a 
weighbridge), while the second method is by using a certified method approved by a 
competent authority to weigh all cargo items, packages and dunnage material inside the 
container as the sum of their weight is added to the tare weight of the container, and the 
total sum provides the verified gross mass (VGM) of the container. 1051F1051F272 The shipper will 
also have to ensure that the verified gross weight 1052F1052F273 of the container is stated in the 
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shipping document that will be submitted to the master or his representative, and that 
will be used in the preparation of the vessel’s stowage plan. 1053F1053F274 
8. Carriage of containers under the Rotterdam Rules 
In Chapter II, it was clarified that one of the aims of the new Convention was to 
respond to the new realities in the shipping industry. As the carriage of cargo in 
containers plays a major role in today’s international transport, the Rotterdam Rules 
could not leave the steady increase in door-to-door container shipments in the liner trade 
unaddressed. While the Hague-Visby Rules are unimodal in nature, the Rotterdam 
Rules are a response to the increase in multi-modal transport, albeit not being a true 
multimodal instrument. The port-to-port scope has given way to door-to-door contractual 
arrangements, and the Rotterdam Rules include those in their scope. Furthermore, some 
substantial changes have been introduced with regard to the carrier’s obligations over 
containerized cargo and these will be discussed below. 
8.1 A package, or not a package, that is the question 1054F1054F275 
Before addressing any provision regarding the carrier’s obligations associated 
with the carriage of containers and containerized cargo, one should note the definition 
provided in Article 1.26 that specifies which article of transport will be regulated by the 
Rotterdam Rules as a container: 
26. “Container” means any type of container, transportable tank or 
flat, swapbody, or any similar unit load used to consolidate goods, 
and any equipment ancillary to such unit load. 
The scope of this definition is important because it has bearing, inter alia, on the 
carrier’s duties regarding containers and containerized cargo, on the information 
provided in the contract of carriage with regard to containers as well as on the limits of 
liability. As seen, the definition is exhaustive and very wide, and it is likely to comprise 
all types of shipping container discussed in section 3.1.3 above. On the other hand, 
shipper-supplied containers are always considered part of the cargo according to the 
definition of “goods” in Article 1.24: 
24. “Goods” means the wares, merchandise, and articles of every kind 
whatsoever that a carrier undertakes to carry under a contract of 
carriage and includes the packing and any equipment and container 
not supplied by or on behalf of the carrier. 
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275 The famous monologue of Prince Hamlet, a character in William Shakespeare’s popular play “The 
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These two provisions show that are the drafters of the Rotterdam Rules have 
attempted to codify the status of containers, which is something that was missing in the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. 
However, whether carrier-supplied containers are considered part of the cargo or 
part of the ship, however, is closely related with the question whether such containers 
are considered a package within the meaning of the Rules, or not. The Rotterdam Rules 
follow the approach undertaken by the Hague-Visby Rules drafters, which is a 
documentary approach and which has already been discussed above. In the Rotterdam 
Rules provision on limitation of liability, there is a special clause dedicated to containers. 
Article 59.2 states that: 
Article 59 Limits of Liability 
[…] 
2. When goods are carried in or on a container, pallet or similar 
article of transport used to consolidate goods, or in or on a vehicle, 
the packages or shipping units enumerated in the contract particulars 
as packed in or on such article of transport or vehicle are deemed 
packages or shipping units. If not so enumerated, the goods in or on 
such article of transport or vehicle are deemed one shipping unit. 
As seen, the clause repeats the position under the Hague-Visby Rules but, at the 
same time, the provision has been widened to include also cargo that is carried in or on a 
vehicle. With this provision, addressing containers, the Rotterdam Rules correspond to 
the growing use of containers in the shipping industry. Article 59.2 of the Rules 
evidently is trying to modernize the regime applicable to this kind of sea transport, and 
in the opinion of the author it successfully closes the gaps between law and practice. 
8.2 The carrier’s obligations regarding containers 
The most outstanding novelty that the Rotterdam Rules brought as far as the 
carriage of containers is concerned, is that the seaworthiness obligation is explicitly 
extended to carrier-supplied containers as well. 1055F1055F276 This will usually be the case with 
refrigerated containers because in the reefer trade it is most often the carrier who 
provides the containers.1056F1056F277 Thus, following Article 14 of the Rotterdam Rules, the carrier 
is the responsible party for the cargoworthiness (seaworthiness) of the containers that he 
has provided, and the containers’ cargoworthiness comprises the following three 
components: (1) the containers should be in a good condition, 1057F1057F278 (2) they should be able to 
                                               
276 Article 14 (Specific obligations applicable to the voyage by sea) of the Rotterdam Rules: “The carrier is 
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withstand the foreseeable hardships of the voyage, and (3) they should be appropriate for 
the cargo that is to be carried in or upon them. 1058F1058F279 
A particular problem associated with this provision has been brought forward in 
literature and it is of practical nature – should a carrier be held responsible for damage 
to an FCL container that he provided to the shipper for stuffing the cargo, if the damage 
occurred while the container was in the shipper’s custody? 1059F1059F280 In this connection, it is 
important to be reminded that regardless whether the shipment is FCL door, FCL depot 
or FCL port,1060F1060F281 any damage taking place during the process of stuffing the container by 
the shipper, will be outside the period of responsibility of the carrier. What is more, in 
such carriage arrangements, the shipper under the Rotterdam Rules is explicitly obliged 
to the carrier to “properly and carefully stow, lash and secure the contents in or on the 
container […] and in such a way that they will not cause harm to persons or property.” 1061F1061F282 
Worthy of mentioning is also that the shipper cannot escape from this container rule, 
meaning that he cannot contractually modify this obligation of his, nor can he delegate 
it.1062F1062F283 Therefore, if the damage or defect on the container is not visible and the carrier has 
exercised due diligence, then he is unlikely to be held liable under Article 14 of the 
Rotterdam Rules. However, if, under the same circumstances, the damage to the 
container is visible but the carrier loads it on the vessel anyway and without putting a 
reservation in the transport document, then he runs the risk to be held responsible for 
the uncargoworthy container. 
In that context, there will be a different outcome for carrier-supplied containers 
as opposed to shipper-supplied containers if those are found to be damaged prior to 
loading. In the first scenario, the carrier will be obliged to rectify the fault or replace the 
container if needed, or otherwise he will be held responsible for the unseaworthiness of 
the containers. In the second scenario, the carrier will still have the duty to check the 
apparent order and condition of the shipper-supplied container and, if this is the case, to 
insert a reservation in the transport document, which will then require the shipper 
either to replace the container or to assume the risk of loss or damage to the cargo, 
resulting from the container’s unseaworthiness. 1063F1063F284 In that latter case, absent such a 
reservation, the carrier will bear the burden of proof and may need to resort to external 
evidence such as the so-called equipment interchange receipt, which shows the apparent 
condition of the container.1064F1064F285 
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container is transferred from one vessel to another or to or from a shipping terminal. The document includes 
information such as the container number, the type of container, the vessel/voyage code, the owner of the 
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An important remark is that, despite extending the seaworthiness obligations to 
containers, the Rotterdam Rules do not take the approach of those courts which 
interpreted a container as a functional part of the ship under the Hague/Hague-Visby 
Rules.1065F1065F286 Instead, the respective provision of the Rotterdam Rules is only targeting the 
specific obligation of the carrier and does not postulate a general rule as to the status of 
containers. As observed in section 8.1, a container under the Rotterdam Rules may well 
be considered a package for the purpose of limitation of liability; also, a container is 
considered goods by virtue of Article 1.24 if it is supplied by the shipper. However, an 
interesting comment was made in that regard at the twelfth session of UNCITRAL’s 
Working Group III on the drafting of the Rotterdam Rules: 
A question was raised with respect to the carrier’s obligation 
regarding containers, as mentioned in draft article 13(1)(c) [Article 
14(c)], and whether the contracts pursuant to which a carrier leased 
or provided containers were intended to be covered by the draft 
instrument. A view was expressed that the draft instrument was 
intended only to apply to contracts of carriage, and not to separate 
contracts for the lease or rental of containers. The contrary view was 
that the draft instrument should apply not only to the contract of 
carriage but also to related contracts, particularly those contracts 
that might be entered into for the execution of the contract of 
carriage. It was suggested that, without taking a stand as to whether 
such contracts related to the contract of carriage were covered by the 
draft instrument, the approach in draft article 13(1)(c) was in 
keeping with the position adopted in most courts that when the 
container was provided by the carrier, it should be qualified as part 
of the ship’s hold, and that the same obligation that the carrier had 
for the ship and the care of the holds should apply to those containers 
once the containers were loaded on board a ship. It was also noted 
that this approach was in keeping with draft article 1(j) definition of 
“goods” [Article 1.24] to include any “container not supplied by or on 
behalf of the carrier or a performing party”. [emphasis added] 1066F1066F
287
 
Two conclusions can be drawn out of this paragraph. First of all, this particular 
comment of the drafters of the Rules partly overlaps with von Ziegler’s view that the 
provision of containers constitutes an autonomous contractual relationship between the 
carrier and the shipper, which is distinct from the contract of carriage. This view, to the 
extent that there is no separate lease agreement between the parties, was disproved in 
section 6.1 of this chapter. Secondly, as to the assertion that most courts adopt the 
position that carrier-provided containers are part of the ship’s hold, it has been thus far 
plainly illustrated that judicial opinion is far from unanimous on that matter. 1067F1067F288 Here, it 
could be added that although a container has a similar character and purpose to a ship’s 
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hold, it cannot be categorized as such. The problem with characterizing a container as a 
functional part of a vessel’s hold is that, unlike the latter, a container is a unit that is 
mobile and can be transported to the shipper’s premises to be stuffed, or to the consignee 
to be unpacked. What is more, other characteristics of containers also point to another 
opinion – namely, that they share similar characteristics with a package that 
consolidates and secures the cargo. These two extreme points can explain why courts can 
hardly give any general, definitive, and unanimous answer as to the nature of 
containers.  
With regard to the main Rotterdam Rules provision on the carrier’s duty to care 
for the cargo (Article 13.1), it has not undergone such a dramatic change and the 
respective article lists basically almost the same duties as those set forth in Article III 
rule 2 of the Hague-Visby Rules, and it also prescribes an equivalent standard of care. 1068F 1068F289 
What has been changed with the new Convention is that, during a voyage, a carrier will 
be continuously responsible (under Article 14) for the cargoworthiness of the containers 
that he provided, on the one hand, and responsible at the same time for his duty of care 
for the containerized cargo (under Article 13). Therefore, the two obligations are now 
concurrently owed, namely during the voyage, since the obligation of container 
seaworthiness is no longer discharged once the vessel has sailed. What is peculiar about 
this change is that under the Rotterdam Rules, at least from the perspective of 
containerized carriage, the two fundamental obligations – the seaworthiness obligation 
and duty of care – have merged even more. Thus, under the same circumstances, a 
carrier may be held liable for breaching his duty under Article 14(c) to keep the 
containers cargoworthy if they are supplied by the carrier; or for breaching his duty 
under Article 13.1 to care for the cargo when those same containers are supplied by the 
shipper (since under Article 1.24 shipper-supplied containers are considered goods). It 
seems that what Langley J. established at the end of last century in The “Imvros” (“it is 
often not an easy question to determine the moment when the line between bad stowage 
and unseaworthiness is crossed”)1069F1069F290 seems to be ever more relevant with regard to 
containerized shipments. 
Likewise, adjudication under the Rotterdam Rules and the Hague-Visby Rules 
may be based on a different obligation of the carrier even though the circumstances are 
the same. In other words, a carrier’s liability may be triggered for breaching a regulation 
enshrining a different obligation under the two Conventions even if all facts remain the 
same. For example, if a carrier-supplied open-top container encounters unexpected 
weather and the cargo starts getting damaged from seawater or rain coming inside from 
the roof of the container, and the carrier has a reasonable opportunity to cover the open-
top container with a tarpaulin to protect the cargo from the damaging effect of the water 
but fails to do so, then he will obviously be held responsible. Under the Hague-Visby 
Rules, the carrier will be held liable for the breach of his obligation under Article III rule 
2 to care for the cargo. However, under the Rotterdam Rules, the carrier will be held 
liable for breaching his obligation under Article 14(c) to keep cargoworthy any containers 
that he had supplied. 
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Furthermore, a few additional points are worthy of addressing about this 
modified cargoworthiness obligation of the carrier with respect to containerized cargo. In 
particular, determining the carrier’s liability for damaged or lost containers is 
specifically addressed by the Rotterdam Rules. Without reaching as far as to comment 
the entire mechanism of Article 17, which regulates liability and burden of proof, Article 
17.5(a) is of particular interest for the liability of the carrier over containerized cargo: 
5. The carrier is also liable, notwithstanding paragraph 3 of this 
article, for all or part of the loss, damage, or delay if:  
(a) The claimant proves that the loss, damage, or delay was or was 
probably caused by or contributed to by (i) the unseaworthiness of 
the ship; (ii) the improper crewing, equipping, and supplying of the 
ship; or (iii) the fact that the holds or other parts of the ship in which 
the goods are carried, or any containers supplied by the carrier in or 
upon which the goods are carried, were not fit and safe for 
reception, carriage, and preservation of the goods; and  
(b) The carrier is unable to prove either that: (i) none of the events or 
circumstances referred to in subparagraph 5 (a) of this article caused 
the loss, damage, or delay; or (ii) it complied with its obligation to 
exercise due diligence pursuant to article 14. [emphasis added] 
Article 17.5(a) in essence provides that, when the carrier has breached his duty to 
provide cargoworthy containers, he cannot avail of the liability-exemption defences listed 
in Article 17.3, which are similar to the Hague-Visby Rules defences laid down in Article 
IV rule 2. This rule is, however, subject to two conditions: (1) the carrier failed to prove 
the lack of causation between the breach and the resulting loss, damage or delay, and (2) 
the carrier failed to prove that he exercised due diligence to make and keep any carrier-
supplied containers fit and safe for the reception, carriage, and preservation of the 
goods.1070F1070F291 The Rotterdam Rules do not elaborate on the standard of proof set by the 
phrase “probably caused”, and, thus, the issue of causation is left to be defined by 
national law.1071F1071F292 Interestingly, Article 15.5 and Article 15.6 suggest that under the 
Rotterdam Rules, the seaworthiness obligation is no longer an overriding obligation and, 
provided there is another contributory cause for the damage or loss besides the 
unseaworthiness, the carrier may be only partially liable. 1072F1072F293 This is a fundamental 
difference as compared to the Hague-Visby Rules. 
8.3 The evidentiary effect of the B/L and the contents of a container 
As observed thus far, the Rotterdam Rules codify much of what has been 
established by means of courts’ interpretation of the various Hague-Visby Rules 
                                               
291 See Article 17.5(b), the Rotterdam Rules. 
292 Michael F. Sturley, Tomotaka Fujita, Gertjan van der Ziel – ‘The Rotterdam Rules: The UN Convention 
on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea’, Sweet & Maxwell (2010), 
p.113, para. 5.094;  
293 Article 15.5: “The carrier is also liable […] for all or part of the loss, damage, or delay if…”; Article 15.6: 
“When the carrier is relieved of part of its liability pursuant to this article, the carrier is liable only for that 
part of the loss, damage or delay that is attributable to the event or circumstance for which it is liable 
pursuant to this article.” This is a position, which is different to the one under the Hague-Visby Rules where 
a carrier will typically be liable in full if there is a breach of the unseaworthiness obligation regardless 
whether this breach was only a contributory cause for the loss or damage. 




provisions. The carrier’s right to qualify the information on the bill of lading, which 
relates to the goods and, in particular, to containerized goods, makes no exception. While 
the Hague-Visby Rules acknowledge in general that a carrier shall not be obliged to 
accept particulars inserted in the bill of lading, which he has reasonable grounds of 
suspecting to be inaccurate (Article III rule 3 HVR), the Rotterdam Rules provide for 
specific rules addressing containerized cargo (Article 40 RR): 
Article 40 
Qualifying the information relating to the goods in the contract 
particulars 
[…]  
3. When the goods are not delivered for carriage to the carrier or a 
performing party in a closed container or vehicle, or when they are 
delivered in a closed container or vehicle and the carrier or a 
performing party actually inspects them, the carrier may qualify the 
information referred to in article 36, paragraph 1, if:  
(a) The carrier had no physically practicable or commercially 
reasonable means of checking the information furnished by the 
shipper, in which case it may indicate which information it was unable 
to check; or  
(b) The carrier has reasonable grounds to believe the information 
furnished by the shipper to be inaccurate, in which case it may include 
a clause providing what it reasonably considers accurate information.  
4. When the goods are delivered for carriage to the carrier or a 
performing party in a closed container or vehicle, the carrier may 
qualify the information referred to in:  
(a) Article 36, subparagraphs 1 (a), (b), or (c), if:  
(i) The goods inside the container or vehicle have not actually been 
inspected by the carrier or a performing party; and  
(ii) Neither the carrier nor a performing party otherwise has actual 
knowledge of its contents before issuing the transport document or 
the electronic transport record; and  
(b) Article 36, subparagraph 1 (d), if:  
(i) Neither the carrier nor a performing party weighed the container 
or vehicle, and the shipper and the carrier had not agreed prior to the 
shipment that the container or vehicle would be weighed and the 
weight would be included in the contract particulars; or 
(ii) There was no physically practicable or commercially reasonable 
means of checking the weight of the container or vehicle. 
Article 40 consists of rather complex provisions which, from the perspective of 
containerized cargo, could be construed in the following manner. 
In general, the carrier shall qualify the cargo-related information on the bill of 
lading (regardless whether it is a containerized shipment or not) in order to indicate that 
he assumes no responsibility for the accuracy of that shipper-provided information if: (1) 
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the carrier has actual knowledge of any false or misleading material statement in the 
bill of lading, or (2) he has reasonable grounds to believe so. 1073F1073F294 
Secondly, with regard to goods delivered in a closed container, which the carrier 
actually inspects, the carrier may qualify the information on the bill of lading relating to 
the description of such goods, the leading identification marks, the quantity or number of 
packages, and the weight of the goods (if furnished by the shipper) if: (1) the carrier has 
no physically practicable or commercially reasonable means of checking that 
information, or (2) he has reasonable grounds to believe that such information is 
inaccurate.1074F1074F295 
Thirdly, when the goods inside the container have not been actually inspected by 
the carrier and he has otherwise no knowledge of its contents before issuing the bill, the 
carrier may qualify the information on the bill of lading relating to the description of the 
goods, the leading identification marks, and the quantity or number of packages. 1075F1075F296 In 
addition to that third scenario, the carrier may qualify also the information relating to 
the weight of the goods (if furnished by the shipper) provided that (1) the carrier did not 
weigh the container, and the shipper and carrier had not agreed, prior to the shipment, 
to weigh the container and include the weight in the contract particulars, or (2) there 
was no physically practicable or commercially reasonable means of checking the weight 
of the container.1076F1076F297 
By regulating so strictly the carrier’s duty and/or right to qualify the cargo-
related information on the bill, Article 40 of the Rotterdam Rules seeks to diminish the 
possible disputes between carriers and shippers as to the circumstances when such 
qualification is necessary.1077F1077F298 Such disputes may be fostered, for example, by the 
shipper’s need to procure an unqualified document of transport in connection with a 
contract of sale, under which the latter is a seller. Such contracts are very often carried 
out on the basis of a credit-payment arrangement, known as a Letter of Credit, which 
may require a clean transport document to be procured in order for the payment to be 
effectuated on behalf of the buyer. The reason why Article 40 distinguishes between a 
duty (‘shall’) and a right (‘may’) to qualify the information in the contract particulars is 
explained with the need to protect third party bill of lading holders, whose rights may be 
affected by the respective information. 1078F1078F299 Therefore, when the carrier has actual 
knowledge or reasonable grounds to believe that such information is false or misleading, 
he is bestowed a duty to give notice to any third party by qualifying the bill, 1079F1079F300 whereas 
when the carrier has no reasonable means to check and verify the accuracy of this 
information, he is not obliged to qualify the bill but he has the right to do so.  
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obviously be that the transport document will be considered a conclusive evidence vis-à-vis a third party 
under Article 41. 










The innovations in the maritime industry and the changes in the commercial 
practices require a critical reassessment of the Hague-Visby Rules. Such a need is not 
surprising given the fact that the Rules were drafted and implemented many decades 
ago and are, thus, adapted to different commercial and business realities. As a 
consequence, courts are often assigned with the task to interpret the meaning of the 
Convention in a way so as to adapt the wording as set forth therein to the modern 
commercial environment. 
The various examples, provided throughout the thesis, of different legal systems 
show that contracts of carriage are interpreted according to the legal family to which the 
court belongs. Common law countries typically adhere to freedom of contract and the 
force of precedent, whereas dispute resolution in civil law countries is dependent mainly 
on the mandatory force of the legal provision rather than on the contractual provision. In 
other words, civil law jurisdictions tend to interpret literally the relevant provisions of 
the Hague-Visby words, while common law jurisdictions give more room in their analysis 
to the terms of the bill of lading. This divergence becomes problematic also because the 
Rules themselves are intended to create a balance between the carrier’s interests and 
the shipper’s interests on the basis of fairness rather than on the basis of freedom of 
contract. This balance of interests was established through a mandatory liability regime 
with minimum liability from which the parties cannot escape. It seems that, together 
with all the numerous problems to be solved by a future legislative reform, the freedom 
of contract within the ambit of the Hague-Visby Rules remains a fundamental issue. 
That is why very often the reasoning of English courts slides along the razor-edge of the 
guardian of the statutory minimum liability (Article III rule 8) in an attempt to keep up 
with practice and modern-day contractual relations such as the FIOS(T) clause, for 
example. The problem with having the need of too much interpretation of the current 
legislation, however, is that eventually this may result in a distortion of the balance 
between the carrier’s and the shipper’s interests, which becomes counterproductive.  
The general conclusion is that, with respect to the obligations of the carrier over 
the cargo, there is less need for the weaker party under a contract of carriage to be 
protected by today’s international sea transport legislation. The studies conducted in 
Chapter IV and Chapter V, in particular, established that cargo interests nowadays are 
better off than their counterparts several decades ago at least when carriage on deck is 
concerned, or when one considers the containerization revolution. 
A very important question, which also summarizes the problems regarding the 
legal lacuna found in regulating of some of the obligations of the carrier, is whether the 
shipping business is in need of more mandatory rules today, or whether overregulation 
may turn out to be counterproductive. This certainly is a policy issue. A good example is 
the enforceability of FIOS(T) clause and all the resulting implications discussed in the 
relevant chapter. On the one hand, one may be a proponent of the codified solution 
provided by the Rotterdam Rules, which may become the future liability regime 




regulation maritime transport of goods. However, other opinions, which can be heard 
particularly in common law countries, may find such codification redundant as all 
matters regarding the applicability of free-in/free-out terms have been clearly settled in 
case law (Jordan II, Eems Solar). Similar problems were found in the other cargo-related 
aspects of the carrier’s obligations that are discussed in the thesis as well. 
Thus, the current study on the carrier’s obligations over the cargo has revealed a 
problem of a more general nature. Considering that the drafting of the Rotterdam Rules 
was a compromise reached on an international level, now the signatory states may need 
to face yet another compromise in deciding whether to ratify the Rules. Should we 
sacrifice legal certainty and rely on the current system established by the Hague-Visby 
Rules and shaped mostly by jurisprudence as a source of law, or should we risk 
overregulation through a very complex maritime plus regime whose benefits may not 
sufficiently exceed the possible shortcomings such as possible increased freight? 
In essence, the Rotterdam Rules offer new solutions to the problems raised in this 
thesis, and codify much of what was previously decided under the Hague-Visby Rules 
through interpretation by the courts. In other words, the gaps in law that were opened 
by the quick development of the entire shipping industry were previously bridged by 
means of the court’s interpretation (or, we can refer to the well-known principle – courts 
should not legislate but are allowed to interpret only within a legal lacuna), whereas, 
under the Rotterdam Rules, these gaps are filled by means of legislation. 
Beyond doubt, there is an obvious need for uniformity in the shipping sector. It 
was evidenced in the current thesis that various national jurisdictions offer different 
solutions to the problems that are created when there is a hiatus between law and 
practice. A uniform legal framework regulating international transport that is similarly 
applied will help minimizing these different outcomes which will result in more legal 
certainty and predictability and less costs for litigation. The latter certainly serves the 
commercial needs and public interest, accordingly. Indeed the Rotterdam Rules are a 
very long and rather complex compromise between the drafting parties but for the time 
being it seems to be the best that could be offered in response to the need of uniformity 
and the need of addressing the technical and commercial developments that has 
occurred since the mid-1920s. 
Having said that, an account must be given of the fact that the Rotterdam Rules 
suffer from being not so friendly to the carrier, which is a trait that may allot the new 
Convention the same fate as that of the Hamburg Rules. It also seems that the 
Rotterdam Rules are tailored for big shipping companies which have enough commercial 
power and infrastructure to cover the entire shipping chain. However, because of the 
extended scope of the Convention, smaller carriers would exposed to much more risks 
outside the sea leg of the journey, where they have little or no control of the situation. 
This means that such carriers will be more likely to be liable for failure to fulfill their 
cargo-related obligations, and this increased risk can easily be transformed into higher 
freight rates. To predict the better alternative is a hefty task but one thing is for sure – 
there is no right choice in absolute terms. In today’s complex shipping environment there 





 The present doctoral thesis contains a research study on the obligations of the sea 
carrier over the cargo that he has undertaken to carry on board the vessel. The 
introductory chapter presents the topic and the scope of the thesis. It also familiarizes 
the reader with the problems that will further be discussed in the following chapters. A 
starting point is the importance of shipping for international commerce and also for the 
nowadays industrialized world in general. Then, it is submitted that the topic discussed 
in the thesis is a fundamental part of any shipping arrangement. The obligations that a 
sea carrier owes to the cargo interests with regard to a particular shipment form a 
significant part of the content of the contract of carriage. 
The introductory chapter also outlines the scope of the thesis and gives the 
parameters and limiting factors used to determine the legal problems that are addressed 
in the discussion in order to ensure that a streamline, logical and comprehensive outline 
is achieved. In particular, in the analysis of the problems discussed, the following 
methodological principles are taken into consideration. Firstly, where possible, attempt 
is made to distinguish between the carrier’s obligations and the pertaining liability. It 
must be conceded that both areas of research are indeed closely related and very often 
the legal analysis will require taking closer look at the carrier’s liability for breaching 
any of his cargo-related obligations. Secondly, the current thesis focuses on the 
obligations of the carrier over the goods carried (Art.III rule 2 HVR) and does not aim to 
analyze the other fundamental duty of the carrier, which is to provide a seaworthy vessel 
(Art.III rule 1 HVR). In particular, it is important to note that the seaworthiness 
obligation will be discussed only to the extent that such discussion can reveal the essence 
and nature of the cargo-related duties from a comparative perspective. Thirdly, the study 
will analyze the leading international liability regime regulating sea carriage, the 
Hague-Visby Rules. However, each chapter of the thesis will also extensively cover the 
relevant provisions of the Rotterdam Rules. The rationale behind including the 
Rotterdam Rules approach regarding the carrier’s cargo-related obligations is the 
additional perspective that such an analysis adds. In essence, what is important about 
the methodology employed in this doctoral thesis is that it does not attempt to carry out 
a comparative study between the two regimes but aims to demonstrate, inter alia, how 
the law in that particular area would change should the Rotterdam Rules ever come to 
force. 
Chapter I: General Introduction to Bill of Lading Law 
The first chapter of the thesis functions as a theoretical background, and serves 
also as a reference point allowing even readers with average knowledge of shipping law 
to grasp the intricacies of the more subtle problems that are discussed further. To the 
extent possible, this chapter adds to the book a source of general shipping knowledge, 
which is intended to limit the instances when the reader has to resort to external 
materials in order to clarify essential notions and positions regarding the carriage of 
goods by sea. The aim of the first chapter is not simply to provide, in a concise manner, 




knowledge on basic concepts in the area of shipping in general but also to clarify areas in 
the carriage of goods that are relevant precisely to the topic of the current thesis – the 
carrier’s obligations over the cargo. 
To be more specific, Chapter I deals with the contract of carriage and the related 
transportation documents as well as with the contractual parties. First, the definitions of 
the various parties are laid down and explained although the same may have mostly 
theoretical significance. Then a division is made between the two major contractual 
arrangements in the area of carriage of goods by sea – a bill of lading and a charter 
party. Section 2 of Chapter I explains in particular the essence of these two documents, 
their functions, types as well as their characteristics as opposed to other transport 
documents, and also the interplay between bills of lading and charter parties.  
To sum up, this chapter provides information about what is commonly referred to 
as “dry shipping”, or in other words the legal problems associated with contractual or 
commercial matters, which is the area of research of the current thesis. 
Chapter II: The Carrier’s Obligations over the Cargo under the Hague-
Visby Rules and the Rotterdam Rules 
Chapter II of the dissertation extensively lays down the legal framework of the 
carrier’s obligations over the cargo. The chapter first establishes where the Hague and 
Hague-Visby Rules are situated in the fragmented law on international sea transport. To 
that regard, substantial information is provided as to development and evolution of the 
law regulating international carriage of goods by sea, in particular, the Hague/Hague-
Visby Rules, the Hamburg Rules, and the Rotterdam Rules. This section also explains 
why the Hague-Visby Rules, being the leading maritime liability regime, form a central 
part of the analysis, while at the same time the relevant provisions of the Rotterdam 
Rules are also extensively covered. Among others, taking into consideration the 
Rotterdam Rules position adds up to the academic debate a specific parallel between the 
two regimes from the perspective of the carrier’s cargo-related obligations. 
Section 3 of Chapter II is dedicated to common law primarily because the common 
law position is illustrative for the various cargo-related provisions found in the liability 
regimes discussed further, and because it may also be very helpful to understand the 
rationale behind these provisions. However, this section is concise and does not aim at 
providing a comprehensive statement of the common law position. The reason for putting 
less emphasis on the problems that arise under common law is that, despite the 
evolution of common law, England and Wales developed a separate body of law on 
admiralty, on which the present thesis is focused. 
Sections 4 and 5 explain in detail not only the specific provisions embodying the 
duty to exercise care for the cargo (i.e. Article III rule 2 HVR; Articles 11 and 13 RR) but 
also the environment in which these provisions are found and operate. Therefore, a more 
extensive approach is undertaken with regard to the entire Article III of the Hague-
Visby Rules as well as with regard to Article II. Thus, section 4 refers to all eight rules 
laid down in Article III while a more thorough analysis is, naturally, dedicated to rule 2. 
In particular, subsection 4.3 reveals the nature of the obligations set in Article III rule 2 
as well as the meaning of the words “properly and carefully”; the relationship between 




transferability of the duty; the period throughout a carrier is under this duty, and the 
burden and order of proof. Reference is also made to the cargo-related obligations under 
charter parties and the specific problems that may arise in that context. 
Similarly, Article 11 (the obligation to carry and deliver the goods), Article 12 (the 
period of responsibility of the carrier) and Article 13 (the obligation to exercise care for 
the cargo) of the Rotterdam Rules’ Chapter 4 are discussed in its entirety in section 5 of 
the thesis. Problems such as the identity of the carrier and the burden of proof are also 
addressed. In this way, it is also shown how the entire architecture of the Hague-Visby 
Rules, on the one hand, and of the Rotterdam Rules, on the other, differ when it comes 
down to codifying the carrier’s duty to exercise care for the cargo. 
Chapter III: The FIOS(T) clause 
Chapter III begins by explaining the quintessence and purpose of the FIOS(T) 
clause as well as of its derivatives such as FIO, FI, FO, FILO, etc. The chapter 
establishes the amendments that such a provision brings to the contract of carriage with 
regard to costs, risks and responsibility for handling the goods as opposed to the same 
under liner terms (gross terms). 
In section 3, it is explained why the FIOS(T) clause is a problem within the 
context of the Hague-Visby Rules. That part of the chapter shows that, when courts 
interpret a FIOS(T) clause in the light of Article III rule 2 coupled with Article III rule 8, 
such transfer or delegation of cargo-related duties may be declared contrary to the 
provisions of the Rules and, thus, null and void at least under some jurisdictions. On the 
other hand, however, such contractual arrangements are often seen in practice, which is 
the reason why the chapter speaks of a “tension” between the Rules and the FIOS(T) 
clause. Examples provided from French law, US law, and Dutch law show that the 
FIOS(T) clause, being an exception to the Rules, has been addressed differently under 
various national legal systems. Furthermore, it is pointed out also that the attitude of 
both courts and scholars is far from unanimous with regard to FIOS(T) terms.  
The entire section 4 of Chapter III focuses on how English jurisprudence has 
defined the limits of the carrier’s responsibilities over the cargo. In order to analyze how 
English courts treat FIOS(T) clauses, a detailed case study is carried out where thorough 
attention is devoted to the milestone cases The “Jordan II” and The “Eems Solar”, both of 
which have definitively recognized FIOS(T) terms as a lawful commercial arrangement. 
The study follows carefully the court’s reasoning in both decisions because it is 
illustrative of how the interpretation of the court provides a solution where a vacuum 
exists between legislation and commercial practices.  
 Furthermore, this section also addresses particular problems that pertain to 
FIOS(T) clauses found in charter parties as well as to the wording, interpretation and 
incorporation of such clauses into a bill of lading contract with a third party. In other 
words, the discussion covers the transfer of cargo-related operations not only from the 
carrier to the cargo interests but also from the shipowner to the charterer. In particular, 
the analysis reveals how courts interpret provisions and wording in the contract of 
carriage that attempt to qualify the FIOS(T) clause such as “under the supervision of the 
master”, or “under the responsibility of the master”, or “under the directions of the 




master”, or “to the satisfaction of the master”, etc.; as well as to what extent such words 
can indeed affect the transfer of responsibility over the cargo-handling operations. 
Finally, the chapter analyzes the respective provisions of the Rotterdam Rules 
regarding the acceptability of FIOS(T) terms, and it gives an appraisal of the approach 
undertaken by the new Convention as opposed to the one under Hague-Visby Rules. 
Chapter IV: The Carrier’s Obligations over Deck Cargo 
The fourth Chapter focuses on the problems associated with the carriage of cargo 
on deck and, in particular, the obligations of the carrier over such cargo. The discussions 
on the legislative and judicial issues regarding deck cargo are preceded by an 
explanation of the notions of deck and deck carriage, and of the various reasons and 
considerations behind shipping goods on the deck of a commercial seagoing vessel 
(section 2). 
Section 3 then lays down the position under the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules with 
regard to deck cargo, which is considered an exception to those Rules, and explains why 
such carriage arrangement are excluded from the scope of the Convention. The two 
requirements as laid down in Article I(c) HVR make it possible to distinguish between 
authorized and unauthorized stowage (carriage) on deck as well as between declared and 
undeclared depending on whether the goods are (1) stated as being carried on deck, and 
(2) in fact so carried. The problems which a Clause Paramount can bring to this division 
are also addressed and clarified. 
The current law on deck cargo is then laid down in section 4 of the chapter. This 
part emphasizes on the fact that new technology and modern shipping practices have 
remodeled the old doctrine on deck cargo. In that regard, a factual study is carried out to 
assess the risks relating to the carriage on deck, taking into account statistical data 
regarding the incidence of lost deck cargo. The design of contemporary vessels is also 
taken into account in support of the argument that deck carriage is another sphere of 
shipping where a hiatus between international law and commercial practice is present. 
Section 5 examines the evolution of the traditional deck cargo doctrine under 
English law, whereby the carrier is allowed to carry goods on deck only (1) when there is 
an express agreement between the contractual parties, or (2) when there is a universal 
custom to carry on deck that is binding within a particular trade. Furthermore, the 
doctrines of fundamental breach and deviation are carefully considered as well as their 
impact on the law on deck cargo. How English courts interpret deck cargo covered by a 
clean bill of lading, on the one hand, and by a claused bill, on the other, is further 
discussed in subsection 5.2; in particular, the effect of liberty clauses in English case law. 
The effect of deck carriage on the carrier’s obligation to care for the goods under Article 
III rule 2 as well as the availability of the carrier’s defences for goods carried on deck 
form a notable part in the discussion. Finally, the specific problems of deck cargo under 
voyage and time charter parties are addressed. 
Section 6 demonstrates how deck carriage is regulated in other jurisdictions as 
well. For that purpose, the national regimes in France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Norway, and Sweden are analyzed and compared. It is noteworthy that this section puts 
a bigger emphasis on the comparative element when juxtaposed to the problems 




problems that deck carriage poses under the Hague-Visby Rules are often related to the 
issue that declared deck carriage may step outside the ambit of the Rules and be 
regulated by the applicable national regime. 
The last section of Chapter IV examines the position taken by the Rotterdam 
Rules with respect to deck cargo. It is shown that the drafters of the new maritime plus 
Convention have taken a modernized approach in that regard, which is based to a large 
extent on today’s shipping practice and which takes into account also the body of case 
law adjudicated by English courts that is discussed in the previous sections of the 
current chapter. Thus, section 7 aims also at assessing the advantages of the new 
Convention in that respect. 
Chapter V: The Carrier’s Obligations over Containerized Cargo 
Chapter V is dedicated to the idiosyncrasies of containerized transport in the 
context of the carrier’s cargo-related obligations. The process of containerization had an 
unparalleled impact not only on the shipping business but, more generally, on 
international trade and even social and economic development because of the 
irreversible changes that it brought to the modern world. Therefore, section 2 of the 
present chapter provides comprehensive information on the advent of the container 
revolution in the second half of the XX century as well as on the history and development 
of containerized shipping and its impact on today’s international shipping and trade. 
Section 3 then familiarizes the reader with certain technical aspects of the 
parameters of the shipping container such as its structure, type, and use. Substantial 
information is also provided with regard to the modern containerships and the necessary 
infrastructure, which allows today’s swift handling of containerized cargo. The level of 
detail of this technical information is consistent with its relevance to the legal problems 
discussed afterwards. 
The following section encompasses the first group of problems which represent 
the core issue in this chapter. This is the problem of conceptualizing the shipping 
container under the Hague Rules and the Hague-Visby Rules. Most notably, section 4 
lists the decisive factors for determining the nature of the shipping container either as a 
part of the vessel or part of the cargo. Defining how containers are considered under the 
Rules (for instance, to what extent a container can be considered a package) has 
relevance to all following issues with respect to the regulation of these standardized 
metal or aluminium boxes. 
In section 5, it is submitted that the transport of containers brought changes also 
to the traditional model of the contract of carriage. Accordingly, the modified period of 
responsibility of the carrier is examined as well as the specific characteristics of through 
bills of lading and combined bills of lading. The contractual terms that designate the 
respective container service (i.e. movement codes such as CY, CFS, LCL, and FCL) are 
also extensively covered and explained. 
In section 6, particular attention is dedicated to the obligation laid down in 
Article III rule 2 to “properly and carefully load, handle, stow, carry, keep, care for and 
discharge the goods carried” as applied to containerized cargo. The application of this 
bundle of duties, which are collectively referred to as the duty to care for the cargo, is 
examined in detail both with regard to the containers themselves and with regard to the 




goods stowed inside the containers. The implications derived from this analysis show 
that the following factors are decisive in interpreting Article III rule 2 when cargo 
carried in containers is involved: which party provided the container; which party stuffed 
the container; and what are the contractual terms designating the container service. 
Another issue considered by this chapter is the problem of weighing the 
containers. It is submitted how crucial it is for the stowage plan, for the stability of the 
vessel, and for the entire journey that the correct container weight is indicated on the 
manifest list. It is also clarified that weighing the container is a duty regulated under 
SOLAS, and it is owed by the shipper. This means that the carrier owes no such duty to 
weigh the containers before loading them on board; nor does Article III rule 2 imply any 
such duty. 
The last section of Chapter V discusses the provisions of the Rotterdam Rules 
which concern the carriage of containers. The regulation of containerized shipments is a 
field where the Rotterdam Rules are expected to manifest to a big extent their nature as 
a modernized liability regime. In particular, section 8 deals with the problems of 
whether containers are perceived as a package or not (Article 1.24, Article 1.26, Article 
59); with the carrier’s obligations regarding containers (Article 13, Article 14, Article 
17.5) as well as with the evidentiary effect of the bill of lading with regard to the 
contents of a container (Article 40).  
Conclusion: 
The final chapter of this doctoral thesis summarizes the observations and 
implications derived from the various discussions in the previous chapters (e.g. FIOS(T), 
deck carriage, containers) and the conclusions made thereof. The general and most 
pronounced remark is that a legal lacuna is observed between statutory law and 
commercial practice in almost all areas that were covered by the thesis. Furthermore, 
the noticeable lack of uniformity between the various legal systems is also summarized. 
Having pinpointed these main problems associated with the carrier’s cargo-
related obligations under the Hague-Visby Rules, the concluding chapter seeks to 
establish whether the new solutions offered by the Rotterdam Rules are capable of 
bridging the gaps between law and practice and of promoting uniformity. The chapter 
does not deny the virtues of the new Convention, which will serve well the commercial 
needs in that particular area. However, it is noted that the solutions offered with regard 
to the specific problems raised in the current thesis should be viewed also in the light of 
the entire impact that the Rotterdam Rules would have on the shipping industry should 
they be ratified and come to force. In other words, any such discussion about the 
Rotterdam Rules and the specific area of the carrier’s obligations over the cargo should 
also consider the overall shortcomings of the new Convention, which is a topic beyond 
the scope of the current thesis. 
Taking into account how academically well drafted the Rotterdam Rules are, it is 
submitted that closing the gap between law and practice regarding the carrier’s cargo-
related obligations may be achieved by ratifying the new Convention but this will not 
inevitably become a panacea. It is noted that because of the long and complex structure 
of these Rules, there may well appear additional problems in other areas regulated by 




international sea transport law is subject also to the new Convention assuming the 













Het onderhavige proefschrift behelst een onderzoek naar de verplichtingen van de 
zeevervoerder ten opzichte van de vracht die hij aan boord van het schip vervoert. In het 
inleidende hoofdstuk worden het onderwerp en de reikwijdte van het onderzoek nader 
uiteengezet. Bovendien worden de onderwerpen die in de volgende hoofdstukken aan de 
orde zullen komen geïntroduceerd. Vertrekpunt is het belang van de scheepvaart voor de 
internationale handel en de vandaag de dag geïndustrialiseerde wereld in het algemeen. 
Vervolgens wordt verdedigd dat het onderwerp van dit proefschrift een fundamenteel 
onderdeel is van iedere scheepvaartovereenkomst. De verplichtingen die de 
zeevervoerder heeft ten opzichte van de vrachtbelangen van een bepaalde verzending 
vormen een belangrijk deel van de inhoud van de vervoersovereenkomst. 
In het inleidende hoofdstuk wordt ook de reikwijdte van het proefschrift 
beschreven en wordt uiteengezet welke parameters en beperkende factoren zijn gebruikt 
om de juridische problemen die in de discussie naar voren komen te bepalen om ervoor te 
zorgen dat een gestroomlijnd, logisch en samenhangend geheel wordt bereikt. Bij de 
analyse van de problemen die aan de orde komen, zijn in het bijzonder de volgende 
methodologische beginselen in aanmerking genomen. In de eerste plaats is waar 
mogelijk geprobeerd onderscheid te maken tussen de vervoerders verplichtingen en de 
aansprakelijkheid ter zake. Toegegeven, beide onderzoeksgebieden houden nauw 
verband met elkaar en zeer dikwijls zal de juridische analyse vergen dat tevens wordt 
gekeken naar de aansprakelijkheid van de vervoerder voor de niet-nakoming van zijn 
vrachtgerelateerde verplichtingen. In de tweede plaats wordt in dit proefschrift de 
nadruk gelegd op de verplichtingen van de vervoerder ten opzichte van de vervoerde 
goederen (Art. III(2) Hague-Visby Rules (HVR)) en is het doel niet gelegen in het 
analyseren van die andere fundamentele plicht van de vervoerder, te weten zorg te 
dragen voor een zeewaardig schip (Art. III(1) HVR). Het is van belang dat de 
verplichting ten aanzien van de zeewaardigheid enkel aan de orde komt waar dit de kern 
en het karakter van de vrachtgerelateerde verplichtingen kan verduidelijken vanuit een 
vergelijkend perspectief. In de derde plaats staat het leidende internationale 
aansprakelijkheidsregime met betrekking tot zeevervoer in dit onderzoek centraal, te 
weten de Hague-Visby Rules. Dat laat echter onverlet dat in ieder hoofdstuk van dit 
proefschrift ook de relevante bepalingen van de Rotterdam Rules uitgebreid aan bod 
komen. De reden om ook de benadering van de Rotterdam Rules met betrekking tot de 
vrachtgerelateerde verplichtingen van de vervoerder te bespreken is dat dit een extra 
perspectief aan de analyse toevoegt. Van belang is dat in dit proefschrift niet wordt 
gepoogd een vergelijkend onderzoek naar de twee regimes te doen, maar dat – onder 
meer – wordt aangegeven hoe het recht op dit specifieke terrein zal veranderen, mochten 
de Rotterdam Rules ooit van kracht worden. 
 
 




Hoofdstuk I: Algemene inleiding op het cognossement 
Het eerste hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift geeft theoretische 
achtergrondinformatie. Het dient daarbij als referentiekader om lezers met een 
gemiddelde kennis van koopvaardijwetgeving in staat te stellen de subtiliteiten en 
ingewikkeldheden te begrijpen van de problemen die later worden besproken. In 
beperkte mate geeft dit hoofdstuk ook algemene informatie over goederentransport over 
zee, vooral bedoeld om te voorkomen dat de lezer al te vaak externe bronnen moet 
raadplegen om wezenlijke zaken te begrijpen die daarop betrekking hebben. Het doel 
van dit eerste hoofdstuk is niet alleen om beknopte kennis over de basisbegrippen van de 
koopvaardij te geven, maar ook om begripsmatige helderheid te scheppen in het 
specifieke onderwerp van dit proefschrift: de verplichtingen van de vervoerder 
(vervrachter) met betrekking tot de lading. 
Concreter gezegd: Hoofdstuk I gaat over de koopvaardijovereenkomst in het 
algemeen, de bijbehorende transportdocumenten, alsmede de betrokken partijen. 
Allereerst worden de definities van de verschillende partijen gegeven en toegelicht, al 
zijn die vooral van theoretisch belang. Vervolgens wordt er onderscheid gemaakt tussen 
de twee voornaamste vormen van overeenkomst met betrekking tot het goederenvervoer 
over zee: het cognossement of beurtvaartadres (Bill of Lading) en de 
bevrachtingsovereenkomst (Charter Party). Sectie 2 van Hoofdstuk 1 zet de essentie van 
beide documenten nader uiteen, de vormen waarin ze voorkomen, de verschillen met 
andere typen transportdocumenten, en tevens de wisselwerking tussen cognossement en 
bevrachtingsovereenkomst. 
Samenvattend: dit hoofdstuk verschaft inzicht in wat gewoonlijk ‘dry shipping’ 
genoemd wordt, of – nauwkeuriger gezegd – in de juridische problemen die verbonden 
zijn met de bijbehorende contractuele en commerciële koopvaardijzaken, want dat is het 
onderwerp waarop dit proefschrift zich met name richt. 
Hoofdstuk II: Verplichtingen van de vervoerder met betrekking tot de 
lading onder de Hague Visby Rules en de Rotterdam Rules 
Dit tweede hoofdstuk geeft een uitgebreide beschrijving van het juridische kader 
van de verplichtingen die de vervoerder heeft met betrekking tot de lading. Het 
hoofdstuk stelt allereerst vast welke plaats de Hague/Hague Visby Rules hebben in de 
gefragmenteerde wetgeving die de internationale koopvaardij beheerst. Met het oog 
daarop wordt uitgebreid ingegaan op de aanpassingen en ontwikkelingen van de 
betreffende wetgeving; het betreft met name de Hague/Hague Visby Rules (HVR), de 
Hamburg Rules (HR) en de Rotterdam Rules (RR). In de betreffende sectie wordt ook 
ingegaan op de vraag waarom de Hague-Visby Rules – de voornaamste wet- en 
regelgeving op juridisch-maritiem gebied die de kern van de analyse uitmaken – in 
samenhang met de bepalingen van de Rotterdam Rules worden besproken. De 
vergelijking geeft onder andere interessante aanknopingspunten voor het 
wetenschappelijk debat over vervoerdersverplichtingen met betrekking tot de lading. 
Sectie 3 van Hoofdstuk II is gewijd aan het gemene recht, voornamelijk omdat het 
gemeenrechtelijke standpunt illustratief is voor de verschillende ladingsgerelateerde 
bepalingen die kenmerkend zijn voor de aansprakelijkheidswetgeving die later aan bod 




bepalingen te begrijpen. Deze sectie is niettemin beknopt gehouden en beoogt niet een 
uitgebreid overzicht te geven van het gemene recht. De reden om niet te veel nadruk te 
leggen op de problemen die voortvloeien uit het gemene recht, ondanks de ontwikkeling 
die het gemene recht heeft doorgemaakt, is dat Engeland en Wales een eigen maritieme 
wet- en regelgeving hebben ontwikkeld, en daarop richt dit proefschrift zich met name. 
De secties 4 en 5 geven een gedetailleerde uitleg over de specifieke bepalingen die 
de taak om zorg te dragen voor de lading omschrijven (bijv. Art. III (2) HVR; Art. 11 en 
13 RR), en tevens over de situaties waarbinnen deze bepalingen gelden of toepasselijk 
zijn. Om die reden wordt dieper ingegaan op de artikelen II en III van de Hague Visby 
Rules. Sectie 4 beschrijft alle acht Regels van Artikel III, waarbij de meeste aandacht 
uitgaat naar Regel 2. Dit gebeurt met name in subsectie 4.3 waarin ook nader wordt 
ingegaan op de aard van de verplichtingen, de betekenis van de woorden “properly and 
carefully” (correct en zorgvuldig), de samenhang tussen vervoerdersverplichting en de 
mogelijkheden van verweer die hem ter beschikking staan onder Artikel IV, de 
mogelijkheden om de zorgtaak over te dragen, de tijdsspanne van de verplichting, en de 
bewijslast en bewijslastverdeling. Tevens komen de ladingsgerelateerde verplichtingen 
van bevrachtingsdocumenten (Charter Parties) aan de orde en de specifieke problemen 
die daarbij kunnen optreden. 
Op vergelijkbare manier worden in sectie 5 de Artikelen 11 (verplichting tot 
vervoer en levering), 12 (tijdsbestek van de verantwoordelijkheid van de vervoerder) en 
13 (de verplichting om goede zorg te dragen voor de lading) uit Chapter IV van de 
Rotterdam Rules in extenso besproken. Problemen die betrekking hebben op de 
identiteit van de vervoerder en de bewijslast komen tevens aan de orde. Zodoende wordt 
duidelijk hoe aan de ene kant de gehele opbouw van de Hague Visby Rules en aan de 
andere kant die van de Rotterdam Rules, onderling verschillen met betrekking tot de 
vastlegging van de vervoerdersverplichting om goede zorg te dragen voor de lading.  
Hoofdstuk III: De FIOS(T)-clausule 
Hoofdstuk III begint met een uitleg van doel en wezen van de FIOS-clausule, 
alsmede van haar afgeleiden FIO, FI, FO, FILO enz. (FIOS betekent Free In and Out 
Stowed en het houdt in dat het laden en stuwen van de lading en het lossen van de 
lading geschiedt voor rekening en risico van de bevrachter, zijnde niet de vervrachter of 
vervoerder.) In dit hoofdstuk worden de verschillen vastgesteld die deze bepaling 
meebrengt ten opzichte van vergelijkbare (bruto)lijnvaartvoorwaarden, met betrekking 
tot kosten, risico’s en goederenverantwoordelijkheid. 
In sectie 3 wordt uitgelegd waarom de FIOS-clausule een probleem vormt binnen 
de context van de Hague Visby Rules. Deze sectie laat zien dat wanneer rechtbanken de 
FIOS-clausule interpreteren in het licht van Artikel III, Regel 2, in samenhang 
beschouwd met Artikel III, Regel 8, dat dan de overdracht of uitbesteding van 
ladingsgerelateerde zorgtaken mogelijk strijdig is met de bepalingen van de Rules, en 
daarmee ten minste nietig en ongeldig is onder sommige jurisdicties. Maar in de praktijk 
worden zulke lastige contractuele arrangementen meestal wel opgelost, reden waarom in 
dit hoofdstuk sprake is van een ‘spanning’ tussen de HV-Rules en de FIOS-clausule. Er 
worden voorbeelden gegeven uit de jurisprudenties van Frankrijk, de Verenigde Staten 
en Nederland om te laten zien dat de FIOS-clausule, die een uitzondering behelst op de 




HV-Rules, verschillend wordt behandeld binnen de verschillende nationale jurisdicties. 
Ten slotte wordt er op gewezen dat zowel binnen de rechtspraak als binnen de 
wetenschap verschillend wordt gedacht over de FIOS-bepalingen. 
Sectie 4 is in haar geheel gewijd aan de manier waarop de Engelse jurisprudentie 
de grenzen van de vervoerdersverantwoordelijkheid met betrekking tot de lading heeft 
gedefinieerd. Om te kunnen analyseren hoe de Engelse rechtspraak de FIOS-clausele 
behandelt, wordt een gedetailleerde analyse gemaakt van enkele cruciale uitspraken, 
zoals The Jordan II en The “Eems Solar”, die beide zonder restricties zijn uitgegaan van 
de FIOS-clausule als een wettig commercieel arrangement. Dit onderzoek gaat 
zorgvuldig de overwegingen na die de rechtbank heeft gevolgd in beide uitspraken omdat 
het duidelijk maakt hoe hun interpretaties een oplossing bieden in die gevallen waar een 
vacuüm heerst tussen de juridische en de commerciële praktijk. 
Verder gaat deze sectie ook in op specifieke problemen die vastzitten aan FIOS-
clausules in bevrachtingsovereenkomsten, alsook aan de manier waarop FIOS-clausules 
worden verwoord, geïnterpreteerd en ondergebracht in cognossementen waarbij een 
derde partij is betrokken. Dat wil zeggen: de bespreking in dit proefschrift dekt niet 
alleen de overdracht van ladingsgerelateerde handelingen van de vervoerder naar 
degene voor wie de lading zelf belangrijk is, maar ook de overdracht van scheepseigenaar 
naar degene die het schip chartert. Dit onderzoek laat met name zien hoe de rechtspraak 
de verwoordingen van de FIOS-clausule in termen als “onder supervisie van de 
opdrachtgever”, of “onder de verantwoordelijkheid van de opdrachtgever”, of “onder 
toezicht van de opdrachtgever”, of “na goedkeuring door de opdrachtgever”, enz. 
interpreteert. Ook laat dit onderzoek zien in welke mate de verwoording invloed heeft op 
de overdracht van verantwoordelijkheid voor de handelingen die op de lading betrekking 
hebben. 
Ten slotte wordt in dit hoofdstuk een analyse gegeven van de relevante 
bepalingen van de Rotterdam Rules met betrekking tot de aanvaarding van de FIOS-
voorwaarden, en geeft dit hoofdstuk een waardering van de benadering die wordt 
gevolgd door de nieuwe Conventie afgezet tegen degene die van kracht is onder de Hague 
Visby Rules. 
Hoofdstuk IV: de vervoerdersverplichtingen voor dekladingen 
Het vierde hoofdstuk concentreert zich op dekladingen, en met name op de 
daarvoor geldende verplichtingen van de vervoerder. De bespreking van de wetgevende 
en juridische zaken die de deklading betreffen worden in sectie 2 voorafgegaan door een 
uitleg over de begrippen dek en deklading en over de verschillende redenen en 
overwegingen om goederen te vervoeren op het dek van een commercieel 
koopvaardijschip. 
Sectie 3 beschrijft vervolgens de dekladingssituatie onder de Hague/Hague Visby 
Rules, die aan deze situatie een uitzonderingspositie verleent, en verklaart waarom 
dergelijke vervoersovereenkomsten niet worden meegenomen in de nieuwe Conventie. 
De twee vereisten die zijn vastgelegd in Artikel I(c) HVR maken het mogelijk te 
onderscheiden tussen rechtmatig en onrechtmatig stuwen/laden van goederen op een 
dek alsmede tussen gemeld en ongemeld stuwen/laden, wat afhangt van de vraag of de 




vervoerd. De problemen die een Clause Paramount (cruciale bepaling die de HVR inroept 
en alle andere bepalingen teniet doet) met betrekking tot deze onderscheidingen in het 
leven roept, worden benoemd en verhelderd. 
De huidige wetgeving die dekladingen regelt wordt beschreven in sectie 4 van dit 
hoofdstuk. Hierin wordt benadrukt dat nieuwe technologieën en moderne 
koopvaardijpraktijken de oude dekladingsleer hebben veranderd. Met het oog daarop is 
een feitenonderzoek gedaan om de risico’s vast te stellen van de dekladingspraktijk, 
waarbij gebruik wordt gemaakt van statistische gegevens om de kans op ladingsverlies 
te kunnen bepalen. Het ontwerp van hedendaagse vaartuigen wordt ook meegewogen om 
te het standpunt te ondersteunen dat deklading ook een aspect van de koopvaardij is 
waarvoor geldt dat er een hiaat bestaat tussen het internationaal recht en de 
commerciële praktijk. 
In sectie 5 wordt de ontwikkeling van de traditionele dekladingsleer onder 
Engelse wetgeving onderzocht, waarbij de vervoerder alleen dan goederen aan dek mag 
vervoeren als (1) er een uitdrukkelijke overeenkomst is tussen de betrokken partijen, of 
als (2) er binnen een bepaald handelsdomein een universeel gebruik bestaat om een 
dergelijke lading aan dek te vervoeren, een gebruik dat daarom voor de betrokken 
partijen bindend is. Verder wordt aan de juridische leer van de fundamentele 
schending/overtreding van een juridische bepaling en aan de redenen om ervan af te 
wijken een zorgvuldige beschouwing gewijd, vooral met het oog op de 
dekladingswetgeving. Hoe de Engelse rechtspraak omgaat met deklading die wordt 
beheerst door enerzijds een ongeclausuleerd en anderzijds een geclausuleerd 
cognossement wordt nader besproken in subsectie 5.2, met name het effect van 
vrijheidsclausules in de Engelse jurisprudentie. 
Sectie 6 laat tevens zien hoe de dekladingspraktijk wordt beheerst onder andere 
jurisdicties. Om die reden worden de wetgevingspraktijken in Frankrijk, Duitsland, 
Nederland, Noorwegen en Zweden geanalyseerd en vergeleken. Het is van belang om op 
te merken dat deze sectie een grotere nadruk legt op het vergelijkende element wanneer 
we de problemen die elders worden besproken erbij zouden nemen. Dit is noodzakelijk 
omdat met betrekking tot de dekladingsproblematiek vaak wordt gesuggereerd dat 
expliciet gemelde dekladingen mogelijk buiten de werkingssfeer van de HVR zouden 
kunnen worden gehouden en worden doorverwezen naar geldend nationaal recht. 
De laatste sectie van Hoofdstuk IV onderzoekt de dekladingssituatie onder de 
Rotterdam Rules. Deze sectie laat zien dat de ontwerpers van de nieuwe ‘maritime plus’-
Convention een moderne aanpak hebben gekozen die grotendeels is gebaseerd op 
eigentijdse koopvaardijpraktijken en tevens rekening houdt met onder Engels recht 
opgebouwde jurisprudentie die al werd besproken in de voorafgaande secties van dit 
hoofdstuk. Sectie 7 probeert daarom ook de voordelen te benoemen die de nieuwe 
Conventie in dit opzicht heeft. 
Hoofdstuk V: Vervoerdersverplichtingen voor containervervoer 
Hoofdstuk V is gewijd aan de eigenaardigheden van containervervoer in de 
context van ladingsgerelateerde vervoerdersverplichtingen. De ontwikkeling van het 
vervoer per container had een ongeëvenaarde impact op niet alleen de koopvaardij, maar 
– meer algemeen – op de internationale handel en zelfs op de sociale en economische 




ontwikkelingen die het gevolg waren van de onomkeerbare veranderingen die het met 
zich meebracht voor de moderne tijd. Sectie 2 verschaft daarom uitgebreide informatie 
over de opkomst van de containeromwenteling in de tweede helft van de twintigste eeuw 
en over de geschiedenis en ontwikkeling van het containervervoer, alsmede het belang 
ervan voor de huidige internationale handel en koopvaardij. 
Sectie 3 maakt vervolgens de lezer vertrouwd met bepaalde technische aspecten 
van de scheepscontainer, zoals de structuur ervan, de containertypen en het gebruik. 
Uitgebreid wordt ook ingegaan op de moderne containerschepen en de benodigde 
infrastructuur die een snelle verwerking van de in containers opgeslagen lading mogelijk 
maakt. De gedetailleerdheid van deze informatie is afgestemd op de relevantie ervan 
voor de juridische problemen die later aan bod komen. 
De volgende sectie benoemt de eerste groep problemen die de hoofdmoot van dit 
hoofdstuk vormen. Dit betreft de problematiek hoe de vervoerscontainer begripsmatig 
moet worden beschouwd onder de Hague Rules en de Hague Visby Rules. In sectie 4 
worden daarom expres de beslissende factoren benoemd die een rol spelen bij de bepaling 
of de aard van de vervoerscontainer deze onderdeel doet zijn van het vaartuig of van de 
lading. De vaststelling hoe containers worden beschouwd onder de Rules (bijvoorbeeld: 
in welke mate kan een container worden beschouwd als een pakket?) is van belang voor 
alle vervolgproblemen die rijzen met betrekking tot de regels voor deze 
gestandaardiseerde metalen of aluminium dozen. 
In sectie 5 wordt gesteld dat het containervervoer ook veranderingen heeft 
teweeggebracht in het traditionele model voor de vervoersovereenkomst. Als gevolg 
hiervan wordt ook aandacht geschonken aan de verantwoordelijkheidstermijn die geldt 
voor de vervoerder alsmede aan de speciale kenmerken van doorvoercognossementen en 
cognossementen die gecombineerd vervoer regelen. De contractuele bepalingen die een 
bepaalde containerdienst vastleggen (bijv. de vervoerscodes die gebruikt worden bij het 
containervervoer zoals CY, CFS, LCL en FCL) worden ook uitgebreid behandeld en 
toegelicht. 
In sectie 6 wordt speciale aandacht geschonken aan de verplichting die is 
neergelegd in Artikel III, regel 2 om “de te vervoeren goederen naar behoren en 
zorgvuldig te laden, te verwerken, te stuwen, te transporteren, te lossen en ervoor zorg te 
dragen” voor zover van toepassing voor het containervervoer. De toepassing van deze 
bundel van verantwoordelijkheden, waarnaar algemeen wordt verwezen als de taak om 
goed te zorgen voor de lading, wordt gedetailleerd onderzocht, zowel met betrekking tot 
de containers zelf als tot de erin opgeslagen lading. De implicaties van deze analyse 
laten zien dat de volgende factoren beslissend zijn bij de interpretatie van Artikel III, 
regel 2 in het geval containervervoer aan de orde is: welke partij levert de container, 
welke partij laadt de container, en wat zijn de contractuele bepalingen die de 
containerdienst vastleggen. 
Een ander punt dat in dit hoofdstuk aan de orde komt is het probleem hoe de 
containers worden gewogen. Naar voren gebracht wordt het cruciale belang voor het 
stuwen/laden, voor de stabiliteit van het vaartuig en voor het gehele transporttraject, 
dat het juiste containergewicht wordt aangegeven op de vrachtbrief. Tevens wordt 
duidelijk gemaakt dat het wegen van de container een taak is die wordt geregeld onder 




verplichting heeft om de containers te wegen voordat ze aan boord worden geladen, en 
evenmin impliceert Artikel III regel 2 zulk een verplichting. 
De laatste sectie van Hoofdstuk V bespreekt de bepalingen van de Rotterdam 
Rules die betrekking hebben op containervervoer. Het regelen van containerverwerking 
zou een gebied moeten zijn waarop de Rotterdam Rules in hoge mate hun eigenschap als 
modern aansprakelijkheidsregime kunnen laten zien. Sectie 8 gaat nader in op de 
problematiek of containers moeten worden beschouwd als pakket of niet (Art.1.24, 
Art.1.26, Art.59), op de vraag wat de verplichtingen van de vervoerder zijn met 
betrekking tot containervervoer (Art.13, Art.14, Art.17.5), en ook wat de bewijskracht is 
van het cognossement met betrekking tot de containerinhoud (Art.40). 
Conclusie 
Het slothoofdstuk van dit proefschrift vat de waarnemingen en implicaties die 
voortkomen uit de verschillende besprekingen in de voorafgaande hoofdstukken samen 
(FIOS, deklading, containers), en trekt de conclusies daaruit. De meest algemene en 
opvallende bewering is dat een juridische leemte is geconstateerd tussen geldend recht 
en handelspraktijk in vrijwel alle gebieden die door dit proefschrift worden bestreken. 
Verder wordt ook gewezen op een opvallend gebrek aan uniformiteit tussen de 
verschillende juridische systemen onderling. 
Nadat allereerst is gewezen op deze hoofdproblemen met betrekking dat de 
ladingsgerichte verplichtingen van de vervoerder onder de Hague Visby Rules, wordt in 
het slothoofdstuk geprobeerd om vast te stellen of de nieuwe oplossingen van de 
Rotterdam Rules in staat zijn om de kloof te dichten tussen wet en praktijk en of deze 
geschikt zijn om uniformiteit te bevorderen. Dit hoofdstuk weerspreekt de voordelen van 
de nieuwe Conventie niet; deze Conventie voldoet aan de commerciële behoeften binnen 
haar toepassingssfeer. Maar het is goed om erop te wijzen dat de oplossingen die worden 
aangedragen voor de specifieke problemen die in dit proefschrift behandeld worden, ook 
moeten worden beoordeeld in het licht van de overall-effecten die de Rotterdam Rules zal 
hebben op de gehele koopvaardij-industrie wanneer deze Rules geratificeerd en van 
kracht zouden worden. Met andere woorden: elke discussie over de Rotterdam Rules en 
het specifieke aandachtsgebied van de ladingsgerelateerde vervoerdersverplichtingen, 
moet ook in in aanmerking nemen de overall-tekortkomingen van de nieuwe Conventie, 
wat een onderwerp is dat de scope van dit proefschrift te buiten gaat. 
In aanmerking nemend de hoge academische kwaliteit van het ontwerp van de 
Rotterdam Rules, wordt in overweging gegeven dat het dichten van de kloof tussen wet 
en praktijk met betrekking tot de ladingsgerichte verplichtingen van de vervoerder 
mogelijk wel bereikt kan worden met ratificatie van de nieuwe Conventie, maar dat dat 
toch niet een onmisbaar middel is tegen alle kwalen. Opgemerkt wordt dat er additionele 
problemen op andere relevante gebieden kunnen optreden als gevolg van de grote lengte 
en complexiteit van de Rotterdam Rules. Ten slot, de toekomstige modernisering en 
standaardisering van het internationale zeevervoer is mede afhankelijk van zowel de 
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